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Mr Secretary
WALSINGHAM
and the policy of
QUEEN ELIZABETH

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Mr Secretary
WALSINGHAM
and the policy of
QUEEN ELIZABETH

by
CONYERS READ

VOL. I



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Let a man by doing worthy acts deserve honour, and though he do not attain it, yet he is much a happier man than he that gets it without desert. For such a man is before-hand with Reputation; and the world still owes him that honour which his deserts cry for and it hath not paid.

FRANCIS WALSINGHAM.

PREFACE

THIS book, as its title implies, is something more than a biography of Walsingham and something less than a history of Elizabethan policy. It is in short an attempt to establish the position of the man in the public affairs of his times. Anything in the nature of an intimate personal biography it does not pretend to be. Indeed any such biography of Walsingham is out of the question. Except in his contacts with public affairs there appears to be virtually no sources of information extant about him. Of the thousands of his letters which survive there is scarcely one which is not in the main devoted to public business. There are no surviving letters between him and his wife or between him and his daughter, nor any personal letters between him and his friends. There are no diaries except two scant journals of public business. He has left no discourses on art or letters or philosophy, except three short essays of doubtful authenticity written in the last year of his life, nor any upon the art or theory of government, nor any, ardent Puritan though he was, upon the religious controversies that raged all about him. Outside the state papers he has, historically speaking, ceased to exist.

But of his official life there is abundant record. He stood at the very centre of the royal administration and for over seventeen years was the most active agent of the Queen in every department of state except those of justice and finance. Two years after his death one of his own secretaries remarked, 'Amongst all particular offices and places of charge in this state there is none of more necessary use, nor subject to more cumber and variableness, than is the office of principal secretary, by reason of the variety and uncertainty of his employment, and therefore with more difficulty to be prescribed by special method and order.' The variety of his employment was indeed such that any attempt to present his public life day by day would inevitably end in utter confusion. It has therefore seemed wiser

to abandon frankly the usual chronological arrangements and to follow separately the main threads of public policy in which he was involved. Such a course is not without its dangers, the danger notably of making plain what was in fact far from plain and of simplifying problems which were difficult precisely because they were complicated. We have but to consider, for example, how much injustice has been done to Elizabeth and to her councillors by singling out the question of Mary Stuart and of the English Catholics for separate treatment, in order to realize how grave this danger may be. Yet it must be faced as the only practicable alternative to chaos and so far as possible guarded against by a judicious amount of repetition, which may at times prove tedious, but which has seemed to the author to be inevitable.

A great deal has been made in this book of the factions which divided the Queen's Council, particularly during the period following 1578. It is easy to exaggerate the influence of this partisan spirit upon the evolution of Elizabeth's policy, but it has been slighted far too long. It happened to find its most striking expression in the inveterate antagonism between Leicester and Burghley, and since Leicester was a selfish, unscrupulous courtier and Burghley a wise and patriotic statesman, historians have not hesitated to define the issue between them in terms of their personal characteristics. But there was much more to the matter than that. In these days of elaborate party organization and strict party discipline, one can hardly speak of party politics in the sixteenth century without putting into the phrase more than it should contain. There was little or no party organization in Elizabeth's Privy Council and little or no party discipline, but there was a fairly well-defined disagreement upon outstanding issues which arose out of a fundamental difference of opinion as to the relation of England to the Protestant movement as a whole. In this sense Leicester and Burghley came to be the advocates of two different and often opposed programmes of procedure. Leicester and his supporters held that the interests of England were so closely identified with those of Protestantism at large that Elizabeth's policy abroad and even at home should be shaped with reference to it. Burghley and his supporters maintained that the religious factor

was simply one of many factors to be considered in providing for the welfare of England. They conceded that it was an important factor but not necessarily the dominant one. Burghley's partisans, in a word, were disposed to subordinate religious considerations to national ones, Leicester's, national considerations to religious ones.

If Burghley's party was fortunate in its leader, Leicester's was fortunate in its followers. The younger and more aggressive councillors were on his side. In point of fact, whereas Burghley not only led his group but also defined its policy, Leicester was little more than a figure-head in his. Behind Leicester stood Walsingham and behind Walsingham the growing strength of militant Puritanism. It would be going too far afield to inquire by what strange combination of circumstances the magnificent Earl of Leicester was induced to assume the sober raiment of Puritanism, whether from a desire on his part to exploit the strength of the Puritans for his own purposes, or from a desire on theirs to utilize his extraordinary influence with the Queen. The fact of the alliance remains and it gives to Leicester's position a character and a dignity out of all proportion to his personal deserts. The complete history of this Puritan court party has yet to be written and its underground connexion with the Puritans in the House of Commons and in the City disclosed. It need only be noted here that in spite of Burghley's opposition it proved in the end strong enough to impose its programme, at least in foreign affairs, upon a very reluctant Queen.

There can be very little doubt that Walsingham was the leading spirit of this Puritan party. This book is largely concerned with stating the case for his policy. The case for Burghley's needs to be stated also. Froude, notwithstanding his glorification of Burghley, has not stated it because he has made the mistake of identifying Burghley and Walsingham far too closely and of confusing Burghley's resolute support of the breach from Rome with any purpose to fight the battles of Protestantism in general. Burghley's vigorous nationalism will not lack advocates but they clearly must not be Protestant crusaders of Froude's complexion, else the particular virtues ascribed to him will prove to belong to his opponents and his real claims to distinction will be neglected.

The scope of Walsingham's activities was so broad that some of them have had to be slighted and some altogether ignored. Irishmen will complain with justice that no attempt has been made to define Walsingham's policy towards Ireland. The truth of the matter is that he is to be numbered among the few English statesmen who never professed to have discovered the panacea for the cure of all Irish ills. His revealed connexion with Ireland is with the details of administration, and any adequate exposition of it would involve a larger discussion of the Irish situation than the importance of it, from the point of view of his public career, would warrant. There would be a mere halfpennyworth of bread to an intolerable deal of sack.

Four portraits of Walsingham are reproduced in this book. The frontispiece to Volume I reproduces a portrait presumably by Zuccaro. It bears the name Francis Walsingham upon the tablet which the figure holds in its left hand. The recorded history of this portrait begins when it was in the possession of Sir Robert Walpole. In 1738 an engraving was made from it by Houbrakan. It subsequently passed to Horace Walpole and was for a long time in his collection at Strawberry Hill. At the sale of the contents of Strawberry Hill in 1842 it was purchased by Beriah Botfield, M.P., who bequeathed it to Lord Alexander Thynne. It is now in the possession of Lady Beatrice Thynne at Norton Hall, Northamptonshire.

The frontispiece to Vol. II is from a portrait in the National Portrait Gallery. It was purchased by the Gallery at the sale of the Drummond-Moray pictures in 1913. It is said to have been painted by Marc Gerard. Its history is unknown. The portrait of Lady Walsingham reproduced in Vol. III is also in the National Portrait Gallery and was purchased at the same sale.

The frontispiece to Vol. III is from a portrait sold at Sotheby's in London on the 25th of February, 1925, to Thos. Agnew and Sons. It is undoubtedly genuine, but it came to light after this book had gone to press and time has not served to investigate its history.

The portrait reproduced in Vol. III facing p. 334 is in the National Portrait Gallery. It was purchased in 1917 from the sale of the collection of Lady Lucas at Wrest Park. It is the

best known type of Walsingham portrait. There are at least six other extant portraits of him nearly identical to it in character, at Parham (Lord Zouche), at Bisham Abbey, Berkshire (Lady Vansittart Neale), at Knole Park (Lord Sackville), at Sudeley, Gloucestershire (Mrs. Dent), at Hampton Court Palace and at Rothmell, near Lewes in Sussex (Miss Byng-Lucas). Miss Byng-Lucas's portrait was purchased at the sale of Lord Torrington's pictures at Yotes Court, Kent, 1923. Yotes Court was conveyed in the seventeenth century to James Master, a direct ancestor of Lord Torrington, by Sir Thomas Walsingham, the grandson of another Sir Thomas, Sir Francis Walsingham's cousin. It is, therefore, not unlikely that this particular portrait was at one time in the possession of the Walsingham family.

This book has been a long time in the making, and despite many revisions its style probably still reveals stains of every variation of the soil which lies between the aspiring graduate student and the prosaic regions of middle life. To those who have in various ways assisted me I have acknowledged my obligations more particularly elsewhere. Of them all I owe my largest debt of gratitude to William Franklin Read, a wise and generous father. I shall wish this book to stand as a tribute to his memory.

CONYERS READ.

VILLA NOVA,

PENNSYLVANIA.

September 1, 1924.

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NOTE

REFERENCE to folio numbers in the collections at the British Museum and in the Public Record Office are not always easy to verify because folio numbers have frequently been changed in both places. The foreign papers in the P.R.O. have been re-numbered and rearranged by the Editors of the Foreign Calendar, and since the Foreign Calendar has been in preparation during the course of my researches it has often happened that the folio numbers to which I refer have been changed since my reference was taken. Where a possibility of confusion may arise I have generally given the date of the document cited, as well as the folio number. Some collections in the P.R.O. and B.M. are arranged by numbering documents instead of by numbering folios. In such cases I have given the document numbers (indicated by no.), in other cases folio numbers (indicated by f.).

In quoting directly from manuscripts and early books I have modernized the spelling and the punctuation. This may be deemed unscientific, but it makes for clearness and readability, and does not, I believe, in any case alter the meaning of the text cited. Explanatory words or phrases inserted in a quoted passage I have in every case enclosed in square brackets. Words in cipher in the original are printed in italics.

DATING. It will not be forgotten that the official year in England under Elizabeth began on the 25th March. Nor will it be forgotten that the Gregorian Calendar, which was established in most Roman Catholic countries late in the year 1582, was not adopted in England until the eighteenth century. The consequence is that dates falling between 1st January and 25th March in English documents of the period are dated one year earlier than we should date them to-day. So too, documents dated in England after 1582 are dated ten days earlier than they would be dated in Roman Catholic countries at the same time. In my dating I use the English style and not the Gregorian style for the day and month, the calendar year and not the official year for the year, unless otherwise expressly indicated.

I

EARLY LIFE

THE town of Walsingham in northern Norfolk, hard by the sea coast, has played a part of some importance in English history. It is said to have been founded by the redoubtable Valsungs of German legend, the offspring of the all-father Odin himself, but its recorded history begins with the Norman Conquest. At the time of the Domesday survey it was a small manorial village of less than fifty inhabitants.¹ Before the middle of the twelfth century it had not established any special claim to distinction. After that it rapidly became famous as the home of a great shrine dedicated to the Virgin Mary.

There is some reason to believe that there was a chapel dedicated to the Virgin at East Walsingham before the Conquest. If so, it fell into decay, for the chapel which made the reputation of the town was founded there about 1150 by a certain pious lady named Richeldis de Favreches. A little later her son Godfrey established near by a priory of Austin Canons.² In course of time under the canons' fostering care the Virgin's chapel gathered about it rather more than its share of relics and miracles until it eventually became almost as celebrated a shrine as the tomb of St. Thomas of Canterbury itself.³ Pilgrims noble and simple flocked to it from all corners of the earth, wearing as they went broad paths across the face of England.⁴ It was the vulgar belief that the stars in heaven were arranged in providential order to point to the holy place.⁵

Naturally with so many pious visitors, each bringing his appropriate gift, the treasury of the shrine grew large. Erasmus found the chapel when he visited it brilliant with silver and gold

¹ For the mention of it in Domesday cf. *V. C. H. of Norfolk*, ii. 157.

² *Ibid.* ii. 394.

³ In 1535 the oblations to 'our Lady of Walsingham' amounted to £260 12s. 4d., while those to St. Thomas of Canterbury only came to £36 2s. 7d. Savine, *English Monasteries at the Eve of their Dissolution*, p. 103.

⁴ *V. C. H. Norfolk*, ii. 399.

⁵ Bloomfield, *Norfolk*, ix. 280.

and precious stones.¹ Its wealth or, as the visitors of Thomas Cromwell would have it, its corruption was its undoing. King Henry VIII in the year 1538 made away at once with all its superstitions, its vices, and its riches.² The image of the Virgin, which had enjoyed the adoration of so many pilgrims, was carted off to London and later burned at Chelsea.³ Sir Henry Spelman says that the matter afterwards rested heavily on the King's conscience and that he sought to recompense the Virgin for her loss by bequeathing to her his soul.⁴ Be this as it may, the King certainly provided no recompense for the town of Walsingham. Robbed of its one great claim to distinction, it fell back into a common place among Norfolk villages with nothing left of its medieval glory but a tradition.

At least three pedigrees of Sir Francis Walsingham trace his family back to the lords of this Norfolk village.⁵ The most far reaching of them begins the Walsingham line with a certain Godfrey who was Lord of the Manor of Little Walsingham about the time of King John. From him the family is traced with a pleasing diversity by the different genealogists. Some of the names which they mention are historical. Sir Richard, indicated to be the son of Geoffrey, was lord of Little Walsingham in Henry III's time. Another Sir Richard, presumably his son, sat for Norfolk in Parliament at the beginning of the fourteenth century and went with Edward II on his visit to France in 1309. Then there was a Thomas, Esquire, who died in 1377, and after him a third Sir Richard who married the

¹ Erasmus gives a sarcastic account of his pilgrimage in his *Colloquia* under the title *Peregrinatio religionis ergo*. An English translation of this was published by J. C. Nichols in 1849.

² In consequence of this and other royal acts of sacrilege a rebellion took place in Norfolk, which was, however, easily suppressed (*V. C. H. Norfolk*, ii. 400). It is interesting to observe that Thomas Sidney, Esq., the father-in-law of Sir Francis Walsingham's sister Barbara, bought the site of the priory from King Henry VIII for £90 and afterwards bequeathed it to his son (Bloomfield, ix. 280). So we may say by stretching the point a little that the land returned to its own.

³ Bloomfield, ix. 209; cf. also *Calendar of State Papers, Henry VIII*, xiii. 521.

⁴ Cited in the *General History of Norfolk* (Norwich, 1829), 605.

⁵ Cf. B.M. Harleian MSS. 1174, no. 53; Additional MSS. 5520, fol. 173, 291; Harl. MSS. 807, fol. 4; also the pedigree of Walsingham in the Herald's College of Arms. Mr. E. A. Webb in his *History of Chislehurst* (London, 1899), p. 112, has printed a genealogy of Walsingham as far as it can be obtained by actual proof or by probable conjecture.

daughter of Sir Thomas Nortoft. But nothing more can certainly be gathered from the pedigrees than that the family in early days had a strong predilection for the names of Richard and Thomas. No two genealogists agree as to just how many of each there were.

It would be pleasant to believe that Sir Francis Walsingham could claim kindred with this eminently respectable old Norfolk family, just as it would be pleasant to believe that some drops of the old Valsung blood still persisted in his veins. But the facts of history admit no such claim. When his family first emerges from oblivion it is not in Norfolk but in London.

In the Hustings Rolls of the city for the year 1403 there is recorded the transfer of certain tenements in the parish of St. Benet's, Grace Church, to one Alan Walsingham, his wife Juliana, and his son Thomas.¹ This Alan was a cordwainer, of some importance it seems in his trade, for King Henry IV named him in 1403 to be one of twenty-nine jurors to settle a dispute which had arisen between his company and the foreign cobblers in the city.² His name appears often in the Hustings Rolls. Now he is acquiring a shop in St. Benet's, Gracechurch, now a tavern, the Greengate, in St. Andrew's, Cornhill, now a mansion house in Eastcheap, now a brewhouse, the 'Cock on the Hoop', in Cripplegate.³ In course of time he amassed a considerable amount of property here and there in London. The Lay Subsidy Rolls for 1412 valued his lands in the city at £17 11s. od. a year.⁴

Who Alan's ancestors were is not certainly known. Other Walsinghams were in London before him, Reginald Walsingham, by trade a barber, was there as early as 1307.⁵ One pedigree mentions an Alan as the son of Osmund Walsingham and his wife Anne de Scathebury, thereby connecting him with the Norfolk Walsinghams.⁶ His name makes it probable that his ancestors

¹ Guildhall, London; Hustings Rolls, 131, no. 62. Dr. Sharpe, Records Clerk at the Guildhall, has prepared a Calendar of the Hustings Rolls, the manuscript of which he very kindly let me use.

² Webb, *Chislehurst*, 112.

³ Hustings Rolls, 133, no. 71; 137, no. 24; 144, no. 16.

⁴ The Exchequer Lay Subsidy Roll, 13 Henry IV, 144/20, memb. 2: 'Nomina homin. et feminar. terr. et reddit. ad valenc. xxli. per annum habent in civitate London. Alanne Walsingham per ann. xviii. xis.'

⁵ Hustings Rolls, 33, *passim*.

⁶ Webb, 112.

were from Norfolk, but whether they were Lords of the Manor or simple folk of the village it is impossible to say positively. Pedigrees are not to be trusted in such matters, least of all Elizabethan pedigrees.

At all events, however shadowy his ancestors may be, Alan Walsingham was a substantial man, a citizen of London and a member of the Cordwainers' Gild at the time when Henry IV ruled over England and Sir Richard Whittington sat in the mayor's seat at Guildhall. He evidently was not of the gentry, but he had an honourable reputation among his fellows, good money in his pocket, good land in the city, and a son to carry on the family name—the type of man, in fact, who has laid the foundations of so many solid English families. Historically speaking he was the first of the Walsinghams. Before him all is surmise and conjecture, after him the line of descent is clear.

Thomas, his son, succeeded him as head of the family. He was a member of the Vintners' Company, one of the twelve Greater Companies which in his time practically monopolized the government of London. The Cordwainers were not of this group. Thomas had in fact risen beyond his father in the city. He was a merchant and a trader rather than a craftsman—an importer of wine, an exporter of cloth and fish. He even dabbled a little in the grain trade.¹ No doubt he prospered in his business. Already in his father's lifetime he had accumulated a considerable amount of landed property in London.² He married Margaret Bamme, the daughter of Henry Bamme, a goldsmith.³ The Bammes were a family of some distinction in London—two of their number had been Lord Mayors. So Thomas seems to have made a good match of it. He must have been a man of some importance in municipal affairs and there is reason to believe that he even attracted attention at

¹ Stählin, *Die Walsinghams bis zur Mitte des 16 Jahrhunderts* (Heidelberg, 1905), 19.

² The Exchequer Lay Subsidy Roll already cited gives the yearly valuation of his land in London in 1403 as £17 13s. 11d.

³ Hustings Rolls, 164, no. 50. Webb says in his *History of Chislehurst* that Margaret Bamme was the daughter of Adam Bamme, the Lord Mayor of London under Richard II, but the Hustings Rolls plainly say that Margaret's father was Henry Bamme, goldsmith. By the same document we learn that she was a widow.

the royal court. In 1425, at the instance of Cardinal Beaufort, he was named one of the collectors of Tonnage and Poundage at the port of London.¹

The year before that he purchased the manor of Scadbury at Chislehurst in Kent, which apparently became his chief place of residence during the remainder of his life.² Probably it was with him and not with the mythical Anne of Scadbury that the connexion of the Walsingham family with Chislehurst began. He died in 1459, leaving two children, a daughter Philippa and a son Thomas.³

Thomas, the second of the name, was also a vintner. Stow mentions him in a list of six London vintners who were knights or men of wealth in 1461.⁴ It seems highly probable, however, that he identified himself very much more with his estates in Kent than with his business in the city. In this connexion it is interesting to observe that in the Hustings Rolls of 1462 he designates himself not as a vintner but as a gentleman, 'son of Thomas Walsingham, late Vintner'.⁵ Thomas II in fact was beginning to claim a place for himself among the country gentry. He contrived to strengthen his hold upon gentility by a marriage with Constance Dryland, the daughter of a well-to-do Kentish gentleman.⁶ Constance bore him three sons, two of whom died in childhood. The third son, James, upon his father's death in 1467, became head of the family.⁷

With James Walsingham, grandfather of Sir Francis, the transition of the Walsinghams from prosperous London craftsmen to dignified country gentlemen was practically completed. The history of their progress is by no means an isolated one. It is indeed eminently characteristic of a general change which was taking place in the social life of fifteenth-century England. The gentry class, especially in the counties near London, was being steadily recruited from the more prosperous tradesmen of the city with effects which were very far reaching both upon the political and economic life of the country-side. In the

¹ Stählin, 21 seq.

² Webb, 114.

³ Ibid. 117. Cf. his will, printed in Webb, 374.

⁴ Strype's Stowe, Book V, 198, cited by Webb, 115.

⁵ Hustings Rolls, 192, no. 14.

⁶ Cf. Hustings Rolls, 192, no. 15; Harl. MSS. 1174, no. 53; also Hasted's *Kent*, iii. 441 and 727.

⁷ Webb, 117.

case of the Walsinghams the process was slow, covering four generations, but the ascent was as sure as it was steady. Alan, the shoemaker, made way for Thomas, the vintner, and he in turn for Thomas, vintner and gentleman. James Walsingham signed himself Esquire. 'Esquires', as Sir Thomas Smith remarked about a century later, 'be all those which bear arms (as we call them) or armories (as they term them in French) which to bear is a testimony of the nobility or race from whence they do come.' James, it seems, had secured a pedigree and a coat of arms. How and when he got it is past finding out, but Sir Thomas Smith has revealed the method common in such cases. 'As for gentelmen, they be made good cheape in England. For whosoever . . . can live idly and without manual labor and will bear the part, charge and countenance of a gentleman, he shall be called master, for that is the title which men give to esquires and other gentlemen, and shall be taken for a gentleman . . . and if need be a king of Heralds shall also give him for money arms newly made and mounted, the title whereof shall pretend to have been found by the said Herald in perusing and viewing of old registers, where his ancestors in times past had been recorded to bear the same.'¹ Probably at this time and in this wise the progeny of Alan, the shoemaker, were grafted on to the stock of the lords of Little Walsingham.

James Walsingham became of age in 1483, two years before Bosworth Field. His formal entry into the ranks of Kentish gentlefolk must have been almost exactly coincident with the accession of the House of Tudor. This fact has an important bearing upon the public career of his family. For the new dynasty did not mean to fall into the error, which had been the undoing of its predecessors, of establishing its power on the slippery foundation of the great English families. It wisely preferred to seek its advisers and servants among those of a newer breed who were free from entangling connexions with the feudal factions of the past and who had no independent claim to distinction, but were content to base their ambitions solely upon the goodwill of the crown. The times in fact were singularly favourable to the political aspirations of families like the Walsinghams. They had the requisite capacity to turn the

¹ Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, ed. Alston, 39-40.

times to their advantage. In the person of James they stepped forward at once into public life.

James Walsingham was, indeed, one of the most prominent men of the time in the political life of Kent. He was Sheriff of the County in 1486-7, and for many years under Henry VIII he sat on the County Commission of the Peace. In 1520 he was one of three to represent Kent in that splendid company which attended Henry VIII on the Field of the Cloth of Gold. But he never aspired to, or at least never attained to, the larger opportunities of life at court. Occasionally he bought and sold land in London, and in 1515 was one of the Sewer Commissioners of the Thames—but he spent most of his life at Scadbury. There he married and there he reared his family of five children, three daughters and two sons. He was almost eighty and many times a grandfather when he died in 1540.¹

In Edmund Walsingham, afterwards Sir Edmund, the elder of James's sons, the main branch of the Walsingham family discovered its most illustrious representative. After him the line gradually descended as it had gradually arisen and finally died out altogether with the death of his great-great-grandson James Walsingham in 1728.² Edmund was brought up to the profession of arms. His opportunity came in 1513 when the Earl of Surrey, during the King's absence in France, rallied all loyal Englishmen to repel the Scottish invasion. Edmund marched with three or four retainers in Surrey's company, fought hard at Flodden and won his spurs there. His gallantry in action commended him to the young King and drew him into the court circle. In 1516 he was breaking lances with other distinguished young gentlemen in the royal presence, and in 1520 he rode in the royal retinue at the Field of the Cloth of Gold. The King evidently marked him as a servant who was not only valiant but also loyal and discreet, for he was appointed the next year to assist at the trial of the Duke of Buckingham and not long afterwards to the lieutenancy of the Tower, one of the most responsible positions in the kingdom. Sir Edmund served the King in this capacity during the rest of his reign.

¹ Webb, 117-18; *Cal. S. P., Henry VIII*, iv, nos. 464, 2002; *Hustings Rolls*, 238, nos. 17, 70; 239, no. 3.

² *Dict. of National Biography*, lix. 230.

It was a difficult and dangerous post and he held it in a difficult and dangerous time, when Fisher and More, Anne Boleyn and Thomas Cromwell and Catherine Howard, with scores of other less distinguished personages, passed into his keeping on their way to the block. He kept them all, Protestant and Catholic alike, equally fast, and though he is said to have shown some mercy to the unfortunate Anne Askew, when she was on the rack, it would be rash to argue from that fact alone that he cherished any secret leaning towards the ideas of the more radical reformers. The truth probably is that he left religion to the theologians and devoted himself to the execution of the King's orders. Throughout his life he enjoyed the royal confidence and some measure of the royal favour. He died in 1550 and was buried in Scadbury Chapel at Chislehurst where one may still see his helmet and sword hanging above the tomb which his son dedicated to his memory.¹

Sir Edmund's younger brother, William, was Francis Walsingham's father. Like many younger sons of the landed gentry in Tudor times he went up to London to read for the bar. Following the customs of the times he joined one of the Inns of Court, passed successfully through the various stages of his legal apprenticeship, and by 1522 had become an Ancient, that is to say, one of the senior barristers at Gray's Inn. Eight years later he was chosen by his fellow members of the Inn to be one of their Readers, an office of government to which men were ordinarily elected by reason of their 'age, discretion, and wisdom'. Even from these facts it is fair to presume that he made a distinct success of his career as barrister-at-law.²

He began his public service in Kent where, in 1524, he sat on the Commission of the Peace. Twice later, in 1526 and again in 1532, he occupied the same position, but his official life was connected in the main with the city in London. In 1526 he was appointed Common Serjeant of the city. As such he became first assistant to the Recorder, the legal adviser of the

¹ *Dict. of National Biography*, lix. 228 seq.; E. A. Webb, *A Guide to the Churches of Chislehurst* (London, 1901). In this book photographs of Sir Edmund's grave and of his sword and helmet may be found together with a copy of the abominable rhymed epitaph which adorns his tomb.

² Jos. Foster, *Register of Admissions to Gray's Inn*; W. R. Douthwaite, *Gray's Inn* (London, 1886), 31, 49. For the office of Ancient see p. 33.

Lord Mayor, and shared with him the main burden of the corporation's legal business. Six years later he was advanced to the position of Under Sheriff.¹ Thence he might have progressed in due season to the Recordership as men had done before him, and thence perhaps in turn to the royal bench. But time was not vouchsafed him.

Throughout his life, owing possibly to his brother's influence, William enjoyed some measure of royal favour. It was due to the King's intervention that he had been chosen Common Serjeant in London in 1526. The Lord Mayor had favoured another candidate, but Henry VIII's will had proved to be law even in city politics, though it had required a second ballot to establish that fact. Four years later William received a second token of the royal confidence when the King appointed him one of four commissioners to report upon the possessions of Cardinal Wolsey in London.²

Like all the Walsinghams from Alan downward, William added somewhat to the family estates. In 1527-8 he acquired land in London.³ Two years later he purchased the Manor of Footscray in Kent, a few miles to the north-east of his father's place at Scadbury, and not long after that the Manor of Rokeslie in the same county. At some time or other the Manor of Chelsfield, also in Kent, came into his possession with the appendant advowson of its village church. His will reveals that at the time of his death he still possessed the manors of Rokeslie, Footscray, and Chelsfield.⁴

William Walsingham married and had six children, one son, Francis, and five daughters. He died in the early spring of 1534. In his will, after making some small bequests to the parish churches of Footscray in Kent and St. Mary's Aldermanbury in London, and setting aside his Manor of Chelsfield to provide a marriage portion for his daughters, he left his personal property and his lands and tenements to the use of Joyce his wife. No specific bequests are made to Francis his son. It

¹ *Cal. S. P., Henry VIII*, iv, nos. 464, 2002, 2639; v, 703, 909; Stählin, *op. cit.* 70.

² *Cal. S. P., Henry VIII*, v, no. 6515.

³ *Hustings Rolls*, 240, no. 13.

⁴ *Hasted's Kent*, i. 148; *Cal. S. P., Henry VIII*, v, no. 220. William Walsingham's will is printed in full in Webb's *Chislehurst*, p. 377.

seems probable, however, that when he came of age he was to inherit all his father's estates.¹

It is unfortunate that we know so little about the father of Francis Walsingham. He was a successful lawyer, a man of some prominence in the affairs of the city of London, and a landowner in Kent. He stood well with the King. That is the whole story. His private life is, historically speaking, a blank. It cannot even be told where he lived. When one considers the offices which he held both in the city and in the country, it seems probable that he had houses both in London and in Kent. The bequests which he made to the two parish churches in his will suggest that his country place was at Footscray and his city house in the parish of St. Mary's Aldermanbury. But this cannot be stated positively.

It would be interesting to know how he stood upon some of the grave questions which were agitating men's minds in his time. What, for instance, was his attitude towards the Reformation? One can only guess at an answer. He cannot have been numbered among the extremists on either side. He would hardly have enjoyed Henry VIII's favour in such a case.

¹ His will is dated 1 March 1533-4 and was proved 23 March 1533-4. He must have died in the interval (Webb, 377). William Walsingham's will, like most lawyers' will, is very badly composed. After preliminary bequests to the churches of Footscray and Aldermanbury and to his servants it continues as follows: 'The residue to Joyce my wife towards the help, relief and comfort of her and my children. Furthermore this is the will of me William Walsingham, the day and year above written as touching the disposing of all these my lands and tenements in Kent where Sir Ed. Walsingham, Richard Jervis, etc., etc., stand seized of and in the manors of Footscray and Rokesly, with the appurtenances within the said country, to them and to their heirs for ever to the only use of me, etc., etc.—my said feoffees to stand to the use of my wife.' Then follows the reservation of Chelsfield for the marriage of his daughters. Then—'If Joyce my wife decease before Francis my son be xxi, my said manors of Footscray to be used for payment of my debts and for the advancement of my daughters.'

Francis, curiously enough, is not mentioned among the heirs. The last quoted clause in the will suggests that Footscray at least was only left to the use of Joyce during the minority of her son. It is highly probable that of all the landed estates of her husband she was only to enjoy the use during the minority of Francis—he being the only son and natural heir. This is further borne out by the fact that Joyce in her will makes no mention of any lands in her possession (cf. Will of Joyce Walsingham printed in Webb), and that we find Francis Walsingham disposing of the Manor of Footscray in 1564-5 (cf. Hasted's *Kent*, i. 148). Probably the property which William Walsingham's brother and others held to his use was transferred to Francis in a deed which needed no recital in a will. I have not been able to discover the value of William Walsingham's estates at the time of his death.

In 1532, when the King was in the midst of his dispute with the Pope over the Divorce Case and prudent men were shaking themselves free of ecclesiastical entanglements, William resigned his advowson of Chelsfield to the Crown. This move suggests a cautious man who wished to avoid rather than to face the issue. Being of a legal type of mind, he was probably content to obey the law of the land and to leave difficult religious questions alone.

His wife, the mother of Francis, was Joyce, daughter of Sir Edmund Denny of Cheshunt in Hertfordshire. The Dennys were a respectable Hertfordshire family. They traced their pedigree back to the time of Charlemagne, but were really, like the Walsinghams, of the new gentry who emerged from obscurity in the fifteenth century. One of their members had fought under Henry V in France, but by far the most notable of them was Sir Antony Denny, the brother of Joyce and so, of course, the uncle of Francis Walsingham. Sir Antony was a member of Parliament and a privy councillor. He was a great favourite of King Henry VIII, was named one of the executors of the King's will and, by the same document, was appointed to the council of the young King Edward. He was a friend of Cranmer and a zealous promoter of the Reformation. His nephew Francis may well have known him. He did not die until 1549.¹

Francis Walsingham, then, sprang from good Kentish stock on his father's side and good Hertfordshire stock on his mother's. Neither the place nor the time of his birth are exactly known. Thomas Fuller, one of the earliest of his biographers, says that he was born in Kent. Later writers, among them Froude,

¹ R. Clutterbuck, *Hertfordshire* (London, 1821), ii. 107; Stählin, 74; *Dict. of National Biography*, xiv. 373 seq. The obscurity which long hung over the antecedents of Sir Francis Walsingham was for the first time effectually dissipated by E. A. Webb, G. M. Miller, and J. Beckwith in their joint *History of Chislehurst*, London, 1899.

Dr. Karl Stählin published in 1905 at Heidelberg a fascicule on the Walsingham family—*Die Walsinghams bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts*. He made extensive use of the *History of Chislehurst* and added some new material, gathered for the most part from the Hustings Rolls in the Guildhall at London.

I had already examined the material at the Guildhall before his work appeared, and though he and I reach substantially the same conclusions we have worked independently of one another. I have, however, received some useful suggestions from his pamphlet and those I have cited in the foot-notes.

although on what evidence does not appear, confidently assert that Chislehurst was his birthplace.¹ It seems more likely, if the assertion be correct, that his father divided his life between Footscray and St. Mary's Aldermanbury in London, that Francis was born in one of these two places, probably, in deference to the tradition in favour of Kent, at Footscray.²

The time of Francis Walsingham's birth is equally uncertain. Some biographers place it as late as 1536,³ but since Francis is mentioned in his father's will dated 1st March 1533-4, it is clear that he was born before that time. A clause in the same will reads, 'If Joyce, my wife, decease before Francis, my son, be twenty-one, my said manor of Footscray to be used for payment of my debts and for the advancement of my daughters.' There is a suggestion in this clause that Francis's sisters were older than himself, for the careful father provides for their advancement at a time when Francis will be under age. Since he had five sisters, and since his mother, Joyce, was only twenty-seven years old at his father's death,⁴ this would seem to argue that Francis was born not long before his father died. The argument in itself is hardly convincing, but it is supported by a more significant fact. Francis Walsingham

¹ Thomas Fuller, *Worthies of England* (London, 1840), ii. 143. The first edition appeared in 1662. Froude (ed. Scribner, 1899), x. 123; cf. also Cooper, *Athenae Cantabrigienses*, ii. 86.

² Webb supports the Chislehurst theory, but he gives no sound arguments in favour of it. His objection to the Footscray theory, that William Walsingham did not acquire Footscray until 1529, is invalidated by the fact that Francis Walsingham was, in all likelihood, born after 1529.

There is, however, something to be said in favour of the belief that Walsingham was born in London. His father in his will requested that he be buried in the church of St. Mary's Aldermanbury, a fact from which we may perhaps conclude that London was his favourite residing place, especially since most of his family were buried at Chislehurst. Walsingham may therefore very easily have been born in London, but the persistent tradition in favour of Kent seems on the whole to make Footscray the most likely place. Unfortunately there are no parish registers either at Chislehurst or at Footscray or at St. Mary's Aldermanbury which can throw any light on the subject.

Stählin favours Chislehurst, simply on the grounds that the earlier biographies favoured it. Their opinion is, however, of doubtful value. Chislehurst being the ancestral home of the Walsingham family would be the obvious guess of a biographer not otherwise informed, especially since the connexion of Footscray with the Walsinghams was rather a brief one. Sir Francis Walsingham alienated it early in Elizabeth's reign (Hasted's *Kent*, i. 148).

³ Froude, x. 123; Cooper, *Athenae Cantabrig.*, ii. 86.

⁴ Clutterbuck, *Hertfordshire*, ii. 107, places her birth 24 July 1506, citing in evidence Harl. MSS. 1529, f. 113.

matriculated at Cambridge in November 1548.¹ It was a time when boys entered college young. Nicholas Bacon, a contemporary of Walsingham, entered college at the age of fourteen; William Cecil, another contemporary, at the age of fifteen. The average age of entry at King's College, Cambridge, in 1550 was about sixteen. Presumably the boy Francis was no duller than his fellows. It may reasonably be supposed, therefore, that when he matriculated at Cambridge he was about sixteen years of age, and so was born sometime in the year 1532.²

It was just at the time when King Henry VIII was making his final arrangements for the break with Rome. The Commons had shown themselves not only tractable but willing to join the King in his attack upon the Church and the Clergy had been whipped into submission. The First Act of Annates had been passed and waited upon the King's ratification to be enforced. It was almost at the very moment when the Church of England broke from the Church of Rome that Francis Walsingham first saw the light of the world.

Almost nothing is known about his boyhood. His father died when he was still an infant, leaving him with his five sisters to the care of his young mother. About two years later Joyce Walsingham remarried. Her second husband was Sir John Carey of Plashy in Hertfordshire, a brother of the Carey who married Anne Boleyn's sister and was the father of the first Lord Hunsdon.³ Sir John was evidently a man of some standing at court. He received many tokens of favours from Henry VIII and was dubbed Knight of the Carpet later under the Protector Somerset. Two years after his marriage to Joyce Walsingham he was appointed royal bailiff of the royal manor of Hunsdon in Hertfordshire. And thither, apparently, he went to dwell with his wife. Probably young Francis accompanied his mother and was reared in his step-father's household, although he may possibly have remained with his grandfather at Scadbury. It is safe to presume that he was decently educated. He went

¹ From the Records of King's College, Cambridge, transmitted by F. L. Clarke, Bursar's Clerk; but cf. p. 15, n. 1.

² Cf. *Dict. of National Biography*, Lives of Bacon and Cecil; A. Austen Leigh, *King's College*, 65.

³ R. Clutterbuck, *Hertfordshire*, i. 129. Joyce had by Sir John Carey two sons, Sir Edward Carey and Sir Adolphus Carey.

up to Cambridge later and throughout his life he revealed abundant traces of a well-grounded training in scholarship. There can be little doubt that the religious influences affecting his boyhood were of a rather radically Protestant sort. The seeds of that militant Puritanism which was one of his salient characteristics must have been sown early.¹ Furthermore it can hardly be supposed that his mentors would have sent him, as they did, to such a hotbed of Protestantism as King's College, Cambridge, unless they had been very much in sympathy with the 'new religion'.² Yet of course while King Henry lived—and Francis was a well-grown boy when the old king died—it was a dangerous business to teach heresy to the young. Of those who surrounded Francis in his youth there were few zealous enough in matters religious to run the risk. His paternal relatives from James his grandfather to Thomas his cousin revealed no traces of positive religious fervour of any sort.³ Sir John Carey was probably too apt a courtier to take liberties with the Six Articles. But Joyce, his wife, was of a different breed. Her brother, Sir Antony Denny, in spite of his favour with Henry VIII, was a very enthusiastic champion of the Reformation. He was also the most distinguished and easily the most influential of Francis Walsingham's near relatives. The bulk of his estate lay in Hertfordshire and probably he was a frequent visitor at Hunsdon. It seems most likely that Francis received his initial impulses in religion from this quarter, either directly from Sir Antony or more probably by virtue of the influence which his uncle exercised upon his mother's religious views.⁴

In the account book of King's College, Cambridge, for the academic year 1547–8 there is a record of four shillings received of Francis Walsingham, Fellow Commoner, for three weeks' commons from 2nd June to 23rd June 1548.

Probably Francis went up to the University in the late

¹ Stählin, *Sir Francis Walsingham und seine Zeit*, i. 36–8.

² A. Austen Leigh, *King's College*, 39–40.

³ Sir Edmund Walsingham himself was too much a friend of the King to have been a zealous Protestant. His son, Thomas, who succeeded him, although he later enjoyed the favour of Queen Elizabeth (*Dict. of National Biography*, liv. 229), was one of the three appointed to attend upon Cardinal Pole who landed in England in Mary's reign; cf. *Acts of Privy Council*, 1554–6, 83 (17 Nov. 1554).

⁴ Stählin, *op. cit.* 50.

spring of that year. The college books show that he was in residence at King's almost uninterruptedly from the beginning of June 1548 until the end of September 1550. Exactly when he left Cambridge is uncertain. The college account books for the year beginning at Michaelmas 1550 are unfortunately missing. He had apparently gone down before Michaelmas 1551. There is no record that he ever took a degree.¹

In Walsingham's day at King's a fellow commoner was an undergraduate distinguished from the rank and file of his associates by a certain social consideration. He was something better than the mere commoner—something less than the young nobleman. Indeed, he occupied very such the same position in the college world that the country squire occupied in the English world at large. Ordinarily he was the son of that same country squire. His position in college was marked by special privileges of various sorts. He sat at table next below the Master and Fellows and occupied a place of honour in chapel. Very often he had more money to spend than was good for him and lived a luxurious and rather an indolent life. The typical fellow commoner belonged to that class of undergraduates who went up to the University not so much for the intellectual advantages which it offered as to enlarge their acquaintances and to gain the social prestige which a University connexion was even then beginning to confer.² It was indeed

¹ Information from F. L. Clarke, Bursar's Clerk at King's. In the account books of King's the following entries appear in regard to Francis Walsingham :

Books of 1547-8 : 2 June to 23 June—3 weeks' commons at 1s. 4d. a week, 4s. 23 June to 22 September—13 weeks' commons, 19s. 6d.

Books of 1548-9 (30 Sept. 1548-29 Sept. 1549) : For Quarter ending Christmas 1548—7 weeks' commons, 10s. 6d. For 37 weeks' commons, Christmas 1548 to Michaelmas 1549, at 1s. 8d., £3 1s. 8d.

Books of 1549-50 : For Quarter ending Christmas 1549—12 weeks, 20s. Christmas 1549 to Michaelmas 1550, 49s. 11d.

He matriculated as a member of the University on 12 Nov. 1548, but as members of colleges could matriculate when they pleased this date does not necessarily fix the year when he first went to Cambridge.

Dr. Stählin, in his account of Walsingham's career at King's, is altogether too positive in declaring that Walsingham left the University in the autumn of 1550 (Stählin, *op. cit.* 79). He was not, apparently, aware of the fact that the books for 1550-1, which began of course at Michaelmas 1550, are missing. The books for 1546-7 are also missing, but if Walsingham had been at the college before June 1548 we should expect to find earlier mention of him in the books of 1547-8.

² Leigh, *op. cit.* 65. Dr. Rashdall has been good enough to lend me the light of his learning upon this point.

one of the shortcomings of the whole Renaissance movement that it made learning fashionable.

Although Walsingham was a fellow commoner, there is no reason to believe that he conformed to the type. It would be dangerous to argue much about his character as a youth from what he was in his maturity, but it is hardly possible that to a man of his intense seriousness a university career had meant no more than a social opportunity. Indeed, there can be very little doubt that the years he spent at Cambridge were extremely significant ones in the history of his development. For the University in his day was alive with great issues and his was far too alert a personality to escape their influences. With the death of Henry VIII, early in the year 1547, the rising tide of the Protestant Reformation, which the old King had done his best to stem, burst upon England. It flowed rapidly to Cambridge and revealed itself there even before the first Parliament of the new reign, by repealing the old heresy laws, had thrown open the flood gates. When Walsingham reached Cambridge it had already invaded many of the colleges. King's was completely inundated. Its new provost, John Cheke, the tutor of the young king, was an enthusiastic reformer, and though he was himself absent at court his ideas dominated the place. Thomas Gardiner, Walsingham's tutor, a young Eton man who had taken his B.A. from King's in 1547, was filled with the same spirit.¹ King's was in fact the most progressively Protestant college in the whole University.

But the champions of the old order of things at Cambridge were numerous and valiant and were in no wise disposed to submit to the reforming spirit without dispute. During the period between the repeal of the heresy laws in 1547 and the passing of the Act of Uniformity in 1549 the restrictions upon the free discussion of religious questions were in large measure removed. The atmosphere of Cambridge was in consequence electrical with controversy. Every college was divided into hostile camps, every undergraduate almost was debating fiercely about the sacred mysteries. An important access of strength came to the Reformers in 1549 when Martin Bucer, fresh from Strasburg, was appointed Professor of Hebrew. Bucer's great

¹ Leigh, *op. cit.* 39 seq. ; Cooper, *Athenae Cantabrig.*, i. 515.

reputation, his eloquence, his moderation, and his conciliatory spirit made him almost at once the most conspicuous figure in the ranks of the Cambridge Reformers.

At no time during the whole sixteenth century would Francis Walsingham have found Cambridge so frankly bent toward Protestantism as it was during the years he was in residence there. At no college perhaps would he have found more ardent exponents of Protestant doctrines than he found in John Cheke, Provost of King's, and in his own tutor, Thomas Gardiner. It cannot be doubted that the effect of this environment was to stimulate mightily his zeal for the principles of the Reformation. How far he came under the spell of Bucer's influence it is of course impossible to say. Bucer was pre-eminently among the continental reformers the apostle of conciliation. He cherished the hope always of bridging the widening gulf between Geneva and Wittenberg, and insisted steadily that unity among the reformers was far more important than the maintenance of minor differences upon points of dogma. Walsingham's own utterances upon this point in later life fall in exactly with these views, and one may suspect that even his boyish enthusiasm for Protestantism received some tincture of breadth and moderation from the influence of the great German theologian.¹

Sir Robert Naunton says that Francis Walsingham left Cambridge to travel abroad 'for the rest of his learning'.² His biographers agree that he was an exile from England on account of his religion during the reign of Mary. He was probably in London in 1552.³ So it appears likely that he made two trips abroad, one to complete his education and one to escape the consequences of his belief. This is borne out by the inscription on a tablet which used to hang above his grave in St. Paul's and which is almost the only surviving record of this part of his life. 'Adolescens, peregrinatus in exteris Regionibus, earum Instituta, Linguas, Politiam, ad civilem scientiam Reiq; publicae usum didicit. Iuvenis, exilium, Maria regnante, subiit voluntarium, Religionis ergo.'⁴

¹ Stählin, *op. cit.* 76-7.

² R. Naunton, *Fragmenta Regalia* (written c. 1630), ed. Arber, London, 1895, 35-6.

³ Jos. Foster, *Register of Admissions to Gray's Inn*.

⁴ This inscription is printed in full in Cooper, *op. cit.* ii. 89.

It must have been some time between October 1550 and 1552 that Walsingham made his educational pilgrimage. There is no record of where he went.

Judging from his epitaph he devoted his attention while abroad to the study of languages and institutions. Very likely at this juncture he laid the foundations for his knowledge of French and Italian, both of which he came to speak with remarkable facility.

Years later Walsingham drew up instructions for one of his nephews about to travel abroad. These instructions have been preserved and they throw so much light upon the character of the man who wrote them that they are worth quoting at length :

‘ First, that God may bless your travel, you must principally appoint some time of the day for prayer and reading of the Scriptures. That you may profit in your tongues you must suffer no day to pass without translating somewhat : and for your most profit in that exercise you shall do well to translate an epistle of Tully into French and out of French into Latin, whereby you may profit in both tongues.

‘ For that knowledge of histories is a very profitable study for a gentleman, read you the lives of Plutarch and join thereto all his philosophy, which shall increase you greatly with the judgment of most part of things incident to the life of man. Read also Titus Livius and all the Roman histories which you shall find in Latin, as also all books of State both old and new, as Plato, de Rep., Aristo. polit., Xenophon (parcelus?), orations.

‘ And as in these the reading of histories as you have principally to mark how matters have passed in government in those days, so have you to apply them to these our times and states and see how they may be made serviceable to our age, or why to be rejected, the reason whereof well considered, shall cause you in process of time to frame better courses both of action and counsel, as well in your private life as in public government, if you shall be called. The way to make you truly profit in the histories, as well profane as holy, to be a good Christian commonwealth’s man is to bring all your examples of things and counsel of administration which you shall find in reading or learn by conference, to the rule which Tully calls the rule of honesty, accounting no act as good that proceedeth not from that fountain. If you follow not this rule you will go astray in all your actions and never honour yourself nor serve your country well.

‘The next piece of a traveller (*sic*) to profit himself by is to join himself to some company, for books are but dead letters, it is the voice and conference of men that giveth them life and shall engender in you true knowledge.

‘This company you have first to see that it be honest and godly : to take heed of lewd youths of wanton, dissolute dispositions and especially such as have of nature the humour of hypocrisy, for by them you shall learn no sound thing and shall discover yourself to yourself to the great peril (*sic*?). For your direction herein . . . the advice of your friends, who shall advise you first to some one that is honest and good and by him you shall learn how to come to the conference of others, for like will to like.

‘And in learning thus and framing your understanding to make it a good treasure-house to serve the commonwealth . . . also the use of the tongues in getting so many languages as you think are necessary for the state you live in ; the French, Italian and Spanish, and above all the Latin, wherein you have to exercise so well that you may have a ready use of it to serve all public service. After these things, take some taste of the mathematics, especially of that part which concerneth cosmography, that in travelling and otherwise you may observe the countries themselves, first without any consideration of the persons, by seeing to which you shall learn matters . . . of fortifications and leading armies as also for private life. Especially have regard in this part to the manners and dispositions of the people, as in general, so chiefly of the nobility, gentry and learned sort and have their company as much as in safety of conscience and peace of God you may : that you see the inclination of each man which way he is bent, whether it be a marshall or Counsellor, a plain, open nature, a dissembling and counterfeit, whether he be in credit with his people, and what pension he hath from abroad, how inclining toward the neighbours bordering upon him ; and for the disposition of the French gentry, whether they incline more to the Spanish or German or English, and who they are, and what account they make of Scotland, how they are affected to any of the Nobility of the realm and what they are ; and so by conference of this nature you shall see whether there be the more similitude or disparity and by it you may discover much to serve yourself and commonwealth. You must show yourself civil and companionable to all but (reject advances?). You may not incline to any faction, to bind yourself in either party, but therein as a stranger remember the precept of the wise, “*Perigrinatus non oportet esse curiosus*”. And acquaint yourself as well as you can with men of state—though otherwise they be not of

themselves sufficient, neither for learning or other quality, that you may get out of their hands and by these means such dealings as daily pass in affairs of state and counsel of princes, whether they appertain to civil government or warlike affairs. For so you have to make your profit as well of your own sort as the other, as well of the experienced as of the learned: for these men of experience as the world calleth them will serve you as conduit pipes though themselves they have no water, these are secretaries, public notaries and agents for princes and cities, etc. In all these aforesaid and what else soever may serve for your profit, you must observe this, to put down in writing what you have learned either by sight or conference, keeping as it were a diary of all your doings.’¹

It must be remembered that these words of wisdom proceeded from Walsingham in his maturity when he was Principal Secretary to the Queen. They are coloured over much by his intense interest in foreign affairs at that time, to the neglect of other interests, the religious interest, for instance, which must have burned strong in him when he set out on his first trip abroad. And, of course, they are councils of perfection, and therefore quite as likely to record what Walsingham in his youth left undone as what he did. However, they may very well reflect his youthful aspirations. At all events, except for the few lines of doubtful value in his epitaph, they supply all that is known of his first continental tour.

After Walsingham returned from abroad he settled in London and enrolled (1552) as a member of Gray’s Inn. This may indicate an intention on his part of following his father’s profession, but it is quite as likely that he began to read law without any intention of proceeding to the bar. It was customary for ambitious young men in his day to spend a few years at one of the Inns of Court as a preliminary to a public career. The discipline of the Inn was wholesome, the acquaintances one formed there likely to be valuable, and a smattering at least of English law was almost indispensable to the politician and statesman. It is remarkable how many of the distinguished public servants under Elizabeth were at one time or another

¹ From a MS. book at Burley-on-the-Hill, lately in the possession of the Rt. Hon. G. H. Finch, M.P. The original was destroyed a few years ago by fire. Before its destruction Dr. Stählin secured a copy of it. He was kind enough to allow me to make a transcription of his copy. Dotted lines indicate illegible words omitted.

connected with some one of these schools of English law. Possibly we should regard Walsingham's enrolment at Gray's Inn as a step deliberately taken in preparation for a public career.¹

But whatever his own plans were they were rudely interrupted by forces over which he had no control. Edward VI's untimely death in the summer of 1553 set everything at topsy-turvy. The succession of Mary, daughter of Catherine of Aragon, and a most zealous Catholic, threatened the very existence of Protestantism in England. Many of the reformers pinned their hopes to Northumberland's scheme of passing over Mary's claim and placing Lady Jane Grey on the throne. But England at large would have none of it. After a brief interval Mary came to her own and mass was sung once more in the royal chapel. At first the Queen disclaimed any intention of compelling men's consciences, and with a few exceptions where heresy was associated with treason, as in Cranmer's case, kept her word for almost a year. Indeed, she instituted no general policy of persecution until she had received legal warrant from Parliament. But the Reformers were well aware that their days of grace were numbered. Many fled abroad at once, some with wives and chattels to establish little English colonies at

¹ Walsingham's name is entered in the Register of Gray's Inn in 1552; cf. Douthwaite, *Gray's Inn*, 49. It is illuminating in this connexion to recall Sir John Fortescue's remarks on the Inns of Court in his *De Laudibus Legum Angliae*, chap. 49. Although written nearly a century before Walsingham's entry into Gray's Inn, it probably held true in his time: 'In these greater Inns there can no student be maintained for less expenses by the year than twenty marks. And if he have a servant to wait upon him, as most of them have, then so much the greater will his charges be. Now, by reason of these charges, the children only of noblemen do study the laws in these Inns. For the poor and common sort of the people are not able to bear so great charges for the exhibition of their children. . . . And to speak uprightly, there is in these greater Inns, yea and in the lesser too, besides the study of the laws as it were a university or school of all commendable qualities requisite for noblemen. There they learn to sing and to exercise themselves in all kind of harmony. There also they practise dancing and other noblemen's pastimes, as they use to do which are brought up in the King's house. On the working days most of them apply themselves to the study of the laws, and on the holy days to the study of Holy Scripture, and out of the time of divine service, to the reading of chronicles. For there indeed are virtues studied and vices exiled. So that, for the endowment of virtue and abandoning of vice, knights and barons with other states and noblemen of the realm, place their children in those Inns, though they desire not to have them learned in the laws nor to live by the practice thereof, but only upon their father's allowance.' (From the English translation by Robert Mulcaster, London, 1672.)

Strasburg, Geneva, Frankfort, and Basle; others with lighter baggage to wander at large in pursuit of wisdom or pleasure. Those who remained at home looked about for a deliverer. Many of them associated with Sir Thomas Wyatt's attempt in 1554. His failure and subsequent execution dashed what hopes they had left to the ground. Those who were not fully prepared to face the wrath to come joined their brethren on the Continent.

Among those who fled from England in the general dispersion of the Reformers was young Francis Walsingham. According to his epitaph he went voluntarily for the sake of his religion. This explanation will probably have to be accepted for the want of any other one. It is worth noting, however, that relatives of Walsingham were associated both with Northumberland's attempt in Lady Jane Grey's behalf and with Sir Thomas Wyatt's revolt.¹ Nor should it be forgotten that it was from Hunsdon in Hertfordshire, which Sir John Carey—Walsingham's step-father—had held as royal bailiff, that Queen Mary had made her escape when, just before her brother's death, Northumberland's officers were coming to seize her.² If more were known about Walsingham's life at this juncture, it might appear that he had other reasons than purely religious ones for passing overseas.

The only contemporary notice of his second trip abroad is preserved in the archives of the University of Padua. There it is recorded that on the 29th of December 1555 Francis Walsingham was chosen Consularius of the English Nation in the Faculty of Civil Law. He held the office, with one short intermission, until the 8th of April 1556.³

At the time Padua was the foremost of Italian universities and perhaps the most distinguished school of Roman Civil Law in Europe. The city itself was on the Venetian 'terra firma' and it shared with Venice that tolerance towards foreign nations and foreign creeds which attracted outlandish students to it from every quarter of Europe. The organization of the university proclaimed its cosmopolitan character. There were two faculties, the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Arts. Each one had

¹ Cf. Stählin, *Walsingham und seine Zeit*, i. 89-90.

² Pollard, *Political History of England*, 1547-1603, 88.

³ Stählin, *op. cit.* i. 91, 106; Andrich, *De Natione Anglica et Scots Iuristarum Universitatis Patavenae*, 31.

its own rector, but the former was by far the larger and more important. The law students were divided into two great groups, the *Ultra montaines* and the *Citra montaines*, and these in turn were subdivided, the former into ten, the latter into twelve nations. Among the *Ultra montaine* nations the English made one. For purposes of university government the students of each nation elected a *Consularius*, and these together with the Rector and a *Syndicus* formed the University Senate. The *consularii* were extremely important officials. Collectively they chose the Rector, and in some measure directed him in the conduct of his office. Individually they were responsible for the behaviour of all members of their nation in its relation to others and to civil and ecclesiastical authorities; they safeguarded its privileges, enforced its laws, and managed its finances. The office was not an easy one to fill and it demanded of its possessor, particularly if he happened to be an English Protestant, the gift of many tongues, coupled with unusual tact and a considerable administrative faculty. The election of Walsingham to such a position, when he could hardly have been more than twenty-three years of age, singles him out as a youth of remarkable maturity.¹

It is not surprising to discover that he devoted his attention while at Padua to the study of the Roman civil law. Most foreigners who went there did and it was the obvious course for a young Englishman fresh from the Inns of Court to pursue. Indeed one is tempted to inquire whether this was not, after all, the chief object of Walsingham's second trip abroad. Certainly to any one aspiring to public service some knowledge of the *Corpus Juris* was almost indispensable and there was no better place in Europe to acquire such knowledge than at Padua. At all events there he was, for some months at least, busy with his law books.

But there were other things to be studied in Padua besides the Digest and the Code. 'Books', as Walsingham observed later, 'are but dead letters; it is the voice and conference of men that giveth them life and shall engender in you true knowledge.' From this point of view Italy in the middle of the cinquecento was one of the most enlightening spots in Europe.

¹ Stählin, i. 101-2.

For half a century the small states in the north and centre of the peninsula had been struggling to preserve their identity in the face of the conflicting ambitions of Habsburg and Valois. Lacking material strength equal to the struggle they had perforce developed an adroitness and a finesse in statecraft hardly approached north of the Alps. Their statesmen had got the maxims of Machiavelli by heart, and though they ignored his finer purposes for Italy, they accepted without reserve his frankly materialistic philosophy and his utter indifference to moral considerations in the choice of means. Abandoning altogether the outworn chivalrous notions of times past, they fenced with nice weapons of cunning and deceit, aiming rather to thrust through the weak point of their foe's armour than to beat him down in his strength, seeking always to catch him unawares, to trick him by fair promises, and betray him by false hopes. It was a difficult game to play which required not only alertness to seize an opportunity but knowledge to recognize the opportunity when it was offered. The successful Italian statesman had to be acquainted with the exact capacity and the exact position of every piece on the board. It was part of his creed that information could not be bought too dear. Consequently he employed countless agents and maintained elaborate systems of espionage to catch indiscreet whisperings through every keyhole and behind every arras. The virtue of his method was that it prevailed against those of the older order. Ultra montaine diplomats discovered that they could not hope to cope with the wily Italians except by mastering their methods. So it was that Italy, particularly Venice, came to be recognized as the great school for statecraft in the sixteenth century, even as she was for art and letters and good manners. 'The Prince' became the guide-book for statesmen in all the courts of Western Europe and the *Relatione* of Venetian ambassadors the pattern for all European diplomatists. Even the Roman Church did not disdain to use a method of attack which gave to the guile of the weak a potency equal to the force of the strong. Among all the secular powers none applied the new statecraft with greater cunning or with greater success than the members of the Society of Jesus. In Padua Walsingham had an excellent opportunity to study the two great masters of the craft, Venetian

and Jesuit, both at work. His diplomatic career will betray a considerable mastery of their methods.

Nor were the influences of Italy upon him confined to his statecraft. His personality revealed later many other characteristics of taste and temper to testify to the deep impress which his Italian tour made upon him. For all that he was very far from conforming to the type which his countrymen branded as Italianate. Italy may have made him more astute, she certainly made him more cosmopolitan; but she left him as she had received him, still essentially English.

After Walsingham left Padua in the spring of 1556 there is no record of him until his reappearance in England after Queen Mary's death. It is possible that he penetrated farther south into Italy, although such a course would have been an extremely dangerous one for a Protestant to pursue. Not many heretics slipped through the nets of the Roman inquisition south of the Apennines. He must certainly have gone to France. Indeed, one suspects from his wide acquaintance in that country and his precise knowledge of the language that he spent most of his time in France. There are passages in some of his letters written years afterwards which suggest that he sojourned for a time in Switzerland,¹ and it is hard to believe that he did not pay a brief visit at least to his exiled brethren in Basle and Strasburg and Frankfort. But nothing can be said positively. This much however is fairly certain: that his years of exile during Mary's reign must have had the effect on him which it had upon other English refugees of increasing mightily his zeal for the Protestant cause.

Probably Walsingham, with the great mass of English Protestant refugees, returned to England at the accession of Queen Elizabeth. He was certainly in England in the spring of 1560. It has been confidently asserted that he sat for Banbury in Elizabeth's first Parliament, but this assertion appears to

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 28 March 1586. 'The opinion of my partiality continueth, nourished by faction, which maketh me weary of the place I serve in, and to wish myself among the true-hearted Swiss' (*Leicester Correspondence*, Camden Society, 1844, 192). Cf. also Walsingham to Wilkes, 2 May 1587, 'I would we were both well established at Basel' (*S. P. Holland*, xiv, no. 80a); and Walsingham to A. Douglas, 22 June 1588, 'I would to God Dr. Michael would speed well in the matter you wot of and that we were all three at Basel to pray for princes' (*Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, iii. 331).

be based upon unsound evidence.¹ More probably he took his seat in Parliament for the first time in 1562.

Meantime many changes had been taking place in his family circle. After his step-father's death in 1552 his mother had gone to live at Thremhall in Essex, on one of the estates which her husband had left to her. Four of her daughters had married, all of them to men of some significance. In 1560 Joyce herself died and was laid beside her husband in the church of St. Mary Aldermanbury in London.²

Upon his return to England Walsingham had taken up his residence apparently at Footscray in Kent. In 1562 he married Anne Carleill, the widow of Alexander Carleill, a London wine merchant. Anne came of a good London family. Her father, Sir George Barnes, had been Lord Mayor of London. Probably she exercised only a passing influence on Walsingham's life, because she died in 1564, leaving to him £100 and the care of a son, by her first husband, Christopher Carleill, who later became a famous captain by land and sea. She bore Walsingham no children.³

A short time before his wife's death Walsingham had disposed of his estates in Footscray and had acquired by lease the manor of Parkebury in Hertfordshire. Although he had already

¹ On the 15 April 1560 Thomas Randolph in Scotland wrote to Henry Killigrew in London, 'Commend me to F. Wals.' *Cal. Scot.* i (Edinburgh, 1898), p. 363. Sir Sidney Lee in his life of Walsingham in the *Dict. of National Biography* (lix. 232), and Mr. Webb in his *History of Chislehurst*, both assert that Walsingham sat for Banbury in 1559. So does Dr. Stählin in his recent life of Walsingham. They find proof of this it seems in A. Beesley's *History of Banbury* (London, 1841), who cites as proof Browne Willis, *Notitia Parliamentaria* (London, 1750). Willis states (i, pt. 2, 66) that Walsingham was returned in 1559 from Banbury, but unfortunately that eccentric antiquary gave no evidence for his statement. The Official Lists of Members of Parliament printed by order of the House of Commons in 1878 (cf. *Parl. Papers*, 1878, lxii, pt. i, 400), which are based upon the Crown Office Lists and upon the actual returns to Parliament preserved in the Record Office, give no return from Banbury to Elizabeth's first Parliament. I have examined the returns at the Record Office myself and found no return from Banbury. Merewether and Stevens in their *History of English Boroughs* (London, 1835, ii. 1201) declare that Banbury was not represented in the Parliament of 1559-60. The *Journal of the House of Commons* (i. 53) and Sir S. D'Ewes's *Journal*, 80, throw no light upon the matter whatever. In a word, the assertion that Walsingham sat in the first Parliament of Queen Elizabeth rests solely upon the unsupported statement of Browne Willis, and is tacitly contradicted by later authorities.

² Stählin, i. 121-3. Stählin corrects a mistaken reference to Joyce Walsingham in Machyn's *Diary* (Camden Society, 1848), p. 193.

³ Stählin, i. 124; Anne's will is printed in Webb, *History of Chislehurst*, 380.

purchased a house in London, Parkebury seems to have been, during the next few years, his chief place of residence. It was in the same county where, as a boy, he had grown up in his step-father's household. Near by lay the estates of his cousin, Sir Henry Denny, of his friends the Brocketts, and of his patron, Sir William Cecil. In this lovely country-side, and in the midst of these congenial spirits, Walsingham lived for a time the life of a well-to-do English country gentleman.¹

He began his public career in Elizabeth's second Parliament which assembled on the 12th of January 1562. He was returned that year to the House of Commons from two places, Banbury in Oxfordshire and Lyme Regis in Dorset. He elected to sit for Lyme Regis, taking the seat occupied in Elizabeth's first Parliament by Sir Nicholas Throgmorton.²

At that time Lyme Regis, although a small town of no great significance, returned two members to the House of Commons. It was a close corporation with an electorate practically restricted to the mayor and a handful of prominent citizens. One of its members was usually chosen from among its inhabitants, the other seems to have been left as a rule to the nomination of the Crown. Under these circumstances it can hardly be doubted that Walsingham owed his election to court influence. Probably Sir William Cecil was responsible for it.

There is some reason to believe that Cecil also had a finger in Walsingham's election at Banbury.³ The considerations which commended him to Cecil are not far to seek. He was without

¹ Stählin, i. 124-6.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1878, lxii, pt. i, 400, 405; D'Ewes's *Journal*, 80. It is not impossible that Throgmorton had something to do with Walsingham's election at Lyme Regis. Later, at any rate, the two men were warm friends. When Throgmorton died in 1571 Walsingham wrote to the Earl of Leicester: 'I was most sorry (as I have just cause) by your letter to understand of the loss of so dear a friend as Sir Nicholas was to me, whose lack, if it were private only to his friends were great, but if it be weighed generally in respect of her Majesty and our country, the want of him will then appear greater. For, be it spoken without offence to any, for council in peace and for conduct in war, he has not left of like sufficiency his successor that I know.' B.M. Stowe MSS. 147, f. 266b, printed in Sir D. Digges, *Compleat Ambassador*, 48.

³ Cecil married the daughter of Sir Anthony Cooke, whose wife was the daughter of William Saunders of Banbury. Saunders apparently held the Spittal lands at Grimsbury, which he seems to have bequeathed to his father-in-law (A. Beesley, *History of Banbury*, 218). Mr. Beesley conjectures that it was because of Cecil's influence in Banbury that the town was given one seat in Parliament in Mary's reign.

question a very able young man, extremely well trained for public service, and he was a staunch Protestant. All of these qualities on their own merits singled him out as a desirable person to sit in the House of Commons. He had, moreover, through his mother's family, the Dennys and through his various brothers-in-law, particularly Sir Walter Mildmay, influential connexions at court. Nor must it be forgotten that through his step-father, Sir John Carey, whose brother had married Queen Elizabeth's maternal aunt, Walsingham had something of a special claim upon the consideration of the Queen herself.

It is unlikely that Walsingham did anything noteworthy in Elizabeth's second Parliament. The *Journal of the House of Commons* makes no allusion to his presence there. There is, however, one mention of him in this connexion which is worth noting. Not long before the Parliament assembled for its second session, probably in September 1566, Sir William Cecil had a memorial drawn up of 'matters to be considered against the meeting of Parliament'. The contents of the paper are not material to the present purpose. It was written, no doubt, by one of Cecil's clerks at his dictation. But at the bottom, Cecil himself has added, in his own long angular hand, 'Mr. Walsingham to be of the House'.¹ It would be idle to conjecture what Cecil had in mind when he made that memorandum. Possibly one might argue from it that Walsingham was playing a more significant part in parliamentary affairs than the House Journal would lead one to suppose. At all events it establishes beyond a doubt the fact that Cecil knew Walsingham at this time and that his presence in the House of Commons was a matter of some importance to Elizabeth's chief minister. Furthermore, it gives added weight to the evidence already adduced to show that Walsingham owed chiefly to Cecil his introduction to public life.

Just before Parliament reassembled in the autumn of 1566 Walsingham married again. His second wife was Ursula,

¹ S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xl, no. 68. This paper is undated, and it is somewhat difficult to fix its exact date. From internal evidence, however, it seems most likely that the paper has reference to the Session of 1566. This Session assembled in October. We cannot, therefore, be far wrong in attributing these memoranda of Cecil's to September 1566.

daughter of Henry St. Barbe, a Somersetshire gentleman. Ursula, like her predecessor, was also a widow. Her first husband, Sir Richard Worseley, of Appuldurcombe, on the Isle of Wight, had died the year before, leaving her the estates of Carisbrooke Priory. She was already the mother of two sons. They were both killed by an accidental explosion of gunpowder shortly after their mother's remarriage, leaving behind them an inheritance over which Walsingham quarrelled for some years with Worseley's executors before the matter was finally settled.¹

Immediately after Walsingham's second marriage he left Parkebury and established his new household at Appuldurcombe. Sometime in 1568 he purchased a house in London. The record of the sale designates him as Francis Walsingham, Esquire, of London.² It is probable that from this time onward London became his head-quarters. Yet he never seems to have served the city in any official capacity as his father had done before him. Nor is there any reason to believe that he practised law for a livelihood or applied himself to business. His inherited estates, considerably enlarged by judicious marriages, evidently provided him with adequate resources to support the position of a gentleman of leisure.

In 1568 when Walsingham was about thirty-six years of age, he entered the Queen's service. From that time on until his death, twenty-two years later, the history of his life is merged in the history of his country and his sovereign.

In 1568 Elizabeth had been on the throne of England for ten years. During that period she had been beset with so many dangers that perhaps her most remarkable achievement lay in the fact that she still lived and reigned. At the very outset she had been forced to make a decision full of the most momentous

¹ The question at issue was this. R. Worseley had left by will certain movables to his two sons to be delivered to them when they came of age. Ursula, on the death of her two sons, claimed these as her own. John Worseley, executor, maintained that they belonged to him (B.M. Lansdowne MSS. 12, f. 51). Walsingham in July 1571 finally won his suit against Worseley, as may be seen by the letter of the Privy Council to Worseley on 10 June 1571 (*Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, pt. i, 516). Robert Beale, later Walsingham's Secretary at Paris, married Ursula's sister Edith. (Stählin, i. 194.)

² *Hustings Rolls*, 255, no. 49. In April 1562, in a transfer of lands recorded in the *Plea Rolls of the Exchequer* (4 Eliz., Pasch., m. 20), Walsingham is spoken of as 'Fra: Walsingham of Footscray'.

consequences. Her predecessor had been a Roman Catholic and had left Roman Catholicism established in England. Should she follow the same course, or strike out in some direction away from Rome as her father and her brother had done? She declared in favour of the latter alternative. The motives which governed her decision are hard to state with certainty. Probably the stigma which Rome had placed upon her birth—she was the daughter of Anne Boleyn—had something to do with it. An acknowledgement of papal supremacy would have involved a confession of bastardy. That, of course, might have been set straight. Popes were known to have been extremely obliging in such matters. But to submit her title to papal ratification would have been contrary to her whole idea of sovereignty. She held the throne of God alone as her fathers had held before her, and was not prepared to acknowledge herself in any sense the creature of any power under the sun. Furthermore, like all the Tudors, she was ambitious to centralize all authority in the state in her own hands. A church subject to Rome would have been an insuperable obstacle to the realization of that ideal. It would have implied a divided allegiance of her subjects and have opened the door to outside interference in the conduct of her kingdom. The German arrangement, *cuius regio eius religio*, was much more congenial to her imperious nature and her uncompromising nationalism.

Elizabeth in fact, in shaping her ecclesiastical policy, aimed primarily at a national church under the control of the Crown. Probably she was more interested in the question of its government than of its creed. In providing for the former she found the old hierarchy well suited to her purposes. It had been shaped to the uses of an autocratic papacy and could easily be applied to the uses of an autocratic crown. An alternate was offered from Geneva, but Elizabeth would have none of it. She saw its workings in France and Scotland and heard its voice in John Knox's *Trumpet Blast*. It was associated in her mind with rebellion against constituted authority. Its democratic spirit seemed to her, as it seemed to her successor, incompatible with monarchy. So she held fast to her bishops as the nearest and surest means of exercising her power in matters ecclesiastical. She held fast, likewise, in large measure to the old ritual.

Probably its formal splendour appealed to a love of ceremonial display that was native to her. It might serve also to conciliate the great mass of her subjects who still retained their affection for the old forms. But Elizabeth did not undertake to rehabilitate the Anglo-Catholicism of her father's time. There was obviously nothing to be gained by such a course. It would merely have alienated her Roman Catholic subjects without enlisting the support of her Protestant ones. These last were probably in a minority, but they included many of the richest, most progressive, and most influential men in England, and their religious ideas were of a character not to be satisfied with a mere breach from Rome. They demanded concessions to the reformed theology. These concessions Elizabeth was quite willing to make, possibly because she was herself of their way of thinking, more likely because she was an indifferent theologian and attached small importance to the fine points of dogma. The result was a religious establishment which looked for its government and its ritual towards Rome and for its dogma toward Zurich and Geneva. But Elizabeth intended it to be distinct from both. In religion as in all other matters her point of view was essentially insular. Her Church was to be neither Protestant nor Roman Catholic, but, as she on one occasion declared herself to be, 'mere English'.

The fact was, however, that religion was altogether too important a factor in sixteenth-century politics to permit Elizabeth to maintain the isolated position in religious matters which she had designed for herself. She had broken from Rome, she had accepted the new theology. To Europe at large, divided in twain between the forces of the Reformation and the Counter Reformation, these facts admitted of but one interpretation. The Protestants hailed her as the champion of their faith, the Roman Catholics denounced her with equal fervour as the enemy of theirs. As far as Elizabeth herself was concerned she was no more disposed to maintain the one than to combat the other. Nevertheless, she found herself compelled by circumstances in some sort to assume the role assigned to her. Her choice of creed to some extent predetermined both her friends and her foes.

From this point of view Elizabeth's decision upon the religious

question appears to have been an amazingly bold step for one of her conservative temper. Protestantism at the time of her accession had practically no official standing in Western Europe outside of Scandinavia, Germany, and a few Swiss towns. It had lost some of its initial impulse and had roused a spirit in the old church no less zealous and even more militant than its own. The inquisition was rapidly annihilating it in Italy and Spain. The Jesuits were steadily winning ground from it in South Germany. It was being vigorously persecuted in France and in the Low Countries. Even in Scotland, where it exhibited most strength, its eventual success was by no means assured. In fact to the ordinary observer it must have appeared that Elizabeth had identified herself with a losing cause.

The fighting strength of Europe was ranged on the other side. Philip, King of Spain, and the two Sicilies, Duke of Burgundy and Milan, and Emperor of half a continent overseas, who commanded the fiscal resources of Genoa and Antwerp and drew at will on the vast treasuries of Mexico and Peru, was Roman Catholic to the core. His proudest title was that of Most Catholic King, his highest ambition to destroy heresy everywhere throughout the world and to restore the unity of the faith. If he sometimes differed with the Pope of Rome as to how these glorious purposes were to be accomplished, his intention to accomplish them was no less sincere and no less persistent than that of the Pope himself. Elizabeth, the heretic, sooner or later, would have to reckon with him and perhaps also with his kindred the German Habsburgs and the King of Savoy. The same was true of the next most potent factor in European diplomacy, the King of France. Henry II's domains did not loom so large on the map as those of Spain, but they were more compact, better organized, and more completely under their sovereign's control than Philip's far-scattered empire. In fighting strength Henry had proved that he was not greatly inferior and Henry was quite as zealous as his mighty neighbour in his support of Roman Catholicism. Nowhere had the persecution of heresy been more rigorous than it was in France during the last ten years of his reign.

Under these circumstances the gravest of many dangers which threatened Protestantism was that these two monarchs

would sink the ancient rivalry between their houses and unite in the cause of their common faith. Elizabeth had not yet been on the English throne a year before a long step was taken in that direction. In the spring of 1559 Philip and Henry came to terms at Cateau Cambrésis and formed an alliance which they cemented at once by a marriage between Philip and Henry's daughter, Elizabeth. It was commonly believed that they meant to proceed together to the extermination of heresy throughout Europe.

Here then, at the very outset of Elizabeth's reign, she was confronted by a league of her two most powerful neighbours, whose purposes toward her, at least so far as her religion was concerned, were unquestionably hostile. Meantime, her flank was far from secure. Her father's attempt to coerce Scotland into a close league with England had simply had the effect of throwing the Scots into the arms of France. James V demonstrated that fact clearly enough when he married Mary of Guise in 1538. Solway Moss followed and the murder of Cardinal Beaton and Pinkie Clough, all of them intended to divert the Scots from France, all of them equally futile. Mary of Guise picked up the threads of the policy which James V and Beaton had both followed to their deaths. Her infant daughter Mary, Queen of Scotland since her father's death, was contracted to marry the young English King Edward VI. In spite of this engagement another marriage was secretly arranged for her with Francis the young French dauphin. And in 1548, when she was scarcely seven years of age, she passed over to France, to be reared in French ways against her wedding day. At the time of Elizabeth's accession she had already married, and was in her politics at any rate altogether French. Her mother, ruling in her stead in Scotland, was doing her best to make her kingdom altogether French as well.

It looked in fact as though Scotland in 1558 could be counted upon to dance as the King of France fiddled. This in itself was bad enough, but from Elizabeth's point of view what aggravated the situation still more was Mary Stuart's pretensions to the English throne. By virtue of her descent from Margaret Tudor, daughter of Henry VII, she was, in default of heirs of Elizabeth's body, next in the line of the English succession.

Following another line of argument she pressed Elizabeth even closer. Mary was a staunch Roman Catholic. In the eyes of those of her faith, Elizabeth had proclaimed herself a heretic. She was already, by papal decree, a bastard. On both of these grounds, according to Roman Catholic reckoning, she forfeited her right to the English throne and Mary became *de jure* Queen of England. So it was that Mary Stuart, already a formidable neighbour to Elizabeth both in France and Scotland, became as well a dangerous competitor.

If Elizabeth could have confronted all these foreign dangers with the consciousness of unanimous support at home, she would have had the less cause for anxiety. As it was, the same forces which were operating to unite her neighbours against her were operating also to divide her subjects. To the English Roman Catholics allegiance to Rome was incompatible with allegiance to their heretic queen. Their faith made them potential traitors at least. This position, of course, was many stages removed from open rebellion. It ran counter to the national and dynastic loyalty which was strong in Tudor Englishmen of all faiths. It ran counter also to insular prejudices which revolted at the idea of foreign interference, papal or otherwise, in matters of purely English concern. Nevertheless, the fact remained that a great mass, perhaps the majority of Elizabeth's subjects, were discontented with her settlement of religion even at the beginning of her reign when the penal laws were mild and languidly enforced. What attitude they would take if persecution became more rigorous was a matter of gravest moment both to the Queen and to her councillors. It seemed certain that their loyalty could not be depended upon in a crisis, particularly if that crisis took the form of a foreign invasion in the name of their faith.

It is hard to believe that Elizabeth associated any such formidable combination of dangers as these with her choice of religion. If she had she would probably have followed a different course. For she was certainly a woman with a fine eye to the main chance, and one not disposed to take large risks for such matters as her mother's honour, her royal pride, or, least of all, the Protestant theology. The fact appears to be that although she perceived the strength of Roman Catholicism in

Europe she discounted its force in politics. She could after all recall that her father had defied the Pope with comparative impunity, and that even her weakly brother had imposed a rather radical type of heresy upon England without disaster. She knew that within living memory Roman Catholic princes had not hesitated to sign treaties of alliance with infidel Turks and German heretics when it suited their dynastic purposes. Facts like these supported her own natural bias to the conclusion that religion exercised no greater influence in shaping the foreign policy of her neighbours than it did in the shaping of her own. Possibly she was wrong. Walsingham was to spend a large part of his public career in trying to prove to her that she was wrong. And he had plenty of evidence at hand to sustain his view of the matter. Yet it was perhaps well for England that she approached her foreign problems without inconvenient religious prepossessions, and that she steadfastly refused to identify the friends and enemies of her country with the friends and enemies of her church.

Elizabeth inherited from her sister a policy of friendship towards Spain and hostility towards France, and during the ten years of her reign which preceded Walsingham's entrance into her service her attitude towards these two powerful neighbours was to a considerable extent influenced by that of her predecessor. With Philip II of Spain, in spite of her dissatisfaction at his failure to recover Calais for her in the peace negotiations of 1558-9, she was evidently anxious to remain on cordial terms. And at the outset of her reign she discovered in Philip a like inclination. Indeed, he even went so far as to offer her his hand in marriage. She was aware, of course, that he considered her heresy unpardonable, but she did not find it difficult to encourage his hopes that she was still open to conviction in such matters. It must have been plain to her also that Philip, slow always either in making his plans or changing them, had thought too long in terms of an English alliance to abandon it hastily. She did not forget that for nearly four years he had been King in England, nor that he had inherited with his Burgundian territories a tradition of friendship with England which harked back at least as far as the Hundred Years' War. With him as with her France was the

traditional enemy, and though he had taken a French bride after her refusal of his hand, it did not by any means follow that he had wedded the French kingdom, nor settled all his old scores with the Valois at the altar.

Furthermore Elizabeth knew that Philip had rather more than his hands full of trouble already without going out of his way to antagonize her. The Turks were threatening his position in the Mediterranean and were forcing him to keep most of his naval strength in these waters. Discontent was rife among his subjects in North and South Italy. Far more serious discontent was revealing itself in his Netherland provinces. In spite of his treasure fleets from Mexico and Peru his debts were increasing and his credit failing. Elizabeth could set facts like these over against Philip's zeal for his faith and assume with some degree of confidence that for the time being at least she had little to fear from Spain. And as a matter of fact, in spite of no little provocation from her, the attitude of Philip II towards her remained during the first decade of her reign distinctly amicable.

Towards France the prospect to start with was far less promising. Indeed, at the moment of Elizabeth's accession England was actually at war with France, and though peace was signed soon afterwards it was signed upon terms which Elizabeth refused to consider as permanent, for they involved the surrender of the last of England's French dominions, Calais. Looking backwards it is easy to see that the loss of Calais was every way advantageous to England. But Elizabeth's sister had regarded it as the greatest of her many misfortunes and Elizabeth herself was very long in reconciling herself to it. Here again the force of tradition influenced her strongly. For Calais was the last link connecting Elizabethan England with the glorious days of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, the days when English kings had declared the law at Paris and ruled over half of France. And though Elizabeth probably never dreamed of recovering the lost Lancastrian Empire, she still cherished such fragments of it as remained, still called herself Queen of France, still quartered the lilies upon her coat of arms, and still regarded Calais as one of the most precious jewels of her crown. The very fact that she was a woman, and therefore under the

suspicion of weakness, made her the more reluctant to accept the inevitable. But perhaps the most significant feature of this whole matter of Calais was that it quickened in Elizabeth an inherited Lancastrian animosity towards France, which it would be easy to exaggerate, but which certainly affected her relations with that country during the early years of her reign.

At the time of her accession, Henry II was King in France, and the readiness with which he had endorsed the claims of his daughter-in-law, Mary Stuart, to the English throne gave some index as to what Elizabeth might expect from him. His death in the midsummer of 1559 did not at first appear to mend matters much, for though his successor, Francis II, was obviously a weakling, he was Mary Stuart's husband and a pliant tool in the hands of her ambitious uncles of the house of Guise. There could be no doubt about their hostile purposes towards Elizabeth and their readiness to take up the cudgels in support of Mary's English pretensions. But fortunately France was too much exhausted after her long struggle with the Habsburgs and too much disorganized internally to be led into a new war at once. The Guises needed time to restore their strength and establish their power and time was not vouchsafed them. Unpopular as they were both at court and in the country their supremacy hung upon the slender thread of the young king's health. Francis II had been sickly from the first. Towards the middle of November 1560 he was taken down with what proved to be a fatal malady. On the 5th of December he died, leaving Mary to enjoy the poor dignity of a childless dowager. The throne passed to his younger brother Charles and the Guises were forced to hand over the reins of power to his mother, Catherine de Médicis.

So far the march of events in France distinctly favoured Elizabeth. Catherine de Médicis was a Roman Catholic of course, but she was no zealot. Like all of the Médicis she was far more interested in advancing the fortunes of her family than of her faith. It was very unlikely that she would hazard a war with England in behalf of a daughter-in-law whom she cordially disliked, or engage in crusading adventures against heresy at large unless she could be quite sure of solid material returns. The fact is that she was too busy with domestic

difficulties to contemplate an aggressive foreign policy of any sort. Her problem in France was to establish the prestige of the Crown and secure her own position as Queen Regent. It was no easy one to solve. Her son the King was altogether lacking in those qualities which command respect or provoke loyalty. She herself was hated as a foreigner and despised as a woman. In the country at large she could count upon little support, at court she found herself in the midst of the factions of Guise, Montmorenci, and Bourbon, each struggling to exalt itself at the expense of the others and all together, in the weakness of the Crown, creating a situation which recalled the days of feudal anarchy. Under these circumstances she chose perhaps the only course open to her when she set about to play faction against faction and to assert the power of the Crown by establishing a kind of balance of power among its enemies.

Catherine's policy might have succeeded if the force of religion had not appeared to disturb her calculations. France was and remained predominantly Roman Catholic, but thanks to the efforts of John Calvin and his preachers the seeds of heresy had been scattered wide over the land. In 1559 the Huguenots had held their first general synod at Paris. Although they were relatively few in numbers their zeal and their organization already made them a force to be reckoned with. Through the Bourbons at first and through the Montmorencies later they were drawn into the factional quarrels at court, and presently the struggle between the rival houses for supremacy began to take on the features of a religious war. Catherine tried from the first to steer a middle course between the two creeds and early pronounced in favour of mutual toleration. But she was never able to muster enough strength to impose her policy upon France. The militant Catholics, conscious of popular support, would have none of such compromises. They were for exterminating heresy altogether, and it took thirty years of almost continuous warfare to convince them that, preponderantly strong though they were, they were not strong enough to do it. And Catherine, though she disapproved of their efforts, never quite dared to identify the Crown with the unpopular side. Being a secularly minded person herself she was disposed to

regard the religious element in the French civil wars as little more than a cloak to cover the baser purposes of the contending factions. To her it was not so much Catholic versus Huguenot as Guise versus Bourbon, and 'a plague on both their houses'. Nevertheless she had to reckon with the effect of the religious shibboleths upon the popular mind. The consequence was that during the rest of her life she oscillated in the main between two courses, taking arms against the Huguenots when she had no choice, but preferring always to maintain them as a counterpoise to the vaulting ambition of the Guises, who threatened alike the Protestant faith and her own power.

The intrusion of religion into the domestic difficulties of France had a very marked effect upon the relations between that country and England. Elizabeth, although she was not at all disposed to champion Protestant causes on their merits, was quick to appreciate the fact that in the French Huguenots she possessed a valuable ally. So long as they kept France in a turmoil they prevented the French crown from pursuing an aggressive course against her. So far as they could shape French policy they were bound to shape it in her interests, or at any rate against the interests of her sworn enemies, the ultra-Catholics. It was inevitable that they should appeal to her for assistance. She alone, among the great powers of the West, was in a position to befriend them. And in view of her fear of France it was certainly in the highest degree expedient that she should not turn to them a deaf ear. She had learned from her father that her best safeguard against France lay in cultivating the alliance of Spain and in stimulating the ancient rivalry of Habsburg and Valois. The French Huguenots offered her an alternative which was the more welcome because it tended to make her independent of Philip's doubtful friendship. Considering how averse she always was from war, the alacrity with which she accepted the invitation of the Huguenots to lend them open armed assistance in the first civil war was an amazingly bold step for her. Probably she was prompted in part by fear of France, in part by the tempting opportunity to regain Calais. Had she been shrewd enough to appreciate more truly Catherine de Médicis' position she might have followed a different course. At any rate the strength of her own nationalism ought to have

taught her that the surest way to compose internal troubles in France was to present herself there in the guise of a foreign invader. The result of her intervention was from her point of view pure disaster. In the end the Huguenots themselves played her false and notwithstanding their promises actually assisted in driving her out of France. They also had not forgotten the days of Crécy and Agincourt. The consequence was that in the second civil war four years later, and again in the third war of 1568 they found Elizabeth much more wary. She had learned not to trust them too much or commit herself too far to their cause. But she did not lose sight of the importance of maintaining them in France. It is probable that she loaned them secret help in the form of money and supplies in the third civil war, and perhaps even in the second.¹ She was done with open intervention for a long time to come, but she never lost touch with the Huguenots, nor ever allowed them altogether to despair of assistance from her. During the next thirty years they remained a constant and an important factor in her relations with France.

Associated always in the minds of Tudor sovereigns with the problem of France was the problem of Scotland. To Elizabeth that association was particularly apparent since the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots to the French dauphin. Indeed the fear of an alliance between the two countries in support of Mary's pretension to the English throne was one of the liveliest of Elizabeth's fears. On that account she could not but regard with considerable satisfaction the development of a movement in Scotland which ran directly counter to French interests there.

During the decade following the departure of Mary Stuart for France in 1548 Calvinism, leaping in living flame from the lips of John Knox and his preachers, had spread rapidly through the northern kingdom. Even before Elizabeth's accession it dominated a large part of the Scottish lowlands and had drawn many powerful nobles to its support. Its amazing progress was due in large measure to the fact that it became identified with another movement for national independence.

The Scots in their anxiety to escape absorption by England had laid themselves open to the danger of absorption by France.

¹ J. W. Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France*, 345, 373.

Their young sovereign Mary Stuart, who was half French by birth, had been carried off to France to be educated. Her mother, Mary of Guise, who acted as regent in her absence, was altogether French, so were her chief officials. She had garrisoned the chief Scottish fortresses with French soldiers. In fact she governed Scotland as though it were already a French dependency. Her policy inevitably had the effect of stirring the national patriotic spirit of the Scots to resistance. At the same time her rigorous persecution of the Protestants provoked the fighting spirit of the 'hot gospellers'. From these two quarters an opposition arose to her government which had gained such strength by the midsummer of 1559 that she could no longer control it. Open war followed. Mary of Guise sent for French reinforcements. The Lords of the Congregation appealed to Elizabeth.

From one point of view the issue in Scotland was one between Rome and Geneva; from another point of view it was one between monarchy and oligarchy; from a third, one between foreigner and native. From the point of view of Elizabeth it presented itself primarily as an issue between the friends of France and the friends of England. That aspect of the question became apparent when the Scottish lords turned to her for assistance. Their success would inevitably mean the re-establishment of English prestige in the north. Elizabeth did not forget either that it would mean also a shrewd blow at the power of her competitor, Mary Stuart. Upon these grounds she decided after some hesitation to intervene, and her timely assistance to the Protestants, coupled with storms at sea which prevented the arrival of French reinforcements, decided the issue. Mary's partisans were obliged to make peace upon terms which sent France and Rome both a-packing out of Scotland and left a national Protestant pro-English party supreme.

So Elizabeth by a few bold strokes secured her northern frontier and found the key to the solution of the Scottish problem for the rest of her reign. So long as the Protestants were dominant in the north her postern-gate was safe. They were too dependent upon her support to betray her interests. It was obviously her policy to keep them in control. Yet Elizabeth could never forget that her friends in Scotland were

rebels against their anointed sovereign. By countenancing rebellion she not only struck a blow at the divine right of kings which was one of the fundamentals of her political faith, but she also established a precedent which her enemies might use against herself. That was one of the reasons why the policy which circumstances marked out for her in the north was always distasteful to her and why she pursued it with such hesitating steps. It was the irony of fate that Elizabeth had to achieve her ends by virtue of the principles which she despised and at the sacrifice of the few principles which she cherished. In Scotland as in France rebellion and heresy supplied the means with which she warded off the dangers from those quarters. A little later she found them equally effective in dealing with Spain. So it was that in spite of her convictions to the contrary she gradually assumed the role of Protestant champion and faced the serried weapons of the old faith in the armour of the new.

While Elizabeth was reluctant to draw upon the resources of her religion, her competitor, Mary Stuart, was eager to exploit hers. The fact is that the events of the years 1559 and 1560 had reduced Mary to a position in which she was ready to welcome assistance from any quarter. Her mother's death in Scotland, followed hard by the Treaty of Edinburgh, had placed the control of her northern kingdom in the hands of rebellious subjects. Her husband's death had made her a mere cipher in France. In January 1559 the resources of two kingdoms had been at her disposal against Elizabeth. In January 1561 she could command neither.

At this time Mary was still a mere girl, just past eighteen, nearly ten years younger than her rival. By general consent she was one of the most irresistible young women in France. In person she was tall and graceful, with dark brown eyes, chestnut hair, and a pale delicate complexion. It is hard to believe from her portraits that she was positively beautiful. No doubt a large part of her charm lay in the vivacity of her personality. Although she excelled in courtly accomplishments and conformed in the main to courtly conventions, she was at heart a free spirit with much of the freshness, simplicity, and abandon of a wild thing about her. Court life never tamed

the primitive woman in her, a woman quick of wit and nimble of body, sensitive, proud, passionate; loyal to her friends, implacable to her enemies; courageous in action, indomitable in purpose. Unlike Elizabeth, Mary knew how to command affection and how to reward it. Her personal magnetism drew to her hosts of supporters and held them. It was perhaps her most potent weapon. In matters of state she revealed ability of a high order, but she lacked the *sang-froid* of a successful ruler. Here, if anywhere, her English rival overreached her. At a crisis Mary was apt to let her passions command her judgement. She would forget her statecraft when her affections were engaged. This fault in the end led to her undoing.¹

It was not to be expected that a woman of Mary's spirit would accept meekly the humiliating situation in which the events of 1560 had placed her. Her first thought was to recruit her strength and the obvious way for her to do so was by an advantageous marriage. Among many suitors for her hand she gave her preference to Don Carlos, the half-witted son of Philip II. Her object was obviously to win the support of Spain. Philip II was disposed to favour the match at first, but he discovered so much opposition to it both in Catherine de Médicis and Elizabeth of England that he feared it might result in joining France and England together against him. Consequently he withdrew his offer. Disappointed in that quarter Mary decided to return to Scotland. On the 14th of August 1561 she took ship at Calais and a few days later landed at Leith.

The problem which faced Mary in Scotland was a difficult one. Her primary object was to restore her own power. Her uncles had trained her to believe that this could best be accomplished with the help of the Roman Church and the French alliance. But she discovered that such a course of action was for the time being at least quite out of the question. The Protestant, pro-English party was altogether too strong to

¹ A. Lang, *The Mystery of Mary Stuart*, 3. The colour of Mary's hair is a matter of dispute. Some observers maintained that it was black. Cf. Haynes, *Burghley Papers*, 511. As to Mary's character, historians disagree so much that one would have to write a life of her to justify one's point of view. I find it easier to agree with Maurice Hewlett's estimate in *The Queen's Quair* than with Schiller's *Maria Stuart*.

be dealt with that way. She therefore pretended to accept the situation as she found it. She confirmed the Protestant establishment by proclamation. She called Murray and Maitland to her councils and followed in the main the course they outlined for her. She abandoned her pursuit of the French alliance and cultivated with some assiduity the friendship of England, even to the point of submitting the matter of her marriage to Elizabeth's approval. But she was very far from reconciling herself with this state of things. Her own purposes were hostile to the Protestant establishment and the English alliance, and it was not in accord either with her temper or her training that she should relinquish them at the behest of her subjects. Her instinct was not to compromise but to fight, not to temporize with rebellion but to coerce it. She turned to France, she turned to the Pope, she did her best to reopen negotiations for marriage with Don Carlos of Spain. But she obtained no substantial encouragement anywhere. Her failure left her desperate but by no means resigned.

It was at this juncture that Darnley arrived in Scotland. Some historians maintain that Mary fell desperately in love with this arrogant, headstrong boy. Others insist that her governing motives in the events which follow were purely political ones.¹ The latter seems to be the more reasonable view. Darnley was a Roman Catholic, of the blood royal, and could command some strength in Scotland. Murray and the preachers and Elizabeth were all strongly opposed to him. These were probably the considerations which found him favour in Mary's eyes. It seems likely that she hoped by a union with him to build up a party which would be strong enough to free her from the domination of the Protestant lords and from the hated English alliance. And so she married him.

But Darnley soon proved to be absolutely unfit for the part which Mary had designed for him. She found him too intract-

¹ Cf. on what follows: Hume Brown, *History of Scotland*, ii. 100 ff.; Henderson, *Mary Stuart*, i. 307 ff.; Froude, viii. 161 ff.; Lang, *History of Scotland*, ii. 138 ff. It would be impossible to consider here the unending controversies associated with Mary's career from this time forward. Henderson's Life seems to me to be the best, though it needs to be read in conjunction with Andrew Lang's *Mystery of Mary Stuart*. To some degree Lang has been captivated by Mary's charms. On the other hand Henderson has rather too much ignored them.

able and untrustworthy to be admitted into her councils or made partaker of her real intentions. Instead of adding to her strength his arrogance bade fair to alienate her most powerful supporters. In a word the defects of Darnley's character robbed Mary's second marriage of any political advantage which she had hoped to gain from it. It simply served to increase the difficulties of her position. She had the additional problem on her hands of rendering a husband, who was incapable of doing her any service, incapable of doing positive injury to her cause.

But she failed even in this. The effect of her attitude towards Darnley was to make him at first peevish and then rebellious. In this mood he naturally became intensely jealous of David Riccio, the Italian choir singer, whom Mary had advanced to the position of confidential adviser. Riccio, in fact, was at this time Mary's right-hand man. Her dependence upon him stood out in marked contrast to her distrust of Darnley. It was darkly rumoured that he was filling her husband's place in more capacities than one. Naturally he made many enemies. The preachers regarded him as the agent of Rome. The Protestant lords despised him as an upstart foreigner who had usurped their place in the royal councils. How far Darnley himself was responsible for what followed and how far he was merely the instrument of others is not an easy matter to determine. He certainly lent his countenance to a plot to murder Riccio in a way which showed that he had no regard either for Mary's interests or for her personal honour. The plot was executed under circumstances too familiar to need repetition. Its effect was to make Mary, who already despised Darnley for his weakness, hate him for his treachery.

The events which follow ought to be considered in the light of the events past. Mary was plainly desperate. For six years she had thrown the whole strength of her young womanhood—she was not yet four-and-twenty—into the pursuit of her political ambitions, and she had been thwarted at every turn. And the future promised as little as the past had paid, a private life with 'false fleeting Darnley', a public life in the midst of the self-seeking politicians that surrounded her. The woman in her was probably weary of it all and lonely from standing long alone. It was at this juncture that Bothwell won her

heart. He brought strength and loyalty and she yielded herself completely into his hands. It was not politics, but mere human passion, long athirst, at length satisfied. Mary drank deep of it without thought of consequences. She threw her political ambitions to the winds and with a fine abandon swore that she would yield her place in Scotland and her hopes in England and go with Bothwell 'to the world's end in a white petticoat, ere she left him'.¹

The result, as is well known, was disaster. Bothwell, probably with Mary's connivance, contrived Darnley's death at Kirk o' Field. Three months later the guilty pair were married in Edinburgh. It was not the murder but Mary's subsequent alliance with Bothwell which led to her undoing. The Protestant lords had good reason not to be unduly curious about Darnley's latter end, but they were in no wise disposed to submit to an arrangement which placed the royal power in the hands of a man who, although a Protestant, was strongly opposed to their personal interests. Their own motives in what followed were probably in large measure selfish ones, but Mary's indiscretion had the effect of rallying Protestant Scotland at large to their side. The moral sense of the people had been outraged by her conduct. They regarded her marriage to Bothwell, whom the universal voice denounced as her husband's murderer, as plain proof of the fact that she had been a lustful partner in the crime. Under the circumstances there was nothing for Mary to do but fight. She fled with Bothwell from Edinburgh and mustered forces in the south. The lords mustered in turn. At Carberry Hill, where the two armies met in June, the lords won a bloodless victory. Bothwell was permitted to escape, but Mary had to yield herself a prisoner. The attitude of her Protestant subjects towards her was revealed by the shouts which greeted her as she entered their ranks. 'Burn the whore ! Burn the murderess of her husband.' Her courage was equal to the occasion. She retorted that she would hang and crucify the lot of them.²

After Carberry, Mary's political career in Scotland was practically at an end. The lords after a fruitless effort to induce her to divorce Bothwell threw her in prison at Lochleven.

¹ Henderson, ii. 455.

² Ibid. ii. 469.

There she was forced to resign her throne in favour of her son, and to appoint her half-brother Murray regent. About a year later she succeeded in effecting her escape and, with the assistance of the powerful house of Hamilton, in making head once more against her opponents. The battle of Langside which followed ended in her total defeat. She fled from the field. After a fruitless effort to reach Dumbarton, where she might have taken ship for France, she turned her horse's head southward. Two days' hard riding brought her to the Solway, which she crossed in a boat, and on the 16th of May 1568 landed in England.

Mary probably fled into England because she had no alternative. Once there, having drawn breath, her first thought was to renew the fight against her rebellious subjects. Sir Francis Knollys, an English Councillor who went to attend her at Carlisle, found her 'dedicated to revenge', with a 'bloody appetite to shed the blood of her enemies'.¹ She appealed to Elizabeth at once for assistance, basing her plea upon assurances of support which had been sent her when she was prisoner at Lochleven. But she made it quite clear that if Elizabeth would not help her, she would seek aid elsewhere, from France, from Spain, from the Pope, even from the great Turk himself before she would submit to the indignities that her subjects had heaped upon her.²

Elizabeth naturally viewed the situation from an entirely different angle. On principle she disapproved of the course which Mary's subjects had taken. It was contrary to her whole notion of sovereignty to recognize any right in subjects to resist lawfully constituted authority. But Elizabeth never allowed her principles to stand in the way of practical expediency. In point of fact events in Scotland had gone very much to her taste. The policy which Mary had been attempting to carry out had been subversive of Elizabeth's interests, and the Protestant lords, rebels though they were, had rendered her a great service in preventing its success. Their pre-eminence in Scotland was her best assurance of security in that quarter. Principles or no principles, Elizabeth realized that it would be bad policy

¹ Pollard, *Political History of England, 1547-1603*, 270-1.

² *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 42.

to assist in Mary's restoration. Though she made some feints in that direction, she probably never seriously intended it. On the other hand it would clearly never do to give Mary a free hand to appeal for help elsewhere. With Spain or France behind her she might become a more serious menace than ever she had been. There was only one thing to be done, and that was to keep her in England.

Yet Elizabeth realized that there were dangers to be faced even in that course. It has been pointed out already that a large proportion, if not the actual majority of her subjects, were Roman Catholic sympathizers and that their loyalty to her Protestant régime was in consequence always a doubtful quantity. So far they had given her little cause for apprehension, but her increasing rigour towards their faith had increased their discontent to such an extent as to breed a rebellious spirit among them. This was particularly true in the north. The gentry and the peasantry in the northern counties were Roman Catholic almost to a man, and their religious zeal was not tempered by the same strong feeling of fidelity to the Crown that kept the south submissive. In spite of all the centralizing machinery of Tudor despotism they were still dominated by a spirit which was rather local and even feudal, than national. They paid their allegiance much more naturally and much more willingly to the houses of Percy and Neville and Dacres than to a distant heretic queen. This condition of things, coupled with their geographical remoteness from the centre of royal power, made the position of the great northern earls an extremely strong one. They were, in consequence, besides being zealous Catholics, stout champions of local autonomy and feudal privilege. As such they were resolutely opposed to the Protestant, ruthlessly centralizing policy of the Crown.¹ It is pretty clear that at the outset their opposition was not so much directed against Elizabeth herself as against her secretary, Sir William Cecil, to whose pernicious influence they attributed all that was objectionable in her manner of government.

Their hostility to Cecil was shared by a group of powerful

¹ R. R. Reid, *The Rebellion of the Earls, 1569*, Trans. Royal Hist. Society, N. S., xx. 171 ff.; Lapsley, 'The Problem of the North,' *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, 1900, pp. 400-66; Reid, *The King's Council in the North*, pp. 1-22.

nobles in the Privy Council itself led by the Duke of Norfolk. These men regarded the secretary as an upstart commoner and wanted to overthrow him because they wanted to get the control of the government into their own hands. They were nominally Protestants, but were for the most part much less zealous for their faith than they were for their own power and influence.¹ Since Cecil was strong with the Protestants, they naturally leaned for support towards the Roman Catholics.

Under these circumstances the detention of Mary in England was, as Cecil himself observed, a step which might lead to grave consequences. Her religion, coupled with her title to the throne, was bound to commend her cause to the malcontents and might serve them as a rallying point about which to organize their strength. That this danger was not merely a theoretical one was demonstrated by the behaviour of the Catholic gentry in north England upon Mary's first arrival there. They had flocked to her from all quarters to pay their respects with an enthusiasm which presaged ill for the future.

These facts go far to explain the course which was followed in the shuffling inquiry into Mary's differences with her subjects which Elizabeth undertook in the autumn of 1568. It professed to represent a desire on her part to get to the bottom of the Darnley murder in order to give her a sure basis for further action. She turned it to the purpose of discrediting her rival in the eyes of those English noblemen who were suspected of being in secret sympathy with her. Probably the most significant part of the whole proceedings, from Elizabeth's point of view, was at the sessions at Westminster where all the most damaging evidence against her rival was laid before the eyes of Norfolk and his partisans in the Council, and before Northumberland and Westmorland, the most dangerous of the northern earls. Shortly afterwards, having refused to give Mary a view of the evidence in order that she might answer in her own defence, Elizabeth allowed the commission of inquiry to terminate its proceedings with an ambiguous decision which left Mary's reputation still under a cloud.² Later, in January 1569,

¹ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 111. This would hardly be true, however, of Sir Nicholas Throgmorton, who shared their hostility to Cecil; cf. Stählin, i. 224.

² Cf. Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 277 ff.

she was removed from the unsteady north to Bolton, farther inland, somewhat cynically described to her as a place 'more honourable and agreeable', and the actual term of her imprisonment under the charge of the Earl of Shrewsbury began.

Of course Elizabeth realized that the domestic discontent stimulated by Mary's presence in England was only part of the danger to be faced from her detention there. Mary had a strong claim upon the support of both France and Spain; upon France in particular by reason of her connexion with the House of Guise; upon both France and Spain as a Roman Catholic monarch deposed by rebellious heretics and held prisoner by an heretic rival. And she made it quite clear that she realized fully the elements of strength in her position and that she meant to exploit them for all that they were worth. She protested that she had been deceived and betrayed. With a view to accentuating the religious character of the issue between her and her rival she began to assume the role of a Roman Catholic martyr.¹ It was evident that she aimed to awaken the zeal of the Roman Catholic powers in her behalf.

In fact the woman was a menace wherever she was, and Elizabeth had no sooner turned the key upon her than she was forced to reckon with the possible consequences of that action upon her relations both with France and Spain.

France at any rate seemed fairly safe. Technically she was still at peace with herself. The Treaty of Longjumeau had terminated the Second of the French Civil Wars in March 1568. But every well-informed person in France realized that the peace was no more than a truce and that the whole attention of Mary's friends, the Guises, there was directed to a renewal of the attack against the Protestants. If the Guises should succeed in their purposes and re-establish their domination over French foreign policy Elizabeth knew what to expect.² But it was not at all certain that they would succeed. Elizabeth had good reason to believe that not only the Huguenots but also a large party among the Catholics were opposed to their domination. The Montmorencies were even contemplating an Anglo-

¹ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 71, 74; Teulet, *Relations politiques de la France et de l'Espagne avec l'Écosse*, v. 41, 43.

² Cf. Norris to Cecil, 28 June 1568, in *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1566-8, 490.

French alliance and had already suggested to the English ambassador at Paris the desirability of a marriage between Elizabeth and Henry of Anjou, the brother of the French king.

From Philip II of Spain Elizabeth did not know quite what to expect. At the outset of her reign, as has been pointed out already, she had counted mainly upon his old fear of France to keep him friendly to England. Even after ten years, and in spite of his French marriage, this ancient rivalry between Habsburg and Valois had not yet spent its force, though it was clearly a less dependable factor than it had been. There remained, moreover, as a very strong force making for Anglo-Spanish peace, the commercial relations between England and Philip's Burgundian territories. For centuries the commerce between England and the Low Countries had been easily the most important branch of English foreign trade. To Elizabeth it probably constituted the most important single factor in the determination of her policy towards Spain. Even to Philip, inconsiderate as he too often was of the business interests of his Netherlanders, it appeared to be distinctly worth the cherishing. Diplomatic tradition, then, and commercial tradition favoured an Anglo-Spanish entente.

But other factors in the situation operated in another direction. Spain welcomed English traders to her ports in Europe, but in the trade with her colonies over seas she aimed to maintain a strictly Spanish monopoly. Up to the time of Elizabeth's accession the English government had never very seriously questioned her right to do so. It was generally held, however, that in those remote regions the responsibility of a government for the conduct of its individual subjects could hardly be fixed. This view found expression in the current phrase 'No peace beyond the line'. The consequence was that when adventurous spirits like John Hawkins began to invade the Spanish colonial preserves Elizabeth disclaimed official responsibility. To the reiterated protests of the Spanish ambassador she made smooth answers and expressed regrets. Secretly she loaned Hawkins her own money and her own ships to continue his enterprises.¹ Whether it was the promise of large returns on her investment or some wider vision of empire which prompted

¹ Pollard, *op. cit.* 314.

her, certainly she did not want war with Spain and certainly she did not expect such trivial matters to lead to war. Yet it is not less certain that Hawkins and others like him did much with her connivance to increase Spanish hostility towards England.

In any event Elizabeth was probably right in assuming that the most serious difference between England and Spain was the difference of religion. One way and another she had managed for a season to convey the impression abroad that her rather lukewarm Protestantism was not beyond the reach of argument. But as time went on and she persisted in her heresy, Roman Catholic Europe, of which Philip of Spain was the acknowledged temporal leader, began to consider seriously vigorous measures to bring her to her reckoning. Elizabeth was not unaware of that fact, and though the stories she heard were no doubt exaggerated, they were not without foundation and their cumulative effect was certainly alarming.

She had been informed that the Council of Trent, which finished its sessions in 1563, had decreed the deposition of all heretic sovereigns.¹ Early in 1564 she learned that plans were being laid in Rome for her assassination. In 1565 came news of a secret conference between the Duke of Alva and Catherine de Médicis at Bayonne, which her Protestant Councillors at any rate believed to have resulted in a holy league of the two great Catholic powers against Protestantism at large. When all due allowance was made, the evidence at hand seemed sufficient to show Elizabeth that her Most Catholic brother of Spain was simply waiting for a suitable opportunity to lead a crusade against her under the banners of the Roman Catholic Church. Faced with this prospect Elizabeth might very well pause and consider what Philip was likely to do about Mary Stuart's imprisonment.

She had at least the satisfaction of realizing that whatever his animus might be he was hardly in a position in the mid-summer of 1568, at any rate, to undertake a war against her in Mary's behalf. There was too much to engage his attention in other quarters. In Spain his oppression of his Moorish subjects had already stirred them to the verge of revolt. In the

¹ Stählin, i. 172.

Mediterranean the Turks, checked for the time being at Malta in 1565 and by the death of Solyman in 1566, were already preparing for a fresh descent upon his coasts. More serious, as it proved, than either of these was the increasing discontent over his rule in the Netherlands.

The causes of that discontent are too well known to demand a detailed discussion. They were in part political, in part religious, in part economic. The great nobles of the Low Countries like the Count of Egmont and the Prince of Orange resented Philip's disposition to govern them through foreigners; the mercantile classes disliked his heavy taxes and his failure to keep the peace; while the Calvinists, who were rapidly increasing in numbers, had no choice but to oppose his exterminating policy of persecution. It seemed at first that the Spanish regent, Margaret of Parma, might be able to conciliate this discontent by judicious concessions. She secured the removal of Granvella, the most objectionable of the foreigners, and made a larger place for the native nobility in her councils. She even went so far, under pressure of increasing religious disorders, as to agree to a limited toleration to Calvinism. But her policy was not successful, nor was it approved by her royal master in Spain. Philip II distrusted the Netherland nobles and he hated the Calvinists like the devil. The local autonomy at which Orange and his confreres aimed was altogether opposed to Philip's Spanish tradition of government. The gospel of toleration was to him a compromise with the powers of darkness. He therefore repudiated the concessions of his half-sister, and early in 1567 dispatched the stern old warrior, Duke of Alva, to re-establish peace by blood and iron. On the 22nd of August 1567 Alva arrived in Brussels with ten thousand men.¹

Alva made short work of every trouble-breeder he could lay his iron hands on. But the greatest of them all escaped him. William of Orange, who had fled from the Low Countries before the Duke's arrival, proceeded with the assistance of his brother Louis and others to organize armed resistance in Germany. The motley armies which he got together proved a little later in the year to be no match for Alva's Black Beards, but at any

¹ Blok, *History of the People of the Netherlands*, trans. by Ruth Putnam, iii. 39.

rate the standard of revolt had been raised and a fire lighted in the Low Countries which was to engage King Philip's attention as long as he lived. It does not appear that Elizabeth realized at the beginning the value of this diversion. To the Spanish ambassador at London she expressed her satisfaction at Alva's successes.¹ Later she was to discover in the Dutch rebels an effective instrument for warding off the hostility of Spain.

Such was the confused state of Elizabeth's relations with her neighbours when Francis Walsingham, being then some thirty-six years of age, wrote a letter which marks his entrance into English foreign affairs. The letter was written to Secretary Cecil at the request of Sir Nicholas Throgmorton, who was himself too ill to write. It concerned a certain Mr. Robert Stewart who had been sent over from France by the Huguenot leaders to solicit aid from the Queen. Stewart was a man unskilled in courtly dealings and too plain spoken to suit Elizabeth. She had not hesitated to say so. On that account Throgmorton, who had been English Ambassador to France during the First Civil War there and who was at this time one of the most ardent advocates of the Huguenot cause in England, felt called upon to explain how it had come about that so inept a man as Stewart had been entrusted with the mission. Walsingham wrote that in the uncertain condition of affairs in France, 'fine spoken' men refused to make 'these voyages of hazard', and he begged Cecil to secure for Stewart 'a grateful access' to the Queen, because he had much to impart 'by mouth' which 'her Majesty should know'. He asked Cecil further to see that Stewart was 'well lodged' and properly attended.²

This letter obviously deals with matters which it was very important to keep secret. There was nothing perhaps which Elizabeth was so anxious to conceal as her underhand dealings with the rebellious subjects of her neighbours. The fact, then, that Walsingham wrote this letter reveals at once that he was deep in the confidence of the government. It reveals further that he was already at the very outset of his official career an earnest co-worker in the cause of militant Protestantism. But, so far, the letter throws very little light upon the exact nature

¹ Froude, ix. 325.

² S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlvii, no. 41.

of the position which Walsingham was occupying at this time. Upon this point a postscript which he added on his own account is significant. 'Touching those matters', he wrote, 'wherein you appointed me to deal, I will to-morrow, in the morning, attend upon your Lordship to advertise you what I have done therein.' Clearly Francis Walsingham in August 1568 was employed in the service of Secretary Cecil.

The nature of the work which he had to do is revealed by a report which he forwarded to Cecil two days later 'from Franchiotto, the Italian'. The burden of this report was to the effect that the Queen should take good heed of the advices she had recently received, and that she should look well to her food, her bedding and other furniture, lest poison be secretly administered. The report included a list of suspicious persons who had arrived in England during the three months past.¹

This 'Franchiotto, the Italian', appears to have been a Captain Thomas Franchiotto, of Lucca, an Italian Protestant of long experience in diplomatic secret service, who had for the past forty years been in the pay of the French crown.² Exactly when he had come to England or for what purpose is uncertain. The explanation of Walsingham's dealings with him is probably to be found in the correspondence of Sir Henry Norris, the English ambassador in France. Ever since Mary Stuart's arrival in England, Norris had been sending to Cecil ominous reports of the hostile intentions of the Guises towards Elizabeth. He reported that they were tampering with the loyalty of the English Catholics, that they were making plans for Mary's deliverance, that their leader, Mary's uncle, the Cardinal of Lorraine, had sent certain Italians into England to practise against Elizabeth's person. Early in August 1568 Norris recommended to Cecil that he make use of Captain François in ferreting out these Italian conspirators. No doubt this Captain François was none other than Franchiotto. The presumption is a strong one that Cecil acted upon Norris's advice and made use of Walsingham to engage the services of the Italian.³

It appears that for the next month at least Walsingham and

¹ *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, i. 361; *Stählin*, i. 203, n. 1.

² *Stählin*, i. 202, n. 1.

³ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1566-8, 490, 500, 505, 512.

Franchiotto were working together upon this business. On the 15th of September Walsingham informed Cecil that he had arranged with the Lord Mayor of London to have weekly reports made of all strangers who took lodgings in the city. By the same letter he sent news 'from a friend', presumably none other than Franchiotto, of two suspicious characters lately departed from Southwark, and he reported a long conversation which the same friend had held with the Cardinal Châtillon, Admiral Coligny's brother, who had recently arrived in England. For the most part this conversation had consisted in a detailed description by the Cardinal of two persons 'sent by the said Cardinal of Lorraine to execute the lewd practice in the search whereof it pleaseth you to employ us'.¹

This letter as well as the foregoing report of Franchiotto make clear that Walsingham at this time was assisting Cecil in secret service work. So far as can be ascertained this was the first work outside his duties in Parliament which he did for the Crown. It must not be supposed that he was acting merely as one of Cecil's paid secret agents. All other considerations aside, that was not the kind of work which a man of his social position and independent means would have undertaken. What little of his correspondence survives for this period indicates that he was doing little more than serving as an intermediary between Franchiotto and Cecil.² Probably he occupied no formal position. It was customary in his time for the Queen to make use of private subjects in casual public business of all sorts, and probably Walsingham's knowledge of foreign languages and his wide acquaintance abroad recommended him to this particular task. Possibly Cecil, who had already recognized his abilities, took this method of trying him out. Walsingham himself no doubt welcomed the opportunity to reveal his aptitude for the Queen's service.

¹ S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlvii, no. 72. On Châtillon's mission to England cf. Atkinson, *The Cardinal of Châtillon in England, 1568-71*.

² All of Walsingham's letters to Cecil which survive from this time begin in much the same fashion: 'I was willed by my friend to advertise you,' or some equivalent phrase. It is not certain that this 'friend' was in every case Franchiotto, but the character of the information supplied establishes a strong presumption in favour of that view. Stählin assumes that there were different informants and so conveys an impression that Walsingham's part in public affairs at this time was larger than it appears in fact to have been.

During the rest of the year 1568 his relations with Cecil followed much the same channel. Franchiotto continued to accumulate evidence of the hostile intentions of Elizabeth's enemies which he reported verbally to Walsingham, who in turn transmitted it, generally without comment, to Cecil. Late in September he sent word of a conversation that Franchiotto had held with the Bishop of Rennes, an envoy lately arrived in London from the French king to remonstrate against Elizabeth's dealings with the Huguenots. By provoking Rennes to anger Franchiotto had succeeded in eliciting the fact that the bishop was a creature of the Cardinal of Lorraine and that his party in France anticipated a rebellion in England and were contemplating forcible intervention in behalf of the captive Queen of Scots. This advice was of some service to the Queen when she gave audience to Rennes a little later.¹ In October Walsingham reported that Franchiotto had news from France of preparations in Marseilles for the transporting of soldiers into England.² A little later, when the question of Mary Stuart's complicity in the murder of Darnley was under consideration at Westminster, he wrote, 'I am willed by my friend to advertise you that if for the discovery of the Queen of Scots' consent to the murder of her husband there lack sufficient proofs, he is able (if it shall please you to use him) to discover certain that should have been employed in the same murder who are here to be produced'.³ Again in December he transmitted information which his friend had received from Paris that both France and Spain had 'within this realm a practice in hand for the alteration of religion and the advancement of the Queen of Scots to the crown'.

¹ S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cii, no. 2031. Cecil wrote to Norris a brief account of the Queen's interview with Rennes (*Cabala*, 142-3). Rennes, by the way, was the brother of the resident French ambassador at London, Bochetel de la Forêt. La Forêt was recalled to France in November of the same year and his place supplied by Bertrand de Salignac de la Mothe Fénélon, a man not so closely connected with the Guisan faction. This change in ambassadors may in itself be an indication of a desire on the part of the French crown to cultivate the friendship of Elizabeth.

² S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlviii, no. 23.

³ S. P., Mary Stuart, ii, no. 46. Apparently this offer was never investigated by the English government and there is no way of telling how much evidence 'my friend' could have produced. It is hard to believe, however, that if the murderers were actually at hand they should have been altogether ignored, even though Elizabeth may not have been desirous of pushing the case against Mary home.

Walsingham seems to have been somewhat sceptical of the truth of this last portentous item of news. His comment upon it to Cecil reveals that fact:

'For that this advertisement is so general and descendeth to no particularities, I thought to have forborne to have troubled your honour withal at this present, but, weighing his [the friend's] earnest protestation of the credit of the party it came from, the nature of the matter as of the greatest importance, the malice of this present time, the allegiance and particular good will I owe to her Majesty, and the danger that might come to me by the concealing thereof, if any such thing (which God defend) thereafter should happen, I saw in duty I could not forbear to write.'

In closing this letter Walsingham makes his first recorded observation upon the situation of affairs in England. 'I beseech your honour', he writes, 'that I may without offense conclude that in this division that reigneth among us, there is less danger in fearing too much than too little, and that there is nothing more dangerous than security.'¹

There appears to be no positive proof that at the time when Walsingham penned his words of caution anything so definite as a joint 'practice' against England had been arranged between France and Spain, though the efforts of the House of Guise in that direction gave good grounds for fearing as much. Elizabeth's Privy Council at any rate realized that foreign affairs were approaching a crisis, though they were by no means agreed as to how the crisis should be faced. One element was disposed to lend a favourable ear to the pleadings of Chatillon and the Huguenot envoys who were urging Elizabeth to join forces with them and declare war on the French crown.² Another element favoured war against Spain. Of the two alternative policies Cecil, who was easily the most influential of the councillors, leaned on the whole towards the latter. It is hardly likely that he actually desired to fight Spain, but he clearly believed that Philip should be dealt with firmly. The virtual expulsion of William Mann, the English ambassador in Madrid, and the insolence of Gerau de Spes, the new Spanish ambassador in

¹ Walsingham to Cecil, 20 Dec. 1568, S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlviii, no. 61.

² *Correspondance de la Mothe Fénelon*, i. 46 ff.

England, demanded no less.¹ Probably Cecil's point of view in the matter was determined in part at least by the dislocation of English trade relations with the Netherlands. The religious disturbances on land and the activities of the Flemish pirates at sea had played so much havoc with English commerce that the Merchant Adventurers had already made preparation to shift their continental depot from Antwerp to Hamburg.² Under these circumstances one of the strongest arguments in favour of cultivating the goodwill of Spain lost much of its force. Cecil saw also that Philip was too much embarrassed by his Moorish and his Dutch problems to be in a position to resent a firmer stand on England's part. These considerations probably explain why it was that Cecil dared provoke his mistress to lay violent hands upon a fleet of Spanish payships which in December 1568 took refuge from the channel pirates in English harbours. The stroke was an audacious one. It called forth reprisals as a matter of course. Alva seized all English property in the Netherlands and placed an embargo on English trade. But when Elizabeth retorted by seizing all Spanish property in England she rather more than redressed the balance. Spain could do nothing more. Even Alva's hope of ruining English commerce was thwarted. The Merchant Adventurers at once proceeded to utilize their treaty with Hamburg and fared so well that they were able to advance the Queen £40,000 out of their profits.³ Yet, of course, the net result of all these manœuvres was to quicken Philip's animosity towards Elizabeth and to increase his interest in practices against her. He was the more ready to lend a friendly ear to the reiterated appeals of Mary Stuart for assistance and to encourage the increasing discontent of the persecuted English Catholics.

In England Mary herself was skilfully organizing the various elements of discord for her own purposes. Even before she came to England she had had some dealings with the English Catholics and had received assurances from prominent men among them of their readiness to rise in her behalf.⁴ The

¹ Hume, *Great Lord Burghley*, 210-12, 220.

² Ehrenberg, *Hamburg und England im Zeitalter Elizabeths*, 102.

³ *Ibid.* 108-10.

⁴ *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, i. 338.

entertainment which she had received at the hands of the north country gentry upon her arrival at Carlisle no doubt encouraged her to count on their support. She seems to have resisted the temptation to tamper with their discontent until she became aware of the nature of Elizabeth's intentions towards her. But before the summer of 1568 was over she was busy formulating plans with the northern earls which contemplated her release from prison, the assertion of her rights to the English succession, and a larger measure of toleration for their common religion.¹ The intention was apparently to achieve these ends by force of arms. The earls were to muster their strength in the north, Mary was to procure foreign aid. Her hopes ran high at this juncture. In September she wrote to her sister-in-law, the Queen of Spain, that if she could get the smallest assurance of support from abroad, she would undertake to suppress Protestantism in England though she died in the attempt.²

Up to this time she does not seem to have made any reckoning of assistance from Norfolk and his partisans in the Privy Council. An opportunity to enlist them in her cause presented itself in October 1568. It came in the form of a proposal of a marriage between herself and Norfolk. There is some doubt as to who suggested this match in the first place.³ Mary with a single eye to increase her strength fell in with it at once. It is probable that she had something to do with securing Norfolk's rather reluctant assent. Her militant Catholic friends were less acquiescent. They distrusted the duke as a Protestant and would have preferred to marry Mary to some strong foreign Catholic prince.⁴ But she succeeded in overcoming their objections. In a word, she was instrumental in joining together with her the two most formidable enemies to Elizabeth's government in England, the religious malcontents in the north, and the political malcontents in the Queen's council. The purposes of this triple alliance did not differ in essentials from those framed earlier by Mary and the northern earls. Norfolk naturally undertook to co-operate with Mary in the assertion of her rights and to secure

¹ Henderson, *Mary Stuart*, ii. 505.

² Labanoff, *Lettres, etc., de Marie Stuart*, ii. 182; Teulet, *Relations politiques de la France et l'Espagne avec l'Écosse*, v. 43.

³ Cf. on this Murdin, *Burghley Papers*, 52; Bain, *Cal. of S. P. Scotland*, iv. 343.

⁴ Bain, *ibid.*, iv. 343.

for the Catholics the recognition of theirs. He in turn was assured of their support in his intention to remove Cecil and control the government in his stead.¹ His attachment to Mary's party did, however, involve a considerable change in its plan of procedure. He was opposed to armed rebellion and believed that he could force Elizabeth by a mere show of his strength to accede to his demands. Mary did not altogether share his confidence, but thought his scheme worth trying and once more drew her Catholic followers into line.²

Meantime, while Mary had been developing her strength in England she had been seeking continually to secure aid from abroad. At first she seems to have appealed indiscriminately to France and to Spain. She even had some hopes of joint action by them both in her behalf. But the breach in the relations between England and Spain which grew out of the detention of the Spanish payships led her to place her main dependence upon Philip. She wrote to Philip herself and worked upon his sympathies through d'Alava, his ambassador at Paris, and de Spes, his ambassador at London. In January 1569 she sent to inform de Spes that if his master would help she would be Queen of England in three months.³ Norfolk and his partisans, who were forced by the necessity of secrecy to work more or less independently of her, followed the same lead. Like her they appealed for aid both to France and Spain; like her also and for the same reasons they leaned mainly upon Spain. It is to be observed, however, that although they sought to bring all kinds of pressure to bear upon Elizabeth from these quarters, they did not at this juncture contemplate any foreign armed intervention. De Spes remarked in them an attitude of mind upon that point which probably constituted in the long run Elizabeth's greatest safeguard: 'The English hate the very name of foreigner and they wish the change to be made in a way that shall not hand them over to any other nation.'⁴

During the spring and summer of 1569 Mary and her partisans for the most part pinned their hopes to the success of Norfolk's plans, although some of the most zealous Roman Catholics

¹ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 111.

² With the exception of Lord Dacres.

³ Labanoff, ii. 237; Teulet, v. 41, 43; *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 97 ff.

⁴ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 157.

concocted schemes to effect her release by a sudden surprise while matters still hung in suspense. The duke himself made great headway. He proclaimed abroad Mary's title to the succession with so much assurance that the fact was generally accepted. In August he secured a decision of the Privy Council to the effect that she should be set at liberty on condition that she married with an Englishman. His strength at this time was so apparent that even Cecil thought it wise to simulate acquiescence. De Spes wrote on the 27th of August that success was practically assured.¹

All that remained to be done was to force the hand of Elizabeth herself. The French ambassador remarked late in July that she had already some inkling of the business and felt very badly about it but, he thought, would hardly dare oppose it.² That was Norfolk's own view and possibly, if he had borne himself with resolution when the crisis came, he might have won the day. But Elizabeth had too much Tudor blood in her veins to be coerced without a fight, and Norfolk lacked the courage to defy her even with the strength at his command. Early in September, in a fine storm of royal wrath, she forbade his marriage. Instead of taking his stand at once he fled from the court to consult with his friends. Elizabeth commanded him upon his allegiance to return. Faced with the alternative of obedience and open rebellion his nerve failed him. He wrote to the Catholic earls in the north, who were already preparing to fight, to stay their hand. 'Considering the number of the Duke's friends in England,' de Spes wrote on the last day of September, 'he cannot be ruined except by pusillanimity.'³ A few days later, on his way back to court, he was arrested.

The effect of Norfolk's failure upon Mary's Roman Catholic partisans was simply to throw them back again upon the policy which they had somewhat reluctantly abandoned at the time he had entered their counsels. They reopened communications with Mary, they appealed for aid to Spain and France, and they organized their forces in the north. In November the Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland raised the standard of revolt

¹ Labanoff, ii. 344; Bain, iv. 343; *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 166, 180, 189; Haynes, 594, Murdin, 30; *Correspondance de la Mothe Fénelon*, ii. 127.

² *Correspondance de la Mothe Fénelon*, ii. 127-8.

³ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 198.

at Durham, proclaimed themselves champions of the old faith, and took the crusading cross. Their plan was to seize York and then march southward to liberate Mary at Tutbury. But dissensions in their own ranks, the swift removal of Mary to a safe position at Coventry, the failure of foreign aid which they had been led to expect, and the apathetic attitude of the English Catholics at large towards them foredoomed them to disaster. Even before the forces which Elizabeth quickly organized to oppose them could give them battle they had begun to retreat. Before the end of the year Westmorland, Northumberland, and most of the other leaders had fled across the borders into Scotland. Another attempt, rather more valiantly conducted under Leonard Dacres early in the next year, met with a similar fate.¹

From the point of view of Francis Walsingham the first Norfolk plot is significant in calling forth what appears to have been the first political pamphlet to have proceeded from his pen. Exactly when this pamphlet was written and when it was printed is not easy to determine, but it certainly appeared before Norfolk's imprisonment in the spring of 1569. How widely it circulated and to what extent it represented a definite appeal to public opinion on the question of the Norfolk marriage project cannot be ascertained. It would be idle to speculate how Walsingham came to write it. Presumably he would hardly have ventured so far in the discussion of such a delicate matter of public policy without some prompting from on high. It seems not unlikely that Cecil himself supplied the stimulus, for although he appeared for a time to acquiesce in the Norfolk matter he almost certainly at heart opposed it. The whole tone of the pamphlet makes it plain that it was addressed to a radically Protestant group of readers. In any event it defines Walsingham's position clearly enough both towards this plan of marriage and towards Mary Stuart in general.²

¹ Reid, *The Rebellion of the Earls*, 1569, in Trans. Royal Hist. Society, N. S. xx.

² Stählin has given a *résumé* of this pamphlet in his life of Walsingham, i. 234 ff. He made use of a manuscript copy of it in the British Museum (Harl. MSS. 290, f. 117). There are two other manuscript copies in the British Museum (Harl. MSS. 4314, f. 120, and Cotton MSS., Appendix L). Stählin does not appear to have been aware that it was not only written for the press but also actually printed, yet there are copies of two different editions of it in the British Museum. One of these has the catalogue number C. 33 a. 42, the

From every point of view he regarded Mary Stuart with hostile eyes. She was a Scot, a Guisian, an evil character, a papist, a competitor for the English throne, a member of a league for the destruction of Protestantism. He distrusted thoroughly her intentions in seeking to match with Norfolk. It was evident that Norfolk was not in her own person calculated to provoke her love. She must be provoked by other motives. The duke was well known to be unsettled in religion. It was to be feared that Mary would beguile him from the true faith, even as Solomon's Egyptian wife had beguiled a far wiser man. It was true that Mary might be obliged to give bond for her good behaviour, but those who knew her and knew the Guisian brood from which she sprung, knew also how little faith could be

other is bound up among the Cotton MSS. (Caligula C ii, ff. 284-91). The first copy mentioned is printed in italics, the other in Roman letters. The first copy lacks a title-page, the second has a title-page, but it contains no mention of the author or date. It is dated in early, perhaps contemporary script, 1570. The pamphlet bears the title, 'A Discourse touching the pretended match between the Duke of Norfolk and the Queen of Scots.' It is attributed in the British Museum Catalogue to Thomas Sampson, the Puritan divine, though on what authority does not appear. It is not mentioned among Sampson's works in his life in *D.N.B.* The proof of Walsingham's authorship lies mainly in the fact that it is ascribed to him in the various manuscript copies and that it conforms in general to his usual style of writing. Stählin's attempt to strengthen the case in favour of Walsingham's authorship by pointing out a fancied similarity in the wording of the pamphlet to certain remarks which Walsingham addressed to Catherine de Médicis on the subject of Mary Stuart two years later (cf. Stählin, 235, n. 1) is rather too far fetched to deserve consideration. Still there is no good reason for questioning Walsingham's authorship. The pamphlet was reprinted by James Anderson in his *Collections relating to the History of Mary, Queen of Scots*, 4 vols., Edinburgh, 1727-8, i. 21 ff. Anderson in his preface to 'A Treatise Concerning the Defense of the Honour of Mary Stuart', which he printed in the same collection (vol. i), states that this pamphlet of Walsingham's was sent in MS. to Thomas Randolph in Scotland before it was printed, but gives us no evidence in support of the statement.

In Cotton MSS. Julius F xi, ff. 20-41, there is a treatise in MS. entitled 'An answer to a slanderous book called "A Discourse touching the pretended match between the Duke of Norfolk and the Queen of Scots" wherein I have overstepped no part of the said book as shall appear by the order following.' There is a rough draft of this same treatise, with the folios badly mixed up in Caligula C ii, ff. 542-55. This copy is endorsed by Lord Burghley, 'Answer to a little book that was published against the marriage of the Duke of Norfolk and the Scottish Queen.' The copy in Julius F xi is dated 15 March 1569-70, which makes it probable that Walsingham's pamphlet was written late in 1569. This answer undertakes to confute Walsingham's pamphlet point by point. It ends with a long denunciation of the political group from which its author assumes Walsingham's pamphlet to have emerged. Walsingham's pamphlet and the last part of the reply to it which has just been referred to are given in full in Appendix I to this chapter.

pinned to her bond. The probabilities were that she would simply use Norfolk's popularity with the English to stir up a rebellion in her own behalf. Better far that she should marry abroad. Such a match would weaken her hold upon the English, who disliked foreign governors and would arouse jealousy between France and Spain, since neither was prepared to see Mary secure the crown of England in marriage alliance with the other. As for the value of the match in uniting Scotland with England, English interests were safer in Scotland with the Regent Murray in command. In the final invocation Walsingham struck the key-note which was to dominate his whole public policy. Let Elizabeth seek the advancement of God's glory as the Protestants understood it, execute her laws against the Roman Catholics with severity, and then, no doubt, God would bless her with long and assured safety. To Walsingham from the beginning the hope of Elizabeth lay in the complete identification of her cause with the cause of militant Protestantism.

But his connexion with the first Norfolk plot was not confined to the composition of diatribes against Norfolk's marriage project. After Norfolk's arrest Walsingham was called upon by the Queen to assist in ferreting out the ramifications of the conspiracy. In this connexion his activity centred about one of the minor figures in the affair, an Italian named Roberto Ridolfi. Ridolfi was a Florentine banker, and a man of some repute in the commercial world. He had settled in London during the reign of Philip and Mary, but he remained there after Elizabeth's accession, and in spite of his manifest sympathy with Roman Catholicism was occasionally employed by the English government in its financial transactions. This circumstance gave him the entrée into Cecil's house. His banking business brought him also into close touch with Norfolk and his coadjutors, or at least served as a cloak to cover his darker purposes with them. For Ridolfi had been expressly entrusted by the Pope with the functions of a secret nuncio in England. As such he aimed to form a league of the English Catholic nobility and to re-establish Roman Catholicism in the realm. He was in the pay of both Spain and France. In fact he was every way qualified to serve as an intermediary between the Pope, the conspiring English nobles, the French and Spanish

ambassadors, both of whom were privy to the plot, and Mary Stuart's agent the Bishop of Ross. In some such capacity he appears to have acted. He was also instrumental in conveying money from the Pope to the rebels in the north.¹

How much of all this Cecil knew it is difficult to say with certainty. At all events he was aware that Ridolfi had received large sums of money from abroad which he had paid over in part to the Bishop of Ross and other servants of Mary Stuart, and in part also to some servants of the Duke of Norfolk.²

On these grounds Ridolfi was arrested in October 1569. He was not, however, thrown into prison. Instead, Cecil did what was often done in such cases, he placed Ridolfi under surveillance in the private house of a gentleman of trust. The gentleman chosen for the purpose was Francis Walsingham.

On the 7th of October 1569 Leicester and Cecil, acting together for the Queen, wrote to Walsingham: 'The Queen's Majesty hath commanded us to write to the Lord Mayor of London for the apprehension of Robert Ridolfi, whom her Majesty would have remain in your house without conference until he may be examined of certain matters which touch her Majesty very nearly.'³

Walsingham did as he was told. A little later at the Queen's command he put Ridolfi through a rigid cross-examination. Ridolfi confessed freely that he had dealt with the Bishop of Ross and supplied both him and the Duke of Norfolk with money from abroad. He even admitted that he had 'been made privy to the matter of marriage betwixt the Queen of Scots and the Duke'.⁴ Cecil hoped to get more than this out of him, and ordered Walsingham to make a second examination. Walsingham did so, but could learn nothing further.⁵ Then Cecil ordered Walsingham to go to Ridolfi's lodgings, to seize and examine all his papers, and to send to court all those of

¹ The best account of Ridolfi is in Stählin, i. 246 ff.

² Cf. Cecil's own report of the development of Norfolk's treason, dated January 1571, in British Museum, Cotton MSS. Caligula C iii, f. 121. This report is imperfectly calendared in Boyd's *Scottish Calendar*, iv, no. 114. In general Boyd's calendars should be used with caution. They appear to give complete resumé of original documents, but at times, as in the present case, leave out important matters.

³ S. P. Domestic, Eliz., lix. 3.

⁴ Cf. Cecil's report cited in n. 2 above.

⁵ Leicester and Cecil to Walsingham, 23 Oct. 1569, S. P. Domestic, Eliz., lix. 11.

public importance.¹ This in turn was done, but no additional discoveries seem to have been made. Ridolfi pleaded for his liberty. He promised that he would meddle no more with public affairs but would stick closely to his merchandising. For some reason or other his request was granted. On the 11th of November 1569 Cecil and Leicester wrote to Walsingham: 'The Queen is pleased to give Ridolfi his liberty on certain conditions. Say to him that he hath misused his privileges, seeing he is but privileged to live here as a merchant and has interfered in affairs of state. These he hath confessed in part. Her Majesty, if she were disposed to be severe, might force him to confess more. Nevertheless, she shall grant him his liberty if that he shall be bound by writing by you to the sum of £1,000, with securities besides, not to deal directly or indirectly in any matters concerning her Majesty or the state of this realm except by her consent.'²

Ridolfi was accordingly released. In January of the following year his bonds were returned to him and he was given his complete liberty.³

It is a little hard to understand why Ridolfi got off so easily. Possibly he succeeded in convincing the Queen that he had told all he knew. On the face of it his story was a plausible one. By assuming the pose of the unsuspecting banker he managed to justify, on the mere grounds of business, his financial dealings with the conspirators. Since he had been employed by the Privy Council itself to assist in the adjustment of the dispute with Spain over the seizure of the treasure ships, his dealings with the Spanish ambassador, even if they had been called in question, could easily have been excused. Of his dealings with the French ambassador and his secret commission from the Pope nothing seems to have been known. It is of course quite possible, as the Queen said, that if he had been more rigorously dealt with he might have been forced to betray more. But probably Elizabeth was not disposed to investigate the matter too closely. Certainly the Privy Council must have been reluctant. Many of its members, Leicester among them, must have been trembling in their shoes as it was.⁴ In any event

¹ Ibid.

² Same to same 11 Nov. 1569, S. P. Domestic, Eliz., lix. 19.

³ S. P. Domestic, Eliz., lix. 30.

⁴ Perhaps it was for that reason that Leicester associated himself with Cecil in the various letters to Walsingham on the subject.

Ridolfi's detention was not fruitless. It kept him apart from the other conspirators at a critical time and probably, since he had served as intermediary, did much to check their communication among themselves.¹

It is no small credit to Ridolfi's cleverness that in spite of his very ticklish position he even contrived to ingratiate himself with Walsingham. He was certainly not a man to be trusted with the Queen's affairs, and yet he succeeded in persuading Walsingham that he was. Indeed, Walsingham was so completely deceived in this respect that some months later he actually recommended Ridolfi to Cecil as a fit man to be employed in composing the differences between England and Flanders: 'Surely, sir,' he wrote, 'the late experiences that I have divers ways had of him, maketh me to believe that if he were employed in that behalf, he would deal both discreetly and uprightly, as one both wise and who standeth on terms of honesty and reputation.'²

The fact that Ridolfi was handed over to Walsingham for cross-examination testifies at once to the high opinion which was entertained of his fidelity and of his ability to worm out of the Italian whatever dangerous secrets he possessed. It was, so far as can be ascertained, Walsingham's last service to the Government in an unofficial capacity. It finishes his apprenticeship in statecraft. His next public appearance is in a sphere of action more worthy of his abilities. In August 1570 he departed on his first diplomatic mission to France.

APPENDIX I TO CHAPTER I

A Discourse touching the pretended matche betwene the D. of Norfolk and the Queene of Scotts. By Sir Francis Walsingham. Harl. MS. 290, folio 117.

For as much as of late it hath bene given out that ye continuance of the gospel here among us and ye safety of our soveraigne depend upon a match to be had betwene the D. of N. and the Q. of Scotts, for that otherwise, she marrying a forreine prince, might

¹ Cecil and Leicester explained to Walsingham in their letter to him of 23 Oct. 1569 (cf. p. 66, n. 5) that their reason for keeping Ridolfi so long confined was to keep him from conference with the Spanish ambassador.

² Walsingham to Cecil, 22 Oct. 1570, S. P. Domestic, Eliz., lxxiv. 12.

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touching the pretended Matche betwene,
the Duke of Norfolke and the
Queene of Scottes.

FOR as muche as of late it hath bene geuen
out that the continuance of the Gospel here
among vs, and the safetie of oure Soueraighe,
shoulde depend vpon a matche to be had be-
tweene the Duke of Norf. and the Q. of Scotts
for that otherwise she marrying a foreine Prince
might growe to that strength, as our Soueraig-
nes forces shoulde not be able to counteruaile
the same (a thing verrey daungerous considering
her aspiring minde) whereby both this presēt
state and Religion should be in hazarde. And
farther, that the vnitng of these two Realmes
by this match might make vs equall in strength
to our neighbours y^e horden about vs, I thought
good by consideration of her person & his per-
son, of the matche to be had betwene them, &
of the present state of this Realme, to se whe-
ther there should not be lesse daunger in com-
mon reason to haue her matched rather abroad
then at home, though it seme a very straunge
Proposition to be proponed by any subiecte of
this land, whether it be better to haue her mar-

A. ij.

growe to y^t strength as our Sovereigne forces should not be able to countervaille the same (a thing very dangerous considering her aspiring minde), whereby both this present State and Religion should be in hazard; and further that the uniting of these two Realmes by this matche might make us equall in strength to our neighbors that border about us. I have thought good by consideracoun of her person and of his, of the match to be had betwene them and of the present state of this Realme, to see whether there should not be lesse danger in common reason to have her matched rather abroad then at home, though it seems a very strange proposition to be proposed by anie subject of this land; whether it be better to have her married abroad then at home, she remayning under our soveraignes government to dispose of her marriage or not marrying, as if it shall seme to make most for her safety, what is it ells but to call in question whether her Ma^{tie} may governe or not within her owne Realme.

A Consideration of the Q. of Scotts person.

In religion she is either a Papist wch is evill, or ells an Atheist wch is worse, and in league ioyned wth the confederate enemies of the Gospell by the name of the holy league, to roote out all such Princes and magistrates as are Professors of the same. A thing well knowne, though not generallie.

Of nation, she is a Scott, of wch nation I forbear to say what may be said, in a reverend respect of a few godly of that nation.

Of Inclination, how she is given, let her owne horrible acts publicly knowen to the whole world witnes, though now of late certen seduced by practise seeke to cloke and hide the same.

Of Alliance on the Mothers side how she is descended of a race that is both enemy to God and the common quiet of Europe, every man knoweth, but alas too manie have felt.

In goodwill towards our soveraigne she hath shewed herself sundry waies very evill affected, whose ambition hath drawen her by bearing the Armes of England to decipher herself to be a Competitair of this Crowne, a thing publicquely knowen. I leave to touch other particular practises that have discovered her aspiring mynde.

The Consideration of the Dukes person.

Touching his Religion, how he is affected I leave to God and his owne conscience. But that he should not bee settled in Religion it shall appeare by sundry reasons to the contrary. First, his education of his sonne under the government of a Papist doth shew it. Secondlie, the corruption of his howse, his chief men of trust being Papists. Thirdly, the reposed trust and confidence

he hath in the chiefe Papists of this Realme. Fourthly, his laste marriage with a Papist and lastly, this pretended matche.

Touching his credit wth the Nobility and Commons it is well knowne to be greate, wth th'one in respect of his alliance, wth th'other in respect of a kinde of familiarity used towards them in publique sport, as in shootings and cock-fightings, a thing not to be discomended if it savoured not of an ambitious and aspiring intent.

Considerations of the Matche.

All matches in mariage wch promise good success and continuance of concord are ioyned in the feare of God and coupled by sincere love, the true and onlie knott of good agreem^t, wch love is engendered by the eye and by the eare and cannot be perfect unless both states be satisfied in either party; which eyeliking in them cannot be, for that neither of them hath seene the other. Now let us weigh whether sincerity of love be the maker of this match. First, for degrees sake, let us begin wth the Queene. Is it likely that the Q. of Scotts that could not lyke of Dernley should like well of the Duke? Such as know them both do thinke it very unlikely.

Now to the Duke. Is it likely that anie man that professeth some Religion, or respecteth worldly honour, or regardeth his owne safety, would match wth one detected of so horrible crimes in respect of Love. Surely none, that is either honest or religious, can thinke soe. Then must it needs follow, that neither the eye in her, and if the Painter have discharged his duty for other eyeliking hath not passed betwene them, nor the eare in him is contented, but that some other respect shold be the knott. Wch respect carieth in itself manifest presumption of evident danger.

A Consideration of the Present State.

Touching religion, for lack of doctrine it is thought that, the realme devided into three partes, two of them be inclined to Papistrie and Atheisme.

Touching Governm^t, such hath bene the lenity of our Sovereigne, a thing very commendable in a Prince, if our corruption abused not the same, as men for the most part are growne so remisse in dutie towards her Majestie as they both contemne lawes and inferior magistrates, to leave to descent into some other particularities in this behalf.

A Discourse upon the aforesaid considerations.

Now let us see upon consideracoun had of either of the persons and of the matche and of the present Estate, what likelihood there is of continuance of Religion and Safety to our Sovereigne.

And first let us resort to the consideration had of her person and begin wth Religion.

Is it likelie that the Gospell shall have continuance by her who is enemie of the Ghospell and is ioyned in league and confederacye wth the coniured Repugners of the same. It may be said that in Religion by persuasion she may be detered. It maie well be answered that it is onely God's office to incline hearts to true Religion and that otherwise to thinke proceedeth of vaine presumption. Surely, if we weigh her inclination by the experience had of her behaviour, we shall see small cause to hope that sincere Religion can dwell in so corruptible a vessell. Then is reason to consider further how unlikely it is that upon consideracoun of the present state, she fynding two parts of this Realme enclining to her Religion, where she thinketh to have a greate partie, will alter the same to ioyne wth the fewer in number.

Now as touching our Soveraignes safety. Is it like that our Soveraignes safety should be groundend and depend upon her who hath deciphered herself to be a competitor of this crowne? I speake of things publicquely knowne. I leave other secret practises tending to the same end. It maie be said that, so that the Q. can be brought to like of the match and to restore her to her kingdom and establish her in the succession, she will by oth and subscription confirme anie thing that may tend to the Queenes safety. If she falsifie her faith no pleading will serve, the sword must be the Remedy.

But how like is it, that one ambitious, a borne Scott, a defamed person, who hath made shipwrack of her honour and reputation, and lastlie a branche of the howse of Guise whose profession is to keepe none Edict never so solemnly promised will keep faith? I leave it to the consideracoun of those that iudge without affection.

Now having showed how unlikely it is that anie safety to our Soveraigne or continuance in Religion can grow by her person in this match, let us see whether the defects in her are likely to be supplied by the consideration of his person. And first will we come to the weighing of his religion, wch having shewed to be unsettled by sundry reasons of good moment, let us now see whether by this match there is not like to insue an evident and undoubted danger of his Revolt. And for the proof thereof let the example of Solomon teach us so to think. Did not he by matching with an Idolatress Egyptian become an Idolater, whereby ensued to him God's high displeasure to the great plague of his kin and posterity. If wisdom might have stayed him he was likest to have been stayed, for he was of all that ever were the wisest. But when wisdom passeth the bounds of God's

commandment it turneth to folly, so that law which forbade Solomon to marry with the Egyptian Idolatress standeth in force still and forbiddeth the Duke to marry with the Scottish Idolatress, lest that punishment which fell upon Solomon's kin teach the D. to beware of like punishment. But let us go further in applying. Solomon married one meaner witted then himself. But the D. would marry one equal in wit and in subtilty superior. To conclude, if Solomon marrying one in degree his inferiour and in wit meaner became an idolater, what shall we then look for of him that in degree is inferiour and in wit rather meaner than equal with her whom he seeketh to marry. But we'll suppose he will continue constant. Is all the danger gone. No : for if either she mislike him which is likely, for that she can hardly love him, having too delicate an eye, or if that she overrule him, for that he is her inferiour, which is not unlikely, considering her courage, or if he die, a thing to be thought of, or if his life be taken from him by indirect means, a practise whereof she is right well acquainted and by a Pope may be dispensed, what shall then become of the continuance of Religion.

Now let us see further, what safety may grow to our Sovereign by his matching with her. Before in the consideration of his person, I shewed that by calling in birth was honourable and of credit great both with nobility and commons w^{ch} two qualities as they are two good gifts of God and such as being well employed by him whom God hath endued withal yield no small benefit to the commonwealth and Prince where he liveth ; 'so on the other side, being abused through ambition, they breed to the Prince danger and the commonwealth disquietness.

Now let us see what doubt groweth by this match of the abuse of the said qualities. First the match itself, not grounded in the fear of God nor upon due respect as afore was showed, can never yield good fruit but must needs taste of ambition, of all other the most dangerous fruit.

Secondly, the party herself whom he is to match withall, having shewed herself once a competitor of this crown is like to draw him from the due consideration of his allegiance by her cunning persuasions, wherein she excelleth, to abuse the said qualities in attempting the said crown, for the thirst of a kingdom can never be quenched until it hath hazarded the uttermost trial.

It may be objected that by divers capitulations that mischief may be well prevented. It may be well answered that such as with simple eye weigh her favours in respect of religion, his friends in respect of calling, alliance and popular familiarity and therewith the egging on of foreign practices, may well see no bond sufficient to bridle so incorrigible an humour as ambition is.

These things all weighed, with the consideration of this present state, how little awe reigneth commonly through the lenity of our sovereign in the hearts of the subjects, whereby they may be more easily seduced, by practices be drawn from the due consideration of their duty, it must needs appear that the home match carrieth in itself the most evident danger.

I leave to lawyers to define of what quality this presumption is, for a subject to seek to match with a competitor of this crown without making his sovereign privy thereof.

A Comparison between the home match and the foreign.

Having shewed the danger of this home match let us now consider it with the foreign match and see which of them yieldeth most danger.

If she marry a foreign prince her party here within the Realm will not be great, for hardly is an Englishman brought to like of a stranger or of a foreign governor. Then must her means to annoy us consist in foreign aid which, though it be dangerous, yet doth it not yield like danger to the home enemy, for one enemy within a city besieged is more dangerous than a hundred abroad.

If she marry a foreign prince, as for example with France, then will Spain be jealous, for it is contrary to the Spanish polity to see France and England united under one government. And therefore England might look for any Spanish aid to keep France from this purpose.

But if she marry at home, whereby the jealousy of these two princes may be taken away, then they both, in respect of the League wherein she is joined with them and the desire they have to disquiet this estate, will join together in aiding of her. And so besides her own help, she should lack no foreign aid. By this short comparison, evidently you may see the home match more dangerous than the foreign, as well in respect of the continuance of Religion as of the safety of our Sovereign.

God be thanked that hath so provided for the continuance of Religion as he hath given us a prince that favoureth Religion and that we need not seek no further stay at her hands who is an enemy to Religion.

God also be thanked that hath so provided for her Majesty's safety as she hath no need of this new-found remedy.

Touching the other respect of this home match which is the uniting of England and Scotland, if we look well upon the uniters with a single eye that loveth the continuance of God's glory and the safety of our Sovereign and the quietness of this state, we shall see more profit in division than in union.

Notwithstanding it hath pleased God in this behalf so favourably

to deal with our Queen as he hath raised up in Scotland a governor during the king's minority so faithfully inclining to her Majesty as of no subject in this Realm she may dispose more than of him, whereby during his government she may assure herself of most perfect union. God grant that she may make that account of him that he deserveth.

Thus you see the Q. in safety, the two realms united and this remedy needless.

God grant her Majesty may seek the advancement of God's glory in simple sincerity, execute her laws with convenient severity and then (no doubt) he will bless her with long and assured safety.

APPENDIX II TO CHAPTER I

Answer to a little book that was published against the marriage of the Duke of Norfolk and the Scottish Queen, Cotton MSS., Julius F. xi, f. 391 ff.¹

... Now that I have answered this uncharitable treatise though not so sufficiently as many others would do, ... I have thought good to touch in a few words how dangerous these opprobrious libels be and especially if they may escape unpunished. Time hath given ever that favour to Princes' causes that ever one King hath misliked to have another unseemly touched, yea, when there hath been war between their realms. But for princes causes I leave them to themselves; he is happiest that least meddles with them. But for the Duke his cause, being a subject, a man may be the bolder to deal. And this I do protest to the ancient state of the nobility of this land, as also to all the honorable Councillors, that they that have dealt thus undeservedly with the Duke will not make bones to be bold with any of you, whenever their peevish spirit moveth them. And they that do in pulpits so gloriously paint over Absaloms (as they think very cleanly) will not stick to find out Ahithophels amongst you, whenever the toy cometh in their heads or else that fortune frowns upon any of you.

I am not one of the greatest of their council and yet I know somewhat. They point not more arrogantly against the Duke than their mouth and pens privily walketh against some of you that think yourself upon the highest wheel. If that once turn, there be that will latch you and deal part of their almose to you, as they have begun with the Duke. The noble Council of England

¹ The concluding portions only are printed here. There is no evidence to show that this 'Answer' was ever published. The spelling has been modernized. Words doubtful in the manuscript have been queried.

doth take great pain for the maintenance of quiet in this land, but this confederator with his brotherhood (if their council might be followed) would by pen and ink show far finer plots. They will be bold to show you their minds though they have little reason thereunto. Which if it were followed it would soon overthrow this state and that were the thing that they would have, for they long for a new world, as much as the papists do or more. A good Protestant doth not so much mislike of a Papist as they do of him that would live within the compass of the law. They say that we must grow still and so God grant that we may do in his true religion, but if we should grow as they would have us, we should not know one month what they would have us to do the next. And what would grow of such uncertainty God knoweth, but experience in other countries may teach us.

Some men will think that herein I do speak of ministers. No, No. I assure you I think them the fewest number of the brotherhood. But I hope that God and our noble Queen will keep them from trying their cunning in this worthy island. If they would try maisteries I would to God we might see some proof of their doings in some other place; this is too worthy a kingdom to be adventured upon trial. These restless heads that are never contented will not make it nice (as occasion serveth) to show their judgments in Princes' causes, yea in our own Queen's; as sometimes, having occasion to come to London at Term times or otherwise, I have heard myself. But of late I have not frequented that city so much as I was wont to do. Now as I hear their chief bent is to procure that the subjects in all countries should be maintained against their annoiued Princes. It is not to me very unlikely, considering what tune (?) I have seen them in, in times past; but they never took the lesson out of Mr. Nowell's godly book of the six homilies, of whom they might (if they listed) learn to sing a new song, that Princes are to be obeyed though they were never so evil, which he proves very learnedly by the Scriptures. If subjects everywhere could have taken out that lesson, some of them had not come to so shameful and cruel an end as they have done. God send us grace that we may take heed after so many examples and to follow David in his obedience unto Saul, which I am sure you will agree was not the best Prince. And yet I think if a man should debate David his cause there might be more reason to prove that David might have instituted rebellion than any in our time can allege for themselves.

Well here I leave that presumptuous sin of rebellion to the judgment of Him that will either punish it in this world or in the world to come or in both. All this carping Brotherhood,

whensoever there is any speech (as I have heard divers times) of our noble Queen's marriage, there are none in words that will so much wish it, and set forth the necessity thereof as they will. But I remember there have been three marriages specially talked of since her Majesty's reign, one at home, two abroad; and I am sure that they liked of never a one of the three. Is this an argument that their crying out to marry with their mouths did agree with their hearts. No, no. It was the least part of their mind. Mark the overthwart course following and thereby you shall perceive their fine dealing; for her highness' most comfortable marriage is not for their purpose, it would mar their whole market, which at the least they have been building up this six or seven years; and yet, if the Scriptures be true they build but upon sand, viz. spuria vitulamina, etc.

But shortly to touch their opinion of the three matches. First of that at home, it would not serve their turns to charge him to be an unfit match, in respect of foreign birth; whereby they were not able to use their old objection which the world knows they were wont to use against Spaniards, because he was known to be undoubtedly born English, neither could they find fault with his parentage, nor yet could they charge him to be a Papist, because they knew they should bely him. But forsooth they must have somewhat to object against him. And therefore, though sometimes they use the name of the noblest to serve their own turn as they did in this which, they said, would never agree to the home match, yet that bruit serves commonly no more for their purpose than this would have done if those noble men had been named. For this by common report was most certain that the nobility, seeing the danger of innovations to be so imminent if God should call our Josias without issue of her body, and therefore they, having care of their children and posterity, besides the danger of adventure of loss of their lands and goods; which their ancestors have been so long in getting; —the nobility (I say) did see no safety so sure for this imminent danger as issue of our most noble and undoubted Queen.

If God would have blessed us with the same, the nobility would not so much have accounted whom her highness should have thought fit to be her husband, as they would have hoped to have received inestimable comfort of such a child that might have had such a royal mother.

Thus, this unbridled band (you may see) doth not so much set up their rest upon religion, as they do upon some private meaning (what pack they have made God knoweth) to win time. I pray God that their platt never take place, for I mistrust that it is grounded both against God, his law and man's. If they strive against God He is able to meet with them and so will do when

it shall best please His omnipotence. But for man's law, as far as I can gather by report abroad, if God should so much plague us as to take our maidenly Queen away without issue, they mind to take no example by the displacing of Queen Mary and our noble Queen Elizabeth in setting up a farther fetched guest (leaping the mother for haste), having I am sure not any grounded quarrel to both those noble Princes for religion, being known to be of two contrary opinions, and our noble Queen now living at that time being known to be as well settled therein as the Lady Jane which then was extolled. But alas, though that all England smarted for that their folly, yet it is now clearly forgotten, for that for aught that I can see they mind to jump once again and to take the son before the mother, although the title come in the right of her, if they stick not the harder to *filios populi*, whereof which is the elder everybody knoweth. But if the question were asked of them that most affect that faction they doubt whether the younger should inherit before the other. Many of these doubts a man shall find that dealeth in so broken causes. This is a quiddity in the Civil Law, they say. But God His law with common law I hope I shall try it in England if our fortune be so evil as that God will leave England without seed of that body of which it is most desired. I fear that there be plagues enough hanging over England. God defend us from such a succession as his word prophesieth shall take no root.

Now shall you see what these trim witted fellows think of the second match. They could not allege that he brought with him any likelihood of charge for defending of his own inheritance, nor that he was a grounded Papist. But yet they found somewhat to mislike of him, saying that he was so poor as the maintenance of his state here would impoverish both the crown and Realm. For religion they said he was affected as the hireling Germans be, where best gain is so they affect, or rather instruct their conscience, and they said that he was covetous without measure. I pray God that these faults do only reign in Germany. Hereby ye may see that they find ever one fault or another to keep England from enjoying her felicity.

But you shall see one great point of cunning in my doctor's practices, wishing you that shall read it rather to take example thereby to decipher such practices than to imitate the same. When they were in fear that this foreign match should take place, then they cried for and wished the match at home, meaning as good faith therein as they did before. But they thought it sufficient to serve their turn, whatsoever the device were, so that it might overthrow the match in hand. For the marriage of our Sovereign wherever it were, should be overthrown, their forryd (*sic*) and foundation, they thought it to stand with their policy

to put down one bucket with the weight of another. Mark well and learn to beware, for whosoever followeth such dissembling devices will in the end beshrew himself. After this another match was talked of, wherein (as London news said) there were both ambassadors come hither and some sent from hence thither commending of the matter. This filled my wise men's mouths, for then they cried out of strangers, of Papists and of confederacies among Papists, saying that this one match brought all these dangers. Here they could not charge that there wanted living to maintain his estate, nor carp at his progeny, being of the noblest that we know in Christendom. And therefore you see that whether he be Protestant or Papist or indifferent, which they think the worst and so do I too, or whether he be rich or poor, English or stranger all is one with them. For if their fancies may take place, as I pray God it do not, then is neither the one nor the other fit to serve for their purpose.

I make this short discourse of the opinions of these busy heads because you may understand that, whatsoever countenance they make, yet by the circumstance you may see that they place all their courses upon hope of a day. You must not think that I do hereupon infer that this their overthwart doings hath cooled her Majesty's mind from marriage, who loveth to govern and not to be governed; but yet I believe her Highness hath been never a whit the better minded to marry (which is the only way to bless this land) when she hath heard the repining of this malicious sort. Perchance some will answer me that such as I speak of could not have access to her Majesty. But this I reply that my fine lads be other manner of fellows than the walkers of Paul's which have changed Papists come into the midst of the Church. For if my fine heads cannot have place to tell their own tale, yet they were not so destitute of friends but that they have either a lady or gentlewoman or some other of the Privy Chamber that shall deliver their tale so smartly as that they will seem to mind nobody's hurt but do it for duty's sake and conscience, so finely can they abuse those good ladies and the rest of their true and plain meaning friends; such fine colour can these mates set upon their bitterest poison. If this will not serve they know then whither to resort to some ladies not of the meanest sort, though that they be not continual courtiers, who are so courteous of nature as they will not forbear their pen when there is any hope thereby to work mischief. I know two such ladies by sight; in religion they be different but nature hath otherwise wrought such agreeableness in them as when they may procure any unquietness they stick together like burs; they be so kind hearted that when they are not able to do so much mischief as they would, they will not stick to weep, yea if it were for the best

game. But God of his mercy has well provided to send curst cows short horns. Our busy heads were contented to use their advices and sometime to follow their counsels for that in the end some division might be wrought thereby, for that makes for their purpose. Thus you may see that they will join with any religion so that it may serve their turns.

They make no meetings in Paul's nor such open places as before I spake of ; that standeth not with their reputation, but sometime at one place, sometime at another. If any of their fraternity keep his house by occasion of sickness or otherwise they will not in such cases stick to meet at his lodging rather than they would miss the clubbish advice of such an odd member or perchance a pillar of their Grand Council. If I were in London I durst undertake within three or four days to be amongst some of them. The grand captains among them will seem to have intelligences, yea sometimes from Councillors, such is their audacity. For this is a general rule amongst them that he hath most commendation of them that can learn most news. If anything happen either abroad or at home otherwise than they would have it then straight, their forge is full trimmed (?) till that they have put abroad in lieu of that three or four lies. Thus they spend their time in brewing of mischief, sometimes by devising such pretty pamphlets as this before, sometimes in sending or throwing of letters without name, wherein they have singular felicity to show their rhetorical indicting, sometimes in setting a preacher at work to rail where they list, and for a change of exercise they will make fair weather where they most hate, to see if they can suck out any poison there to set at work their restless mills. I am sorry to think that such good ants should spend their time so vainly. God send them more grace.

And thus, with my most humble prayer to Almighty God that it may please him so to illumine our most noble Queen's heart as she may discern who mindeth faithfully to her and who doth dissemble, whereby her Majesty I doubt not shall know that all these fine spoken fellows be not the surest unto her which have further fetches in their heads, I end, praying God of his mercy long to preserve our noble Queen, Queen Elizabeth and if it be his will, to bless us with some offspring of her Majesty's most royal body to the confusion of all these practisers' far-fetched reaches. Amen.

The 15th day of March, 1569.

II

THE FRENCH EMBASSY

THE year which intervened between the first Norfolk Plot and Walsingham's departure for France, though it seems to have been an altogether uneventful one in his own career, was full of alarms for his royal mistress. Norfolk's failure in October was followed hard by the Rising of the North in November, and that in turn by Dacre's rebellion in the following February. Although all of these attempts failed, they gave evidence of a rather dangerous amount of discontent, particularly in the north. To aggravate the situation in that quarter still further, Scotland, which had seemed under the Regent Murray's government secure for England, was set topsy-turvy by Murray's assassination in January 1570. For months the country was without a governor. In the confusion Mary Stuart's party, which Murray had never quite succeeded in destroying, increased its strength. In the confusion also the border clans, true to their form, swept over into North England to burn and ravage and plunder. The situation called for prompt and vigorous action on Elizabeth's part, particularly since she was credibly informed that the French King was preparing to assist the Marian faction with armed forces.¹ For once in her life she acted promptly. She dispatched Thomas Randolph to Scotland to encourage the English party there, and she ordered Sussex with 4,000 men over the border to give the Scottish raiders a deep draught of their own medicine. Later in the spring she sent another force of some 1,500 men to reinforce her positions in Scotland, and so secured the election of a new regent, the Earl of Lennox, favourable to her interests.

These northern troubles were serious enough in themselves, but even more serious, Elizabeth felt, in their implications. Norfolk's attempt, the rebellion of the earls, the assassination of Murray, the growth of the Marian party in Scotland all

¹ Norris to Cecil, 10 Dec. 1569, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 532.

seemed to her particular manifestations of some large design against her. And she read a confirmation of her fears in the declaration of war against her by Pope Pius V. On the 25th of February the Pope in his bull *Regnans in Excelsis* formally excommunicated her, deprived her of her 'pretended right' to the English throne, and released her subjects from their allegiance. Elizabeth could not believe that Pius would have taken such a step without the knowledge and approval of both France and Spain.¹ She interpreted it as the signal for a joint attack by them both against her. That such an attack was in preparation her foreign agents left her in no doubt. From France, from Spain, and from the Low Countries came the same bad news.²

Under these circumstances Elizabeth was for a time strongly inclined to conciliate her enemies by timely concessions. She released Norfolk and his confederates, Arundel and Lumley. She told Cecil that she wished to make an end of Mary Stuart in accordance with the goodwill of her brother of France. La Mothe Fénélon, the French ambassador at London, wrote to his master on the 25th of July: 'I wish to assure your Majesty that the Queen and her servants have spoken more strongly to me than ever before in favour of the confirmation of friendship with your Majesty and of the perseverance of peace between our two kingdoms. Neither the Bishop of Ross nor myself nor those who support the Queen of Scots here have ever seen better hope of her restitution than at this present.'³ Not long afterwards the Spanish ambassador reported that Elizabeth was denouncing Cecil and his policies openly and was showing more favour than usual to the English Catholics. According to this report, she 'even went so far as to say publicly that she thinks if need should arise she will adhere to the Catholics and abandon the heretics'.⁴

Without attaching too much importance to the impression which Elizabeth made upon the French and Spanish ambassadors at this juncture, there can be little doubt that she was frightened, nor that her fears were not without foundation, though the

¹ *Correspondance de la Mothe Fénélon*, iii. 225.

² Stählin, i. 255.

³ *Correspondance*, iii. 248.

⁴ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, p. 257.

foreign situation was not so menacing as it appeared to be. Philip of Spain, it is true, wrote to the Duke of Alba in December 1569 that he thought it would be necessary to apply force to Elizabeth since she would not respond to reason,¹ but he was very far from falling in with the plans of his English ambassador, who was urging him to come to the relief of Mary Stuart and the English Catholics. His response to the trumpet call of the papal bull was apathetic to say the least. 'His Holiness', he wrote, 'has taken this step without communicating with me in any way, which certainly has greatly surprised me. . . . Since, however, his Holiness allowed himself to be carried away by his zeal he no doubt thought that what he did was the only thing requisite for all to turn out as he wished. . . . But I fear that not only will this not be the case, but that this sudden and unexpected step will exacerbate feeling there and drive the Queen and her friends the more to oppress and persecute the few good Catholics still remaining in England.'² Philip was certainly in no mood for an immediate crusade under the papal banners. No more was France. It is rather curious to discover that while Elizabeth's ambassador in Paris was sending alarming reports of the hostile intentions of the French crown towards her,³ the French crown seems to have been mainly concerned about preventing a hostile demonstration by Elizabeth against France.⁴ It is true that Charles, at the prompting of the Guises, was protesting vigorously against Elizabeth's treatment of Mary Stuart. It is true that he was privy to and sympathetic with the Norfolk marriage project.⁵ It is even true that he instructed his ambassador in England to promise aid to the Northern Earls. But it is pretty certain that his hostile disposition went no further than a desire to fish in troubled waters, to maintain faith with his professed friends, the Guises, and to keep Elizabeth engaged at home.⁶

It appears, indeed, that the policy of France towards England at this juncture was very much the same as that of England towards France. If Charles IX contemplated a league with

¹ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, p. 217.

² *Ibid.*, p. 254.

³ *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 740, 761.

⁴ *Correspondance de la Mothe Fénelon*, vii. 28, 32, 38.

⁵ *Ibid.* vii. 35, 57. One of his motives appears to have been a desire to prevent Mary's mating with Don John of Austria.

⁶ *Ibid.* vii. 54, 89.

Spain against England, Elizabeth contemplated a league with the German Protestant princes against France.¹ If Charles sent money and men to the Marians in Scotland, Elizabeth sent more money and more men to the support of her own friends there. If Charles encouraged English rebels, Elizabeth harboured Huguenot refugees, loaned them money, and assisted them in the levy of German mercenaries.² Both sovereigns probably wanted to keep the peace, yet each foresaw the possibility of a breach of the peace by the other, and each took the obvious course to provide against it.

At first sight Elizabeth's policy towards France at this juncture looks double-faced. While she reached out one hand in friendship towards Charles, she nourished his rebellious subjects with the other. The truth of the matter appears to be that she could not quite make up her mind whether to regard the French crown as a friend or as an enemy. Possibly she realized that the French King and his mother were peaceably disposed towards her, but she realized also that they were both of them more or less the playthings of the various factions at the French court, and that their policy towards her would depend largely upon the outcome of the civil war. If the Huguenots were crushed, the Guises pretty certainly would govern France. That the Huguenots could triumph seemed more than doubtful after the defeats they suffered in the autumn of 1569 at Jarnac and Montcontour. There remained the possibility that the fight would end in a draw. This issue seemed increasingly probable as the winter of 1570 wore on into spring and the Huguenots began to raise their heads again in the south. What would be the effect of such an outcome upon Anglo-French relations? Would the Guises, even though thwarted, still remain in control and utilize peace for the purpose of pursuing their hostile intentions against herself, or would their failure mean their fall from power and the triumph of their Catholic rivals the Montmorencies, who preferred a policy of toleration before civil

¹ Ibid. ii. 245, 274. Cf. also the dispatches of Henry Killigrew in *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, *passim*.

² For the financial assistance rendered by Elizabeth to the Huguenots in the third civil war, cf. Atkinson, *Cardinal Chatillon in England*, 39, 40, 57; cf. also Burgon's *Gresham*, ii. 334 ff. *Correspondance de la Mothe Fénelon*, ii. 98, 239; iii. 209-11; on the German mercenaries, cf. *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, pp. 217, 224, 236, 258, 277.

disorder, and who had already begun to talk about a marriage alliance between France and England? ¹

Elizabeth herself, if we are to accept the opinion of the French ambassador in London, believed that peace in France would be favourable to her.² Many of her councillors, however, were of the opposite opinion.³ Whether or not, as Leicester intimated to the French ambassador, Cecil held that view of the matter, it is pretty clear that many of his Protestant supporters in the Queen's council did. According to La Mothe Fénélon, they favoured armed intervention on Elizabeth's part in behalf of the Huguenots. They came nowhere near persuading her to such a course, but they did at least demonstrate to her that a restoration of civil peace in France on terms disastrous to the Huguenots would be disastrous to her. That was probably what she had in mind when she offered her services to the French King as a mediator between him and his rebels. And that was probably why in the summer of 1570, when the peace negotiations there were well under way, she dispatched a special envoy to France to assist the Huguenots in securing favourable terms. The man she selected for that mission was Francis Walsingham.

For the three years following Walsingham's dispatch to France in the summer of 1570 he was so closely associated with French affairs that it would be impossible to follow his public career during that interval without some preliminary examination of the conditions which obtained at the French court.

Charles IX sat on the throne of France, but he was a weak king at best, and for the most part he left the conduct of public affairs to his mother, Catherine de Médicis. Of Catherine something has already been said. She was an Italian both by birth and by temper, cunning in her devices, unscrupulous in her methods, and for the most part, like the rest of the Médicis, dynastic in her purposes. Her interest in France was largely that of a mother anxious to preserve the patrimony of her sons. Of religious zeal she reveals little or nothing. Nor was she particularly concerned about the national welfare of France, except in so far as it was identified with the interests of the crown. Like Elizabeth she preferred peace on almost any terms

¹ Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France*, 359.

² *Correspondance*, iii. 59, 134, 165, 220.

³ *Ibid.* iii. 125, 225-6.

to war. In the devious ways of sixteenth-century diplomacy she found her true *métier*.

She had three surviving sons, Charles, the King, Henry, Duke of Anjou, and Francis, Duke of Alençon. Henry was her favourite, and he was personally the most prepossessing of the three, though his charms were of the sort more highly esteemed by dissolute courtiers than by statesmen and warriors. He was indeed at his best in fine raiment, toying with his favourites. Yet in the third civil war he had managed with the assistance of Marshal Tavannes to acquire a military reputation. Perhaps on that account he commanded more respect than his brother, the King. In his policy he was generally held to be a strong adherent of the ultra-Catholic party. He was still very young, not quite nineteen years of age.

His younger brother, Francis, the last of Henry II's legitimate offspring, was just sixteen. He was regarded as a child and had so far played no part in public affairs.

The problems and difficulties which faced Catherine remained in 1570 very much as they had been since the beginning of her regency ten years before. Three civil wars had not settled the religious question one way or the other, though they had demonstrated the fact that the fighting strength of Huguenot and Catholic was pretty evenly balanced. The great families of Bourbon, of Guise, and of Montmorency still competed for the control of the crown. Their personnel had changed somewhat in ten years, and their dynastic ambitions had become more closely identified with the larger issues of the contending creeds, but their antipathy to the Italianate government of the Queen Mother and their strong mutual rivalry, persisted undiminished. Antoine, the head of the Bourbon house, had become converted to Protestantism in Henry II's time. In such wise, though he himself proved a renegade, his family came to be identified with the Huguenot cause. His brother, Prince Louis of Condé, was their first great military leader. After Louis's death at Jarnac his young nephew, Antoine's son, Henry of Navarre, became head of the house. In 1570 Henry was a pleasure-loving youth of sixteen, who revealed small promise of the qualities of leadership which he was later to display. Had it not been that he was first prince of the blood

royal he might, for the time being at least, have been almost ignored as a political factor. He had been raised a Protestant, but was clearly not of the stuff of which martyrs are made. His cousin, Henry of Condé, who was about a year older, was apparently of much the same sort. Of far more significance than either of them in 1570 was Henry's mother, Jeanne d'Albret, Queen of Navarre in her own right. In her the religious zeal which burned feebly enough in father and son was a consuming fire. She it was above all others who kept the Bourbons true to their professions of faith. But the military leadership of their party passed after Louis of Condé's death to the Admiral Coligny, a tried soldier, a far-sighted statesman, and one of the most zealous Protestants of his time. He was a man who knew how to command the loyalty of the turbulent Huguenot nobility and to hold the respect and love of the Huguenot rank and file. Consequently he did much to amalgamate the discordant elements within his own following. Through his mother, the sister of the great Constable Anne de Montmorency, he furnished a connexion between the Bourbons and the Montmorencies, which probably facilitated their *rapprochement* during the third civil war and their alliance after the Peace of St. Germain. Coligny more than any one else defined the policy of his party. 'That which I desire the most', he wrote in his will, 'is that God be served everywhere and chiefly in this realm in all purity and according to His ordinance, and after, that this kingdom be preserved.'¹ He aimed in fact at nothing short of the conversion of France to the Huguenot faith. Considerations of religion he placed before national considerations. For that reason he did not hesitate to summon assistance from the natural enemies of France overseas. He regarded the Protestant Englishman and the Protestant German as nearer of kin than the Roman Catholic Frenchman. In that respect he ran counter to the nationalistic tendencies of his time. His point of view, however, made him a particularly valuable ally to the Queen of England, since he considered her enemies as the most dangerous enemies of his faith, and therefore of his country. He could be depended upon to exert his influence in French affairs in favour of an alliance with England and of war against Spain.

¹ Cited in Whitehead, *Coligny*, 347.

Opposed to him and his Bourbon partisans stood the house of Guise under the leadership of Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine, and his nephew, Henry, Duke of Guise. The Cardinal was the older as he was the abler of the two. At once an eloquent speaker, an able administrator, and an experienced diplomatist, he shaped the policy and directed the intrigues of his party. But his unpopularity and his lack of personal courage disqualified him as a leader of men. Both of these deficiencies his nephew supplied. Although Henry of Guise was not yet twenty, he had already revealed a power to lead and a power to charm which were to make him one of the most popular figures of his time. It was to his personality that the Guises owed much of their strength among the rank and file. Even so they laboured under a disadvantage in the popular eye because of their foreign origin. They were Lorrainers, not good Frenchmen.

Their policy both in domestic and in foreign affairs ran directly counter to that of the Admiral. They were determined to exterminate Protestantism in France. Though the Cardinal of Lorraine possessed little or none of the religious zeal which inspired Coligny, like Coligny he preferred religious considerations before national ones. He would rather have seen France dismembered than have seen her half heretic. Like Coligny also, he did not hesitate to invite the foreign enemy into France to assist him in the realization of his purposes. As Coligny turned to England and the German Protestants, Lorraine turned to Spain, the Emperor, and the Pope. His foreign policy, then, was as unfavourable to Elizabeth's interests as might well be. The fact that Mary Stuart was his niece simply served to intensify his anglophobia. Face to face Coligny and he stood as the great protagonists of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in France.

Between these two extremes the house of Montmorency occupied a middle ground. Its great leader, the old Constable Anne de Montmorency, had been killed at the Battle of Saint Denis, but he left behind him a notable progeny. His two elder sons, Francis and Henry, surnamed de Damville, occupied public positions of great distinction. Both of them were Marshals of France. Francis as Governor of Paris controlled the capital, and Damville as Governor of Languedoc was virtually the ruler

of a large part of South France. Two younger sons, generally known as Meru and Thoré, also held important places in the army and the royal council.

These four brothers differed too widely in temper to act together upon all questions of public policy, yet in the main the political and religious ideas of Francis, the eldest of them, came to represent fairly well the family position and commanded in general their common support. Francis was a soldier by training, and had served with distinction both in foreign and civil wars, but his conspicuous talent lay in the fields of statecraft and diplomacy. Like all his breed he was a Roman Catholic, though his moderate and judicious temper alienated him from the more extreme members of that sect. That fact combined with a family rivalry inherited from his father, accounts for his steady opposition to the plans and purposes of the House of Guise. On the other hand, he found it not impossible to remain on friendly terms with his zealous Huguenot cousin, Admiral Coligny. He was indeed both by temper and by conviction well qualified to act as a mediator between the warring creeds. In that capacity he had managed to bring them to terms after the First Civil War. He has been well called the great peacemaker of France.¹

His public policy was informed by the same spirit of compromise. Like the great chancellor L'Hôpital, he believed that the true solution of the French religious problem lay in mutual toleration. On that basis he would have disposed of civil strife and diverted the turbulent spirit of the French nobility towards foreign wars. He had been brought up to regard the Habsburgs as the inveterate enemy of the French royal house. He therefore favoured war against Philip of Spain, and as a concomitant, peace and alliance with England. In this respect, of course, he found himself once more in opposition to the Guises, and in some sort of agreement with the Huguenots. But he differed radically from Coligny in this, that he placed national considerations before religious ones. That was what the more ardent Catholics really meant when they denounced him as a *politique*.

There can be little doubt that Montmorency's solution of the domestic problem in France was the one most congenial to

¹ De Crue, *Le Parti des Politiques*, chap. ii.

the Queen Mother. The civil wars were not of her making. She would have preferred peace on the basis of toleration, but the Guises would have none of it, and they proved strong enough in 1563, in 1567, and again in 1568 to impose their own ultra-Catholic policy upon her. Naturally she never endorsed their programme with enthusiasm, if only because she realized that its success would deliver her the more completely into their hands. Even when the forces of the crown were fighting on their side she probably dreaded victory more than defeat. Their failure to crush the Huguenots in the third civil war cannot have been altogether distasteful to her. Scarcely a month after Coligny's discomfiture at Moncontour she was willing to make peace on terms which admitted some measure of toleration.¹

To some extent her antipathy towards the Guises at this juncture was increased by the failure of their foreign policy. They aimed at a close alliance between France and Spain, but Catherine found Philip II curiously cold to her advances. He had refused to consider a marriage between his daughter and her son, Henry of Anjou. After the death of his own wife, Catherine's daughter Elizabeth, in 1568 he had rejected a proposal to marry her other daughter Margaret, and had married instead the Austrian princess whom Catherine had designed to be the bride of her son the French King.² Catherine also believed that he had interfered to prevent a match she had tried to arrange between her daughter Margaret and the King of Portugal.³ She knew that he was working against the interests of her family in Italy. To a person as much engrossed as Catherine was in the advancement of her family, all these affronts were strong arguments against a policy of close friendship with Spain and against the Guises who favoured it.

The consequence was that some time in the spring of 1570 Catherine finally made up her mind to abandon the Guisian policy of exterminating warfare with the Huguenots and to come to terms with them. It cannot be doubted that she was strengthened in this decision by the support of Montmorency and such other influential men among the moderate Catholics as the

¹ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 514, 516.

² Thompson, *op. cit.* 424.

³ Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, vi, pt. i. 113.

Marshal de Cossé, Montmorency's brother-in-law, and the Marshal de Biron.¹ These men were in fact largely instrumental in arranging the terms of peace. As finally announced at St. Germain on the 8th of August 1570, they conceded to the Huguenots freedom of conscience in all France, the public exercise of their religion in two cities in each province, in all places where it was already established, and in the houses of all Protestant nobles who exercised 'high justice'. For security the Huguenots were to be allowed to hold and garrison the four towns of La Rochelle, Montauban, La Charité, and Cognac. Their allies, the Prince of Orange and his brother, Louis of Nassau, were formally recognized as good friends of the French King.

While the negotiations were still in progress the Huguenot deputies had earnestly requested Queen Elizabeth to assist them in their negotiations, and Sir Henry Norris, her ambassador in France, had strongly urged her to send some honourable person over to intervene with the French King in their behalf.² When she decided to dispatch Walsingham to France she evidently intended that he should arrive there in time to assist the Huguenots in their negotiations. In her original letter of instructions to him she expressly charged him with this business.

'We desire that the accord betwixt the King our good brother and the Prince of Navarre, Prince of Condé and the Admiral, with the rest of the company being the King's subjects might be made as favorable for the reasonable contention and surety of the said Princes and their party as may be possible to the maintenance and continuance of them in the liberty of conscience and for the cause of religion. And because we consider that there is no small labour made by some directly to impeach this accord, and by some others, though not openly to withstand it, yet by doubtful dealing in the granting to their requests to ruin the said Princes and their party in the end, we find it the more necessary for us to use all good measures to countervail such contrary labours, and to procure not only a good accord, but therewith the continuance thereof. . . .'³

¹ De Crue, *op. cit.* 60-1.

² *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 897, 1132, 1133, 1158.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 1168, printed in full in Sir Dudley Digges, *The Compleat Ambassador* (London, 1655), p. 1. *The Compleat Ambassador* is easily the most valuable source of information in print upon Walsingham's embassy to France in 1570-73. It prints practically all the English state papers available on the subject and in some cases preserves letters the originals of which have been

She accordingly directed Walsingham to urge upon the King the desirability of dealing honestly and generously with his rebellious subjects. At the same time he was to admonish the Huguenots not to be over hasty in acceding to the King's offers. 'And if', she wrote, 'our ambassador and you think that the hasty yielding of the deputies in their negotiation may bring peril to the cause, we think it good that they might be induced to stand somewhat hard therein, as policy may serve them, without making to them any further aids in money. But as yet we do rather give them some countenance to use more earnestness for their own surety.'¹

The day after Walsingham had received his letter of instructions, but before he had left England, Elizabeth was informed by La Mothe Fénelon, the French ambassador at London, that the treaty of St. Germain had been signed.² She was surprised at the news and somewhat inclined to doubt it. She determined to dispatch Walsingham notwithstanding. Two days later she sent him a second letter of instructions. In this letter she ordered him, if the treaty had not actually been signed, to proceed as she had already appointed. If it had been signed he was to present her letters of congratulation to the French King, to express her satisfaction at the conclusion of the peace, and to promise her support in maintaining it. At the same time he was especially to impress upon Coligny and his party her constant solicitude for their welfare and to let them understand that he had been sent over chiefly on their account.³

So Walsingham's mission was reduced in appearance at least to one of formal congratulation. But La Mothe Fénelon, the French ambassador at London, saw rather more to it than that.

lost. It is, however, very badly printed, especially when the letters, as is often the case, contain passages in cipher. Whenever possible I have consulted the originals. Many of them are in the English Record Office and consequently in the *Calendars of State Papers, Foreign, Elizabeth*. Many more are in the British Museum among the Cotton MSS. In the Stowe MSS., no. 147, there is a copy of almost all of them in a hand of the early seventeenth century. Perhaps this copy was made by Digges himself or by some one who assisted him. There are also copies of many of them in Harleian MSS. 260. Still another series of copies is alluded to in *Hist. MSS. Comm. Report*, viii. 27. There is one also in Dr. Williams's Library, Gordon Square, London. These copies suggest that Digges's compilation circulated in manuscript before it was printed.

¹ Digges, 5.

² Ibid.

³ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1186; in Digges, 5.

According to him, Elizabeth's principal motive in sending Walsingham to France, notwithstanding the fact that peace had already been concluded there, was that he might discover what effect the peace was likely to have upon the attitude of the French King towards her in general and particularly upon his attitude towards Scotland and the Queen of the Scots.¹ No doubt this was the question uppermost in Elizabeth's mind. Peace between the French King and his Huguenots did not, as she well knew, inevitably entail increased goodwill towards her. After the first French civil war it had been the signal for a joint attack by their combined forces against her. If Fénelon is to be believed, she was not without fear that even the treaty of St. Germain had included some secret clauses directed against herself.² In any event it is not at all unlikely that she regarded the question of Mary Stuart and of Scotland as excellent touchstones with which to try out the disposition of the French King.

Walsingham received his second letter of instructions on the 15th of August 1570 and he set out immediately for France. On his arrival there he found that the peace of St. Germain had already been concluded as Fénelon had said. Consequently he had little more to do than present the formal message of his mistress to the French King. On the 28th of August he went with Sir Henry Norris, the resident English ambassador at Paris, to the court and was presented. He gave to the King Elizabeth's letters of congratulation with appropriate compliments, and, according to his instructions, he expressed her desire that the peace should be carefully guarded. Charles in reply made many protestations of friendship towards England and declared his steadfast intention to keep his faith with the Huguenots inviolably. A little later he referred to the question of Mary Stuart. He said he hoped that the two queens would settle their differences as soon as possible. Walsingham replied that he was sure his mistress would do everything in that regard which in honour and safety she could do. Catherine de Médicis then suggested that doubtless the harsh treatment which Mary had met with in England had been due to the malevolence of Elizabeth's ministers. Walsingham took her up at once. He

¹ La Mothe Fénelon, *Correspondance*, iii. 274-5.

² Ibid. iii. 281.

was sorry, he said, that the Queen Mother thought that his mistress would allow herself to be diverted from an honourable course by any minister whatsoever, that her dealings with the Queen of Scots had been such as she was able to justify before all the world. Both the King and his mother professed themselves entirely satisfied with Walsingham's answers, and the dangerous question was, for the time, dismissed without further parley.¹

Don Francis de Alava, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, in writing to the Duke of Alva of Walsingham's reception at the French court, conveyed the impression that it had been far from cordial. 'The English nobleman', he wrote, 'at his audience was clothed entirely in black. He entered haughtily and spoke with the King and Queen Mother in a blunt and uncourtly fashion. At his dismissal both he and Norris were so ill-mannered that I hear that both of them did not escape censure as they passed out the doors. They did not bestow upon the Duke of Anjou so much as a salutation or even a glance, nor for that matter upon any other of the great personages present.'² But Walsingham's own report of his interview does not confirm this impression.³ According to his account, he had been very cordially received. Charles and Catherine had expressed nothing but goodwill towards England. Even the vexing question of Mary Stuart had been passed over with a few friendly words.

With the Huguenots Walsingham had to all appearances surprisingly little to do. He wrote to Cecil that he had communicated the Queen's message to them through Cavannes, one of their peace commissioners, and had learned of their intentions to send an envoy over to England, to thank Elizabeth for her friendly assistance in dark times.⁴ Further than this there is no record either in his own correspondence or in the letters of Sir Henry Norris of any dealings with them. If anything more

¹ See Walsingham's account of this interview in his letter to Cecil of 29 Aug. 1570 (*Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1214), and in his letter to Leicester of the same date (B.M. Stowe MSS. 147, f. 219), both of which are printed in Digges, 6-7.

² Archives nat. K 1516, 85, cited by Stählin, i. 299.

³ I cannot agree with Dr. Stählin on this point. The brevity of Walsingham's style of writing is not sufficient evidence that his behaviour before the King was curt and unpolished.

⁴ Cf. Walsingham's letter to Cecil cited in n. 1 above.

passed between Walsingham and them, as is not unlikely, he discreetly kept his council until he could convey it by word of mouth.¹

On the 29th of August Walsingham wrote to Cecil that he had finished his business in France and desired to know the Queen's future pleasure regarding him.² By return of post Elizabeth herself replied, expressing her satisfaction at the skilful way in which he had executed his commission. She said further that she had chosen him to succeed Norris as her ambassador in ordinary to the court of France.³

This was no news to Walsingham. For some time Sir Henry Norris had been importuning the Queen to recall him. As early as the 7th of February 1570 Cecil had written to Norris, 'I have named to the Queen's Majesty two to be your successor, both be well liked if their livelihoods were answerable to their qualities; the one is Mr. Francis Walsingham, the other is Mr. Henry Killigrew, who is indeed in livelihood much inferior. If I can procure that either of them, or some other, might relieve

¹ Another matter had also claimed his attention. He wrote to Leicester: 'I have been desirous underhand, to search out something touching the thing your Lordship gave me secret informations of, yet I can learn nothing thereof. Though that would be dangerous, I pray God there be not a thing attempted of more danger which may with more ease be brought to pass' (Walsingham to Leicester, 29 August 1570, cited above). This is a dark sentence on which contemporary documents throw very little light. It is not unlikely that Leicester had word of some Guisan plot for the release of Mary Stuart. Norris, in a letter to Elizabeth, dated 31 August, hints at a device in France to attack England through Scotland and so to bury civil contentions in foreign war (*Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1560-71, no. 1216). What Walsingham himself held to be more dangerous and more possible was perhaps an attempt against the life of Elizabeth herself. But it is useless to advance theories. The matter is only worth mentioning because it shows into what strange and devious paths Walsingham's short stay in France was leading him.

² About the same time Walsingham wrote the following to two unnamed friends: 'Gentlemen: For lack of leisure I am driven to join you together in paper who I am sure are not unjoined in friendship. In what state things are here this enclosed shall show you so far forth as I could learn in this short time of my abode in these parts. I pray you let me be beholding to you both as my return may be hastened so much as lieth in you, for here now I have nothing to do unless it be to charge my lord ambassador who hath already been overcharged. And yet I thought it not fit to return without order lest I should be shent for my labour in making more haste than good speed' (S. P. Domestic, *Eliz.*, xlv. 3). This volume among the S. P. Domestic at the English Record Office is apparently a copybook of Walsingham's correspondence. Unfortunately it has been ignored by the editors of the foreign calendars, though it contains many illuminating documents on foreign affairs.

³ Digges, 9.

you, I assure you that there shall not lack any goodwill in me.' ¹ Again in June Cecil wrote to Norris, 'We look daily that peace will be made, though we see not how it shall continue. But I trust thereby you shall be revoked and I think Mr. Walsingham shall come in your place.' ² Late in July Elizabeth finally decided to recall Norris, ³ and when she dispatched Walsingham to France in August she had already decided to appoint him to the place. ⁴

When the Queen informed Walsingham of his appointment she directed him, if he conveniently could, to remain in France and to assume his new duties at once. If he could not, she told him to come home and make his arrangements quickly for a long stay abroad.

Walsingham's private affairs made it very necessary for him to return home, and he was on the point of leaving France when he received a message from the court asking him not to depart until the King returned to Paris. ⁵ La Mothe Fénélon had been writing from London that the Earl of Sussex, commander of Elizabeth's forces in North England, had been harrying the Scottish border and that, in spite of many promises to the contrary, Mary Stuart was still a fast prisoner with small hope of release. Charles IX was very indignant. As soon as he returned to Paris he summoned Walsingham to him and said

¹ Printed in *Cabala, sive Scrinia Sacra*, 162. The full title of this work is *Cabala, sive Scrinia Sacra: mysteries of state and government in letters of illustrious persons . . . in the reigns of King Henry the Eighth, Queen Elizabeth, King James and King Charles*. The first edition was published anonymously in 1654 in 8vo. The second edition appeared in folio in 1691. The first edition consists of letters written chiefly in the seventeenth century, but also contains many valuable letters of Sir Francis Bacon, Sir William Cecil, the Earl of Essex, and others, including seventy-eight letters (1568-70) from Cecil to Norris, English Ambassador to France. A second part was added in the second edition, containing letters of Lord Buckhurst, Sir Francis Walsingham, and others, relative to Leicester's government in the Low Countries (1586-7). The originals of most of the letters printed in this collection are in the English Record Office.

² *Cabala*, 166.

³ Elizabeth to Norris, 31 July 1570 (*Cal. S. P. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1125).

⁴ Fénélon to the King, 14 August 1570 (*Correspondance*, iii. 274). Upon this subject Walsingham wrote a letter to some lady of his acquaintance which has escaped the editors of both the Foreign and Domestic Calendars, and which is interesting because it is one of the very few personal and private letters of Walsingham which survive. This letter is printed in full on p. 103 below.

⁵ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1275.

that he was amazed at the Queen's hostile demonstrations against Scotland. Walsingham assured him that Sussex had acted without warrant. Charles replied that if this were so, he expected Elizabeth to punish Sussex as he deserved and to establish her good faith by setting the Queen of Scots at liberty. Otherwise, he said, he would have just cause for resentment and would use all the powers which God had given him to secure his sister-in-law's freedom and to preserve her kingdom.¹ It was this message, hardly in keeping with the cordial expressions of friendship which he had listened to at his first audience, that Walsingham carried back home with him.

He got back to England towards the end of September.² Of his formal report to the Queen we have no more than La Mothe Fénélon's version, which is so obviously flattering to the French King and his mother that it was evidently intended to reach their ears.³ What Walsingham really thought about the situation in France is rather hard to get at. While he was still in France he wrote to an unknown friend that he thought the peace there would endure. 'I see great hope', he wrote, 'of the continuance of this peace for that the King's inclination bendeth altogether that way. Of himself he is altogether given to pleasure and enemy to all such troubles as are incident to the wars. Such as are at this present in most credit with him and carryeth (*sic*) the whole sway of the court are likewise inclined to his disposition.'⁴ But he was not quite so sanguine about the matter in his letters to the Earl of Leicester. He told Leicester that he saw five reasons for hoping peace would last, and three for fearing it would not. The King, he said, was

¹ This is the King's account of the interview (cf. *Correspondance de la Mothe Fénélon*, vii. 129). Walsingham has left no record of it.

² Sometime between the 22nd and the 29th of the month (cf. Fénélon, *Correspondance*, iii. 320). There is an interesting note of his expenses for travel on the first mission in the Public Record Office (S. P. Domestic, xlv. 1), which reads as follows:

'A copy of the charges of Fra. Walsingham as well for transportation as also for postage from London to Paris and so back again, being sent from London and Paris and so back again to congratulate the peace with the French King as followeth:

Transportation. Inprimis, for my shipping over into France as also for my return £6 10s.

Item, For postage from London to Paris and from Paris to Windsor, the whole xviii posts at 2s. 6d. the post, the same being run by vij horses £12.'

³ *Correspondance*, iii. 323.

⁴ S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlv. 3.

himself anxious for peace. He was of too pleasure-loving a disposition to relish the discomforts of war and his resources were practically exhausted. It was a good sign, Walsingham thought, that the Guises were growing unpopular at court and that the advocates of peace, the Montmorenci, were increasing in favour there. On the other hand, Walsingham said that he distrusted the Queen Mother. He had observed that she was conferring very often with the Cardinal of Lorraine. He also saw the possibility that the King's marriage with the House of Austria might draw him from his peaceful inclinations. But the most dangerous enemy to the peace, as Walsingham looked at it, was the King's brother, Duke Henry of Anjou. He had been, at least nominally, in command of the royal forces during the Third Civil War and had won just enough military success to make him thirsty for more. It would be very difficult, Walsingham thought, to keep him in subjection. So the case, in Walsingham's opinion, stood. 'I leave your Lordship to consider,' he concluded, 'by that which hath been showed, both hope and fear of the continuance of this peace. What will be the issue of this tragedy, I pray God that fall out that may be to His glory.'¹

Certainly there was considerable doubt in the mind of his mistress. With the Guises in disfavour, and with Montmorency and the Politiques, her friends, in control, she had good reason to expect a marked increase in friendliness on the part of the French crown towards her. But during the month or two which followed Walsingham's return she found very little in the reports of Norris from Paris to justify her expectations. On the contrary almost every letter from him brought some fresh indication of a spirit hostile to her at the French court. In the same letter in which he announced the signing of the peace of St. Germain he spoke of whispered enterprises against Scotland. A little later he wrote of plans afoot to dispose of the unruly Duke of Anjou by placing him in command of an expedition which was to attack England by way of Scotland. Later still he sent word that they meant to marry Anjou to Mary Stuart

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 29 August 1570, Digges, 8. La Mothe Fénélon believed that Walsingham, though in some doubt about the matter, leaned on the whole to the opinion that the peace of St. Germain would endure. (*Correspondance*, iii. 321, 332.) The Spanish Ambassador in London reported him to be of the opposite opinion. (*Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, 281.)

if she could be got out of England. Then came the more definite and alarming news of money and troops being sent north to convenient embarking points, and of promises made by the Queen Mother to send 3,000 horsemen to Mary's assistance if she were not promptly released.¹

No doubt much of this news was exaggerated, but much of it was only too well substantiated. The French King had not been over civil to Walsingham, he was not over civil to Norris. He did not hesitate to say that if Mary were not released by treaty he would undertake to release her by force, and he frankly admitted that he had sent troops and was preparing to send more troops to assist her partisans in Scotland. At the same time his ambassador in England was harping so incessantly upon the one strain of Mary Stuart's release that Elizabeth finally told him flatly that his master seemed a good deal more interested in keeping on good terms with her rival than he did with her.²

Indeed Elizabeth was so much in doubt about the attitude of France at this juncture that she began to interest herself once more in reconciling her differences with the Habsburgs. La Mothe Fénelon saw certain signs of an Anglo-Spanish *rapprochement* at the English court in the autumn of 1570,³ and even the Spanish ambassador, reluctant as he was to concede that anything good could come out of the accursed Cecilian régime, remarked that the situation in France had disposed the English to be more friendly towards Spain.⁴ It is interesting to observe that Walsingham, though mainly concerned of course with French affairs, played some small part in this Spanish business also. Even before his first departure for France he had been sent to the Spanish ambassador to protest mildly at his implacable attitude, and incidentally, it appears, to hint at a friendlier attitude at the English court towards Spain. In August he had crossed the Channel with young Henry Cobham, who was going to Flanders to salute the new Queen of Spain and thence to Germany to revive, if he could, the long-abandoned project of marriage between Elizabeth and the Archduke

¹ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 1167, 1216, 1296, 1313.

² Fénelon, *Correspondance*, iii. 351, 364, 380; vii. 138-9, 156-8.

³ *Ibid.* iii. 296, 369, 383.

⁴ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, 271.

Charles.¹ And again in October, after his return from France, Walsingham was conferring with his old prisoner, Robert Ridolfi, about the possibility of settling the differences between Elizabeth and the Duke of Alva, and was recommending Ridolfi to Cecil as a fit person to be employed in the business.²

It appears that one of the chief obstacles in the way of a friendly understanding between France and England at this juncture was the French King's brother, Henry Duke of Anjou. Anjou was ambitious, he was ultra-Catholic in his sympathy and hand in glove with the Guises. In the civil wars he had made some reputation as a soldier. With the return of peace he was left unoccupied and only too ready to encourage discontent against the government of his brother the King. For the sake of France it was necessary to make some disposition of him. The rumours which Norris had picked up in Paris of a project to send Anjou with an army to Scotland in Mary Stuart's behalf and to marry him to the Scottish Queen, were not altogether without foundation. It is even possible that the great interest which the King and his mother displayed in the release of Mary at this juncture may have been connected with some such project. In any event Anjou was plainly a menace to an Anglo-French entente, unless he could be lured away from the glittering prospects which the Guises were dangling before his eyes by an equally attractive alternative.

It had already occurred to the pro-English party in France two years before that the easiest way to divert Anjou from his hostile purposes towards England was to hold out to him the hope of marriage with the Queen of England herself.³ In June of 1568, before the outbreak of the Third Civil War, Coligny and Montmorency together had sought Elizabeth's co-operation in this plan. They had expressed the opinion that the negotiations for such a match, even if they came to nothing, would serve an excellent purpose in alienating the duke from the Guises.⁴ But Elizabeth at that juncture had not been much

¹ Ibid. 271, *S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1253; Fénélon, *Correspondance*, iii. 296-7.

² Walsingham to Cecil, 22 Oct. 1570, *S. P. Domestic, Eliz.*, lxxiv. 12.

³ The idea was not a new one. It had been entertained for a season, though not very seriously, in 1566, Stählin, i. 302.

⁴ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1566-8, no. 2295.

interested. For the moment she was pursuing an affair with the German Archduke Charles. The following summer, however, after the collapse of the German courtship, she began to consider more favourably the idea of a French marriage. In August of 1569 she intimated to La Mothe Fénelon that she would welcome a marriage alliance with the French royal family, and spoke in significant terms of the manifest virtues of the Duke of Anjou.¹ But she failed to provoke a response from the French court. It is true that in the spring of 1570 Catherine de Médicis pointed out to the English ambassador at Paris the desirability that his mistress should marry, but when Norris retorted eagerly that he supposed she was speaking for her son the Duke of Anjou, and that he thought his mistress would be glad to hear from him on that subject, Catherine replied that Anjou was far too young for Elizabeth.² So the matter stood at the time of Walsingham's first visit to France. Elizabeth was plainly eager to entertain a suit of marriage from the French duke, the Huguenots and the Politiques in France were prepared to promote it, but Catherine de Médicis was reluctant, not so much probably because she was averse from an English alliance as because she realized that an approach to such an alliance through the medium of courtship gave Elizabeth too great an advantage in the *pourparlers*. The rules of sixteenth-century love-making conceded to the woman pursued the right to play fast and loose with her suitor, and Catherine had already observed how skilfully Elizabeth could utilize them to excuse long-protracted and futile negotiations.

Yet no doubt the prospect of a marriage between her son and the Queen of England was an alluring one to Catherine de Médicis. It offered to France a strong ally, it offered to her turbulent son a kingdom and the best match in Europe. Could Catherine have been assured of Elizabeth's good faith she would probably have jumped at the chance. But she was convinced, in the autumn of 1570 at any rate, that Elizabeth merely wished to negotiate, not to marry.³ For that reason she was reluctant to consider the matter at all, and she steadfastly refused to take the initiative.

¹ Fénelon, *Correspondance*, ii. 116 ff.

² Ibid. vii. 110-11.

³ Ibid. vii. 143-4.

It is not unlikely that Walsingham had been charged upon his first mission to France to discover if he could the attitude of the French court towards the Anjou match. If so, he apparently accomplished nothing.¹ The matter seems actually to have been put in motion in the early autumn of 1570 by the Cardinal Châtillon and the Vidame de Chartres, two prominent Huguenot refugees, who were still in England.² Châtillon broached it to Catherine de Médicis in October, and de Chartres pointed out its advantages in a long letter to Montmorency about the same time.³ But the French court was not yet prepared to make advances, and it was not until late in December that any real progress was made. At that time La Mothe Fénelon conferred at length on the subject with the Earl of Leicester who argued strongly in favour of the match and promised to promote it. At Leicester's instigation Fénelon also spoke privately with the Queen about the matter, who received him in her best clothes, turned pretty compliments about French princes, and swore she would never take a husband unless he were of the blood royal. Fénelon was so much encouraged by these interviews that he advised Catherine de Médicis to open negotiations.⁴

There can be little doubt that at the outset at any rate the Anjou marriage project was more actively promoted by the English than by the French crown. Whether Elizabeth seriously intended to carry it through or not is difficult to say. The probabilities are that she merely wished to use the marriage negotiations as a diplomatic expedient which might be exploited indefinitely, and then abandoned when it had served its turn. There is some reason to believe that she was incapable of bearing children.⁵ Her very sensitiveness on that point may account

¹ Cf. Stählin, i. 304, n. 1. The mysterious passage in Walsingham's letter to Leicester of 29 August cited above (p. 97, n. 1) may have had reference to these negotiations, but the wording of it is too ambiguous to justify Stählin's (p. 312) positive attitude.

² Fénelon gives an interesting account of the origin of the affair in his *Correspondance*, iii. 466.

³ Ibid. vii. 143, *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1413.

⁴ *Correspondance*, iii. 414-20.

⁵ Cf. Pollard, *Political History of England, 1547-1603*, p. 181, and references there cited. The following passage from one of La Mothe Fénelon's letters is interesting on this point: 'Les grandz de ce royaulme [England] tiennent pour chose résolue qu'elle ne prendra jamais mary; et quant bien elle en

at once for her fondness for suitors and her antipathy to husbands. Among her advisers, Cecil, the most influential, plainly preferred the match, though he contemplated the possibility that it might be a childless one.¹ Leicester, her favourite, seemed to favour it also, in spite of the fact that it ran counter to his own private hopes. The Spanish ambassador in London was of the opinion that the French had bought him over.² Leicester himself told the French ambassador that since the Queen had announced her intention to wed with none below the blood royal, he had urged the French marriage upon her, in opposition to Cecil and others of the Spanish faction who preferred to match her with the Habsburgs.³ It is certain Leicester misrepresented Cecil's position, though Cecil had been one of the most zealous supporters of the earlier marriage project with the Archduke Charles. It is equally certain that Leicester had not yet abandoned his private hopes. Yet he was undoubtedly very active in support of the French marriage at this juncture. Possibly he was convinced that it would come to nothing. More probably he discovered in the Queen so strong an inclination towards it that he preferred to cultivate her favour by supporting it than to risk her dislike by opposing it. That may explain why he misrepresented Cecil's position to the

prendroit, qu'il n'y aura toutesfoys lignée d'elle, estant mal sayne, et que mesmes, pour quelque accident qu'elle a aux jambes, elle ne sera de longue vie, et que néantmoins elle refouyra, tant qu'il luy sera possible, de déclarir son successeur.' *Correspondance*, ii. 122. On the other hand the late M. A. S. Hume's position in the matter is well taken and is undeniably a strong one. 'That there was no physical reason that the Queen should not marry and bear children may be deduced not only from Lord Burghley's several state memoranda addressed to or drawn up for the Queen herself, and in which the continuance of the direct royal line is usually made one of the principal arguments in favour of her marriage with one suitor after another, but also from the many similar expressions used in the private letters that passed between Burghley, Sussex, Leicester, Walsingham, and others, who, even if they wished to keep up a pretence to the Queen herself in public papers, would not have done so in private and confidential communications to each other if marriage and issue had really been out of the question, which they would certainly have known if such had been the case.' (*Courtships of Queen Elizabeth*, revised edition, 360-1.) It is not easy to find out the truth about this matter, though any one familiar with the intrigues at Elizabeth's court may well question whether any of the four councillors just named would have ventured to confide very far in any one of the others.

¹ Froude, x. 127-30.

² *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, ii. 291.

³ Fénelon, *Correspondance*, iv. 22-3. On another occasion Leicester expressed the opinion that Cecil did not want the Queen to marry at all but preferred to remain King himself. *Ibid.* iii. 462.

French ambassador. He may have wished to keep the *pour-parlers* as far as possible in his own hands.

Meantime Walsingham was in London awaiting his orders to depart for France. The cause of his delay was ascribed by the French ambassador to the fact that Elizabeth wished to complete the negotiations for Mary Stuart's release first. According to him she feared that the dispatch of Walsingham, whose antipathy to Mary was well known, would lead the French King to distrust her good intentions towards his sister-in-law.¹ It seems more likely, however, that Walsingham himself was responsible. From the very outset he had expressed a reluctance to undertake the task. Just before he left for France in August he wrote a letter to some lady unknown, perhaps his wife, in that vein.

'Madame,' he wrote, 'about the time of the receipt of your letters I was dispatched from the court to go to the French King on a message which, though I hope it shall not long entertain me there, yet am I put in great doubt that her Majesty's meaning is to employ me in some further service in these parts of more continuance than the discharge of this present message. Only my hope is this, that her Majesty will find so small taste in this my present service that she will forbear to employ me any further by making choice of some other of more sufficiency. Thus, Madame, you see in what doubtful terms I stand, whereby I cannot dispose of myself. If I might be my own carver I had rather be your neighbour in Sothery (which you wish and I most desire) with a piece of bread and cheese than to have in the country to which I am going their best delicacies and entertainments, but seeing I am born a subject and not a prince, I am tied to the condition of obedience and commandment.'²

It is easy to attach too much significance to protestations of this sort.³ Walsingham was in point of fact the last man in the world to have been contented with a bucolic existence on bread and cheese. To one of his temper and his training a diplomatic career was admirably suited, and it is hard to believe that he was not attracted to it. Yet there can be no doubt of his strong disinclination to accept the French embassy. In

¹ *Correspondance*, iii. 372-3.

² S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlv. 2.

³ Stählin, i. 270-1, seems to me to have done so.

another letter to another unknown friend he expressed his feelings on that subject even more strongly.

'Sir,' he wrote, probably in the autumn of 1570, 'for that her Majesty's meaning is (though thoroughly not resolved) to employ me in France as Mr. Norris's successor, an office and function both of skill and countenance and therefore unfit for me that am not any way sufficiently furnished to supply the one or the other. My private life hath made me utterly unacquainted with that skill that the dealings in Prince's affairs requireth. And as for ability to maintain the countenance of that calling, it is well known how over heavy the burden is for me to bear. These two respects well weighed, my case is very hard if her Majesty alter not her intention, when either I must stand on terms with my Prince (a thing very unseemly in a subject) or else yield to take upon me a function that without her Majesty's especial consideration is like to bring me to beggary. So having now as you see, the wolf by the ears, according to the proverb, I beseech you assist me with your advice, that I may thereby resolve to do herein as duty and my state requireth.'¹

It is probable that in the latter part of this letter Walsingham set forth what were his real objections to a diplomatic post. He frankly could not afford it. He was not a rich man, his father had died encumbered with debts, and though he had retrieved the family fortunes by his profitable marriages, his whole estate at this time probably did not amount to more than £5,000.² His short visit to Norris in Paris had opened his eyes to the heavy expenses attached to the service of the embassy. Though it was not unusual for Elizabethans entering the Queen's service to plead poverty, in the hope perhaps of securing an increase of allowance,³ there can be little doubt that Walsingham's finances were in no condition to bear the heavy strain of foreign service. Elizabeth was apparently not disposed to make what Walsingham considered a sufficient provision for him. He on his part was evidently determined not to go unless she did. And so the matter stood. Towards the end of October Walsingham began to grow impatient. On the 22nd of that

¹ S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlv. 2.

² Stählin, i. 269, n. 3.

³ For the attitude of Sir Edward Stafford, who later served as English ambassador at Paris, on this matter, cf. *American Hist. Review*, xx. 295-6.

month he wrote to a friend at Court: 'I send this bearer with a letter to Mr. Secretary, being desirous by his good means to understand what shall become of me. If by enabling of me her Majesty resolve to employ me, then were it high time for me to bend myself to make my provision as well here as there. If her Majesty resolve otherwise then, that known, I may with more quietness follow mine old course of private life. I beseech you therefore if the time serve convenient let me by your good means have resolution either of the one or of the other by the bearer whom I have appointed to attend.'¹

His letter to Cecil of the same date is in the same vein. 'Surely,' he wrote, 'if her Majesty make choice of any of my mean calling and ability she must also resolve to enable them some way whereby they may bear the burden. Sir Henry Norris whose living is known to be great hath found the charge very heavy, and therefore unfit for the shoulders of any other of my mean calling. I am therefore most humbly to require your Honour that if her Majesty have any inclination to employ me in the said calling, so to use the matter towards her Majesty as she may not think the disabling of myself proceedeth either of lack of goodwill to serve her Majesty to whom I know that of duty I owe both life and goods or else of lack of consideration that it becometh not a subject to stand in terms with his prince; but only with all humility to beseech her so graciously to consider of me in the employing of me as I may not be charged above my calling and yet ready to yield as she shall dispose.'²

It does not appear in precisely what manner Walsingham wished the Queen to 'enable him', nor to what extent she satisfied his wishes. Possibly the favourable intervention of the Privy Council not long afterwards in his suit with his brother-in-law for the possession of the royal leases of Carisbrooke Priory may represent the measure of the royal consideration.³ At any

¹ S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlv. 3.

² Ibid. lxxiv, no. 12.

³ Cf. on this *Cal. of Salisbury MSS.*, i. 516; *Acts of Privy Council*, viii. 48. Apparently the Queen made a regrant of these leases to Walsingham in 1571. (Patent Rolls, 13 Eliz., 8 March.) Long after Walsingham's death his wife spoke of these leases as a 'relic of the Queen's bounty to her late husband'. (*Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, xii. 152). In 1572 the Queen also granted to Walsingham certain special privileges for the export of wool (Patent Rolls, 14 Eliz., 21 May), of which more later.

The actual provision which Elizabeth made for Walsingham's expenses appears in a letter dated 21 Nov. 1570 which she sent to the Lord Chamberlain

rate it was decided early in November that he should take Norris's place in France.¹ He was not, however, finally dispatched until more than a month later.

On the 19th of December he received his letters of instructions. These are particularly interesting from the point of view of English diplomatic practice because they attempt a general definition of the duties of an English ambassador abroad.

Walsingham in the first place was to execute the Queen's commands, to deliver such messages as she sent to the French court, and to procure speedy answers to them.

(S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxvi. 1072). 'Our pleasure is,' Elizabeth wrote, 'and so we command you to make allowance and payment to the said Francis Walsingham, Esq., or to his sufficient assigns of the sum of £3 6s. 8d. by day for his diet: the same to begin 14 days before his arrival at the port where he meaneth to embark and to continue until his return home to our presence. And our further pleasure is that you shall advance unto him before hand after that daily rate for three months and so to continue the said advance of three months before hand during all the time of the said embassy. We are also pleased in consideration of his present charges in putting himself in order for the service that you shall advance unto him the said diet of three months moreover and besides the three months above mentioned, defaulting the whole advance upon his said diet as they shall grow to be due. We will you also to pay unto him or his assigns such sums of money as he shall testify unto you under his hand and seal to have defrayed for his transportation going and returning, and also such money as by his like writing, the same to be also signed by our Principal Secretary, that shall appear unto you that he shall have defrayed in sending of letters to us and to our Privy Council in post or otherwise, and also for our special service.'

Attached to this warrant is the following statement: 'Charges in transportation of Francis Walsingham, Esq. appointed ambassador resident for her Majesty in France for his train, horses, stuff, and other necessities from his departure till his arrival in Paris the xvi Jan. 1571.

Inprimis—Shipped in a hoy at London to be transported to Paris as appeareth by a bill of George Clover £34 10s. 7d.

For 8 posts from London to Dover, for 10 horses and for as many from Boulogne to Paris being 16 posts at 2s. 6d. a horse £26 6s.

For the freight of his geldings, train, duties to searchers, porters, bridges, farmers, mariners, and other officers and shipping in 2 barks from Dover to Boulogne and unshipping there £12 13s. 4d.

For his transportation from Dover to Boulogne in Richard Edges' bark £5.

For the hire of a bark from Boulogne to Paris to carry his stuff in £10 16s. 8d.

For two guides, one for himself and the other for his cart from Boulogne to Paris £6.'

Walsingham's diet as ambassador to France appears to have been the same as that allowed to Sir Nicholas Throgmorton who had been French ambassador in the 1560's, cf. *Cal. S. P. Domestic*, 1547-80, 128, Warrant to pay £3. 6s. 8d. per day to Sir Nicholas Throgmorton appointed ambassador resident to France. Sir Henry Norris, Walsingham's predecessor, was allowed £280 a quarter for his diet, which would amount by the day to a little less (cf. *Cal. Domestic, Addenda*, 1566-79, 313).

¹ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1385.

In the second place he was to watch closely the progress of all matters in France, public and private, which in any way affected the Queen's interests, and to keep her informed about them. In case any matter arose which demanded such immediate attention as to allow no time to consult her wishes, he was to act on his own discretion. But he was to be careful not to proceed too hastily upon imperfect information.

In the third place he was to protect and promote the welfare of English merchants trading in France and to see that their rights, by treaty established, were respected by the French government.

So the Queen defined Walsingham's duties in general. In particular she charged him to have a special care of the interests of the French Protestant party. 'We doubt not but you do consider,' she wrote, 'how profitable a thing it is for the quietness of us and our realm to have that party in France which hath professed reformation in religion to be maintained and continued in the favour which the King hath granted them by this edict. And therein we would have you at all times (when occasion shall be given you) let it appear to the King, that we think nothing can procure more assurance of inward quietness in his realm than the due observation of those things which he hath granted to his subjects in this edict. . . . And in any other things wherein you shall be able at any time to further and advance the observation of the matters of the edict in favour of them of the religion, we would you should endeavour yourself in such sort as may stand with our honour.'¹

Walsingham received this letter of instructions on the 23rd of December with orders to proceed at once to France.² He had already made practically all his preparations. On the 24th of December he went to court and conferred with Leicester and Cecil. Four days later he set out for France. At Canterbury he saw and talked with the Cardinal Châtillon. Thence he went

¹ Digges, *Compleat Ambassador*, 18. It is interesting to observe that when Walsingham afterwards drafted the instructions of Sir Amias Paulet who was sent as ambassador to France in September 1576, he used precisely the same words which are used in this letter of instructions which he himself received at this time (*Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1575-7, no. 935). From this time it is fair to assume that Walsingham highly approved of his letter of instructions and found them adequate. Wherefore we may conclude that this letter contains a good statement of the ordinary duties of an English ambassador abroad.

² Cecil to Walsingham, 23 Dec. 1570, Digges, 18.

forward to Dover, took ship, and on the 1st of January 1571 landed at Boulogne.¹

Before he left England he had held many conferences with La Mothe Fénélon. He had some reason to believe that the French King regarded him as a trouble-breeder, and he did his best in dealing with Fénélon to remove that impression. He protested again and again that he was most amicably disposed towards the French. He invited Fénélon to dinner and entertained him royally. In some measure he seems to have convinced the French ambassador of his good intentions. Fénélon wrote to his master that Walsingham was a very clever fellow, an ardent supporter of the new religion, and hostile enough to Mary Stuart, but that he would probably conduct himself with moderation.²

At the same time, Guerau de Spes, the Spanish ambassador, wrote to Philip of Spain: 'The Queen is shortly sending Walsingham as her new ambassador to France as she thinks he is more likely to raise dissensions there than any other man.'³

The estimates which the representatives of the two foremost Catholic powers in Europe made of Walsingham at this time are prophetic. They reveal at the very beginning of his political career the attitude which Catholic Europe was to maintain towards him throughout. First to last they recognized in him an able and determined enemy.

De Spes, however, put the matter a little strongly when he said that Walsingham was sent to raise dissensions. Elizabeth was not, for the moment at least, disposed to make trouble in France. It is obvious, however, from Walsingham's instructions, that she did intend to keep in close touch with the Huguenot party in France, and it is not without significance to observe that she chose for her ambassador at this time a man altogether in sympathy with the Protestant cause.

Walsingham, as we have seen, landed in France on the 1st of January 1571. He did not reach Paris until the 16th of the month. On the 28th he repaired with Norris to court to be formally presented. He was received with marked courtesy.

¹ For the details of Walsingham's movements at this time cf. his Diary in *Camden Miscellany*, vol. vi. 2.

² Fénélon, *Correspondance*, iii. 275, 364, 379, 408, 431.

³ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, 288.

When Norris introduced him as his successor, Charles replied 'that he could not but conceive great hopes of continuance of amity betwixt her Majesty and him, for that she made choice of one to supply the place so well inclined to entertain it'. After some exchange of compliments Walsingham, at the request of the Huguenots, commended their cause to the King who, 'with great demonstration of outward speech and countenance', replied that 'it was his fixed intention to keep the terms of the peace at all hazards'. Walsingham then presented letters from Elizabeth to the young queen and withdrew. Thereupon he was conducted to Catherine's chamber, where more compliments were exchanged and more assurances of goodwill expressed. Then he repaired to Anjou, the King's brother, who received him very graciously and promised his favour for 'Elizabeth's sake'. Afterwards, to complete the royal group, he was led to the Duke of Alençon, Catherine's youngest son, with whom he held a short conversation, using 'such speeches as were aptest for his capacity' and receiving such answers 'as were to be expected of his young years'.¹ Everywhere Walsingham encountered nothing but the utmost friendliness and goodwill.² 'If outward entertainment,' he wrote to Leicester, 'may be a just argument of inward affection, then surely there is great likelihood of continuation of amity and concord.'³

With this auspicious introduction Walsingham settled down at once to the duties of his office. The matter which naturally engaged his interest at the very outset was that of the Anjou marriage project. Privately he appears to have disapproved of the match. Possibly he was opposed on principle to any matching of the Queen abroad.⁴ Possibly he feared that if

¹ This is an interesting commentary of Walsingham's on the age and intelligence of the young Duke. If he had known that in a little more than a year Alençon was to come forward as a suitor for Elizabeth's hand he might have spoken with more respect.

² Digges, 22.

³ Walsingham to Leicester, 28 Jan. 1571, Digges, 28.

⁴ Sir Thomas Smith represents him as having subscribed to that opinion in a dialogue which bears some marks of being merely one of Smith's rhetorical exercises, but which may have been a record of an actual conversation between Smith and Walsingham on the subject. Strype, *Life of Smith*, 60 ff. It seems to me that Stählin, i. 118-19, is too much disposed to take this discourse at its face value. Imaginary conversations of this sort were not uncommon forms of literary exercise at this time, particularly among men so familiar with classical models as was Sir Thomas Smith.

Elizabeth married a Roman Catholic she would be won away from her lukewarm adherence to the Protestant faith. But speculation on the subject is idle. He himself took care never to express his opinion very frankly. The most he ever did was to hint at it in his private letters to Leicester. The reason which he himself gave for his reticence on the subject was that he conceived it his duty as ambassador to suppress his personal views in order that he might the better serve to transmit those of his prince. But it may be well believed that he was reluctant to commit himself to an opinion which while it might have commended him to Leicester would have antagonized Cecil. He probably found it wise at the beginning of his public career to avoid aligning himself too definitely with either of the factions which divided the English court.

No mention was made of the marriage project in Walsingham's formal letter of instructions. He did, however, confer with Leicester about it before his departure, and Leicester evidently advised him to keep his eyes and ears open and his mouth shut.¹ It appears that Leicester also instructed him to secure a portrait of the young suitor and send it back to England. Upon his arrival in France Walsingham soon discovered that no such portrait was to be had. He consequently had to content himself with sending Leicester a description of Anjou drawn from personal observation. 'In stature,' Walsingham wrote, 'by judgement of others that viewed us together, he was esteemed three fingers higher than myself, in complexion somewhat sallow, his body of very good shape, his leg long and small, but reasonably well proportioned. What helps he had to supply any defects of nature I know not. Touching the health of his person, I find the opinion diverse, as I know not what to credit; and for my own part, I forbear to be over-curious in the search thereof for divers respects. If all be so well as outwardly it sheweth, then is he of body sound enough. And yet, at this present, I did not find him so well coloured as I esteemed him to be at my last being here.'²

Upon Walsingham's arrival many attempts were made by the

¹ So much may be gathered from Walsingham's letter to Leicester of Feb. 1570-1, in Digges, 34.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 28 Jan. 1570-1, in Digges, 29.

French to find out how he himself regarded the match. 'My general answer is,' he wrote to Leicester, 'that I left my private passions behind me and do here submit myself to the passions of my prince, to execute whatsoever she shall command me as precisely as I may, not presuming to do anything further than I shall be commanded. And as for her marriage, whensoever it shall please God to incline her to that change I should forget my duty towards her and my country if I should not like very well thereof, though my present calling requireth me to do no more neither in that nor in any other thing further forth than I am prescribed. This answer seemeth very well to satisfy those that would further this matter for that I was forejudged to be a very passionate enemy.'¹

Walsingham at the same time tried to find out how they felt at the French court about the match. He learned that the Queen Mother was not disposed to make any further advances until she had 'full hope of speed'.² 'They think here you do but dally,' he wrote to Leicester, 'and though no overture hath been made, notwithstanding I find this already hath been done underhand, if the matter go not forward, will breed some disdain, for that they take their penny to be so good silver, as they think them evil used if it may not pass as current. To the end there may grow less harm thereof (as some there must needs) your lordship shall do well to hasten it to some end with what speed you may.'³

Among the enemies of England, the Duke of Guise, the Pope, and Philip of Spain, Walsingham discovered a very strong opposition to the match. This, of course, he had good reason to expect. He found that they were doing their best to prejudice Anjou against it. The Papal Nuncio was telling him that Elizabeth was old, probably barren, and certainly a heretic.⁴ Philip was offering to make him head of the Holy League which had been formed the year before against the Turks and which was thought, as Walsingham said, 'to stretch to as many as they reputed to be Turks'. The Guises were persuading him that it would be an easy matter to win England by conquest

¹ Digges, 29-30.

² Digges, 34.

³ Digges, 38.

⁴ Walsingham to Cecil, 8 Feb. 1570-1. *S. P. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1547 (Digges, 37).

These arguments were having their effect upon Anjou. Walsingham learned that among his friends he was beginning to deprecate the idea of marriage with Elizabeth.¹

But it should not be forgotten that the Anjou marriage was after all simply a means to an end, the end being, of course, a close political alliance between France and England. To this purpose the Politiques in France were steadily directing their energies. They believed that religious difficulties in France could be composed upon the basis of toleration, provided that the restless spirit of the French nobility could be directed against a foreign enemy. They favoured therefore an aggressive policy against Spain and sought to strengthen France for the fight by alliances with other powers disposed to strike a blow at the same quarter. Although the Politiques were not primarily concerned with religious issues, it was perhaps inevitable that they should have found their most promising allies among the Protestant powers, namely, in England and the German Protestant states. The effect of their foreign policy, then, as it worked itself out, was virtually to place France in the centre of a Protestant league against the great Catholic powers. It is not therefore surprising that they should have been opposed by the Pope and the ultra-Catholic Guises, and should have received the cordial support of the French Huguenot leaders. Nor is it surprising to discover that Walsingham, however he may have felt about the Anjou match, was thoroughly in accord with their plans. He had some reason to hope that Elizabeth herself would not be averse from them. Not very long before she had been advocating to the German Protestant princes the formation of a similar league. It is true that Henry Killigrew, who went to Germany in the spring of 1569 to negotiate the matter, found the German princes on the whole rather unresponsive. Frederick III, Elector Palatine, whose Calvinistic leanings were fast isolating him from his Lutheran fellows, was indeed the only one who displayed much enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the fact that Elizabeth was prepared to go so far as to make the proposal was in itself promising.

In two important particulars her plans for a league differed from those of the Politiques; hers was frankly designed in the

¹ Digges, 42.

interests of the Protestant faith and was to be purely defensive in its operation.¹ Yet, after all, a league against Spain and a league in defence of Protestantism were to a man of Walsingham's way of thinking so nearly identical that he may well have presumed that his mistress would endorse the one since she had already undertaken to advocate the other.

When Walsingham went to France in December 1570 the Queen had made little progress with the German negotiations, but had not altogether abandoned them. It may well be, as La Mothe Fénélon believed, that Walsingham's departure from England had been hastened in order that he might confer about the matter with ambassadors of the German Protestant princes who had come to France to intervene with the French King in favour of the Huguenots, and who had not yet departed.² It was Fénélon's opinion at any rate that Walsingham meant to treat with the Germans about the affairs of his religion, and that the King would do well to watch him, since he was known to be a very passionate fellow in such matters.³

There is no record of any conference between Walsingham and the Germans after his arrival in Paris except for the brief mention in his diary that Hubert Languet, the leader of the German delegation, came to visit him.⁴ So La Mothe Fénélon may have been misinformed. It is worth observing, however, that very shortly after he reached France he wrote a letter to the Elector Palatine offering his services and suggesting further correspondence.⁵ It was evidently his intention to keep in contact with the chief advocate of a Protestant league in Germany.

Walsingham got into touch with the Huguenot leaders about the French court as soon as he arrived there,⁶ and he was discussing the question of a league with them before he had been in France a fortnight. He was particularly intimate with the Vidame de Chartres, whom he may have met in England.

¹ Ritter, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 1555-1648, i. 419 ff.

² These Germans were already in close touch with Walsingham's predecessor, Sir H. Norris, *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 1444, 1494.

³ *Correspondance*, iii. 431.

⁴ *Diary*, 3. There is a good brief account of the negotiations between the German Protestant princes and France at this time in Platzhoff, *Frankreich und die deutschen Protestanten in den Jahren 1570-73*.

⁵ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 1610-11.

⁶ Digges, 29.

But his more significant conferences appear to have been with the Huguenot General, François de Beauvais, Sieur de Briquemalt. Both of these men had already taken up the question of an Anglo-French alliance with Walsingham's predecessor, Sir Henry Norris.¹ The Vidame de Chartres had, as we know, been largely instrumental in bringing forward the Anjou marriage project when he was a refugee in England. Briquemalt had been to England in behalf of the Huguenots during the First Civil War. He had later served them with distinction in the field. In the autumn of 1570 they had sent him with two other deputies to Paris to protest against certain infractions of the peace of St. Germain.² After that he remained in Paris as a kind of semi-official representative of the Huguenot interests.³ It was in that capacity probably that he went to visit Walsingham shortly after his arrival in France. The purpose of his visit was evidently to sound out the attitude of the English towards the Anglo-French league against Spain. He told Walsingham that the French King was much incensed at the treatment he had received at the hands of Philip II, was strongly opposed to the Holy League between Spain and the Pope, and was seriously minded to form a counter-league with the German princes and the Queen of England. 'After he had made me acquainted with this matter,' Walsingham wrote in describing the interview to Cecil, 'he asked me how I thought the King should find the Queen affected. I asked him whether he had any commission so far forth to deal with me. He told me, no, but he desired me to say frankly my opinion how I judged the Queen my mistress would be inclined. To whom I answered, that for my own private opinion I thought not but that her Majesty would very well like of it, first in respect of the common cause of religion, secondly in respect of the goodwill she beareth the King, whose friendship above all other princes she doth chiefly embrace, and lastly in respect of her own safety. And as for myself, for these respects when the matter shall grow to some further moving, it shall not lack any futherance that I can give him.'⁴

¹ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1495.

² For the details of his life cf. Haag, *La France protestante*, art. Beauvais.

³ In that capacity he had assisted Norris to get into touch with the German ambassadors, *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1444.

⁴ Digges, 26-7.

Walsingham was better than his word. A few days later, without waiting for the matter to 'grow to some further moving', without even waiting for instructions from home, he found occasion to urge the desirability of an Anglo-French alliance upon the Queen Mother. His official justification of this rather rash course he set forth in a letter to Cecil of the 8th of February: 'The reasons that moved me to use this speech were these: first, for that Spain seemeth not to be at this present very well inclined towards the Queen, my mistress; secondarily, for that the King hath no great liking of Spain as before advertised; lastly, for that I was advertised how that the Admiral [Coligny] had advised lately the King and Queen Mother by his letters to seek to strengthen himself by confederacy with the princes of Germany and the Queen's Majesty, my mistress.'¹

One may, however, be permitted the conjecture that his chief motive was his own strong approval of the proposed league, not only on its own merits, but also because it offered an acceptable alternative to the Anjou marriage project of which he disapproved.

The Queen Mother's response to Walsingham's approach was favourable, if not enthusiastic, and Walsingham was on the whole encouraged by the King's attitude. 'Touching the state of things here,' he wrote to his brother-in-law, Sir Walter Mildmay, on the 27th of January, 'I refer you to this enclosed note of occurrents, and though they seem to give some doubt of the King's sincerity, yet surely Sir, they that know him thoroughly are of opinion that if matters grow to new troubles he will incline to those of the Religion. This oration, sir, whereof I send you a copy, pronounced and delivered to him and to the Ambassadors of the Princes of Germany, hath put him in some good courage, whereas before by the faction of the Guises he was put in great fear of the Catholics as well foreign as at home. Thus Sir, you see, for that he is not settled in Religion, how he is carried away by worldly respects, a common misery to those of his calling. God make those of his calling more truly religious than we are.'² It was perhaps just as well for the cause of Protestantism at large that Charles IX was as much influenced

¹ Ibid. 37.

² Ibid. 30.

'by worldly respects' as he was. Had he been more 'settled' in religion he would undoubtedly have been settled in the wrong camp according to Walsingham's way of thinking. At any rate, whatever were the King's motives, Walsingham was hopeful of him, particularly so because of his ill-concealed aversion from Spain.¹ Walsingham marked the contrast between the curt treatment of the Spanish ambassador and the exceptional courtesy extended to himself. He informed Cecil that the reception accorded to the Count Olivarez, who had come from Spain to congratulate the King upon his marriage, was 'nothing answerable' to that which Lord Buckhurst had received when he came from England on the same mission.²

Things like these tended to persuade Walsingham that the French crown was drawing away from Spain and towards England. And yet, on the other hand, the Guises were still at court, and they were as busy as ever in their plottings against Elizabeth. The King perhaps was not disposed to help them, but he did very little to hinder them. Walsingham learned that De la Roche, a Guisian captain who had lately been assisting the Catholic rebels in Ireland, was preparing in Brittany a second expedition in their behalf. He protested to the King again and again, and Charles swore that if he caught the offenders he would punish them severely; but Walsingham found him 'in promise speedy, in performing slow'.³ At first he was disposed to excuse the King. 'When I consider', he wrote to Cecil, 'how he is not fully restored to the reputation of a King, and that daily many disorders are committed, I see some cause to stay in condemning.' But as time went on and no adequate redress followed his repeated protests, he began to distrust the King's intentions, and wrote to Elizabeth to beware, 'lest Ireland through too much security be neglected as Calais was'.⁴

Moreover, Walsingham got wind of a Guisian plot to set Mary Stuart free and to marry her to the Duke of Anjou.⁵

¹ Digges, 48-9.

² Lord Buckhurst to Elizabeth, 24 Feb. 1570-1, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1573.

³ Digges, 38.

⁴ Ibid. 33, 38.

⁵ The President of the Parlement of Paris, de Thou (father of the historian) told Walsingham that the Cardinal of Lorraine was bribing Villiquier, one of Anjou's favourites with the promise of a rich abbey if he could persuade his master to marry Mary Stuart (*Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1571). Andrew Lang in *History of Scotland*, ii. 234, says that Walsingham invented the

Things like these made him not so sure of the friendly disposition of the French crown toward his mistress. The plot indeed proved to be a mere rumour, but it brought home to Walsingham's mind the fact that the Guises were still a power to be reckoned with in France and that the heir presumptive to the crown, if he were not got out of the way, was likely to prove a useful instrument in serving their hostile purposes against England. 'Here [in France]', he wrote to Leicester, 'they stand upon this point, that neither the King can be safe nor the realm quiet unless Monsieur [the Duke of Anjou] be provided of some other harbourage. The places likely to be attained and fit for his calling, where they would place him, are two, England and Scotland. If England refuse, then is Scotland more ready to receive him.'¹

Anjou indeed continued to be the disturbing factor, and Walsingham after some hesitation came to the conclusion that the best way to dispose of his case was to marry him. It seemed to be the only practicable way out of the difficulty. On the 18th of February he wrote to Cecil: 'I would be loathe in any letter that is to be showed unto her Majesty to make mention of any thing that may anyway concern Monsieur, for that her Majesty doth suspect that I am inclined that way in respect of his religion; and therefore, sir, I shall desire you to use this letter as private to yourself. And as for my inclination to Monsieur (for that I hear he may be drawn to be of any religion), I see so great necessity of her marriage as if it may be to her Majesty's contentment and the benefit of the realm, by judgment of those that are fit to deal and advise in a matter of so great weight, I can be content as becometh me to subscribe the same.'²

Cecil, he was now Lord Burghley, endorsed his opinion. 'I am not able to discern what is best,' he wrote to Walsingham, 'but surely I see no continuance of her Majesty's quietness

story as a ruse, basing his opinion apparently on La Mothe Fénélon's statement to that effect (*Correspondance*, iv. 20, 21); but there is no evidence in Walsingham's correspondence of any such elaborate story as Fénélon fathered upon him nor of its terrifying effect upon Elizabeth which Fénélon describes. Indeed Cecil's reply to Walsingham's advertisement suggests that the Queen did not pin much faith to the tale (Digges, 53).

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 9 Mar. 1570-1; Digges, 52.

² Walsingham to Cecil, 18 Feb. 1570-1; Digges, 42.

without a marriage.’¹ Elizabeth herself, observing the dangers which threatened her at home and abroad, the English Catholics restless, Ireland and Scotland in tumult, plots and rumours of plots in Spain and among the Guises and even in Italy, became more and more convinced even against her will of the necessity of a match. ‘I perceive her Majesty more bent to marry’, Leicester observed to Walsingham in a letter of the 14th of February, ‘than heretofore she hath been.’² And on the 3rd of March Burghley wrote: ‘If any person of value shall deal with you to understand your mind in the case of her Majesty’s marriage you may say, that at your coming from hence, upon some common bruit of such a matter concerning her Majesty and Monsieur le Duc d’Anjou, you sought what to think or report thereof; and this you are assured that at your coming out of England, Her Majesty, upon consideration of the benefit of her realm, and to content her subjects, resolved to marry if she should find a person in estate and condition fit for her to match withal, and that she meant not to marry but with a person of the family of a prince. And you may add that you cannot by any means perceive that her Majesty is altered from that disposition, so as you may conclude that if any such matter should be moved to you by any meet person to deal therein, you will advertise her Majesty thereof, and so would her Majesty you should do.’³

These were the first instructions touching the marriage which Walsingham had received from the Queen since he left England. Both Elizabeth and Catherine were by this time pretty thoroughly converted to the idea of a match, but neither of them wished to make the first advances,—Elizabeth because she did not want to commit herself, Catherine because she distrusted Elizabeth’s good faith. Toward the end of February Elizabeth sent Lord Buckhurst over to France ostensibly to congratulate the King on his marriage, but with secret instructions to treat with Catherine upon the Anjou match if opportunity offered. By the 23rd of February Buckhurst had delivered his formal message, but on the 11th of March he was still in France,

¹ Burghley to Walsingham, 3 Mar. 1570-1; Digges, 55.

² Digges, 47.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 3 Mar. 1570-1; Digges, 54.

'stayed', as Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 'under colour of certain triumphs'. He had been so magnificently entertained, that he wrote to Elizabeth he feared he would hazard his credit in the telling of it. But nothing at all had been said to him directly about the marriage. Catherine had sent Guido Cavalcanti to him more than once to try and beguile him into a declaration, but Buckhurst, having no commission to mention the marriage until it was first broached to him, held his peace. Finally on the eve of his departure from France he met Catherine secretly in the Tuileries gardens, 'as it were by good hap', and they conferred upon the match together. Catherine said that nothing would please her more than a marriage between her son and the Queen of England, if she could be sure of Elizabeth's good faith. Buckhurst solemnly assured her of Elizabeth's intention to marry. Finally it was agreed that M. de Foix should be sent over to England with authority to discuss terms. In the meantime Catherine desired that the matter should be kept secret. The next day Buckhurst received a written offer of Anjou's hand to Elizabeth with eight articles as a basis for negotiations. On the day following, the 14th of March, he left Paris for England.¹

With Buckhurst's departure to England with something like a definite offer of marriage, the field of negotiations shifted from France to England, leaving Walsingham busy with other matters. It cannot be too clearly emphasized that he was not a special envoy sent by Elizabeth to treat for a special purpose. So much the most important question under discussion when he was in France was the marriage question in one form or another that one inclines to neglect many smaller matters which came under his attention as ambassador in ordinary. Grievances of English merchants against the French occupied much of his time. His diligence in the De la Roche affair has already been alluded to. Not only did he bring the matter again and again to the King's attention, but he also dispatched secret agents of his own to Brittany through whom he gathered all the details of the expedition. That De la Roche, in spite of everything

¹ *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 1573, 1602, 1614; Fénelon, *Correspondance*, vii. 183 f. Some interesting details of Buckhurst's entertainment are to be found in his letters to Thos. Heneage, given in *Hist. MSS. Comm., Cal. of Finch MSS.*, 13-16.

that Walsingham could do, escaped to Ireland after all, is not to be laid against him, but against the lethargy or intentional neglect of the King. Also Walsingham, following his detective instinct, had an eye to all sorts of things at the French court; of how the Spanish ambassador was plotting with the Guises and with the Scottish ambassador; of how an ordinary servant of the Queen of Scots, armed with letters of importance, had come to court; of how Lord Seaton, one of the Scottish Catholic rebels, had arrived in France with 'goodly store' of horses and armour and money.¹ In many parts of France he had confidential agents who supplied him with information. We even find him arranging to bribe one of the French ambassador's train to furnish him with news out of Spain.²

He had been ordered by Elizabeth in February to deal with Don Francisco de Alava, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, concerning certain offers made by the Duke of Alva to compound the differences between herself and Mary Stuart and concerning the reception of Irish rebels at the Spanish court. The interview was not very fruitful of results, though Walsingham's rather malicious description of it in a letter to Cecil is not without its points of interest:

'His answer was in the Spanish tongue, which I understand not and other tongue than Spanish he would not vouchsafe to speak, and therefore, Sir, I may rather tell you by guess than otherwise. . . . He said she [Elizabeth] did never use Don Francisco, for so he named himself, but by fits, who from time to time towards her ambassador had always used himself so sincerely as they could not but report that Don Francisco was a gentleman of great sincerity. And if it had pleased her Majesty to have used him thoroughly, he would have done offices worthy of Don Francisco. When I came to that point . . . touching the King his master's . . . entertaining of her Irish rebels. . . . To this (after some time spent in exclamations and admirations) he answered that nothing could seem so strange unto him as her Majesty, being a prince of that wisdom and experience that she is of, should once give ear to such vain bruits as thereby to doubt that his Master (considering the long amity that hath been between the House of Burgundy and England) would now attempt anything that would breed any breach thereof. And as for sending to his Master, he said the way was long and that

¹ Cf. Walsingham's correspondence in Digges, Jan.-March, 1571.

² *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, nos. 1578, 1602; Digges, 45.

it would be two months at the least before he could have any answer. He said therefore he would write to the Duke of Alva in that behalf.

'I showed that my commission was to request to procure satisfaction from the King; and as for the Duke of Alva her Majesty lacked no means to send unto him, no more she did not to send unto the King, but would have been glad, as one well persuaded of him, to have used his help therein as a thing as beneficial for his Master as for her Majesty. In the end he said he would write, but that it would be two months before he could receive answer. In the meantime he wished her Majesty to think of his Master as she would wish him to think of her. Stewkley he protested never to have heard of. If in the rest he be no sincerer than in this, then is he, Don Francisco, not so sincere as he protesteth. As for any attempts by Julio Romero to be done in Ireland, tell your Mistress, saith he in few words, that you her ambassador here knoweth that they be no Spaniards that have the enterprise in hand. I told him that whatsoever I knew he might assure himself her Majesty could not be ignorant of. And whereas, said I, you think that they be Frenchmen, I assure myself to the contrary for that the King hath so assured me. He showed me that he thought the King in that behalf sincere, and that if there were any such matter it proceeded not from him but from others.

'This sir was in effect what I could guess proceeded between us. Never spake I with a prouder man, or with one more disdainful in countenance and in speech. . . . He seemeth to be no better affected towards me than I am towards him, which is such and no further forth than may concern her Majesty's service. I mean to have little else to do with him.'¹

Evidently Don Francisco's lordly manner amused Walsingham considerably more than it impressed him. He never did seem to get on well with Spanish diplomats, partly, no doubt, because he disagreed fundamentally with their policies, but partly also because he found the temper of the Spanish gentleman altogether uncongenial to his own.

Not so many days later Walsingham received a visit from Don Francisco in turn. His manner on this occasion was much more familiar and courteous, he talked of love matters and dilated upon the virtues of the ancient league between Burgundy and England. Walsingham concluded that the French King's unfriendly bearing towards Don Francisco had set him to

¹ Digges, 45-6; cf. *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1578.

thinking that the friendship of England was perhaps worth cultivating. 'The end of our talk was', so Walsingham wrote to Cecil, 'that he for his part and I for my part would not fail to think of those things that might best tend to breed reconciliation between our Princes.'¹ But they never seem to have made any further progress in that direction. This was not by any means because Elizabeth had decided to have done with Spanish friendship. Very likely it was because Walsingham showed her pretty plainly that he was not the man to be employed for 'love talks' in that quarter.

Also Walsingham had something to do with Count Olivarez, the Spanish envoy who had been sent to Paris to congratulate Charles IX upon his marriage. Walsingham found Olivarez 'after the Spanish fashion more solemn than wise'. They had some talk together about King Philip's relations with Ireland. The Count told Walsingham that there was no truth whatever in the rumour that Philip was preparing an expedition to go to the assistance of the Irish rebels.²

But Walsingham had a visitor on the 25th of March who told a different story. This visitor was Maurice Fitzgibbon, titular Archbishop of Cashel in Ireland. He had left Ireland about two years before with a petition from the Irish Catholics to the Pope and to Philip of Spain to free them from the yoke of the Protestant English. He had been to Rome, had lived for two years in Spain upon the bounty of Philip, and now for some reason not clearly known he had come into France. Evidently he regarded Walsingham as a new man easily beguiled.³

He told Walsingham that he had left Spain because he had discovered plots against Elizabeth in which he had no desire to partake. He offered to reveal the details of these plots if Elizabeth would restore him to his bishopric. Walsingham had already learned some things about Fitzgibbon. He knew that the Archbishop had been more or less involved in the De la Roche expedition. He knew also that he had held secret conference not very long before with the Cardinal of Lorraine at Nantes. However, Walsingham pretended to accept his

¹ Digges, 48-9; cf. *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1590.

² *Ibid.* 56.

³ Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, ii, 200 ff.

professions of loyalty in good faith and urged him to return to his allegiance.¹

But when Cashel had left, Walsingham sent for a certain Captain Thomas, an Irishman who had served under the King in the Civil Wars and who was well known at court. Thomas passed in France as a Catholic refugee who had fled from Ireland because of his religion. In reality he was one of Walsingham's secret agents.

Walsingham instructed Thomas to keep watch on the Archbishop and, if possible, to win his confidence.

It was easy enough for Thomas to present himself to Cashel as a fellow countryman and to tender his services as one well acquainted at the French court. In a little while the Archbishop revealed his real purposes by desiring the captain to procure for him an audience with the Cardinal of Lorraine. At Walsingham's advice Thomas 'bore the Archbishop in hand', secured an audience for him, and awaited results. As Walsingham had expected, a few days later Lorraine sent for Thomas to consult him about the Archbishop and his plans. Thomas, primed by Walsingham, painted Cashel in dark colours and represented his plans as chimerical. Wherefore, Cashel, as Walsingham observed to Cecil, found less favour at the Cardinal's hands than he had looked for.

This sent him back to Walsingham again. He wrote to ask that a trusty servant might be sent to him to receive a communication of importance. It appeared that Cashel's real object in sending was to gather news rather than to give it, but the servant showed himself as crafty as his master. Finally, through the Irish captain's ingenuity the Archbishop was altogether discountenanced. Thomas persuaded him to request an audience from the Duke of Anjou. Meanwhile he himself conferred with the Duke and succeeded so far in prejudicing him against Cashel that when his request for an audience came, Anjou replied that he was too busy with affairs of state.²

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 26 Mar. 1571 (*Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1624); in Digges, 58, where it is misdated 19 Mar. A similar mistake is made in the copy in Harl. MS. 260, a fact which tends to establish a relation between Digges and these copies in the Harl. MSS.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 22 April 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1671; Digges, 79.

Walsingham held other conferences with the Archbishop, who seemed at one time about to throw himself upon Elizabeth's mercy, but afterwards changed his mind and returned to Nantes. He found his way later to Scotland, suffered imprisonment there, and died eventually in Portugal.¹ The episode of his visit to France is not in itself historically of great importance. It has been worth considering because it illustrates very well Walsingham's adroitness in the handling of such cases, and it throws some light upon his secret service at court.

Meanwhile Lord Buckhurst had returned to England and had communicated to Elizabeth the French King's formal offer of his brother's hand.

Also he handed to the Queen a paper which Catherine sent containing certain questions for Elizabeth to answer, which were by way of being an invitation to begin negotiations for the match. In this paper the Queen Mother suggested that preliminaries should be discussed between her councillor Paul de Foix and Walsingham 'until the matter might be brought to such ripeness that the King could, without hazarding his honour, send a noble Ambassador'. She specially requested that the question should not be discussed with Fénélon.

It was evidently Catherine's desire to carry on negotiations as far as possible under her eyes in France, and to get Elizabeth to commit herself to some definite proposals. But Elizabeth was wary. In her reply sent by Walsingham on the 24th of March she returned her thanks for Anjou's honourable offer, but with some show of maiden modesty she declined to propose conditions until she understood exactly what was offered. The Queen Mother, she said, would understand her difficulties. She consented that preliminary matters should be negotiated between de Foix and Walsingham, but with evident reluctance, for she instructed Walsingham as 'of himself' to advise the Queen Mother that much time would be saved if some one were sent at once to England. She agreed not to open the matter to Fénélon and to keep it secret from all her councillors except Leicester and Burghley, although she confessed that she saw no reason for concealment, believing the marriage to be highly honourable to France.

¹ Bagwell, *Ireland under the Tudors*, ii. 206.

It is apparent that Elizabeth wished to avoid committing herself to any definite terms. On the other hand, she did not want to frighten the French off altogether. She accordingly instructed Walsingham, if he found the King discontented with her answers and reluctant to consider the matter further without some more definite knowledge of her intentions, to suggest to him the articles of marriage accorded between Queen Mary and Philip of Spain as the basis for further negotiations. She made, however, one important exception to them. 'Of necessity,' she wrote to Walsingham, 'it must be especially prejudged that Monsieur shall not have authority to exercise the form of religion in England that is prohibited by the laws of our realm.' This point she charged Walsingham to make clear to the Queen Mother secretly.¹

In a letter of the same date Leicester explained to Walsingham how the Queen stood on the subject of the match. 'We perceive', he wrote, 'they deal very daintily and doubt much her Majesty's intention to marriage, at least that she had rather hear of it than perform it. But assuredly I do verily believe her Majesty's mind herein is otherwise than it hath been and more resolutely determined than ever yet at any time before. Yet do they mean to deal so secretly on that side as though they will not yet believe it. And accordingly her Majesty mindeth not to deal but as privately as may be devised. . . . The person of Monsieur is well liked of. . . . I see her Majesty misliketh not his estate, for she is of mind to marry with the greatest. . . . The conditions will be all, wherein I am right glad, and we are bound to thank God to see her Majesty so well to stand to the maintenance of the cause of religion.'²

Leicester's zeal for the 'cause of religion' became more and more remarkable as the marriage negotiations progressed. It served him the double purpose of discrediting the match with the Queen and winning the support of Walsingham and the Puritans who really had religious convictions on the subject. There can be little doubt that Leicester was the chief prompter of Elizabeth's conscience in the matter. Burghley, on the other hand, who had become the chief promoter of the marriage in

¹ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 24 Mar. 1570-1; Digges, 62.

² Leicester to Walsingham, 23 Mar. 1570-1; Digges, 70.

the English Privy Council, wished as far as possible to ignore the religious question.¹ His comments upon the Queen's instructions to Walsingham just cited stand in marked contrast to those of Leicester: 'I am in doubt', he wrote to Walsingham on the 24th of March, 'that if this matter for religion be not well conceived by them there the adversaries to the marriage will take great advantage thereof and urge the persisting in it of purpose to dissolve the same. So as I had rather the speech hereof might have come from the Queen Mother or the others to you and so you might answer them as you are warranted, than to begin abruptly of yourself.'²

By the time Elizabeth's letter of instructions had reached Walsingham he had discovered 'great practices in hand' to break off the negotiations. The Guises had been at work again on Anjou. Walsingham heard that the young Duke had told De Foix that unless Elizabeth sent him a direct answer one way or the other without further dalliance, he would have nothing more to do with the matter. Walsingham learnt also that the King and his mother were beginning to grow impatient of the Queen's delay. It was perfectly obvious to him that if he made mention of the obstacle of religion at such a time, it would be fatal. 'I was very much perplexed', he wrote to Burghley, 'what course to take, when I myself saw it most safe for me to follow the course by her Majesty prescribed, whatsoever came of it. But when I beheld her Majesty first, how she in her own judgment did think it expedient for her to marry; secondarily, that if her Majesty did mean to marry abroad this was the only gentleman fit for her to marry; thirdly, the discontentment of her subjects for not marrying; fourthly, how presently she is beset with a number of foreign practices,

¹ Burghley to Walsingham, 9 July 1571; Digges, 115. Upon the attitude of the English Council towards the marriage at this time the comment of de Spes, the Spanish ambassador, is interesting. He wrote to Philip II on 19 July 1571: 'Although the Queen's favorites say how little desirous she is of concluding the marriage, yet demonstrations are still made that it will come about. The only person who is earnest in his efforts to this end is Lord Burghley, who thinks in this way to undo the Earl of Leicester' (*Cal. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, 325). This letter may throw light on several passages in Burghley's letter to Walsingham in which he accuses some unnamed person of double dealing. Burghley appears in his letters to Walsingham as anxious for the match—while Leicester is shown to make much of the 'scruple of religion'.

² Digges, 67.

the execution whereof only stayed upon the event of this match ; I then resolved that it was most fit for me to forget myself and to think only of her Majesty and of her safety ; like that Roman that notwithstanding a law was made that no man should hazard to come on the wall without consent of the magistrate, yet he, seeing the enemy preparing for the scale and that delay of time in asking the magistrate's consent might have hazarded the loss of the City, preferring a public safety before his private perils, repaired to the walls and repulsed the enemy.¹

Evidently, for the time being at any rate, Walsingham was disposed to follow Burghley's lead rather than Leicester's. He accordingly conveyed Elizabeth's answer to Catherine without making any mention of the religious difficulty. He suggested that she send De Foix over to London to open formal negotiations. Catherine was not at all satisfied with Elizabeth's wary attitude. She told Walsingham 'that she could have wished that the answer had been more direct, not so much for her own satisfaction as for others in whom there rested as yet some scruple'. She could not go on so far as to send a formal envoy to London until she had better assurance of Elizabeth's good faith. She did, however, decide to send Cavalcanti. What was more important, she sent with him a definite statement of what she demanded.² And so Walsingham by his discretion had won his point. He had avoided committing his mistress, and he had forced the Queen Mother to declare her hand.

On the 13th of April Cavalcanti had audience with Elizabeth at Westminster, and he placed in her hands Catherine's statement of the terms upon which she was willing to treat. They were briefly six : (1) that no ceremonies should be used at the celebration of the marriage repugnant to Anjou's conscience ; (2) that he and his household should enjoy the free exercise of their religion in England ; (3) that on the day following the marriage Anjou should be crowned King and should rule thereafter conjointly with Elizabeth ; (4) that he should be paid from the English exchequer an annual allowance of £60,000 ;

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 1 April 1571 (*Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1632) ; in Digges, 67, misdated 2 April.

² *Ibid.* ; cf. also Fénelon, *Correspondance*, vii. 199.

(5) that children born of the marriage should succeed to the maternal and paternal estates according to the laws of the lands in which these estates were situated ; (6) that if Elizabeth died before Anjou, leaving no heirs, he was to continue to enjoy during his lifetime his titles and his income.¹ On the 24th of April Cavalcanti was back in Paris with Elizabeth's reply. She answered Catherine's demands one by one. To the first she answered that the marriage must be celebrated according to the rites of the English Church, but she promised that Anjou would not be forced to participate in any ceremonies repugnant to his conscience. To the second she would concede no more than that he should be excused from attending the English service. In return for this slight concession he must pledge himself not to attempt nor to encourage any attempt to change the ecclesiastical laws of England. To the third she agreed that he should rule jointly with her as Philip had ruled with Mary, but she would not admit his right to be crowned. To the fourth she promised to provide an allowance suitable for him. To the fifth she agreed, but she refused to concede the sixth demand of a life pension for the Duke if she died before him.²

Elizabeth sent Walsingham a copy of these answers with some account of the conferences held with Cavalcanti and the French ambassador upon the subject of the marriage. It appeared that the question of religion offered the greatest difficulty. La Mothe Fénélon, she said, had urged her to allow Anjou and his household the private use of their religion, but she had resolutely refused to do more than excuse them from attending the English service. Upon this point Elizabeth charged Walsingham to make her attitude perfectly clear to the Queen Mother. He was in no wise to give the French 'any other comfort on this behalf'. Until it was settled she refused to submit any counter-propositions.³

Burghley attributed this obstinate stand of the Queen to certain information which she had received from France to the effect that if she were firm upon the question of religion, the

¹ Digges, 85, prints a French copy of these.

² *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1634.

³ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 16 April 1571, *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1661 ; (in Digges, 83, where it is misdated 19 April).

French would yield. He himself feared that they would consider it 'but projected to colour the delay in breaking off', and begged Walsingham to do his best to correct such an impression. 'I know your wisdom sufficient', he wrote, 'to invent sufficient answers to mollify their hard conceits.'¹

As soon as Walsingham had received Elizabeth's answers he went to confer with de Foix, who had been appointed by the King to deal with him about the matter.

Walsingham told de Foix that he believed the question of religion to be the only real obstacle to a marriage and that he thought it could be removed. De Foix answered that he hoped it might be, but declared emphatically that if Elizabeth persisted in her uncompromising attitude, it was no use carrying the negotiations any further. 'For', he said, 'Monsieur hath either religion or no religion. If he have religion, then religion being a constant persuasion confirmed by time cannot but in time be removed: if he have no religion, then he is unworthy of your mistress and the place and degree he beareth.' It was a neat dilemma and Walsingham had some difficulty in escaping it. He replied that Elizabeth did not wish Anjou to change his religion all at once, but simply to forgo the practice of it. De Foix pressed his advantage. He retorted that such a course of action would be equivalent to the abandonment of all religion. He was sure, he said, that Elizabeth did not want an atheist for a husband.

Thereupon Walsingham shifted his ground a little. He said he had heard that Anjou was already somewhat bent toward Protestantism and he thought that with a little more instruction he might be led to go the rest of the way. It would be no dishonour for him to turn from error to truth. Moreover, Walsingham bade de Foix consider the great disadvantage to Anjou himself if he came to England as a Catholic. In the first place, he said, it would prejudice the English Protestants, who were the Queen's friends and councillors, against him, and in the second place, it would hardly win him the goodwill of the Catholics, for as supporters of the claims of Mary Stuart to the throne, they could not be expected to befriend a bridegroom who was likely to provide another heir. Finally, Walsingham

¹ Burghley to Walsingham, 19 April 1571; Digges, 88.

said, Elizabeth's objections were to be considered. She did not want the Duke to come as a Catholic, because by doing so he would break the laws of her land, offend good Englishmen, and encourage bad Englishmen in wrongdoing. These objections, Walsingham maintained, deserved greater consideration than any which Anjou could bring forward, for they were the objections of a queen with a nation's interests in her hands, while his were only those of a private gentleman.

De Foix replied to this that the Duke's conscience was a matter of supreme importance to himself. Then followed replications this way and that. The end of it all was that de Foix declared for certain that the Duke could not be brought to consent to any sudden change in religion and that Walsingham maintained with equal assurance that Elizabeth was fully resolved not to allow him the use of the Catholic religion in England. And so the conference ended not far from where it had begun.¹

Four days later, 28th of April, Walsingham rehearsed this conference with Catherine at St. Cloud. The arguments followed the same course, and reached substantially the same conclusion. Catherine encouraged Walsingham to believe in Anjou's early conversion, but she declared positively 'that neither Monsieur, her son, nor the King nor herself could ever yield to any such sudden change for any respect whatever'. She desired Walsingham to convey this decision to Elizabeth with the request that if she meant to proceed further, she would send within ten days a statement of the terms upon which she would be willing to treat.²

Walsingham sent an account of this conference at once to Elizabeth. In a private letter he told Burghley that the French, for all their long-winded declarations, were very much more concerned about their honour than their consciences. He attributed their obstinacy upon the point of creed to assurances

¹ There is a report of this conference in *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1732. It is, however, misdated 25 May. This conference certainly took place before 11 May for Elizabeth mentions it in a letter of that date (cf. Digges, 97). Walsingham wrote in his Diary (*Camden Miscellany*, vi. 7), under the date of 24 April, 'I went to speak with Monsr. De Foix.' Furthermore, there is a copy of this report in Harl. MS. 260, f. 90 b, dated Paris, 28 April.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 28 April 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1677; in Digges, 88.

which they received from Fénélon to the effect that if they persisted Elizabeth would yield in the end. He believed that at a pinch Catherine would concede the point rather than allow the marriage project to collapse.¹ The Huguenots supported him in these views. Teligny, the son-in-law of Admiral Coligny, told Walsingham about a conversation he had held with the King upon the subject. 'My brother,' Charles had said, 'if there fall out no other let but religion, will be ruled by me. And because I may the better bring the matter to pass I will have my brother with me out of this town, and divide him from certain superstitious friars, that seek to nourish this new holiness in him.'² What was still more convincing to Walsingham, he observed that the increasing discord between the King and his brother made the match almost essential for the internal peace of France.

Indeed it is pretty clear that Charles IX and his mother were eager for the match at this time. Their strained relations with Spain made a close alliance with England eminently desirable. It was necessary for the sake of civil peace to get Anjou out of the country. Besides, from a worldly standpoint, it would have been hard to find a better match in Europe.³ So Catherine was not disposed to make too much of the religious difficulty. What she feared was that Elizabeth was simply using religion as a pretext and that she did not really want to marry at all. The Queen Mother was, consequently, unwilling to concede the point until she was sure that its concession would effect the end which she sought.

Elizabeth's attitude is a good deal harder to define. She seems to have been attracted to the young Duke's person. She certainly liked to be courted. For political reasons already set forth, she was anxious to cultivate the goodwill of the French crown at this juncture, though it was characteristic of her that

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 28 April 1571, S. P. Foreign Eliz., vol. cxviii, no. 1138. The abstract of this letter in the Foreign Calendar is unsatisfactory.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 22 April 1571; Digges, 82.

³ Catherine wrote to Fénélon on 11 Feb.: 'Or M. de la Mothe vous êtes sur le point de perdre un tel royaume et grandeur pour mes enfants, dont j'ay un très grand regret. Voyez si'l y aurait quelque autre moyen, comme je vous avais mandé autre fois, qu'elle vouldût [*sic*] adopter quelqu'une de ses parents pour fille, et la déclarer son héritière et que mon fils l'espousât.' (Fénélon, *Correspondance*, vii. 179.) Cf. also *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1733.

she had scarcely begun to talk matrimony with the French before she sent Henry Cobham to Madrid to talk peace and goodwill with the Spanish.¹ It is doubtful if she ever seriously contemplated a match with Anjou. She utilized the religious difficulty as she had utilized it in the past as a serviceable pretext for protracting the negotiations. But she concealed her ultimate intentions so skilfully that no one at the English court, not even Burghley or Leicester, were quite sure of what they were. Possibly the truth of the matter was that she had no ultimate intentions. Her Privy Council appears to have been in the main favourable to the match. Burghley wrote to Walsingham somewhat later, 'God direct the matter for I have done my uttermost and so hath other councillors here. My Lord Keeper [Bacon] hath earnestly dealt in it and so hath my Lord of Sussex. My Lord of Leicester hath in my dealings also joined earnestly with me, and among the rest of the councillors I know none directly against it.'² Burghley, himself, certainly was doing his best to induce the Queen to go forward with it. There is good reason to believe, however, that Leicester was working equally hard underhand to defeat it. His method seems to have been to encourage the French ambassador on the one hand to believe that the Queen would yield on the religious question, while he urged her on the other hand to stand fast by assuring her that the French would yield. It was doubtless to this practice that Burghley referred in writing to Walsingham: 'It were strange that any one man should give comfort to the ambassador in the cause and yet the same man to persuade the Queen's Majesty that she should persist. Both these things are done, but I dare not affirm by anyone.'³

¹ On Cobham's mission and its purposes cf. Fénelon, *Correspondance*, iv. 37 ff., and *Cal. Spanish*, 1568-79, 305-17.

² Digges, 115. The Spanish ambassador, however, maintained that Burghley was the only councillor very earnestly in favour of the match, *Cal. Spanish*, 1568-79, 325.

³ Digges, 100; cf. in a similar vein, Digges, 108. That this passage refers to Leicester is sufficiently obvious from the fact that no man in England except Leicester was in a position to do just this thing. Burghley's belief in Leicester's double-dealing finds support in the dispatches of la Mothe Fénelon. Leicester certainly assured Fénelon that Anjou would be allowed the private exercise of his religion both for himself and his household (*Correspondance*, iv. 85). At the same time Leicester's letters to Walsingham leave little room for doubt that he was urging the Queen to resist the French demands for concessions of this sort. Burghley with his usual caution refrained from stating his suspicions of

Walsingham was of course by this time thoroughly conversant with the views of both Burghley and Leicester. His own position at first had been one of opposition to the match, but as time went on he became converted to Burghley's view of the matter. In one respect, however, he played directly into Leicester's hand. His own religious opinions were such that he was not at all prepared, as Burghley evidently was, to make any concessions to Anjou's religious tenets. 'The only scruple I have', he wrote to Burghley on the 28th of April, 'is the exercise of his religion, being myself not persuaded that an evil may be done whereof good may come.'¹ Walsingham could not therefore but join forces with Leicester in urging Elizabeth to stand fast upon that point. He did not, however, regard this as an unsurmountable obstacle to the success of the match. He had ample assurance from the friends of the marriage in France that the French crown would yield upon the point of religion if the Queen stood fast. Burghley evidently disagreed with him in this, or at any rate intimated to him more than once that he would facilitate matters in England if he said somewhat less about the acquiescent mood of the French.² But Walsingham ignored the hints. He had no taste for Burghley's compromise with what he considered the cause of God. Sooner he would have preferred to abandon the marriage project altogether. 'Above all things,' he wrote to Leicester on the 28th of April, 'I wish God's glory and next the Queen's safety. If this match may advance them both then I wish it to proceed, otherwise not.'³

In a letter dated the 28th of April Walsingham had reported to Elizabeth his interview with de Foix about her answers to the French proposal and his conference with the Queen Mother on the same subject. In her reply (11th of May) Elizabeth instructed him to push home the point of religion, reiterating the imminent danger both to herself and to her realm if Anjou came as a Catholic. One argument which she used was eminently

Leicester more directly. Indeed, he usually represented Leicester to Walsingham as favourable to the match, and even urged Walsingham to tell Leicester that he (Burghley) so regarded him. (Digges, 105, 115.)

¹ S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxviii, no. 1138.

² Digges, 88, 108.

³ S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxviii, no. 1139. In the Foreign Calendar (no. 1676) this letter is wrongly indicated to have been addressed to Burghley.

characteristic of her. She said that for her part she could see no reason why Anjou should not worship in the English Church without injury to his conscience. The service was very similar to the Roman one. She even went so far as to assert that the English Prayer Book had been allowed by the Council of Trent.¹ It was in the vernacular to be sure, but she had no objection to having it translated either into the Latin or into the French tongue for the Duke's benefit.²

As soon as Walsingham had received the Queen's letter he went to confer with Catherine de Médicis. He found her very much more conciliatory than she had been at her former audience. She admitted that Elizabeth's arguments had weight and she said that she would speak with her son about them.

The next day Walsingham was at court again. In conversation with the King he took occasion to state once more Elizabeth's reasons for being so obstinate upon the point of religion. Charles agreed with his mother that they were of great moment. He requested that he might have the Queen's counter-proposals in order that he might consider the whole matter together. He was sure, he said, that the Duke would be ruled by him so far as was compatible with honour and conscience. Catherine spoke to Walsingham in similar terms. She urged him to press Elizabeth for her counter-proposals, suggesting that if she consulted with Fénelon before sending them, much time would be saved. Finally she bade Walsingham assure Elizabeth that as well in religion as in other points, reason should decide on their parts all such difficulties as should arise.

Walsingham found likewise that Anjou himself was inclined to be somewhat less obstinate upon the point of religion. He paid the Duke a visit on the 20th of May and explained to him at length the reasons which had led Elizabeth to deny him the exercise of his religion in England. At the same time he gave

¹ This rumour was prevalent in England at the time. It is not improbable that such an offer may have been made, but there is no documentary evidence of it. Cf. Pollen, *The alleged Papal Sanction of the Anglican Liturgy*, *The Month*, Sept. 1902, and W. H. Frere, *History of the English Church*, 1558-1625, p. 76. Walsingham, in a letter to Burghley dated 21 June 1571 (*Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1813), says that Sir Nicholas Throgmorton had told him that the Cardinal of Lorraine had promised that the Pope would have the English Prayer Book declared orthodox if Elizabeth would acknowledge the same as received from him.

² Elizabeth to Walsingham, 11 May 1571; Digges, 97.

him a copy of the English Prayer Book and bade him consider how closely it corresponded to the Roman one. Anjou retorted with great protestations of admiration and affection for Elizabeth, 'the rarest creature', as he had learned, 'that was in Europe these five hundred years'. 'If I thought', said he, 'that there could ensue any inconvenience to her disquiet through me, I would rather wish myself never to have been born.' As for religion, he hoped that she would permit him to enjoy his own in such private fashion as would be without offence to the state. When Walsingham declared this to be impossible, the Duke responded that 'he knew not how God hereafter would dispose his heart', but he desired Elizabeth to consider, 'what it were to do anything with scruple and remorse of conscience.'¹

Walsingham's conviction was strengthened that the young suitor was not so obstinate a Catholic as was pretended. 'His religion', he wrote to Burghley, 'dependeth upon his mother's direction, whose persuasions induced him to be so superstitious last Lent for conserving his credit with the Catholics if this match did not proceed. What her religion is, your lordship can partly guess.'² To Thomas Heneage, an old friend, he conveyed the same impression in terms which reveal a pleasant glimpse of the man behind the ambassador. 'Knowing how dangerous matters and thankless *marriage* matters are, I thought it good to take some breath before I gave my full *opinion* touching *this gentleman*. *Though he be choleric* yet lacketh *he* not *reason* to govern and bridle the same. And you know that these natures are the best natures and commonly prove the best *husbands*. Or else should not you and I be in the highest degree in such perfection as we are. Yet in this matter we shall do well not to be judged neither by Mrs. Heneage nor Mrs. Walsingham because they are parties.'³

De Foix swore to Walsingham secretly that within a year the Duke would be as good a Protestant as any one in England, and Walsingham found this opinion confirmed by others.⁴ Furthermore he learned that Anjou had already begun to confer

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 26 May 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1729; Digges, 101.

² Same to same, 21 June 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1813.

³ *Cal. Finch MSS.* (Hist. MSS. Comm., 1913), i. 18. The words in italics are in cipher in the original.

⁴ Cf. n. 2 above.

with French gentlemen who had been in England as to how he should direct his conduct there so as to gain the goodwill of the English.¹

All these things encouraged Walsingham greatly. 'I thought good to advertise her Majesty with speed', he wrote to Burghley and Leicester on the 19th of May, 'that they rest here in very good opinion of the matter; and that if the articles were here that are to be propounded by her Majesty, it would make them more reasonable on the point of religion. Thus far I hear they are come on that they are content that that article [of religion] should be left uncapitulated. . . . They stand upon this, as I learn, that her Majesty promised to deliver her articles as soon as she could receive the King's; and that therefore, without the having of them, they will not deal so frankly as otherwise they would. . . . I beseech your lordships therefore, for putting away all jealousy, to deal earnestly with her Majesty for the present sending of them with all speed.'²

In a private letter to Leicester written at about the same time Walsingham did not hesitate to express himself strongly in favour of the match. 'The Protestants here', he wrote, 'do so earnestly desire this match; and on the other side the Papists do so earnestly seek to impeach the same as it maketh me the more earnest in furthering of the same. Besides, when I particularly consider her Majesty's state, both at home and abroad, so far forth as my poor eyesight can discern; and how she is beset with foreign peril, the execution whereof stayeth only upon the event of this match, I do not see how she can stand if this matter break off. No particular respect, as God is my witness, moveth me to write thus earnestly, but only the regard I have to God's glory and her Majesty's safety.'³

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 26 May 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1733.

² Walsingham to Burghley and Leicester, May 19, 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1712; Digges, 97. The Venetian ambassador at Paris wrote home on 11 June: 'The negotiation for the marriage between the Queen of England and Monseigneur d'Anjou still continues. The Court is at Gaillon and the English Ambassador has been granted a long and most gracious audience in the matter of the marriage by the Queen Mother who, for the great love she bears her son, is doing her best to bring the affair to a conclusion; and although there are many reasons to the contrary, and amongst others the disparity of age and the difference in religion, it is nevertheless the opinion of many that the negotiations will be successful.' *Cal. Venetian, Eliz.*, i. 468.

³ Digges, 96.

In spite of Walsingham's urging and of the best effort of Burghley to hasten the Queen's resolution, nearly a month passed before she sent her counter-proposals to France. At first she had refused to proceed further until the religious question was settled. Burghley, however, finally prevailed upon her 'by some long labourious persuasions' to define her position. Even after she had consented to do this he had considerable difficulty in inducing her to omit a demand for the restoration of Calais.

Elizabeth's counter-proposals were little more than a repetition of the most important articles in the treaty of marriage between Philip and Mary. They provided :

That the Queen should share all the possessions of Anjou during the marriage and should have a dower in case she survived him ;

That the offspring of the marriage should succeed to the maternal and paternal estates according to the laws of that country in which the estates were situated ;

That the Duke should not make any innovation in the laws or customs of England, and should not promote any foreigner to any public office or benefit within the realm ;

That the Duke should not take the Queen out of England without her consent ;

That the children of the marriage should be educated in England ;

That in case the Queen died before the Duke he should claim no right to the kingdom, but should allow the succession to pass according to the laws of the land ;

That the Duke should not transport any treasure out of the realm, nor any ships, nor munitions of war, nor alienate any possessions of England ;

That the Duke should in no way restrict the right of the Queen to rule in as ample a manner as she had always done, and that he should make no claim to sovereignty by reason of the marriage (he was, however, to affix his name to all royal documents) ;

Finally, that in case a child born of the marriage should succeed at once to the crowns of France and England, the rights and privileges of the English should be preserved.¹

¹ Digges, 104 ; *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 545. Endorsed by Burghley '4 Junii 1571'.

It is to be observed that these proposals did not admit the right of Anjou to be crowned King as Catherine had demanded. More important still, they omitted altogether, except by implication, the disputed question of religion. It was far from being the Queen's intention, however, to pass over that matter in silence. When she sent her proposals to Walsingham on the 8th of June she expressly commanded him to inform the King that she considered the question of religion to be the principal point at issue.¹ Two private letters of Leicester and Burghley to Walsingham leave no doubt about her stand in the matter. 'Her Majesty doth stand still very stiff touching the point of religion required of that side,' wrote Leicester, 'and as far as I can perceive she will hardly relent to any other qualification than you know of.'² Burghley wrote: 'Her Majesty conceiveth that if she will stand fast [upon the point of religion] they will utterly yield.'³

When Walsingham presented Elizabeth's proposals to Charles he received them 'in very good part' and said he meant to send de l'Archant, Captain of the Duke's Guard to thank her for her frankness. Shortly afterwards he would send de Foix and Montmorency to England with his answers.⁴ Catherine, less confident, in conference apart with Walsingham, hinted at suspicions, still entertained by some, of Elizabeth's insincerity. For herself, she said, she indignantly threw aside such insinuations and she desired Walsingham, as a private gentleman, frankly to tell her what was the best way to bring the match to an end. He said he thought that in the first place they insisted too strongly upon the point of religion and proceeded to recapitulate the dangers to which England would be exposed if Anjou were allowed the freedom of his religion. He pointed out again the similarity of the English ritual to that of the Church of Rome, and he bade Catherine consider how desirable the match was for both France and England. In the second place, he said, he wished that the French were more straightforward in their wooing. Catherine let his remarks upon the point of

¹ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 8 June 1571; Digges, 106.

² Leicester to Walsingham, 9 June 1571; Digges, 110.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 7 June 1571; Digges, 108.

⁴ Walsingham to Burghley, 21 June 1571; *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1811. (In Digges, 109, misdated 20 June.)

religion pass unanswered. She apologized for their manner of wooing. They feared, she said, to go forward too quickly lest some unkindly impediment to the match would endanger the good friendship between the two countries.¹

Not many days after this conversation l'Archant departed for England. He found Elizabeth at Hampton Court early in June and held a number of conferences with her there. As usual, the discussion turned upon the point of religion, and old threadbare arguments were dragged into service again. The result of it all was that Elizabeth flatly declared that Anjou should not worship in England contrary to the laws of the land. All the arguments which l'Archant and Fénelon could bring forth, and they were many and often reiterated, did not move her an inch from that position. Referring to the expected mission of de Foix and Montmorency, she said plainly that if they were to come over with a head full of notions that she could be induced to yield the point, it were better for the cause of friendship that they stay at home. L'Archant was considerably taken aback. The Queen herself afterwards, relenting a little, sent Leicester and Burghley to talk the matter over with him. But the only solution of the difficulty which they could discover was in the omission of the subject of religion altogether. With this l'Archant returned to France the richer by a gold chain which Burghley, after some haggling, induced the Queen to bestow upon him.²

Burghley confessed to Walsingham in a private letter that he did not know what to make of it all. He had done his best, he said, and so had the rest of the Council to bring the Queen to reason, but to no purpose.³ Leicester said he believed that 'the scruple in religion' would break off the whole match and urged Walsingham to try and smooth the way for an alliance on some other basis.⁴ The Queen herself instructed him not to speak of the marriage at all unless it was directly put to him. She agreed, she wrote, to the omission of the subject of religion,

¹ Same to same, 21 June 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 1813.

² Compare 'A summary of the several answers made by the Queen's Majesty', Digges, 112; also Fénelon's report of these negotiations in his *Correspondance*, iv. 165 seq.; also Burghley to Walsingham, 9 July 1571; Digges, 115.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, just cited.

⁴ Leicester to Walsingham, 7 July 1571; Digges, 116.

but she charged him to make clear that such an omission was not to be regarded as a tacit concession of the point in dispute. 'You may plainly say,' she wrote, 'either to Monsieur himself or to some other in credit about him whom you may trust, that the forbearing of it by way of treaty shall not content us only, but also the forbearing of the use of it.'¹

In such wise the marriage negotiations stood at the end of July 1571. Catherine had made the definite proposal of marriage late in March. She had coupled with it the demands that in case of marriage Anjou should be crowned King jointly with the Queen and that he should be given freedom to worship in England according to his own faith. In April Elizabeth had replied to these proposals unfavourably. She had accepted the idea of marriage, but she had objected to the terms which Catherine had offered. Upon the matter of religion she had been particularly firm, declaring that she would in no wise permit the Duke to worship as a Catholic in England. From that time onward the issue had turned upon whether Anjou would consent to become an English churchman or Elizabeth would marry him as a Catholic. The French appeared on the whole disposed to yield upon the point of religion or at least to ignore it, provided they were well assured of Elizabeth's good faith. They had asked the Queen to state her own terms without regard to the religious question. Elizabeth after some haggling had consented to do so. The terms which she had submitted had made no mention of the religious difficulty. Elizabeth, however, had made it very clear that she had no intention to ignore it. When the French King had sent l'Archant over to England to thank her for her proposals, she told him pretty plainly that it was a *sine qua non*. Elizabeth's attitude had puzzled her councillors. Religious zeal was not an emotion which she displayed on many occasions. Burghley and Leicester indeed had about come to the conclusion that it was merely a pretext and that the Queen did not want to marry on any terms.

Now at the end of July 1571 l'Archant was back in France once more and Walsingham was called to court to learn what the French crown meant to do in consequence of the envoy's report. The King and his mother received him courteously.

¹ Eliz. to Walsingham, 9 July 1571; Digges, III.

Both of them expressed their gratitude for Elizabeth's frank dealing. Both regretted that the match should be hindered because of religion. Catherine asked Walsingham if he did not think that he could induce Elizabeth to be more tolerant. He answered shortly that he could not, that his business was 'to advertise, not to advise'. 'And if it were otherwise,' he added, 'yet should I stand you in little stead being persuaded as I am, for neither as a christian, nor as a subject, nor as an ambassador I may well do it.' Charles said that he meant to send de Foix to England to see if he could not persuade the Queen to be more indulgent. But Walsingham noticed that both the King and his mother had become 'stiffer' upon the question of religion than they had been before. He informed Burghley that Anjou had been so alienated from the marriage by the practices of the Cardinal of Lorraine that even though Elizabeth should concede the point of religion it would not avail. Walsingham took some comfort from the fact that Anjou's obstinacy would enable the Queen to withdraw without damage to her honour or good faith, but he had plainly come to the conclusion that the match-making was at an end.¹

This change in attitude of the French crown towards the match had doubtless been induced in part by their fear that Elizabeth would disappoint them in the end. But another cause seems to have arisen in the person of Anjou himself. The Guises apparently had been to work at him again. At any rate he flatly refused to consider a marriage with Elizabeth unless she allowed him the freedom of his religion. Charles had some very warm words with his brother on this subject. Catherine pleaded with him with tears in her eyes. But they could not move him. Both the King and his mother were very much provoked. Catherine wrote to Fénélon: 'As I have a particular confidence in you, I will not conceal from you that my son Anjou's obstinacy annoys me greatly. He is so determined not to go to England without a public assurance that he may enjoy his religion there, that neither the King nor I have been able to persuade him to trust the Queen's word. We shrewdly suspect Villiquier, Lignerolles or Sarret, possibly all three of them are responsible for these humours. If we can prove it, I tell you they will

¹ S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxix, no. 1251.

suffer for it. For all that I do not mean to give up hope for we may possibly be able to change his mind—or the Queen's.' ¹

It was this optimism of the French crown which led to the dispatch of de Foix to England about the 1st of August. He was instructed to thank the Queen for her frank dealing and to urge her once more to yield the point of religion. If she would not yield, he was to return home without discussing the other terms. There was no mention in his letter of instructions about negotiating a treaty of alliance, in case the marriage negotiations fell through, but he may have had some verbal instruction upon this subject.² Walsingham at any rate thought so. In a letter to Leicester of the 31st of July he wrote, 'The King is resolved to send over forthwith M. de Foix with his full resolution touching the matter in hand, who, as I suppose, hath commission to conclude either marriage or some strait amity between the two crowns.'³ By the same post he informed Burghley that the King and his mother most earnestly desired strait amity with England and that it was thought de Foix would be commissioned to make some liberal offers to that end.⁴

Walsingham's own attitude towards the possibility of substituting for the marriage project a league without marriage is set forth clearly in his letter to Leicester of the 3rd of August:

'What to hope of the marriage I know not, because it hath so many overthrows both here and there. If it may be to God's glory and her Majesties safety and contentment, I then wish it, otherwise at an end.

Touching the conclusion of some League and Amity I hope every one doth wish it that desireth her Majesty's safety and the benefit of our Country, notwithstanding there lieth a block in the way whereat divers may stumble. The block is our ancient league with the House of Burgundy, which by entering into some strait league with France may somewhat be touched, and for that the one cannot yield that profit that the other may,

¹ The Queen Mother to Fénélon, 25 July 1571, *Correspondance*, vii. 234, from a holograph original. Catherine advised Fénélon to burn this letter. It may be significant to observe that Lignerolles was murdered a little while after this. Cf. also S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxix, no. 1251. (In *Cal. For.*, 1569-71, no. 1886.)

² See his letter of instructions in Fénélon's *Correspondance*, vii. 238. This letter is signed by the King, his mother, and the Duke of Anjou.

³ Digges, 119.

⁴ *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1886.

at the first sight it may seem disputable whether the same is to be received otherwise than after the accustomed manner, but if the circumstances of the present time be duly considered this block may be removed and the amity that will be proffered profitably received.

‘The House of Burgundy, till of late days, was ever inferior to England and so depended thereon, but now being tied to the House of Austria he is grown to the greatness as of inferior he is become superior, of a good quiet neighbor a most dangerous and ambitious neighbor, which we shall speedily find if we do not speedily provide for it.

‘How evilly they rest satisfied with us in respect of the injuries received, it is well known; how naturally they are inclined to revenge, the world hath had sufficient trial of. If presently they forbear it is not for lack of good will, but in respect of the incommodity of the time, which if the jealousy between them and France were taken away we should soon see the experience thereof. To renew traffic with them before they do think themselves revenged, or that their pride or greatness be some way abated, were but to present them a fit opportunity of revenge.

‘Now if the dangerous greatness of the House of Austria be well considered, the discontentment they have in respect of the injuries received, their natural inclination to revenge, and the unseen traffic of our merchants as yet;—these considerations well weighed, the case may seem somewhat altered.

‘And though France cannot yield like profit that Flanders doth, yet may it yield some profit with less hazard and more safety. In this case two things I consider chiefly:—

‘First, that the House of Austria is become the Pope’s champion, and professed enemy unto the Gospel, and daily practiseth the rooting out of the same, and therefore we that are professors of the Gospel ought to oppose ourselves against it.

‘The other, that the entrance into the league with France will not only be an advancement of the Gospel there but also elsewhere, and therefore though it yieldeth not so much temporal profit, yet in respect of the spiritual fruit that thereby may ensue, I think it worthy the embracing, or rather to say better I think we have cause to thank God that offereth us so good occasion both to advance His glory, and also for her Majesty’s safety. I doubt not but your Lordship will do your uttermost that this occasion offered may not grow to be fruitless.’¹

It will be observed with what alacrity Walsingham abandoned the marriage for the league, though perhaps some allowance should be made for the fact that his letter was addressed to

¹ Digges, 120-1.

Leicester, whose opposition to the marriage he was well aware of and whose support of the league he was particularly eager to enlist. In his letter to Burghley of the same date he presented the matter in a somewhat different light. He pointed out to Burghley that the ascendancy of the Huguenot pro-English party in France largely depended upon their ability to arrange a firm league of friendship with England and the German Protestant princes. If they succeeded, they could in all probability carry out their design of a war against Spain. If they failed, they would inevitably fall and the French crown would be obliged to turn to the ultra-Catholics and accept a Spanish alliance upon the Spaniards' own terms. Walsingham bade Burghley consider how advantageous it would be if France and Spain were brought to blows while England stood aside and enjoyed in peace the prospect of her two most dangerous neighbours cutting each other's throats. He remarked incidentally that an Anglo-French league was likely to prove the best salve for that dangerous sore, Mary Stuart.¹

In the letter to Leicester the argument in favour of the league upon which Walsingham laid most stress was that it would 'advance the Gospel both in France and elsewhere'. He conceded that from the point of view of commercial advantage it would probably be better to remain upon good terms with Spain, but he preferred the 'spiritual fruits' that the French alliance promised. To Burghley he said nothing about 'spiritual fruits', carefully refrained from discussing the commercial aspects of the subject, and based his case for the league chiefly upon the principle which had so long governed Tudor foreign policy, that England's interests were best served by provoking strife between her two most powerful neighbours. The difference between these two letters is interesting. It reveals the fact that Walsingham had diagnosed pretty carefully the attitudes of the two men with whom he had to deal, and had purposely selected in each case the arguments most likely to carry weight with each of them. He knew what every one else knew, that Leicester and Burghley were the two councillors upon whose advice the Queen chiefly depended, and that the opposition of either one of them to the league would probably be sufficient to prevent it. He,

¹ *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1902.

therefore, realized that unless he could win the support of them both it had small chance of success. Yet he knew also that it was no easy matter to line them on the same side of any issue, foreign or domestic. He had learned already that generally speaking either of them could be depended upon to oppose whatever the other suggested. His hope of success lay then in leading them by different paths to the same conclusion. There can be little doubt that he found Leicester's attitude towards the immediate problem more in agreement with his own than Burghley's was. Leicester opposed the match, and though the basis of his objection to it was probably in the main personal, he preferred to state it in religious terms. For religious reasons also he was quite prepared to support the league with France. On both questions, therefore, he professed to stand on common ground with Walsingham. For Walsingham could not but see in the marriage a compromise with Popery, particularly if it involved any concessions to Anjou's religious scruples. He had, it is true, brought himself rather reluctantly to endorse the match, but simply because he had about reached the conclusion that without it the league was impossible. He was more than ready to drop the match the moment he saw, or thought he saw, any kind of reasonable chance that the league might be achieved without it.

Burghley, on the other hand, regarded the marriage as the indispensable preliminary to the league. Possibly his opposition to Leicester in the Privy Council had something to do with the determination of his point of view. He may have foreseen, as Leicester foresaw, that the Queen's marriage would weaken the position of the royal favourite. With Walsingham's religious scruples he was not in sympathy, or at any rate he did not regard them as unsurmountable difficulties. He was certainly irritated at the alacrity with which Walsingham abandoned hope of bringing the marriage to pass. 'I fear', he wrote on the 16th of August, 'the offers of so great amity will diminish or divert the former intention of the marriage, without which the French amity shall serve to small purpose, but to make us minister of their appetites and those fulfilled to cast us off. Surely I could have wished that the extremity of the marriage had been seen before these baits of amity had been thrown before us. I see

those most liked by such as I could not find to like of the marriage. But all this is contrary to yourself.' ¹

Despite the last sentence it is pretty obvious that Burghley did not hold Walsingham altogether blameless in the matter.

Burghley indeed had very grave doubts about the advantage of a league with France considered merely on its own merits. Walsingham's suggestion that it might result in a war between France and Spain with England cast merely for a spectator's part he dismissed as visionary. France, he held, would never agree to a league against Spain unless Elizabeth definitely committed herself to active co-operation. By so doing she would expose Ireland to easy attacks from Philip II, would sacrifice her lucrative trade with Burgundy for a far less profitable trade with France, and might find herself when she was irrevocably committed abandoned by her ancient enemy. He saw advantages in a defensive alliance, particularly if it embodied recognition by the French of the regency in Scotland. That 'dangerous sore' Mary Stuart troubled him not a little at this juncture. But to court war against Spain was in his mind to court disaster. ²

It was indubitably the purpose of the French Politiques and their supporters the Huguenots to utilize the proposed league when it was formed as the basis of an attack upon Spain. The presumption was of course that the blow should be struck in the direction of the Netherlands. The Netherlands were the part of the Spanish dominions to which the French had perhaps the best historical claim; they were the point easiest for France to attack and hardest for Spain to defend. They offered, moreover, an objective attractive not only to France but also to her possible allies. England was interested in them because of her commercial connexions. Germany was interested in them because the Germans regarded their eastern provinces at any rate as rightfully part of the Empire. Finally, Protestants at large were interested in them because their faith was strong there and bitterly persecuted. The fact that the Netherlands were greatly discontented under Philip II's iron rule and that William of Orange and his brother had already raised the standard of revolt against it was another and a cogent reason for striking at Spain in that quarter.

¹ Digges, 129.

² *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1938.

It has been remarked already that the French war party were after all simply undertaking to revive the old struggle of the Valois against the Habsburgs, which had occupied Europe during the first half of the sixteenth century. It is therefore rather surprising to discover that one important element of the earlier struggle, namely the Italian element, was almost completely ignored. Yet there was an Italian factor involved. It found expression in the efforts of Giovanni Maria Petrucci, the ambassador in France of Cosimo de Médicis, Grand Duke of Tuscany, to promote the league against Spain. The motives of the Grand Duke need not be examined at length. They were certainly not altruistic and certainly not religious. He had his own reasons for fearing the hostility of Spain, and consequently his own interest in any proposal calculated to divert the Spanish power. These were sufficient to explain Petrucci's enthusiastic advocacy of the anti-Spanish league.¹ Walsingham knew Petrucci well.² According to the Spanish ambassador in Paris, they worked hand in glove in pursuit of their common policy of hostility towards Spain.³ Walsingham himself acknowledged Petrucci's assistance in promoting the Anjou match,⁴ and in urging upon the French King the desirability of a close alliance with England.⁵

Hardly less active in these affairs than the Florentine ambassador was Hubert Languet, representative in Paris of the German Protestant Elector of Saxony. His particular efforts seem to have been directed towards the formation of a close alliance between Saxony and France, but he was also without doubt urging upon the French King the expediency of a league with the German Protestant princes at large.⁶ Languet was himself a Frenchman by birth and a Huguenot by conviction. Years before he had fled from France because of his religion. His enthusiasm for a Protestant league against Spain was on a par with Walsingham's own. It is not therefore surprising to

¹ *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, iv, introduction, xiv ff.

² Walsingham's *Diary*, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13.

³ Stählin, i. 361.

⁴ Walsingham to Burghley, 25 June 1571. The imperfect version of this letter printed in Digges, 110, may be supplemented by what appears to be a fragment of a copy of it in Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 97. There is another copy of it in Harl. MS. 260, f. 112b.

⁵ Walsingham to Burghley, 3 Aug. 1571, S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxix, no. 1262.

⁶ Waddington, 'La France et les Protestants allemands,' *Revue Historique*, xlii. 259.

discover that the two men were upon intimate terms. They dined together frequently and no doubt co-operated closely in the advancement of the policy which they both strongly favoured.¹

With the ambassadors of England, of Florence and of Saxony, the strongest of the German Protestant states to support them, the Politiques and the Huguenots were in a position to present to Charles IX with considerable force their policy of a league with militant Protestantism against Spain. It was also particularly fortunate for their purpose, though more or less accidental, that Count Louis of Nassau, the brother of William of Orange and one of the famous leaders in the revolt against the Spanish government in the Netherlands, was at that time in France. After the disastrous failure of their campaign against the Duke of Alva in 1568 Louis and his brother William had both taken refuge in France. William shortly afterwards had gone into Germany. Louis, however, had remained in France, had fought in the Third Civil War on the Protestant side and had afterwards established himself at La Rochelle. There he gathered together a small fleet of Dutch privateers and from La Rochelle as a base, made systematic incursions upon Spanish shipping.² He had, however, larger designs in mind. At the time Walsingham arrived in France he was preparing a maritime expedition of 10 ships and 3,000 soldiers to attack Alva in the Netherlands.³

Most of all, Count Louis needed money. There were plenty of soldiers in France, put out of employment by the Peace of St. Germain, who were willing enough to follow him if he could pay them. It does not appear that at this time he entertained any hope of assistance from the French crown, and it was not until later in the year that his own plans blended into the larger scheme of an offensive league against Spain. His first appeal was to England. Scarcely had Walsingham settled down in Paris before Jacques Taffin, one of Louis's agents, came to visit him.⁴ There is no record of the conversation which passed between them, but about a month later Walsingham dispatched

¹ *Diary*, 8, 9, 10.

² K. de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, ii. 289.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 23 Feb. 1570-1, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1571.

⁴ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 3, 26 Jan. 1570-1: 'Taffin, servant to the Prince of Orange, came to visit me.'

his secretary, Robert Beale, with a verbal message to Burghley, 'by which', he wrote, 'you may perceive that the Queen has offered her a means to be revenged for the pretended troubles in Ireland by keeping the King of Spain occupied in Flanders.'¹

There is no direct evidence of the offer which Beale carried over to England, but some notion of it may be gathered from Walsingham's letter to Burghley of the 5th of April. It had to do with an expedition against the Netherlands out of France, presumably under the leadership of Count Louis himself. The French crown was apparently not involved, though Louis evidently hoped by some initial success to provoke French assistance. 'It is meant', Walsingham wrote, 'that Monsieur shall be the head of the enterprise if the matter at the beginning take good success.' Evidently the intention was also that Anjou should become master of the Low Countries when he had conquered them. The part which Louis seems to have cast for England in his plans was that of the money-lender. 'It may seem very dear,' Walsingham admitted to Burghley, 'because the sum required is very great and the gage of repayment very casual.' Nevertheless he advocated co-operation. He argued that by so doing Elizabeth might divert the Spaniard from his hostile purposes in Ireland. She might provoke war between France and Spain, and might even by marriage with Anjou secure the Low Countries for England.²

Elizabeth at first revealed some inclination to assist Count Louis in his expeditions. In a letter of the 10th of March she directed Walsingham 'to learn further thereof, and discern their intentions, and the likelihood of their intentions and what are the meanest sums of money to be demanded and what are the best assurance.'³ But when she heard through Beale from Walsingham that much money was needed and little security offered, she drew back. 'You shall as much as may be', she wrote to Walsingham on the 13th of April, 'say to the party that hath made the demand that we are sorry that we cannot satisfy their demand at this present; neither for the place where they require to be satisfied, nor for the same with

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 5 March 1570-1, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1591.

² Digges, 72.

³ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 10 March 1570-1, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1607; Digges, 57.

such speed ; the same being indeed impossible to us both for place and time.' ¹

Walsingham could hardly have expected more, but he was plainly disappointed. 'I am sorry', he wrote to Burghley, 'the request I preferred took no better effect. . . . The enterprise within this month will break forth and I hope to good effect, by that I have further understood of their matter ; and surely, the match proceeding, nothing could be more fit in my poor opinion, than for us to have been dealers in the same, thereby to have avoided others.' ² In spite of the Queen's refusal, he did not cease to urge the matter privately upon Burghley. 'I beseech you therefore', he wrote to Burghley on the 26th of May, 'if there be offered any opportunity to your Lordship to do him [the Prince of Orange] good, omit not the same. Thereby her Majesty may have the law in her hands to dispose of the country as may best stand to bridle those that otherwise would be too great.' ³ By the end of June it appeared that from lack of money Count Louis's project had, for the time at least, collapsed. 'I am sorry', Walsingham wrote again to Burghley on the 30th of June, 'for many respects that her Majesty forbare the sending of the 50,000 crowns your Lordship knoweth of. It might perhaps have saved her the disbursing of 300,000. Let her Majesty well assure herself that Spain will never forget the injuries they have received, as shall well appear when opportunity of revenge shall be offered. I wish, therefore, they were reduced to that state they had more will than ability to execute their malice.' ⁴

Walsingham's enthusiasm in this instance seems to have got the better of his judgement, for even admitting that it was sound policy to encourage attacks upon Spain in the Low Countries, it is extremely doubtful if Elizabeth would have done well to invest very heavily in enterprises which gave no greater promise of success than this one. At any rate Louis's failure to get promptly the money he needed resulted in the abandonment of

¹ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 13 April 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1648 ; Digges, 80.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 22 April 1571 ; Digges, 81.

³ Same to same, 26 May 1571, *S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, cxviii, no. 1176.

⁴ Walsingham to Burghley, 30 June 1571, *S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, cxviii, no. 1222.

his plans for immediate direct action. He turned now to promote the large scheme for an offensive league of France, England, and the German Protestant princes against Spain, which Walsingham, as we have seen, had been discussing for several months with the Huguenot leaders.

At the French court the attitude towards this league in the midsummer of 1571 was still uncertain. The Queen Mother evidently looked askance at warlike projects, though the King gave some evidence of being favourably inclined. He had already begun to correspond with William of Orange,¹ and in the early spring had expressed his approval of a plan to invade the Netherlands.² The Florentine ambassador in May thought that Charles would carry through the Flemish enterprise, but Walsingham a little later was less sanguine. 'I fear', he wrote to Burghley on the 30th of June, 'that the affair of Flanders will not take that effect that were to be desired. . . . The French King is well bent but he hath none whom he may trust.'³ The Huguenots, of course, were pushing it for all it was worth. In July Taligny, their agent at Paris, persuaded the King to confer privately with Count Louis of Nassau who was to be fetched from La Rochelle for that purpose. Charles met Louis in secret conference on the 19th of July at the Chateau de Lumigny en Brie and later at Fontainebleau where Louis lay for five days concealed in the lodge of the concierge. At these conferences Louis described the motive which led the Dutch to rise against Philip, showed how they had sought by every lawful means to obtain redress, and at last had been forced boldly to claim their rights, sword in hand. He besought Charles to lend them his assistance, making clear to him the large advantages which would accrue to France. Louis's proposals as he stated them to the King were nothing more or less than those which the Huguenots had been urging upon him for some months. Charles was to join the German Protestant Princes, France and England together in a league with the Dutch rebels against Spain. Together they were to eject Philip's government from the Low Countries and, that accomplished, to divide them up between them; Flanders and Artois, the old French possessions, going to France; Brabant,

¹ *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, iv. xvi.

² S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxviii, no. 1222.

³ Stählin, i. 348.

Guelders and Luxembourg, once fiefs of the Empire, to the Germans; Holland and Zealand to England.¹

Charles IX was not averse from the scheme. The best evidence of this is the reception which greeted d'Alava, the Spanish ambassador, when, having learned through his spies of the King's conference with Count Louis, he came to complain. He talked in high terms 'after the Castilian fashion' about Charles's lack of goodwill towards his master and hinted at war and revenge. The King answered him roundly that, although he was misinformed about the matter, neither he nor his master need look to dictate laws to France. Count Louis, he said, was a free prince of the Empire and should confer with him if he liked. As for war, his master could please himself about that. France was not to be frightened with threats.²

The King then laid Count Louis's plans before certain of his councillors, 'who all approved of it' and saw great reason not to neglect it. But they advised the King, before he undertook it, to make sure he had enough money to carry it through and that the German princes and Elizabeth would join with him.³

It was this which brought Count Louis to Walsingham. Their negotiations so far had been carried on through Taffin, Louis's agent in Paris. It was not until the 6th of August that the two men met face to face. Walsingham liked Louis at once. 'I would your Lordship knew the gentleman,' he wrote to Leicester, 'for courage abroad and counsel at home they give him here the reputation to be another Oliver. He is in speech eloquent and pithy; but which is chiefest, he is in religion, as religious in life as he is sincere in profession. I hope God has raised him up in these days to serve for an instrument for the advancement of His glory.'⁴

The Count took Walsingham into his confidence at once. He told him all about his secret conference with the King, of his

¹ K. de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, ii. 299 seq. Walsingham in a letter to Burghley of 12 Aug. 1571 (*Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1920; Digges, 123) gives a full account of Louis's interview with the King. Before this Louis had been bickering with one of Catherine de Médicis' Italian agents. (Canestrini and Desjardins, *Negotiations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, iii. 649.)

² Walsingham to Burghley, 12 August 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1921; Digges, 121.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 12 August 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1920; Digges, 123.

⁴ Walsingham to Leicester, 12 August 1571; Digges, 128.

plans for a Protestant league, of how they had apportioned the map of the Netherlands between them, and of how both Charles and his council had agreed that the assistance of England was essential to the success of the scheme. Then he proceeded to show how necessary it would be for Elizabeth to join forces against Philip, as a counterpoise to his plots against her in Ireland and among the English Catholics. He pointed out the advantage of an Anglo-French league to the cause of Protestantism. He maintained that it would be dangerous for Elizabeth to let the French get entire possession of the Low Countries, but very profitable for her to possess Holland and Zealand. Finally, he asked Walsingham to submit these arguments to his mistress and to invite her to join the enterprise. At least, he said, she might lend them money—or perhaps, her fleet.¹

Walsingham undertook to bring the matter to Elizabeth's attention. His own attitude in the matter may be taken for granted, though his letter on the subject to Leicester is so admirable a statement of his general policy that it is worth quoting at length.

‘I think it dangerous’, he wrote, ‘to advise a prince to wars for that the issue of wars is doubtful. Notwithstanding, things may so fall out sometimes as nothing can be more dangerous than not to enter into wars. Wars grounded on ambition for increase of dominion are always unjust, but wars grounded on necessity, for safety's sake, are necessary. I leave to your Lordship to judge by consideration of the state of things, as well at home as abroad, whether necessity doth not urge us therto at this present. One supplying my place, only beholding the state of things abroad and not understanding the inward secrets of home matters, may rather guess than presently know what is meet in so weighty a cause, notwithstanding I am bold privately to discover unto your Lordship my folly in setting down mine opinion of a matter, both without the compass of my calling as also my understanding. First, I conclude that we rest in evil terms with Spain, whereof there must grow redress either by composition or by sword. Redress by composition may seem scarce sure, as that which will serve their turn but for a while, they can disguise their malice for a time. Redress by the sword, comparing our forces with theirs may appear at the first sight void of all possibility. But, if you consider the opportunity that this present time offereth, that doubt to man's judgment may soon be avoided, though victory (as well as other things

¹ Cf. p. 152, n. 3.

else are) is in the hands of God, who many times disposeth the same contrary to man's judgment; but foreseeing and judging of likelihoods as men may foresee and judge, there is great appearance that the pride of Spain may be so presently daunted, as we need not fear their malice. The remedy perhaps may seem more dangerous than the disease, for, in seeking to abate the pride of Spain we may advance another, whose greatness will contain no less danger. For the answering whereof your Lordship shall understand that thus standeth the case. The Princes of Germany, who can be content to be parties in the enterprise, do foresee that if the whole Low Country be united to the crown of France, it would grow too great. They mean to capitulate with him to content himself with Flanders and Artois which once pertained to the Crown. And as for Brabant and the other parts, which once pertained to the Empire, they mean to reduce them to their old state, committing the government therof to some prince of Germany, which in reason cannot be but to the Prince of Orange. Holland and Zealand they wish were united to the Crown of England which they desire for two respects, the one to make the enterprise more easy by having her assistance, the other, the better to bridle France if he seek to exceed his portion. . . . If these then may take place, upon the likelihoods, two mischiefs may therefore be avoided. First, the malice of him that is mighty and hath goodwill to revenge; secondly, the greatness of another who perhaps otherwise may grow a dangerous neighbour. A third mischief may be avoided of no less, or rather greater consequence, which is that those who otherwise will not perhaps live quietly at home, may be kept occupied by being employed abroad. . . . I do not doubt but that your Lordship will do what you may so to deal with her Majesty as that some of the Count's requests may take place, whereby the fire that is now akindling may grow a flame, and we take comfort of the heat thereof. I perceive nothing will so much advance the matter, as for her Majesty to give some countenance to the same. The proud Spaniard (whom God hath long used for the rod of His wrath) I see great hope that he will now cast him into the fire that he may know what it is to serve against God.' ¹

This long discourse is particularly interesting because it serves to define very early in Walsingham's official career the policy which he never ceased to advocate during the whole course of his public service. His fundamental assumption was that the attitude of Spain towards England was so uncompromisingly hostile that war between the two countries was bound sooner

¹ Cf. p. 151, n. 3.

or later to ensue. He therefore concluded that it was the part of safety for England to strike at Spain rather than to wait until Spain found a convenient opportunity to strike at her. If one accepts his premises, it is hard to resist his conclusion. Historians, particularly Protestant historians, with foreknowledge of the wars which were to come, have generally accepted Walsingham's diagnosis of the situation. They have therefore generally condemned Elizabeth for her reluctance to seize the opportunity which Walsingham held out to her. But to her and to her more conservative councillors it must have appeared that Walsingham was begging the main question. Was it after all so certain that Spain was irreconcilably hostile? Tradition argued rather the other way, and though Philip's dealings with Norfolk established a pretty strong case against him, evidence was not wanting to establish a pretty strong case against the French as well. It was true that the French King showed some disposition to follow a pro-English policy for the time being, but France was, after all, France and no Lancastrian monarch could ever regard French friendship as more than a temporary affair. For more than ten years Elizabeth had steered a safe course in her foreign policy by temporizing with both her powerful neighbours and by avoiding entangling alliances with either. The programme which Walsingham outlined for her constituted nothing less than a diplomatic revolution for which his chief justification appeared to be the interests of Protestantism at large. Elizabeth was not yet by any means certain that the interests of England and the interests of Protestantism were identical, and her very consciousness of Walsingham's religious bias led her the more to distrust his judgment. The consequence was that his eloquent appeal for the league met with little response from his mistress, and it was not until a little later in the year when evidence of Spain's hostile purposes towards her were revealed that she addressed herself very seriously towards the plan.

In France, on the other hand, the prospects of the league grew distinctly more promising as the summer wore on. At least the King began to smile benignantly upon its chief advocates, the Huguenots. Many of them were already at court and Charles was seriously thinking of calling Coligny, the leader of the party, at that time in La Rochelle, to his side. 'I am most constantly assured,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 12th of August,

'that the King conceiveth of no subject that he hath better than of the Admiral; and great hope there is that the King will use him in matters of greatest trust, for of himself he beginneth to see the insufficiency of others, some for that they are more addicted to others than to himself, others for that they are more Spanish than French, or else given more to private pleasures than public.'¹ The Queen Mother, jealous of her own power, at first opposed Coligny's recall. But Coligny succeeded in quieting her suspicions by a letter full of the warmest protestations of loyalty. And so the King sent the Marshal de Cossé to conduct Coligny to court.² Many of the Huguenots were opposed to his coming. They feared that something would happen to him. But Walsingham himself scouted the idea. 'Some, notwithstanding,' he wrote to Burghley, 'do judge these things to be only to be but colours and to tend to some dangerous issue, but they that think so have nothing but jealousy for ground, fearing to lose one whom they may so ill spare.'³

The Admiral was to meet the King at Blois at the beginning of September. Early in August Charles ordered the ambassadors of the various powers at Paris to proceed to Blois in order that they might attend upon the meeting. Walsingham's departure was delayed for a few days 'by the necessity of taking physicke'. Indeed he had been far from well for some time. But he finally set out from Paris about the 20th of August and reached Blois a day or two later.⁴

Just after Walsingham arrived at Blois, or possibly just after he left Paris to go to Blois, he had an interview with a man named Michel de la Huguerye, a secret agent in the service of François de Briquemalt, the representative of the Queen of Navarre at Paris. This la Huguerye came to Walsingham apparently at Briquemalt's instigation with an extraordinary proposal, namely,

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 12 August 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1921; Digges, 122.

² Cf. A. W. Whitehead, *Life of Coligny* (London, 1904), 236 seq.; also de Thou, *Historia sui temporis*, vi. 274.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxix, no. 1275. Obviously at this time Walsingham pinned no faith to the theory that St. Bartholomew's was premeditated. And yet after St. Bartholomew's he wrote to Burghley: 'I am sure that the murder of the Admiral should have been executed at Blois, but that they saw him too well accompanied.' (26 Nov. 1572, in Digges, 290.

⁴ Walsingham to Burghley, 17 August 1571, S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxix, no. 1275.

to marry the young King Henry of Navarre, then only eighteen years of age, to Queen Elizabeth, then nearly forty.

At the time, it will be remembered, Paul de Foix was in England trying to arrange a marriage between Elizabeth and the Duke of Anjou, a marriage which the Huguenots had proposed in the first place and which they were, to all appearances, doing their best to further. They were also trying to further a match between the young King of Navarre and Marguerite of Valois, the sister of the French King. It is therefore hard to reconcile the proposal of la Huguerye with the general course of their policy. Nevertheless, it seems quite likely that he made such a proposal and that Walsingham not only listened to it, but also spoke in favour of it. He apparently sent news of it to Elizabeth and received from her an encouraging reply. Thereupon he dispatched Robert Beale, his secretary, to La Rochelle with directions to discuss the matter secretly with Admiral Coligny and with Count Louis of Nassau.

Coligny seems to have favoured it, Count Louis as well. It was through the Count that the proposal was brought to the attention of Jeanne d'Albert, Queen of Navarre. She listened to it and though her initial reaction was unfavourable, she promised to consider it. But she never did anything more. And so the whole matter ended.

This at any rate was la Huguerye's version of the affair, written some thirty years after the event and altogether too full of obvious inaccuracies to be accepted as it stands. There is very little in the way of substantiating evidence, though it is certainly surprising to discover that Catherine de Médicis picked up vague rumours of a marriage project afoot between Elizabeth and young Henry of Navarre at just about the time la Huguerye assigns to his secret negotiations. In answer to Catherine's inquiry the French ambassador in England wrote that he had heard about such a project early in 1570, but was certain that it had been abandoned long since. Possibly there was some informal talk of it at this time between Walsingham and the Huguenot leaders. Walsingham himself, who had about abandoned hope of the Anjou marriage, may have been disposed to entertain it as a possible alternative. It may even have been designed with a view to stimulating Anjou's flagging zeal. That

would explain how it got to Catherine's ears. It certainly was not very seriously meant, and it does not appear to have had any appreciable effect upon the Anjou marriage negotiations.¹

These were at the time under discussion in England. Charles IX had sent de Foix to Elizabeth early in August to see if he could induce her to yield upon the point of religion, which had hitherto been the one great obstacle in the way. De Foix found the Queen at first not so obstinate as she had been. He had taken with him a portrait of the young Duke, which had very plainly attracted her feminine eye. Yet in the long run, in spite all that Burghley could do to dissuade her, she remained steadfast upon the point of religion. She did indeed go so far as to allow that Anjou might practise any religion not contrary to the Church of God, but she robbed this concession of any meaning it might have had by declaring to de Foix that the Duke would certainly not be allowed to hold any private mass in England.² Leicester wrote to Walsingham on the 20th of September, 'Surely I am now persuaded that her Majesty's heart is nothing inclined to marry at all.'³ Even Burghley, who more than any one else in the Council favoured the match, began to despair. Elizabeth swore to him that if Monsieur would yield upon the point of religion she would surely marry him. 'Yet all of us', Burghley wrote to Walsingham, 'are not so persuaded, not for doubt of her assertions, which surely are agreeable to her mind when she uttereth them but for doubt that others, misliking the same, may indirectly draw her from her determination.' Observing the instability of the Queen's mind, he began to think with Walsingham that a firm league without marriage, however unsatisfactory, was perhaps the only solution of the difficulty. He therefore joined de Foix in urging Elizabeth to send some one into France to convey her answer to the French King, with power, if the marriage project failed, to negotiate for some 'straiter alliance and confederacy'.⁴

Before de Foix left England a matter came to light there which had a very considerable effect upon the relations between

¹ An elaborate discussion of this whole affair is given in Stählin, i. 391-404. La Huguerye's story is given in *Mémoires de la Huguerye*, i. 36 ff. Catherine's suspicions are revealed in Fénélon, *Correspondance*, vii. 242, 256. Fénélon's own version of the affair is in his *Correspondance*, iv. 224.

² Elizabeth to Walsingham, 2 Sept. 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1974; Digges, 129.

³ Digges, 139.

⁴ Burghley to Walsingham, 2 Sept. 1571; Digges, 133.

France and England. Ever since the discovery of Mary Stuart's efforts to arrange a marriage with the Duke of Norfolk in the summer of 1569 Burghley had been ceaselessly on the watch for other conspiracies of a similar or a more dangerous sort. In the spring of 1571 his agents at the port of Dover intercepted a certain Charles Bailly, coming from the Continent with letters addressed to the Bishop of Ross, Mary's agent in London. Bailly was imprisoned, tortured, and by various crooked ways induced to reveal the fact that Robert Ridolfi, who had figured so prominently in the Norfolk marriage affair, had left England for the Continent in March with instructions from Mary and a group of her friends in England to arrange with the Duke of Alva, the Pope, and the King of Spain for armed intervention on her behalf. This was the first inkling of the so-called Ridolfi plot to reach Burghley's ears. During the next few months he was busy tracing out its various ramifications. It does not appear that he informed Walsingham of his efforts at the time,¹ though Walsingham unwittingly gave him some slight assistance from France. 'I am given secretly to understand,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 14th of May, 'that Ridolfi had letters of credit given him by the Spanish Ambassador unto the Duke of Alva; whereupon he had long conference with the Duke and was dispatched in post to Rome with letters of credit to the Pope, as also with letters of credit to the King of Spain promising to be at Madrid the 20th of this present month. Touching the matter of secrecy committed unto him I can learn nothing as yet, notwithstanding I thought it my part to advertise your Lordship of thus much who perhaps by other advertisements can give some guess what the same importeth.'²

Before the summer was over, Burghley knew that Mary Stuart had been conspiring with English noblemen to bring about an insurrection assisted by foreign invasion, which was to depose Elizabeth and put Mary in her place. Mary's own share in it and the part which Spain was allotted to play were made sufficiently plain. The final difficulty was to identify the English noblemen involved, and the clue to this was discovered by chance in September while de Foix was still in England awaiting

¹ There is a hint of it in Burghley's letter to Walsingham not dated, in Digges, 94. The letter was probably written 5 May 1571.

² *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 1704; Digges, 95.

Elizabeth's decision on the Anjou match. A servant of the Duke of Norfolk was caught in the act of transmitting money to the Queen of Scots' party in Scotland. The servant and a little later the Duke himself were arrested and examined, with the result that Norfolk was found to be deeply implicated in Mary's plan. Further investigations along this line disclosed his English confederates, and before the end of the year practically every detail of the whole wretched affair was known.¹

It is not necessary to follow here the further history of the conspiracy. Loyal Englishmen when they heard of it were hot with wrath against Mary. Parliament urged the Queen to bring her to trial for her treachery, and the Bishop of London wrote to Burghley that the best way with her was to set her head upon London Bridge where it might nod a solemn warning to other intending traitors. But Elizabeth preferred a milder course, and though she finally after much delay consented to Norfolk's execution she did little more to Mary than to increase somewhat the rigour of her imprisonment.²

From the point of view of Elizabeth's foreign relations the effect of the Ridolfi plot disclosures was inevitably to increase her fears of Spain and therefore to strengthen her inclination to come to terms with France. At the same time, by revealing to the French Mary's disposition to turn from them to Spain for assistance weakened the interest of the French crown in her cause. In the long run Norfolk's treachery served to some good purpose on both sides the Channel in promoting an Anglo-French *rapprochement*.

Perhaps had Elizabeth known as much about the Ridolfi plot when de Foix, the French envoy, was in London, she would have revealed to him less intolerance of the Duke of Anjou's religious scruples than she did.³ As it was, de Foix returned to Paris

¹ The steps in the unravelling of the Ridolfi plot can be traced in *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, i and ii, *passim*. Many of the most significant documents are printed in Murdin, *Burghley Papers*. For Ridolfi's efforts in Mary's behalf cf. *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1569-78, *passim*, and Teulet, *Relations politiques de la France et l'Espagne avec l'Écosse*, v, *passim*. Mary's letter of instructions to Ridolfi is printed in Labanoff, *Lettres de Marie Stuart*, iii. 221-52.

² *Bardon Papers* (Camden Soc., 3rd Series, xvii), p. xxvi.

³ Elizabeth apparently did seek to modify her statements in that regard a few days after de Foix's departure; cf. Walsingham to Burghley, 8 Oct. 1571, in *S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, cxx, no. 1343: 'I received your letters sent by Charles the Scotsman, one of the viij the other of the ix of September. And whereas I perceive by the same that her Majesty can be content to yield in toleration I mean to reserve the same unto myself unless I see more towardness here.'

early in September with his mind practically made up that the marriage project was hopeless. And Walsingham reached the same conclusion from what he could pick up at the French court and among his French friends. In a letter of the 8th of October, plainly intended for the Queen's perusal, he wrote that he had been advised by her friends, 'for certain respects (that they will not tell me) to forbear to deal in the marriage for a time'.¹ But privately to Burghley he revealed the true state of affairs. He had discovered, he said, that Anjou would no longer consider the match on any terms, that the French King regarded it as a thing of the past, and that Catherine de Médicis was considering the possibility of substituting her younger son as a candidate for the Queen's hand. 'Thus', Walsingham added, 'your Lordship seeth in what terms that matter standeth. Against the coming of him whom her Majesty meaneth to send I will do what I may to renew it, but to be plain with your Lordship I despair thereof and so do as many as wish it. My fear is that if you wade further, it will be discovered that her Majesty is forsaken, which opinion may be dangerous and touch her Majesty as near as herself.'²

Walsingham for his part had long ago abandoned the marriage in favour of the league and had been doing his uttermost for months to win Burghley to his point of view. It is clear that he did not succeed. In view of the Ridolfi disclosures Burghley was convinced of the necessity of some kind of an understanding with France, but notwithstanding Walsingham's warnings to the contrary he plainly favoured a renewal of the marriage project. He revealed his attitude clearly enough in a letter to Walsingham of the 28th of September. 'Truly,' he wrote, 'the more matters are discovered the more necessary it is seen that her Majesty should marry.'³ Very likely both Burghley himself and the other promoters of the marriage in England discounted Walsingham's desperate attitude towards it as coloured by his own prejudices, but they had evidently reached the conclusion that he was in no frame of mind to serve their purposes and in consequence, since they were not prepared to endorse his project for an offensive league without marriage, they left him practically to his own

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 8 Oct. 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 2066.

² Same to same, 8 Oct. 1571, *S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, cxx, no. 1343.

³ Digges, 139.

devices, evidently intending to mark time until some special envoy could be sent over to France.

It is not clear whether or not Walsingham was aware of the drift of official sentiment in England at this juncture. At any rate his own interests were plainly focused upon the progress of the league. From that point of view he regarded the arrival of Admiral Coligny at the French court on the 12th of September and his enthusiastic reception there as of good augury.¹ He was satisfied of course that the Huguenots had England's interests very much at heart. Indeed, the very day after the Admiral's arrival at court he found occasion to send to Walsingham assurances of his devotion to Elizabeth, and Walsingham in reporting this fact to Burghley added, 'generally all those of the religion who are the flower of France do make like protestation, assuring her Majesty that when occasion or trial shall be offered, she shall find them no less ready to serve her than if they were her own natural subjects.'²

Walsingham observed that Coligny's arrival had stimulated not a little the development of the plan for an attack upon Spain in the Low Countries. He learned that the King had discussed the matter with Coligny and his marshals and had reached the conclusion that there were only two difficulties in the way of it, one the lack of money, the other the doubtful attitude of England.³ In a letter to Burghley of the 16th of September he stated the case even more concisely. 'The resolution of that enterprise stayeth only upon the expectation what her Majesty will do.'⁴

Yet notwithstanding this promising state of affairs Walsingham knew well that the enemies of England were leaving no stone unturned to thwart the purposes of Coligny and his followers. 'It is feared', he wrote to Burghley, 'that the [Flemish] matter will be so long protracted as the opportunity for the enterprise will be let slip, which if it so fall out, the unkindnesses between this crown and Spain will be reconciled, which I fear will not tend most to her Majesty's safety, and so do as many fear as love her Majesty here. The House of Guise secretly doth travail by all

¹ There is conflicting evidence as to the character of Coligny's reception, cf. Stählin, i. 406. Walsingham sent his own report by word of mouth, but Fénélon said (*Correspondance*, iv. 245) that Walsingham reported it as enthusiastic.

² *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 2049.

³ Digges, 135.

⁴ Digges, 136.

means to break the amity with England for that they think nothing will more prejudice the Queen of Scots, their kinswoman, than the same.'¹ Ten days later he wrote Burghley again that Morvilliers, one of the King's council and a man altogether at the devotion of the Guises, was exerting all his influence to prevent the Flemish enterprise, and that the Cardinal Rambouillet, the French ambassador at Rome, had solemnly warned his master against making friends with the heretics, and had transmitted large offers of friendship from Spain.² 'The fear I have,' he told Burghley, 'that if Spain and France grow to accord by the devilish practices of those who seek the utter subversion of the Gospel, that as well religion as her Majesty's safety shall be in great peril, maketh me earnestly wish that some encouragement might be given to France to proceed in this enterprise. If it proceed, those of religion who are devoted to her Majesty shall continue their credit with the King; but if it go not forward, the House of Guise are like to bear sway, who will be as forward in preferring the conquest of Ireland and the advancement of their niece to the crown of England, as the other side is contrarywise bent to prefer the conquest of Flanders.'³

In Walsingham's view the failure of the Flemish enterprise would mean the abandonment by the French crown of the Huguenots and their policies and the domination of that party in France which was not only opposed to war with Spain, but strongly advocated war against England. Walsingham saw the situation in sharp contrasts—if not the Huguenots then the Guises—if not a war against Spain in alliance with England then a war against England in alliance with Spain. The possibility of any third, middle course, the kind of course which Elizabeth would have instinctively preferred, he ignored. No wonder if his violent alternatives were almost equally displeasing to one of her temper.

The activity of the enemies of England in France was at this time considerably stimulated by the course of events in Scotland. Ever since the flight of Mary Stuart into England civil war had been in progress in that country between Mary's supporters and the Protestant party. The Protestants under the Regent Lennox

¹ Digges, 136.

² Cf. p. 162, n. 3.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 26 Sept. 1571, S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxx, no. 1336a.

had been pretty generally successful, but early in September 1571 a band of Marians in a sudden attack upon Stirling Castle by a stroke of luck accomplished the murder of Lennox himself. His death, by creating the necessity for a new regent, presented in a concrete form the old question as to whether the partisans of France or of England should rule in Scotland. Mary's agents in France appealed to the King at once for assistance. And this appeal, coming hard upon the news of the discovery of the Ridolfi Plot, brought the whole question of Mary Stuart and Scotland once more into prominence. Walsingham heard that the Guises were offering to go to Scotland and serve at their own expense, and that the King was considering their offer.¹ He went to de Foix privately and warned him that French intervention in Scotland would be fatal to the hopes of a league with England. And he took occasion, when he was at court early in October, to discuss the whole question of Mary and Scotland with the Queen Mother. He professed to speak simply as a private gentleman who had the friendly relations between France and England very much at heart. As such he expressed his regret that the French ambassador in England should have been discovered to be in communication with such a dangerous subject as the Duke of Norfolk had shown himself to be, and particularly that the French ambassador should have chosen so inappropriate an occasion as the discovery of the Ridolfi Plot to press for Mary's release. 'These things', he said, 'may breed in the Queen my mistress some opinion that the friendship professed is not altogether sincere, and therefore I wished that the King and she in seeking the Queen of Scots' liberty would not forget to have regard to the Queen of England's safety, especially now, seeing the Queen of Scots seeketh to quit herself of his protection.' Catherine de Médicis in reply undertook to justify La Mothe's dealings with Norfolk and explained that the interest of her son in Mary Stuart was nothing more than a natural solicitude for the welfare of his sister-in-law. She protested that he never had any intention of promoting her interests to the prejudice of Elizabeth. Walsingham bade her consider 'whether the amity of England might not be as beneficial as that of Scotland'. She retorted that the King was in any case bound in honour to maintain his ancient league with Scotland. Walsingham

¹ Digges, 144.

pointed out that this might be done by joining with England in support of young James VI's government there. Catherine insisted that her son might not abandon his sister-in-law. Walsingham answered, 'that the King's bond towards his sister-in-law is not more than of a natural father towards his natural child, yet if the child grow to be dissolute and lewd, whereby he is shaken off by his father, the fault is not to be imputed to the father but to the child; even so, if the King in respect of the indignities committed by his sister-in-law shall give over the protection of her, the cause thereof is only to be imputed to her misdemeanor, unworthy of her calling, and not to him. I desired her to consider further, that whereas she saith the King in honour is bound to seek her liberty, that he is more bound in honour to have regard of the Queen my mistress' safety; first, for that she is a Princess of life virtuous, in government guided by law and justice, in affection toward him sincere. Now if, by the Queen of Scots' liberty procured by him, the state should be disquieted, what thing could happen that might touch the King more in honour and conscience. And as for any assurance or protestation that she might make to the King touching her peaceable behaviour toward the Queen my mistress; first I desired her to weigh that she was ambitious, and therefore no capitulation could serve for a bridle; secondly, that she is most guided by the advice of those of her kindred, who have been the greatest cause of the disquiet of Europe, whereof she could be a witness; thirdly, how that now she meaneth chiefly to depend upon Spain, who will be always provoking her to the disquieting of England and France. These considerations (said I) Madam, if you will weigh, I hope they will give you cause not to be over earnest in procuring any enlargement of liberty especially upon this late discovery of her evil meaning towards her Majesty. In my private opinion you shall do well therefore to remit the same until the coming of the gentleman whom the Queen's Majesty my mistress meaneth to send. So in the end she concluded that she would confer with the King her son, whom she assured me would be loath to do anything that might any way discontent her Majesty, or tend to her prejudice.'¹

Somewhat later in the month Walsingham spoke with Charles himself on the same subject. The interview was provoked by

¹ Digges, 142-3.

rumours that had reached the King's ear of an intention on Elizabeth's part to send troops into Scotland. Charles mildly protested against such a course and hinted that if she did so he was in honour bound to do the same. Walsingham did not mince his words in his reply. He said he had heard nothing of any intention on the Queen's part to send forces into Scotland, but if she meant to do so the dangerous practices of the Queen of Scots gave her ample justification. Charles protested (speaking as Walsingham late discovered by the advice of his councillors) that he had not meant to recommend the liberty of the Queen of Scots, but simply the liberty of Scotland. 'I told him in that behalf,' Walsingham wrote in describing the interview to Burghley, 'I doubted not but he should find the Queen my mistress inclined to do anything to agree to reason, and stand with her safety; but if his Majesty should have any intention to seek the liberty of the Queen of Scots, in my private opinion, I thought by no means he should prevail, she now of late being discovered to be so dangerous an enemy who hath as it were dismembered her Majesty's politique body by corruption of sundry of her best qualified subjects, which thing (said I) if your Majesty could consider in the Queen my mistress' person, I am sure your Majesty would forbear at any time hereafter to recommend her cause. His answer to that was, that he meant not now to recommend the same, and so he willed me to present his affectionate commendations unto her Majesty, adding further that he hoped shortly to see one from her here, to treat of such things as may tend to increase of good and perfect amity between them.'

On the whole, Walsingham was very well satisfied with the interview. 'I am put in great hope,' he wrote to Burghley, 'that the King will be content to join with her Majesty in the establishing of the young King's government. Surely if her Majesty send hither in time, whilst her friends enjoy the credit of the Court here, some personage of good quality whereby the King may think she maketh some account of him, I think her Majesty shall obtain any reasonable thing at his hands that she herself can desire, for he is persuaded that no amity is so fit for him as that with her Majesty, in respect that all occasion of quarrels are now taken away. If it might so like her, I would wish that her Majesty would in talk with the ambassador use

some words of excuse in that she hath so long deferred the sending of the gentleman that is here looked for, as also two words of assurance of the great desire she hath of the increase of amity with the King. This I know, would content him, as also stop the mouths of those that persuade the contrary.' ¹

This was the state of affairs in France when Walsingham fell sick. For some months he had been failing in health. He had written again and again to the Queen asking her to be relieved temporarily from his duties, but she had been slow to grant the requisite permission. Now he almost began to despair of his life.

'My disease groweth so dangerously upon me,' he wrote to Burghley on the 16th of September, 'as I most humbly desire her Majesty to take some speedy order for some to supply my place. I hope my life shall stand her Majesty in more stead than my death, and upon these extreme points standeth the deferring of the cure.' ²

Nevertheless, Elizabeth still delayed. After some fluctuations in favour of Robert Beale, Walsingham's secretary, ³ she fixed upon Henry Killigrew as the person to act as substitute, and Burghley had drafted his instructions as early as the 8th of October. But it was not until the 20th of the month that he was finally dispatched with orders to Walsingham to set about effecting his cure without delay 'for that by your good service hitherto we do plainly perceive that our election of you hath been well answered, and the continuance of you in that service is to be much desired by the recovery of your health.' ⁴ What between contrary winds in the Channel and lack of post-horses in Picardy, Killigrew was eleven days in making the journey from London to Paris. ⁵

Walsingham was at Blois where he had been since the middle of August. The departure of the King thence on the 16th of the month and the importunities of his own disease, which began to grow beyond 'the reach of cure', led him to return to Paris.

¹ Digges, 144-5.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 16 Sept. 1571, S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxx, no. 1329. (In Digges, 136.) On the nature of Walsingham's malady, cf. Fénélon, *Correspondance*, iv. 247.

³ Beale to Burghley, 15 Sept. 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 2037.

⁴ Eliz. to Walsingham, 20 Oct. 1571; Digges, 145.

⁵ Killigrew to Burghley, 6 Nov. 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 2116. According to La Mothe Fénélon, Burghley contemplated a journey to France at this time, *Correspondance*, iv. 228.

He left Blois on the 30th of October, and proceeding by easy stages reached Paris on the 4th of November where he met Killigrew. He placed himself at once under the care of physicians, began his diet on the 14th of November, and from that time for two months occupied himself only unofficially in French affairs.¹ Killigrew undertook the formal business of the embassy.

Killigrew had been charged by the Queen with two commissions: (1) to inform the King that she meant shortly to dispatch a special envoy as she had promised; (2) to explain at length Mary Stuart's connexion with the Ridolfi Plot with especial emphasis upon her dealings with Philip of Spain.² These done, negotiations stood still, awaiting the coming of the envoy, and Killigrew's correspondence is filled with observations upon the state of affairs in France.

It appears on his testimony that the foreign policy of the French crown, which Walsingham had left swinging in the balance, was inclining more and more in favour of England. This was due in part to Coligny's influence at court, in part to the news of the Spanish naval victory at Lepanto, which reached France late in October.³ While the Admiral and his friends eloquently described to the King the advantage to be gained by an attack on the Spaniards in the Low Countries, the news of Lepanto convinced him that something must be done to curb the greatness of Philip II. 'Whatsoever show the King here giveth of joy outwardly,' Walsingham wrote to Leicester in sending him news of the Turkish defeat, 'inwardly he doth not best like of the victory, as that thing which addeth too great an increase of reputation to the King of Spain. I think, therefore, no time more fit to treat of amity than this present.'⁴ To

¹ On Walsingham's movements at this time cf. his *Diary*. Hume (*Courtships of Queen Elizabeth*, 144) is wrong when he says that Walsingham returned to England at this time. A glance at his diary proves this beyond dispute.

² Killigrew's instructions are printed in Digges, 147.

³ Walsingham sent news of it to Burghley on 8 Nov.; Digges, 149.

⁴ Digges, 150. Shortly after writing this letter Walsingham had a curious interview with Francisco De Alava, Spanish ambassador at Paris, just before he left the country. In the interview Walsingham hinted at the possibility of arranging a match between Don John of Austria, the victor of Lepanto, and Elizabeth and tried to draw out De Alava on the subject of military preparations in Spain for the Low Countries (*Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, 369). It seems to me that Stählin (i. 424) takes this interview too seriously. So far as Walsingham was concerned he appears to have spoken on his own responsi-

increase the King's distrust of Spain, letters were captured from a courier in Dauphiné which revealed dealings between the ultra-Catholic party in France and the King of Spain in terms not flattering to Charles and his mother. Moreover, the physician who had attended the King's sister, late Queen of Spain, arrived in France just at this time to whisper in Catherine's ear that her daughter had been poisoned.¹

The effect of these things on the King's mind soon became apparent. There was talk of an enterprise under Philip Strozzi against the Spanish coast, and Catherine began to take counsel with Marshal Cossé upon the ways and means for beginning a war with Spain.² Fregoso, one of Catherine's Florentine agents, was sent to Béarn to urge the Queen of Navarre to come to court.³ Louis of Nassau, now openly recognized as a Royal pensioner, was called for further consultation with the King.⁴ The Guises, who had left the court upon the advent of the Admiral and were breathing vague threats against him from afar, were ordered to return with a limited number of followers.⁵ The English alliance naturally became more popular. There was great talk of friendship and a profusion of regrets at the ill success of the marriage negotiations. Even upon the question of Mary Stuart the French showed a disposition to accede to Elizabeth's wishes, for Mary's negotiations with Spain, revealed just at this time when the feeling against Spain in France was so strong, perceptibly weakened her cause there. Upon a show of hands in the Royal Council a majority proved to be in favour of joining with England in support of the King of Scots' party. Killigrew perceived that Mary's cause was not earnestly handled at the French court, in fact he declared that the only reason why Catherine continued to plead for her was because the French feared that Elizabeth's leniency in dealing with Mary would encourage other more successful Spanish plots, and so they did not wish to antagonize her who might before long be Queen of England.⁶

Seeing matters so favourably disposed towards England, bility and probably had no deeper purpose in mind than to distract De Alava's attention from the Anglo-French league.

¹ News from France, 3 Dec. 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 2157.

² *Ibid.*, no. 2158.

³ *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, iv. 77.

⁴ Cf. note 1 above.

⁵ Killigrew to Burghley, 17 Dec. 1571, *Cal. Foreign*, 1569-71, no. 2181.

⁶ Killigrew to Burghley, 3 Dec. 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 2155.

Killigrew and Walsingham did not cease to urge the Queen to send the promised envoy as soon as possible. But as usual it took her some time to make up her mind to act. Finally, after an attempt had been made to induce Burghley to undertake the mission,¹ she dispatched Sir Thomas Smith, an old hand in Anglo-French negotiations. Smith reached Paris on the 24th of December.² His instructions, if they were ever formally committed to paper, have been lost, but it appears from the course of his conduct at court that he had been sent over chiefly to renew the negotiations for the Anjou marriage, with authority even to yield upon the point of religion so far as to allow Anjou the private use of the Catholic ceremonial. This failing, he was instructed to open negotiations for a treaty of alliance between England and France.³

Elizabeth's delay in sending Smith is probably to be explained by her reluctance to commit herself definitely to an alliance with France, involving as it did a departure from her favourite policy of keeping the balance between her two great neighbours.⁴ Very likely it was the discovery of Spanish participation in the Ridolfi Plot that finally brought her to a decision, though the disturbance of the European balance of power by the Spanish victory at Lepanto may have influenced her as well. Just before Smith's departure from England she asked the French ambassador why it was that de Alava, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, had suddenly taken his leave, and whether the French King meant to recall his ambassador from Spain. Fénelon ventured the opinion that de Alava needed a change of air. Elizabeth retorted with a laugh that the Spanish ambassador in London, by reason of his intrigue with Ridolfi, would presently need a change of air also. It was evident to Fénelon at any rate that she regarded the departure of de Alava from Paris as an indication of a definite break between France and Spain, and that her own intention to dismiss the Spanish ambassador at London

¹ Burghley to Walsingham, 26 Sept. 1571; Digges, 139. De Foix had suggested Burghley to the Queen (Digges, 134). Burghley gave as one reason for his not going: 'I am known only meet to speak as my mother taught me' (Digges, 146).

² Walsingham's *Diary*, 13.

³ Smith told Fénelon before leaving England that he was commissioned to arrange for a close friendship with France either by marriage or by treaty (Fénelon, *Correspondance*, iv. 305).

⁴ Fénelon, *Correspondance*, iv. 306.

was associated in her mind with the pursuit of a foreign policy in harmony with the French.¹ As a matter of fact she did dismiss Don Guerau de Spes on the 14th of December and about the same time broke off her negotiations with the Duke of Alva. These things taken together with the dispatch of Smith to France indicate that Elizabeth had made up her mind in December 1571, about as definitely as she was capable of doing it, to depart from her traditional diplomacy and to base her foreign policy on a French alliance.

It will be observed that as between the marriage and the league for cementing a French alliance she preferred the marriage. Burghley's policy, in a word, prevailed with her against Leicester's. As for Walsingham's early warnings that if she pursued the marriage further she would find herself forsaken, Burghley confessed to Walsingham that he had never reported this to her. Burghley himself believed that Elizabeth was never more earnestly bent to the marriage² and Leicester concurred in the opinion.³ Smith brought over letters from them both to Walsingham instructing him to do what he could to persuade the French to renew their courting. The Queen, they said, was anxious to employ Admiral Coligny's services in the matter and they accordingly instructed Walsingham to arrange for the Admiral's presence at court during the time Smith was there. However distasteful this policy may have been to Walsingham, he had no choice but to pursue it. He accordingly, though he was not yet fully recovered from his illness, set to work at once.⁴

On the last of December he wrote to Burghley :

' Touching your Lordships by Sir Thomas Smith, according to her Majesty's order I have caused the Admiral to understand, as well the trust she hath in him as also how much she desireth his presence at the Court, whereby Sir Thomas Smith may be the better assisted by his advice. Some like office I have also used towards Montmorency, who hath always been an especial furtherer of the cause. From him, who liveth not far from this town, I have received most earnest promise that he will do his uttermost; and for that he is here employed by the King in the punishment of those that committed the late disorder, he hath written secretly to his friends to the Court to sound there in what

¹ Fénélon, *Correspondance*, iv. 310.

² *Ibid.* 153.

³ Digges, 153.

⁴ *Ibid.* 151.

state the matter standeth, and as they find, secretly to advertise Sir Thomas. He protesteth that he would be loath to see her Majesty abused, as any subject she hath that loveth her most dearly. He hath great hope that the matter will take good success, for that he seeth the state of both realms doth necessarily require so strait an amity as marriage bringeth. He promiseth to use the more expedition in that which is committed to his charge, to the end he may repair to the Court with the more speed. Lignerolles, who by the House of Guise and the rest of the Spanish faction was made an instrument to dissuade his master, was slain the ninth of this month. His death yielded no small futherance to the cause.' ¹

Strangely enough, Walsingham now, for all his former warnings, was disposed to be rather sanguine about the prospects of the match. 'Though I left the matter of the marriage most desperate at my departure from Court,' he wrote to Burghley on the last of December, 'it may be that Lignerolles's death and the Turkish victory may have yielded new life to the same.'² To Leicester he wrote, 'As I have cause to doubt, so have I cause more to hope; to doubt for that her Majesty's long deferring in sending may have bred some doubt here of her cold inclination that way and so cause them to give ear to some other offers, having small hope of this; to hope, first, for that there is no other match worthy the seeking elsewhere; secondarily, for that they begin to fear very much the greatness of Spain, and therefore desire to be strengthened by the arm of England; and though that may be done by way of league, yet they think the marriage the surest knot of amity.'³

How far this represented Walsingham's real view of the matter and how far it was intended merely to be shown to the Queen as evidence that he was not opposed to the course she had elected to follow, is difficult to say. In any event he plainly did not

¹ Digges, 160-1. This letter, the original of which is missing, is dated in Digges, 8 Dec., but it is obviously of the same date as the letter which follows it in Digges, that is, 31 Dec. In the letter as Digges prints it the word King is inserted where the word Admiral is printed in the text. King is obviously wrong. The cipher sign for Coligny was K., doubtless he was meant. Where the name Montmorency is printed in the text, Digges prints I. From the letter which follows this one in Digges it is apparent that I stands for the Marshal de Montmorency.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 31 Dec. 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 2202.

³ Walsingham to Leicester, 31 Dec. 1571; Digges, 161.

intend that the marriage project should side-track his larger plans for a Protestant league. Early in October he had taken occasion to write to Frederick the Pious, Elector Palatine, the most enthusiastic supporter of the league in Germany, inviting his co-operation in urging the league to the Queen. He wrote in a similar vein to Frederick late in December, acting, it appears, on his own responsibility and without the knowledge of his mistress.¹ Indeed he does not even appear to have informed either her or Burghley or Leicester of what he had done.

Thanks to Walsingham's efforts, Sir Thomas Smith, when he reached Paris the day before Christmas, found the way cleared for his negotiations.² On the 4th of January 1572 in company with Killigrew (Walsingham was still in retirement recuperating) he was received at court. His first interview with the King consisted in little more than an exchange of the usual preliminary compliments. No serious business was attempted, although Smith took occasion to present evidence confirming Mary Stuart's complicity in the Ridolfi Plot.³

At a second conference two days later with the Queen Mother, the marriage question was reopened. Catherine declared the only obstacle to the match to be the old difficulty about religion. The Duke, her son, she said, had grown so devout in his belief that he began to be lean and evil coloured from perpetual fastings and vigils. Smith inquired of the Queen Mother whether she thought her son would be satisfied if he were allowed the benefit of private worship in England. Catherine answered that nothing less would content him than high mass with all the public ceremonies after the manner of the Roman Church. 'Why, madame,' quoth Smith, 'then he may require also the four orders of friars, monks, canons, pilgrimages, pardons, oils and creams, relics and all such trumperies. That in no wise can be agreed.' Smith thereupon rehearsed the old arguments anent the evils which would result in England if Anjou were allowed the use of his religion. But Catherine was firm upon the point, even declaring that her son would not only

¹ Kluckhohn, *Friedrich der Fromme*, ii. 442 ff.

² Smith to Burghley, 26 Dec. 1571, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1569-71, no. 2187. On Smith's reception in France cf. his letters in *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, nos. 414, 415.

³ Smith to the Queen, Jan. 1572, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 8.

require Elizabeth's acquiescence in his open practice of Catholicism, but also the formal ratification of the same by Parliament. So naturally the conference led nowhere.¹

At a second meeting between the Queen Mother and Smith some days later it became clear that the Anjou match was a thing of the past. Catherine declared frankly that her son was so fixed in his conscience that there was no use trying to dissuade him. Some semblance of negotiations was maintained for a time to preserve good feeling between the two crowns, but Anjou as a suitor for the hand of Elizabeth was never again seriously considered.

And so ended another of Elizabeth's courtships. Beginning in the late autumn of 1570 it had lasted for a little over a year. It had been proposed by the Huguenots for the purpose of bringing France and England closer together, and it had been furthered both by the French crown and by Elizabeth for precisely the same reason. It is difficult to say who is to blame for its failure. At the beginning Elizabeth's scruples on the point of religion appeared to have been the chief obstacle in the way. Whether these scruples were genuine or not is a point which admits of some dispute. Burghley, who was more eager for the match than any one else in the English Council, believed that they did not originate with the Queen herself, but that she had assumed them at the prompting of Leicester and others who for one reason or another were opposed to the match. He doubtless had good grounds for his belief, and yet it must be said in Elizabeth's defence that she was probably right in thinking it would be dangerous for her to allow a Prince Consort to give open countenance to a prohibited form of worship. He would inevitably have become the centre of the discontented Catholic element in England.

Towards the end, when Elizabeth, under the pressure of threatening dangers within her realm, was inclined to concede the point of religion, another obstacle to the match arose in the person of Anjou himself. As she enlarged her concessions he enlarged his demands. He did this probably at the prompting of Elizabeth's enemies, the ultra-Catholic Guises. There is every

¹ Smith to Burghley, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 20.

reason to believe that his brother the King and his mother were in favour of the match throughout. They exerted themselves continuously to bring Anjou to their way of thinking, and they might have been successful if they could have counted on Elizabeth's good faith. But her vacillations gave enough colour to the arguments of those opposed to the match in France to enable them to hold their ground. Consequently, although Anjou was directly responsible for the breaking off of the match, Elizabeth herself must be held in a large measure to blame for it.

Walsingham himself was never enthusiastic for the marriage. He hardly ventured openly to oppose it, but even when he seemed to endorse it he clearly regarded it as at best an unsatisfactory way of achieving another end which he had in view, namely that of drawing France and England together into a Protestant league. His antipathy to the marriage as such seems to have been based largely upon religious grounds. Possibly he feared that marriage with a Catholic might weaken still further Elizabeth's half-hearted loyalty to the Protestant faith. He certainly feared that a Catholic consort would strengthen the hands of the Romanist party in England. It does not appear that his view of the matter was to any appreciable extent influenced by his connexions with Leicester. He shared Leicester's view, but hardly for Leicester's reasons. If any one's, he regarded himself as Burghley's man at this juncture. His close alliance with Leicester is of a later date, and even then it was Walsingham's ideas rather than Leicester's that shaped the policy of the pair. The fact is that Walsingham was too firm in his own convictions to be influenced much by the views of those about him. He was, on the other hand, too apt a politician to proclaim his differences with the great ones from the housetops. So he had one voice for Leicester, another for Burghley, and still another for the Queen. On that account it is not often easy and not always possible to discover his private opinions about public questions. But there can be little doubt that he secretly rejoiced at the failure of the Anjou match, and that he turned from it to the negotiation of an Anglo-French league with enthusiasm.

III

THE TREATY OF BLOIS

THE Anjou marriage project had failed. That fact was admitted by French and English alike at the beginning of the year 1572. But Catherine de Médicis did not wish to abandon the idea of a marriage alliance with England on that account. She had a younger son, Francis, Duke of Alençon, and though he was only seventeen years of age she thought he might be substituted in place of his brother as a suitor for Elizabeth's hand. She had had the idea in mind for some time.¹ Walsingham had heard rumours of it in October.² At the same interview in which she had practically closed the Anjou negotiations she had suggested it to Smith.

Smith himself seems to have thought well of the idea. The young Duke, he wrote to Burghley, was a good fellow and a lusty prince, as popular among the Huguenots as Anjou was among the Catholics: not so tall, perhaps, nor so fair as his brother, but, on the other hand, not so obstinate or so papistical, and, if rumours were true, more 'apt for the getting of children'.³ Walsingham likewise, though not so enthusiastic as his colleague, saw some points in the young man's favour. 'As for the party himself,' he wrote to Burghley, 'if his years and personage be agreeable, there is more surety to her Majesty in him than in the other.'⁴

But this was as far as the matter got for some time. Smith had not been sent over to discuss new matrimonial projects.

¹ She suggested it in a letter to Fénelon of 25 July 1571, *Correspondance*, vii. 234.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 8 Oct. 1571, S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxx, no. 1343. '*The Queen Mother* desired the *Admiral* to advise her how she might make a marriage between *her Majesty* and the *Duke of Alençon*. He dissuaded her utterly and said it could not but breed disdain.' The words in italics are in cipher in the original.

³ Smith to Burghley, 9, 10 Jan. 1571-2, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, nos. 23, 28.

⁴ Walsingham to Burghley, 17 Jan. 1571-2, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 45.

Elizabeth had instructed him, if he could not revive the Anjou courtship, to open negotiations for an alliance without marriage. She did not contemplate at the time a substitution of Alençon for his older brother as a suitor for her hand. When it was suggested to her a little later she refused to hear of it. She had, however, come to the conclusion that a French alliance was highly desirable for her, especially in view of the Spanish plots against her throne and her person which had been discovered in the autumn of 1571. Catherine de Médicis on her part would undoubtedly have preferred a marriage, but she thought it wise not to push the Alençon proposal at the time. Fénélon, her ambassador in England, advised her to make a league with Elizabeth first, and to talk about marriage afterwards,¹ and this advice she saw good to follow. Accordingly, at her second interview with Smith she asked him if he had any commission to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce. Smith replied that he was prepared to join with any one whom she would appoint to consider the terms of an agreement. Shortly afterwards Catherine named Paul de Foix, a member of the King's Council, and Chancellor Biragues as her commissioners. On the 4th of January they joined with Smith and Killigrew, the English Commissioners, in the Château of Amboise, and the preliminary negotiations for a treaty began.²

In the first sessions of the commissioners little more was done than to define the questions which the treaty itself was designed to settle. It was easily agreed that the league should be a defensive one, under the terms of which each party to the treaty was to assist the other if attacked. But here at once arose the first great difficulty, an inevitable one when a Catholic and a Protestant power in the sixteenth century attempted to come to terms—the difficulty, namely, of religion. Smith and Killigrew wished it to be expressly stated in the treaty, by what came to be known as an ‘*etiamsi religionis causa*’ clause, that assistance should be rendered by one party to the other even if attacked under the pretence of religion. They urged, not without justice, that most of the danger which threatened England from abroad was either on account of religion or could

¹ Fénélon to Catherine, 10 Feb. 1571-2, *Correspondance*, iv. 371.

² Smith to Burghley, 17 Jan. 1571-2, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 47.

easily be made to appear so. The French, while admitting the force of these arguments, did not wish to commit France to a league professedly hostile to Catholicism.¹

This, then, was the first great difficulty to be disposed of. A second one which very soon appeared was the old one of Scotland.

For centuries this Scottish question had been a bone of contention between France and England. It had been brought to a precise issue when the flight of Mary Stuart from Scotland in 1568 had left the country divided into two factions, a Marian Catholic French faction and an anti-Marian Protestant English one. Of course the French crown was anxious to maintain its old strength in Scotland, and of course Elizabeth, though perhaps half-heartedly, sided with her friends. The murder of the Protestant pro-English Regent, Murray, in 1570, and the subsequent murder of his successor, Lennox, a member of the same faction, emphasized the point at issue. The Protestants, in spite of these set-backs, steadily gained ground and the Marian faction, at least in its active fighting aspect, was reduced by the beginning of the year 1572 to a handful of desperate men who had shut themselves up in Edinburgh Castle. Mary, their leader, was held fast prisoner by Elizabeth in England. Their case looked hopeless to say the least, but even so the French King was not disposed to abandon them. What he wanted to do in their behalf is not quite clear. At all events he clearly did not like to see his sister-in-law a prisoner in England, and he very strongly objected to Elizabeth's interference in Scottish affairs. These subjects had given rise to warm debates between England and France during the three years past. As the influence of the Guises waned at the French court, Charles IX grew less enthusiastic in the cause of his sister-in-law, but he did not by any means give it up altogether. That is why the question of Scotland came up in connexion with the treaty negotiations under consideration.

The French wished to include Scotland in the league and to come to some terms with England as to how the Scottish problem should be settled. The English were not opposed to this, but they could not agree with the French as to what the word

¹ Smith to Burghley, 17 Jan. 1571-2, cited above.

Scotland meant. The French maintained that it meant Mary Stuart and her following; the English that it meant the government of the new Protestant Regent Mar.

Upon these two difficulties—the difficulty of religion and the difficulty of Scotland—the negotiations which follow really turned. Other matters of dispute, to be sure, arose. There was some debate as to whether the ally who gave aid in case of need, or the ally who received it, should pay expenses. The nature of the privileges to be enjoyed by the English merchants—for one of the matters under consideration was the transfer of the English staple towns from the Netherlands to France—also furnished a matter for dispute. Then Elizabeth made a suggestion to include Spain in the treaty, which the French vigorously contested.¹ But all these matters were settled without much trouble. It was too obvious to be long denied that the ally who received aid should pay for it. The French were too anxious to gain the English trade to haggle much over conditions. And as for Spain, Elizabeth herself was brought to see the folly of including in the league the enemy against whom it was chiefly directed.

And so the business of the commissioners very quickly narrowed itself down to two questions—the question of the insertion or omission of the ‘*etiamsi religionis causa*’ clause in the provision for mutual assistance in case of need, and the question of Scotland.

When matters had reached this stage Walsingham, who had been living in half-retirement at Paris for the past three months recuperating his health, joined the English commissioners.²

Meantime, Smith and Killigrew had informed Elizabeth of their proceedings. As yet they had been given no power to negotiate a treaty. Their dealings with the French up to this point must consequently be considered as merely preliminary.

On the 11th of February Elizabeth sent to Smith and Walsingham full commission to negotiate a treaty with the French.

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 8 Mar. 1571-2, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 284 seq.

² Burghley wrote to him on the 11th of February 1571-2 (Digges, 165) that the Queen was very anxious for him to hasten back to court. His diary fails us at this point, but he was certainly at court on the 21st of February; cf. Digges, 166.

By the same post she informed them of her attitude upon the two chief points in dispute. Upon the point of religion she urged her commissioners if possible to persuade the French to concede the 'etiamsi religionis causa' clause. If they were unwilling to go so far as this, she would be content to have inserted instead the words, 'sub quocunque praetextu vel colore et quavis de causa nulla omnino qualicunque excepta' in the clause providing for mutual assistance in case of attack, on condition that the King, by secret letter signed and sealed, would declare that such a clause was taken to embrace attacks made under pretext of religion. Yet even upon this point Elizabeth did not insist, although she wrote that she would be very loath to have her commissioners assent to the treaty without it. Obviously at a pinch she was willing to concede the 'religionis causa' clause.

Upon the other matter in dispute—the matter of Scotland—Elizabeth showed herself hardly less conciliatory. She was not prepared for a moment to admit the right of Mary Stuart to the Scottish throne, but she suggested that if the French refused to recognize the regency of Mar, Scotland might be dealt with in the treaty under the ambiguous appellation of *Regnum et Status Scotiae*. The most reasonable solution of the Scottish difficulties she thought might be affected if a joint commission appointed by the French King and herself were to undertake the settlement of differences between the warring Scottish factions.¹

It is plain that Elizabeth was sincere in her desire for a league. Her explicit statements on the points in controversy, and the sealed commissions to Smith and his colleagues which she sent along with them, placed the English commissioners in a position to begin formal negotiations. On the 21st of February Smith, Walsingham, and Killigrew went to the King and told him that they were prepared to proceed at once to the conclusion of a treaty. Charles said that it could not be concluded too soon for him. He promised to send his commissioners to confer with them on the morrow.²

¹ Elizabeth to Smith, Walsingham, and Killigrew, 11 Feb. 1571-2, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 38 (in Digges, 154, who, however, misdated it 13 Feb.).

² Smith and Walsingham to Elizabeth, 22 Feb. 1571-2; Digges, 166, cf. *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 456.

With such manifest good intentions in both sovereigns there seemed to be every hope that the obstacles to the treaty would shortly be removed. Indeed Smith and Walsingham were so confident of the outcome that, although Elizabeth had instructed Killigrew to return as soon as Walsingham was well enough to resume his duties, they detained him for a time, wishing to send back by him definite news of the completion of the negotiations.

The King's passion for hunting delayed matters for some days, but by the end of February the treaty, as Smith wrote, was 'in matter at a point'. Neither of the points at issue had been settled, but it seemed likely that the French would accede to Elizabeth's wishes in the matter of Scotland, and the Queen had already intimated to Fénélon that she would not insist upon the '*etiamsi religionis causa*' clause. It looked as though the negotiations would very speedily be brought to a conclusion.

Killigrew packed up his baggage, and on the 1st of March with Smith and Walsingham went to court to take leave of the King. Naturally conversation turned upon the negotiations. Smith told Charles that practically all difficulties had been disentangled except the knotty point of religion. The King maintained that it had been already provided for in the general clause in the treaty. Smith held that this was not sufficient. Walsingham pointed out the advantage of an express religious clause as an inducement for other Protestant princes to join the league. Charles offered to set the matter right by a private letter to the Queen. 'How do you mean, sir,' inquired Smith, 'in a writing after the fashion of a treaty and sealed with your great seal of France, or but in a letter close?' 'In a letter close,' the King replied, 'signed with my own hand, where I will express the same words are meant as you would have put in the league.' Smith answered that although the King's word was as good as any prince's living, treaties had to do neither with words nor with letters close, but with parchments signed and sealed. Walsingham declared that, after all, treaties were not private agreements between persons, but between states, and he hinted at a Spanish party in the English Council which would be willing enough to take advantage of any opportunity to dissuade the Queen from accepting the French amity. Charles replied that he was sure that his good sister would be content

with his private word. The English commissioners again demurred. Then the King got angry. 'Well,' he said, 'ye have coursed me awhile, now I must course you again; for the Queen of Scots, I must have that my request put into the treaty for her. Make what objections you will, she is my kinswoman and my sister-in-law.' Smith replied that it was impossible, and bade the King consider how she had plotted against Elizabeth. Killigrew observed that it was no use bickering about the Queen of Scots, that she was as good as dead any way. Whereupon Charles relented a little. In that case, he answered, there was indeed no use in pleading for her.

The English commissioners talked the matter over later with the Queen Mother. She upheld the King's attitude upon the point of religion, but, finding Smith obstinate, she proposed that the difficulty should be passed over until the ratifying ambassadors were exchanged. But Smith was not to be caught in any such snare. The treaty, he said, as was the custom, must formally be settled and signed by the commissioners before there was any talk of ratification. So Catherine agreed to confer with the King about it. She said nothing about the Queen of Scots.¹

These conferences reveal very clearly the attitude of Charles and his mother towards the two points in dispute. In spite of the King's warm words he was obviously willing to concede the question of Mary Stuart provided that the English would meet his terms upon the point of the 'religionis causa' clause. Catherine, it is to be observed, never even spoke of the Scottish Queen. She confessed afterwards that she had forgot to mention her. But the very fact that she did forget indicates that Mary Stuart was a minor consideration with her.

Upon the point of the 'religionis causa' clause, Charles, while he refused to have it expressly included in the treaty, professed his willingness to concede it in a private letter to Elizabeth. There can be little doubt that he took his stand upon this point advisedly. Fénélon had informed him that, at a pinch, Elizabeth was willing to concede it.²

Smith himself knew the Queen's attitude in the matter, and

¹ Upon the point of the 'religionis causa' clause, cf. Smith and Walsingham to Elizabeth, 1 Mar. 1571-2; Digges, 169, cf. *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 457.

² Fénélon to the King, 1 Feb. 1571-2, *Correspondance*, iv. 365.

his rigid insistence upon the insertion of the 'religionis causa' clause appears in consequence somewhat gratuitous. Doubtless he wanted to get all that he could, but he seems on the whole to have wasted time by his obstinacy. The point was conceded in the end as everybody knew it would be.

Walsingham took a saner view of the situation. He was strongly in favour of the league and he saw no sense in making mountains out of molehills. In a letter to Leicester written just after his interview with the Queen Mother, he said he thought it inadvisable to stick out any longer for the 'religionis causa' clause. For his part he believed that the King's pledge in a private letter was sufficient guarantee. As he remarked, after all, the continuance of the treaty depended solely and entirely upon the goodwill of the parties concerned. If it were broken, parchments, however much besealed, would be of little value. It would not then be a question for high courts which took cognizance of such things to settle, but for the arbitrament of the sword. So, he argued, that while nothing permanently could be gained even if Charles were finally dogged into compliance with Elizabeth's wishes, much might be accomplished in the way of friendship by chivalrously deferring to the King's word of honour. 'I know nothing', he wrote, 'can more content him, for he desireth to be reputed a prince that esteemeth his word and honour above his life.' Indeed, Walsingham, strangely enough for a man of his legal training, laid much more stress upon the encouragement of a spirit of friendship than upon the formal expression of it in Latin legal formulae. Both to Burghley and to Leicester he confessed his belief that the exchange of honourable personages to ratify the league would do as much, if not more, to cement the friendship between France and England as would the treaty itself. 'Your Lordship', he wrote to Leicester, 'can do more good in one hour here than twenty such petty companions as myself is can do in a whole year, or possibly in all our lives' time.'¹

With the other great obstacle in the way of completing the

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 4 Mar. 1571-2; Digges, 173. Original missing. This letter is not dated in Digges, but it appears from the context to have been dispatched about the same time as a letter to Burghley dated 4 Mar.; cf. Walsingham to Burghley, 4 Mar. 1571-2, Cotton MSS., Caligula C iii, f. 217.

treaty, notably the one of Mary Stuart, Walsingham had in mind a more radical course of procedure. Elizabeth was considering how she ought to deal with the Scottish Queen in consequence of her complicity in the Ridolfi Plot. Walsingham, who learned that Mary was even at the moment contriving other schemes for her release,¹ would have given her short shrift. His opinion was that many difficulties at home and abroad, the difficulty of the treaty among others, would be solved if she were got out of the way. 'So long as that devilish woman lives,' he wrote to Burghley, 'neither her Majesty must make account to continue in quiet possession of the crown, nor her faithful subjects assure themselves of safety of their lives.'²

It is clear from a letter which Walsingham wrote to his second cousin, Thomas Randolph, a little while later that he did not anticipate any great objection on the part of the French King to such a summary method of dealing with the problem. 'The fear of Spain's footing there [in Scotland],'³ he wrote, 'maketh the King here more temperate in soliciting the Queen of Scots' cause, and if it were not for the doubt that he is put in by his ambassador there in England, that she is likely one day to enjoy the Crown of England in respect of her title, the great party she hath there, and the Queen our mistress's irresolutions in doing of justice, he would then yield to anything that might be for the Queen's good, and though it touched that good lady as near as her life. But the fear of that, whereby she attaining the Crown, there may ensue an uniting of England and Scotland in amity with Spain (a thing that to him might grow very prejudicial), maketh him to use some show of favour towards her, lest otherwise she might think herself quite abandoned of him. When we tell him that the Queen our mistress meaneth to do justice on her, forced to the same for her own surety, he telleth us that the Queen our mistress is too merciful a Princess to shed the blood of so near a kinswoman as she is; but that is rather spoken *ironice* than otherwise. And therefore if her Majesty would do that both reason and justice requireth, they would

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 4 Mar. 1571-2, Cotton MSS., Caligula C iii, f. 217.

² Same to same, 31 Jan. 1571-2, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 32.

not inwardly be miscontented what outward show so ever they make.' ¹

Upon one other point in connexion with the negotiations for the treaty Walsingham expressed himself at this time with some vigour. Elizabeth had proposed to include Spain in the treaty. He ridiculed the notion. It was manifestly inconsistent, he said, with the confessed purpose of the treaty, which was no other than to bridle the King of Spain's greatness. 'If, therefore,' he wrote to Burghley, 'her Majesty do think that this prince [Charles IX] is of any value, who is towards all men sincere, towards her Majesty well affected, towards religion *pius inimicus*, she must not weigh him in one balance with Spain who is of word insincere, in affection towards her Majesty maliciously bent, and the common enemy to our religion. If her Majesty mean to take profit of his [the Spaniard's] friendship, the next way shall be to strengthen herself with the amity of others in such sort as she shall have no need of it, for it is the nature of a proud man to make best account of them that least esteem him.' ²

It is plain that Walsingham did not altogether approve of Smith's procrastinating method of dealing and that he wanted to bring the negotiations to a conclusion as soon as possible. His arguments, although not aimed directly at the Queen, were doubtless intended to hasten her resolution. Now that the points at issue had been clearly defined and both sides had taken their stand, the issue really depended upon her. Killigrew had returned to England early in March carrying with him the report of the English commissioners on the progress of the negotiations and asking for further instructions. It was some time before she sent them.

Meanwhile, Smith and Walsingham spent much of their time debating with the Queen Mother the question of Mary Stuart. They reiterated again and again the old arguments against her. They spoke eloquently of her personal shortcomings and of her plottings against the peace and safety of their mistress. But the point upon which they laid the greatest stress was her dealings with Philip of Spain. This was a particularly sore

¹ Walsingham to Randolph, 19 April 1572, B.M. Additional MS. 33531, f. 107.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 8 Mar. 1571-2, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 284.

point with the French, and Smith and Walsingham knew it. On the whole they found the King and his mother disposed to listen to their arguments. When Fénélon's letters out of England came to confirm Mary's complicity in the Ridolfi Plot, Charles exclaimed, 'Ah, the poor fool will never cease until she lose her head! In faith they will put her to death. I see it is her own fault and folly. I see no remedy for it. I meant to help, but if she will not be helped, *je ne puis mais*.' ¹

In these informal conferences with Walsingham and Smith during March, Catherine brought up again the project of a marriage between her younger son Alençon and Elizabeth. She tried to make out that the immature and undersized youth was wise beyond his years. She bade Smith mark his budding beard. Walsingham had little to say in this matter, but Smith showed himself, as indeed he was, very enthusiastic about the match. He added words to Catherine's own arguments, pointing out how the knot of marriage would make stronger than any waxen seal the bond of friendship between the two countries, how Elizabeth would have little to fear from Mary Stuart's machinations with the promise of an heir from her own body, and such like matter. He and Catherine even got to reckoning on the number of the children. She scorned Smith's fervent wish for one child.

'No,' she said, 'two boys, lest the one should die, and three or four daughters to make alliances with us again.'

'Why, then,' quoth Smith, 'you think that Monsieur le Duc shall speed?'

With that she laughed and said, 'I very much hope so.' ²

Negotiations confined themselves during March to conversations like these between the Queen Mother and Smith and Walsingham while they awaited Elizabeth's further instructions upon the questions of the treaty.

Elizabeth delayed sending them. By the 30th of March the English commissioners had heard nothing. On that day Smith wrote home pressing the Queen earnestly for a reply. ³ Scarcely had he dispatched his courier when one arrived from London

¹ Smith to Burghley, 22 Mar. 1571-2; Digges, 193, cf. *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 466.

² *Ibid.*, just cited.

³ *Ibid.*, Palm Sunday (30 Mar.), 1571-2; Digges, 198, cf. *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 466.

with a royal letter.¹ But it did not contain the instructions for which Smith and Walsingham were so eagerly looking.

On the 7th of February Charles had sent an envoy, one Du Croc, to England with certain charges concerning the settlement of differences in Scotland.² His instructions had been vaguely worded. He was himself strongly Guisan in his sympathies, and instead of joining frankly with Elizabeth to consider a solution of the matter as the English had expected he would, he began to talk at the English court about the rights of the Queen of Scots, produced letters from the King requesting that she be set at liberty, and demanded permission to converse with her and then to proceed alone to Scotland.

This attitude Elizabeth resented. She told Du Croc flatly that he could not see Mary Stuart. Touching his voyage into Scotland she was not quite so dogmatic; but finding that the Marian party in Edinburgh Castle had been fortified by promises of aid from abroad, she thought best to keep Du Croc in England until she had communicated with the French King.³

This was the news which Smith and Walsingham read in the Queen's letter which came to them on the 30th of March. They hastened to Catherine to protest. Smith told her that his mistress was not a little perplexed to receive from the King of France a request to set Mary Stuart at liberty just at the time when she had discovered nefarious dealings between the Scottish Queen and the Duke of Alva. Catherine hastened to reassure him. 'Monsieur my lord ambassador,' she said, 'we did not know then [when we sent Du Croc] of no such intent of the Queen of Scots. You may be sure we would be loathe that any such thing should be attempted and rather loather. . . . She is allied to the King and me, and brought up here, and we, for our part, could do no less than entreat for her what we could obtain at the Queen's, my sister's, hands. She seeketh another way to ruinate herself, to hurt her friends, to deserve no pity or favour, and sorry we must be for her, and if she be so dangerous (as it appeareth) we cannot nor dare not require liberty for her which is so perilous to the Queen, my sister's estate.'

¹ Smith and Walsingham to Elizabeth, 3 April 1572, Cotton MSS., Caligula Ciii, f. 429.

² Charles IX to Fénélon, 7 Feb. 1571-2, *Correspondance*, vii. 288.

³ Elizabeth to Smith and Walsingham, 20 Mar. 1571-2, Cotton MSS., Caligula Ciii, f. 243.

Satisfied with this, Smith turned to the kindred question of the settlement of civil difficulties in Scotland. Charles had commissioned Du Croc to bring the warring Scottish factions to accord, by inducing them to choose among themselves a number of nobles to govern the kingdom, as though he would have established an oligarchy there, hoping thus to escape a definite recognition of the young James as King. Both Smith and Walsingham contended that this commission was not sufficient. The Scotch were too turbulent a people, Walsingham said, to be governed by any self-imposed oligarchy. Such a provision would rather excite disturbance than allay it. Smith caught up the thread of the argument. The easiest way out of the difficulty, he said, was to accept Elizabeth's solution. Let the young King be acknowledged as King, and for the distribution of land, titles, and honours among the Scotch nobility let that be settled by two umpires appointed, one by the French and the other by the English, with the joint power of France and England behind them to enforce their decisions. Catherine wavered. Walsingham, to clinch the argument, hinted at the dangers to be anticipated from 'a third party', who was likely to step in while France and England were splitting hairs. Smith at once followed up the point. 'Madam,' he said, 'take heed of the put-hawk, for he is ready.' Catherine caught the suggestion too. 'I know what you mean,' she replied, and she promised that no reasonable demand should be denied.¹

The next day, the 1st of April, de Foix and the French commissioners came to Smith and Walsingham to discuss the Scottish matter further. The arguments which the English commissioners had advanced the day before to the Queen Mother they repeated again, 'each one serving the other's turn to make probable that they said'. The French were driven from point to point, until it was finally agreed that France and England should join to bring the Scotch under subjection to one government, to which end instructions should be sent to Du Croc.²

On the 2nd of April Walsingham had a touch of his old malady, and Smith, whether because of the lack of fire in his

¹ Smith and Walsingham to Elizabeth, 3 April 1572; Cotton MSS., Caligula C.iii. 429. Printed in Digges, 177, and corrected from the original in *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, Addenda, 467. The 'put-hawk', of course, was Philip of Spain.

² *Ibid.*

bedroom or the strong waters which he used for his stomach morning and evening 'to resist the cold', was also indisposed.¹ In the evening de Foix and Biragues brought to them a copy of Du Croc's instructions for inspection. By these Du Croc was charged to proceed to Scotland with a commissioner to be appointed by Elizabeth, and together with him, 'acting as if they were ambassadors of one prince', to bring the Scotch to order either by gentle persuasion or if necessary by sterner arguments.² Smith and Walsingham expressed their approval. In their joint letter to Elizabeth they urged her strongly to accept this solution as an honourable and easy way out of the Scottish difficulty, although Walsingham in a private letter hinted that a more permanent settlement might be effected, 'if the doubts of the Queen of Scots' possibility were taken away'.³

On the 3rd of April, after a long delay, came Elizabeth's further instructions to her commissioners. They proved to be in entire accord with what had been done already in furtherance of the treaty. She was willing to accept the King's letters in lieu of the 'religionis causa' clause, and to consent to a joint settlement of the Scottish question as designed in Du Croc's commission.⁴ So from the English side all obstacles to the consummation of the treaty were removed. In France the Spanish party tried their best to cause delay upon the point of Scotland, but to very little effect. The French commissioners were determined to surmount all obstructions, and they were resolutely supported by the King.⁵ On the 17th of April Smith could triumphantly write home, 'At last Mr. Walsingham and I have concluded the league.'⁶

¹ Ibid. Smith cites his grievances against the French weather and the French houses in a letter to Burghley of the 3rd March; Digges, 193. Some very entertaining private letters from Smith in France at this time are printed in *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, Addenda, 442 ff.

² For these new instructions to Du Croc, cf. *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 215.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 4 April 1572, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 15.

⁴ Elizabeth to Smith and Walsingham, 2 April 1572; Digges, 185.

⁵ Walsingham to Burghley, 22 April 1572; Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 50.

⁶ Smith to Burghley, 17 April 1572; Digges, 199; cf. also *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, Addenda, 478. The original of the treaty is in the British Museum, Additional MSS. 24671. It is printed in Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique* (ed. 1728) v, pt. 1, 211 ff.

The draft of the treaty was signed by the English and French commissioners at Blois on the 19th of April 1572.

Briefly the Treaty of Blois as signed bound England and France together in a defensive league. It stipulated that if either of the confederates were attacked the other was obligated upon request to furnish a certain definite amount of military and naval assistance. This assistance was to be paid for at a stipulated rate by the power which sought it. The contracting power agreed to furnish for this purpose at least 6,000 foot soldiers and eight ships. More should be lent if possible, but no more was pledged by the treaty. And certainly this was little enough even if one takes into account the relatively small scale of sixteenth-century military operations.¹

The league, in fact, so far as it provided for common defensive action, was about as weak as such a league well could be. Its virtue lay rather in the promise of each confederate not to assist the enemies of the other than in any adequate provision for mutual aid against any such enemies. In view of the fact that the Huguenots were doing their best in France at this time to promote an aggressive attack upon Spain in the Netherlands, it is rather surprising to discover that no effort at all seems to have been made either by the French or the English negotiators to promote an offensive league. Indeed it was agreed at the beginning of the negotiations 'not to meddle with any league offensive but only defensive'.²

The commercial provisions in the treaty are interesting and deserve more attention than has ordinarily been paid to them, though they came in the end to naught. They have to be explained in the light of Anglo-Spanish trade relations. It will be recalled that the arrest of the Spanish pay ships in English harbours late in the year 1568 resulted in a stoppage of trade between England and the Low Countries. This involved serious consequences to the two most important branches of the English export trade,³ that in wool and that in cloth, for the reason

¹ For Elizabeth's attitude upon this point cf. Digges, 185, 191.

² *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 461.

³ In the year from Michaelmas 1564 to Michaelmas 1565 the total export trade of England was apportioned as follows: Cloth, 81·6 per cent.; wool and wool fells, 8·45 per cent.; tin and lead, 4·55 per cent.; the rest in miscellaneous commodities. Ehrenberg, *Hamburg und England*, 8.

that both the Staplers who monopolized the wool trade and the Merchant Adventurers who controlled a large part of the export cloth trade were at this time carrying the great bulk of the continental business through the Low Countries.¹ When the Duke of Alva closed this channel to them they were forced to seek continental *entrepôts* elsewhere. The wool trade had ceased to be a matter of great consequence, but about 80 per cent. of the total English export trade was in cloth, and the industries related to cloth-making were easily the most important and the most widespread in England. Any serious interruption in the cloth trade, therefore, was bound sooner or later to produce acute industrial distress all over England.² On that account the matter became one of national importance. Fortunately, the year before the stoppage of trade in the Netherlands, the Merchant Adventurers had come to an agreement with Hamburg which provided them with another continental outlet for their cloth. But the English merchants were not altogether satisfied with the Hamburg trade, and during the period between 1568 and the reopening of the ports in the Low Countries in 1573 they were groping about for some other substitute for the Antwerp market.

Such was the situation in the English commercial world when Smith and Walsingham began their negotiations for a league with France. No doubt one of the chief reasons which had made Elizabeth hesitate to commit herself to a French alliance was her fear that any anti-Spanish policy would in the long run be disastrous to English trade. She certainly must have felt that in any league with France as ample provision as might be should be made to secure an adequate market for English cloth. Accordingly the treaty provided for the establishment of an English staple in France for the vent both of wool and of cloth. The location of this staple was not fixed in the treaty, though provision was made that it should be fixed within four months after the treaty was signed. English merchants were to be permitted to erect their own house there and to establish their

¹ On the Staplers, cf. Jenckes, *The Origin, the Organization and the Location of the Staple of England* (Philadelphia, 1908), 50; on the Merchant Adventurers, cf. Lingelbach, *The Merchant Adventurers of England*, xxxvi.

² Indications are not wanting that there was a good deal of distress of this sort in England in 1572; cf. *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1569-78, 435, 443.

own government. They were not to be molested either in person or goods and were to be permitted to hold religious services according to the Anglican communion. It was further provided that the tolls, customs, port dues, and other charges to which they should be subject should be fixed and recorded within four months of the signing of the treaty and should not be increased.

Evidence is lacking to show how or with whom this plan of a French staple originated. It first appears in the form of a series of articles in Latin enclosed in a letter from Smith to Burghley of the 17th of January.¹ With strikingly few changes these articles were incorporated in the final treaty three months later. There is little or no evidence of any debate about them in the course of the negotiations. The French commissioners were evidently delighted with them,² not realizing apparently that English competition might prove damaging, as indeed it did, to the native cloth industry.³

As a matter of fact this English staple never was established in France. Both the French King and his mother, Catherine de Médicis, appear to have been very eager for it,⁴ and during the months immediately following the signing of the treaty their ambassador in England, acting upon their instructions, did his best to get Elizabeth to take the necessary action. He even went so far as to maintain that failure to carry out the commercial provisions in the treaty might operate to invalidate the whole of it.⁵ But even to such threats he found the English curiously unresponsive. In a letter to Walsingham late in May Burghley laid his finger upon the root of the difficulty. 'I see', he wrote, 'no likelihood of any great moment thereby, so are our merchants affected to traffic by the Low Countries or to Germany.'⁶ July came and no English commissioners had yet been appointed, and though La Mothe Fénélon heard late in that month that the English Privy Council was discussing the matter with the English merchants, nothing definite appears to have emerged from the conference.⁷ A month later the news

¹ *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 20. These articles are printed in full in *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 445, but are wrongly dated there.

² *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 22.

³ Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* 132.

⁴ Fénélon, *Correspondance*, vii. 294, 312.

⁵ *Ibid.* v. 49.

⁶ Digges, 203.

⁷ Fénélon, *Correspondance*, v. 50, 60.

of St. Bartholomew's reached England and shook the whole Anglo-French entente to its foundations. Fénelon was rash enough to bring up again the question of commercial relations in November, but he met with the cold rejoinder that France was no safe place for Protestant Englishmen. About a year later, when the matter was again revived, the English merchants argued strongly against it. They pointed out that there was small demand for English cloths in France and few facilities there for dyeing and finishing them, a consideration of importance since a great deal of the English cloth exported was unfinished. They complained of the difficulties put in their way by French cloth-makers, of the inadequate harbours in North France, and of the lack of return freights. And they made much of the religious disorders.¹ What they failed to point out was that, with the re-establishment of trade relations between England and the Low Countries in June of 1573, the only real justification for an English cloth staple in France had vanished. It is not impossible that the English had designed the whole plan mainly as a threat to force the Duke of Alva to raise his embargo on English trade.² In any event, when that embargo was raised both Elizabeth and her merchants lost whatever interest they may have had in developing a French *entrepôt*.³ The French were, however, not willing to let the matter drop at once. They reverted to it indeed as late as 1575. But Elizabeth once again, although she was polite about it, refused to give it serious consideration.⁴ Fortunately for her, the persistence of civil disorders in France gave her an excellent excuse for evading this provision of the Treaty of Blois without any glaring breach of faith.

Another group of articles in the treaty devoted to commercial questions was also evidently the outcome of the breach in Anglo-Spanish trade relations. It was provided that if English merchants or their merchandise were seized or arrested in Flanders, Artois, Brabant, Holland, Zealand, Friesland, Pomerania, or Prussia, the King of France would undertake to procure

¹ Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* 131-2; *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 433-4.

² Smith himself seems to have cherished the hope that the French market would in time prove a satisfactory substitute for the one in the Low Countries; Digges, 180.

³ Cf. on this *Cal. S. P. Spanish*, 1568-79, 436.

⁴ Fénelon, *Correspondance*, vi. 434-5.

their release by remonstrating with the prince who ordered the arrest. If such remonstrance proved fruitless, the King bound himself to arrest all the merchants belonging to the offending prince within French territories and to hold them until the arrested English merchants were released. It is true that Elizabeth bound herself to reciprocal action. It is true also that in a general way other regions of trade not expressly designated were included. But it can hardly be doubted that this promise was designed mainly to prevent any further seizure of English merchants or their merchandise in the Low Countries. It also proved in the end to be a dead letter.

The concluding articles in the treaty dealt with the Scottish question, and from the point of view of the English they represent perhaps the largest concessions made by the French. In the first place they omitted any mention of Mary Queen of Scots, or any provision whatever for her welfare. In the earlier stages of the negotiations the French had fought hard for a recognition of Mary's rights in Scotland, but the English commissioners had refused to concede it, and in the end it was dropped. To avoid any commitment upon the question as to whether Mary or her son were rightful monarch in Scotland, the government there was alluded to in the treaty as the '*regnum et status Scotiae*'. It was provided that for the establishment of order in that country the King of France and the Queen of England should, as soon as might be, send a joint commission with power to reconcile the warring factions and to restore civil peace there. It was agreed that neither prince should take action to the prejudice of the Scottish crown or its possessions, but should do all in his power to protect and preserve the same. Both promised to do their uttermost to prevent any foreign prince from sending troops into Scotland, and both agreed to withdraw any troops which they themselves had sent there. It was, however, conceded that if rebels against Elizabeth took refuge in Scotland, and if the Scottish government upon demand either could not or would not expel them, she might herself send troops across the border and drive them out. Smith and Walsingham had hard work to get this concession inserted in the treaty. The French commissioners argued that it simply opened a door through which the English might invade the northern kingdom at will, and swore the King would never yield

to it. Smith replied that it was indispensable, and offered to the French the choice of conceding it or of breaking off the negotiations altogether. The Spanish faction at the French court was for taking him at his word, but both the King and his mother thought otherwise, and in the end Smith won his point, though he consented to some verbal change in deference to the French.¹

Considering the treaty as it was signed in relation to the negotiations from which it proceeded, it obviously expressed rather the English than the French conception of an alliance. Of all the matters which Elizabeth's envoys vigorously demanded the insertion of the 'etiamsi religionis causa' clause was the only one they failed to get. The weakness of the provisions for mutual defence were clearly inspired by Elizabeth, the commercial clauses were evidently dictated by Smith himself. As for Scotland, while it appears that the English would have preferred to omit any reference at all to that kingdom, the provision which was made for it followed exactly Elizabeth's own suggestions.² The French practically committed themselves to a recognition of the *status quo* in Scotland, and tacitly agreed to no further intervention there in Mary's behalf. Smith could well write 'The Queen's Majesty with her honour hath all that which is desired of her Highness'.

In another letter written a few days later Smith sang the praises of the treaty at greater length:

'We can perceive nothing in any wise,' he wrote to the Queen, 'but that the King here goeth as sincerely and *tam bona fide* with your Majesty as any Prince can and trust we suppose and certainly by God's grace that this league shall be as great an assurance and defense of your Majesty as ever was or can be. The two realms being so near and ready to defend if it be required, if Spain will now threaten or shew evil offices, as it hath done of late against your Highness' surety, it will be afraid hereafter, seeing such a wall adjoined. And if it will not, it may sooner feel the smart of evil doing than it would. If the House of Burgundy will be friend, whereof there is great reason to have much doubt, yet nothing is done on your Majesty's part to break the amity. And peradventure, this will make him loather, seeing so good, or near hand so good, and peradventure in time a better vent granted here for your subjects and merchants than that is.'³

¹ *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 479, 482.

² Digges, 156.

³ *Cal. Foreign Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 480; Digges, 180.

Smith's enthusiasm, though excessive, is pardonable considering that the treaty was largely his work. It will be observed that he singled out for emphasis those points in it likely to appeal to the Queen herself, and it is not easy to decide how much of what he wrote was simply designed to satisfy her, and how much represented his own reaction. He was at particular pains to explain that the treaty involved no breach with Spain, and on the face of it that was so. But the very fact of the treaty, irrespective of its particular provisions, did represent a departure from the traditional English foreign policy. That probably explains why the French proved to be so acquiescent in the arrangement of details. The party in power in France was contemplating a war with Spain, and their chief object, if they could not secure the active support of Elizabeth, was to secure her benevolent neutrality, and that much they accomplished. They interrupted, if they did not completely break, the old Anglo-Burgundian alliance. They diverted, or thought they had diverted, to their own advantage the old Anglo-Burgundian trade. Compared with these advantages they probably regarded their concessions on the Scottish question and on Mary Stuart as a relatively small price to pay.

In any case the Treaty of Blois is significant rather for what it might lead to than for anything it actually accomplished. Its separate provisions had no permanent value. The promises of mutual assistance in case of need were never lived up to by either party. The solution which it proposed for the Scottish difficulty proved hopelessly inadequate. Even its commercial arrangements, designed to transfer to France the trading advantage which the Low Countries had formerly enjoyed with England, never amounted to anything. But in April 1572 all those weaknesses were concealed in the bosom of the future. Men regarded the treaty then as a great triumph for Protestantism and a shrewd blow aimed at the power of Spain. And so in its intentions, if not in its effects, it may be said to have been. In France it was a triumph for the foreign policy of Coligny and his Huguenots over that of the ultra-Catholic Guises. From the point of view of England it may be said to mark a diplomatic revolution. Up to the Treaty of Blois, Elizabeth, on the whole, inclined towards alliance with Spain and hostility towards France. After Blois the situation is reversed.

From this point of view the treaty achieved one of its purposes and worked Philip of Spain harm in the long run. Some may see in it, as an attempt on the part of France and England joined, to counterpoise the preponderating power of the Habsburgs, an early expression of the principle of the Balance of Power.

The Treaty of Blois must be regarded as the joint work of Walsingham and Smith, for although Smith was the ambassador especially appointed for the purpose and to him the bulk of the correspondence fell, yet Walsingham was associated with him in every important conference, by no means as a silent supporter, and it is certain that every step in the negotiations was planned by the two together. In the main they seem to have worked together in perfect harmony. Both were ardent Protestants, both favoured the settlement of the Scottish difficulty by removing Mary Stuart effectually from the discussion. Perhaps the only point upon which they differed was the point of the insertion or omission of the 'religionis causa' clause. Smith appears to have insisted upon it at all costs, and to have been willing to break the negotiations off if Charles did not concede it. Walsingham, on the other hand, did not regard it as of vital importance. The proposal of the French that it should be settled by a private letter of the King appeared to him to be sufficient guarantee. It is to be observed that Walsingham's point of view was the one eventually accepted in the treaty.

Walsingham confessed satisfaction, though he displayed no great enthusiasm at the conclusion of the treaty. Probably he would have preferred a strong offensive alliance to the very dilute defensive one for which it provided. But he regarded it as, at any rate, a step in the right direction, a step away from Spain. He realized that even as it stood it would strengthen the hands of the Huguenot party in France, and perhaps enable them to carry through their project of an offensive war against Spain. There is some reason to believe that he hoped it might invite the participation of the German Protestant princes.¹ He may even have dreamed that it would serve ultimately as the nucleus for a general Protestant league against the power of Rome.

¹ Digges, 169.

IV

THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S

WHILE Walsingham and Smith were hammering the Treaty of Blois into shape, they were occupying themselves at the same time with another matter, equally important in its bearing upon the cause of Protestantism. This was the projected match between Marguerite of Valois, the King's sister, and Prince Henry, son of Jeanne of Navarre. After many persuasions Catherine had induced this staunch old Huguenot Queen to think favourably of the match. Jeanne made up her mind to conduct the negotiations in person, and it was for that reason that she reluctantly left her beloved La Rochelle to come to the court.¹

Her visit to the Queen Mother was deferred for a time by the presence at Blois of the Papal Legate Cardinal Alessandrino. He had come from Rome for the purpose of getting the King to join the Holy League against the Turk, to induce him to publish the decrees of the Council of Trent in France, and to turn him from the English alliance and the Navarre marriage. He brought Charles a sword blessed by the Pope, but neither his arguments nor his presents accomplished aught. 'And so the foolish Cardinal', Smith wrote, 'went away as wise as he came. He neither brake the marriage with Navarre, nor got no dîmes of the Church of France, nor persuaded the King to enter into the league against the Turk, nor to accept the Tridentine Council, nor to break off treaty with us; and the foolishlest part of all his going away, he refused a diamond which the King offered him of 6,000 crowns.'² As the Cardinal left the gates of Blois, discomfited, on the 1st of March, he passed the train of the Queen of Navarre just about to enter.

Jeanne d'Albret had not been very long in Blois before

¹ K. de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, ii. 363.

² Smith to Burghley, 3 Mar. 1571-2; Digges, 193, corrected from the original in *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 457-8.

Walsingham and Smith entered into communication with her. Walsingham was in favour of the marriage of her son with the King's sister, 'knowing', as he wrote, 'how much the support of the same might further the cause of religion'. With intention to help her through the difficulties which he had reason to know might beset a match between princes professing different religious beliefs, he sent her a copy of a treaty¹ which had been drawn up when a marriage had been contemplated between Edward VI and Elizabeth of Valois in 1547.² In answer Jeanne sent for him and Smith, told them what she had already done to arrange a marriage between her son Henry and the King's sister, and what obstacles stood in the way of its successful conclusion.

Walsingham, at this first interview (7 March), observed that the matter was 'full of jealousies'. 'Until the same is concluded,' he wrote to Burghley, 'I hold it for doubtful.'³

But as time went on he became more sanguine. A week later the Queen of Navarre invited him and Smith to dinner. She was evidently, Walsingham remarked, very much disturbed about the marriage. The difficulty was, of course, upon the question of religion. She was determined that her son should remain Protestant. The King was equally determined that his sister should enjoy after marriage as before all the privileges of her own faith. Smith and Walsingham discussed the matter with the Queen of Navarre at the dinner-table. After dinner she led them into another room, where they found assembled some dozen gentlemen of 'the Religion'. There the discussion turned upon the question of the marriage ceremony—naturally a matter fertile in dispute. The Calvinist ministers showed themselves willing to concede much, but upon the question of having a frocked priest actually perform the marriage service they stood fast. 'It could not but breed', they said, 'general offense to the Godly.' This was enough for the Queen of Navarre, staunch Calvinist as she was. She would never consent to do that thing 'whereof there might grow any public scandal, for that she knew', she said, 'she should so incur God's high displeasure'.

¹ Cf. Walsingham to Burghley, 8 Mar. 1517-22; Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 284, in Digges, 174.

² Cf. Pollard, *England under the Protector Somerset* (London, 1902), 132.

³ Cf. note 1 above.

The marriage was held to be broken. 'Notwithstanding,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 'I am of a contrary opinion, and do think assuredly that hardly any cause will make them break, so many necessary causes there are why the same should proceed.'¹

The course of events justified Walsingham's far-sightedness. While the treaty between France and England still hung in the balance, the King of France and the Queen of Navarre came to an agreement, and early in April the treaty of marriage was signed.² Walsingham had nothing more to do with these negotiations than has been already described. It is interesting to see, however, that the Queen of Navarre called upon him for advice. It indicates that she recognized as clearly as Walsingham did the essential identity of her interests and Elizabeth's. 'Upon the success of the Navarre marriage', Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 29th of March, 'depends the enterprise of Flanders.'³ His enthusiasm made him over-sanguine, yet no doubt the successful conclusion of these marriage negotiations marked a great step forward for Coligny's foreign policy, especially in view of the fact that Henry of Guise himself had designs upon the hand of Margaret of Valois, and that the Pope had tried his best through the medium of Cardinal Alessandrino to prevent the match. It was a union between the foremost Protestant house in France and the crown. In an age when marriages stood for leagues it meant much. It came, too, just at the time when Charles IX was definitely allying himself with Protestant England. Taken together with the Treaty of Blois it gave good grounds for the belief that the King of France meant to pursue the foreign policy which his Huguenot advisers counselled him to pursue, namely, to strike a blow at Spain in the Low Countries.

To those in France best acquainted with the progress of affairs, war against Spain in conjunction with England and possibly with the German Protestant princes seemed indeed almost certain. The obstacles in the way were personal rather

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 29 Mar. 1571-2; Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 4b. This is Walsingham's original draft. The letter sent is in *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 60.

² On 11 April; cf. *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 78.

³ Cf. note 1 above.

than political. The anti-Spanish policy was indissolubly connected with Admiral Coligny, and its success meant his advancement. Now the King himself was genuinely fond of Coligny. But the Queen Mother, recognizing his ability and his influence on the weak mind of her son, distrusted him. She had no intention of being supplanted in her place behind the throne. The Admiral, who knew her nature as well as any one, tried his best to conciliate her. For a time it looked as if he had succeeded. But as his favour increased, her jealousy of him increased also.¹

It was this which made essential a speedy and successful culmination of his foreign policy. As it had gathered strength from him, he turned for strength to it. Apart from other considerations, his personal safety in a measure depended upon it. For if he once led Charles into an open war with Philip, his position, not only as one of the foremost military leaders in France, but also as the recognized head of the anti-Spanish party, would render him indispensable to the crown.

A great deal depended upon the attitude of England. For although Coligny himself would have been willing to engage Spain alone, the King of France was reluctant—his mother still more so—to enter into a conflict with so redoubtable an enemy without the assistance of their English ally. Elizabeth, for more reasons than one, hesitated to join hands with them, and many of her councillors shared her hesitation. Even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Blois, Antonio de Guaras, a Spanish agent in London, reported that the English Privy Council was almost equally divided between a pro-French party and a party strongly disposed to come to terms with Spain.² Of this latter group he indicated Burghley himself as the foremost. No doubt he exaggerated the strength of Burghley's inclination towards Spain, yet it is clear enough that Burghley, like his mistress, was acutely conscious of the increasing pressure from English commercial and industrial interests for a restoration of the old trade relations with Antwerp. There was a chance, of course, that the establishment of a French staple would relieve the pressure, but as time went on Burghley found the English

¹ Whitehead, *Coligny* (London, 1904), 229 seq.

² *Cal. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, 384.

merchants less and less eager for the French alternative.¹ It was clear that if the French were encouraged to make war in the Low Countries, English trade would suffer rather more than less. Furthermore, it was open to question whether the conquest of the Netherlands by the French would not in the long run be more disastrous to England than their retention by the Spaniards. The French were geographically in a position to absorb them far more completely than Spain ever could. As they stood, they constituted rather a source of weakness than of strength to Spain. As they would stand incorporated with France, they would increase French strength to menacing proportions both as a military and a naval power, and more particularly as a commercial rival. There is perhaps no more constant factor in the whole history of English foreign policy than the determination on the part of the English to prevent the union of the Low Countries with France. It harks back at least as far as the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War, and it was perhaps the decisive factor in preventing England from going to the assistance of France in 1870. It drew England into the wars against Louis XIV, and again into the wars against the French Revolutionists. Lord Burghley was just as conscious of its menace in the sixteenth century as Edward III was in the fourteenth century or Queen Victoria in the nineteenth century. Burghley laid his finger on the sore spot early in June when he wrote to Walsingham: 'As to the matters of the King of Spain's Low Countries, we have great cause to bear a jealous countenance thereto, for as being in the Spaniard's hands we lack traffic with surety, so if the maritime ports come to those where you are [the French], not only the traffic into those parts for our merchants will be regulated by them, but our sovereignty upon the narrow seas will be abridged with danger and dishonour.'² And on the very same day upon which he dispatched this letter he seems to have outlined for the Queen a policy to be pursued in the matter, which was as far as possible from Walsingham's way of thinking.³ Burghley in fact recommended that Elizabeth should ascertain what the chances were that the Dutch rebels with French assistance would be able

¹ Digges, 203.

² Ibid. 212.

³ Cf. Stählin, i. 478. The author of this document is not indicated, but I agree with Stählin that it bears all the ear-marks of having been written by Burghley.

to overthrow the Spanish rule. If it should appear probable that the Duke of Alva would be able to hold his own, then Burghley thought that England should stand aside. If, however, it seemed likely that the rebels and the French together would prove too strong for Alva, and particularly if it seemed likely that the French might win the seaports, then England ought to intervene on the Spanish side, upon condition that Alva would relieve the Dutch of their intolerable burdens, would restore their political privileges, would abolish the Inquisition, and finally would agree to a resumption of trade with England. It is gratifying to discover that Burghley had at least some concern for the liberties of the Netherlanders, and for their religious welfare, though it is to be observed that his brief made no provision for the contingency that Alva should be completely successful. Certainly the most influential councillor in England was in no mood to co-operate with the French in a well-sustained aggressive warfare against the Spaniards in the Netherlands. Leicester, to be sure, supported the case for the French, and the majority of the English Privy Council sided with him, but Elizabeth herself was probably of Burghley's way of thinking.

From the signing of the Treaty of Blois on the 19th of April until the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve on the 24th of August, most of Walsingham's time in France was taken up in dealing with the questions as to whether or not the French King would adopt Coligny's foreign policy, and as to whether or not Elizabeth would join with him if he did. His own sympathies in the matter have already been made abundantly clear. Probably there was no one on either side of the Channel who supported Coligny's policy more enthusiastically than he did, and who was more eager to lead England to its support. But he was well aware that his mistress did not share his enthusiasm, and that Burghley was at best lukewarm, and he had to be careful not to commit his Government any further than it was prepared to go. For, after all, his main business in France was to serve as the mouthpiece for his sovereign.

At the time when the Treaty of Blois was signed the prospects for the success of his policy appeared unusually bright. In the Netherlands themselves, the discontent with Alva's iron rule, which had long been smouldering, suddenly broke into flame.

The spark was applied by the Dutch sea-rover La Marck, who, on the 1st of April, with Elizabeth's secret connivance and assistance,¹ suddenly seized the town of Brill in Zeeland and held fast to it in spite of all the efforts of the Spaniards to dislodge him. Other towns along the coast promptly ejected their Spanish garrisons, and within a month the spirit of revolt had spread through all the provinces of the north.

William of Orange felt its impulse even in Germany, where he was trying to recruit an army of mercenaries, and was encouraged by substantial contributions from enthusiastic Dutch burghers to hasten his preparations for an attack upon Alva from the south-east. No wonder if Alva in alarm thought it well to concentrate his forces and if the King of France began to feel that the time was about ripe for putting Coligny's policy into effect.

It looked, indeed, during the spring of 1572, as if Charles IX meant to make war on Spain without waiting for Elizabeth's co-operation. The French garrisons along the Flemish frontier were put upon a war footing. French troops in small bands began to filter into the rebellious towns in Zeeland.² In the harbours of western France a fleet of formidable dimensions was assembled under Strozzi's command. No one seemed to know exactly what was to be done with it. Some said it was designed for the West Indies, some for Algiers, some for Flanders. Walsingham heard in April that Strozzi was in touch with the Moors.³ But all were agreed that it boded no good for Spain.

Yet as a matter of fact the policy of the French court was not by any means so positively anti-Spanish, even in the month of April, as the signs of the times seemed to indicate. Walsingham himself was well aware of this. In commenting on Strozzi's preparations to Burghley he wrote on the 22nd of April :

'Of late there hath been hard hold here for the overthrow of this enterprise. The King is resolute in the matter, otherwise it had been quite broken. They of the Robe longue do fear that it will breed a pike between this crown and Spain. And they would be loath that the King should enter into wars for that they doubt

¹ Pollard, *Political History of England*, 1547-1603, 331-2.

² Stählin, i. 467.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 22 April 1572; Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 50.

that the managing of the affairs should come then to the hands of others. They persuade the *Queen Mother* that it will diminish *her credit*. They persuade *Anjou* that if the *French King* have good success therein it will diminish his reputation. These respects do make the said parties to become enemies secretly to the wars. Because lack of treasure is the only let that is alleged, they do what they may to hinder all such devices from taking place as lately have been offered to supply that want. Amidst these difficulties it is hard yet to judge what will be the issue of this matter.' ¹

Walsingham's view of the situation is supported by the testimony of Petrucci the Florentine ambassador at Paris.² There was in fact a marked rift in the relations between the King and his mother over the Spanish question at this juncture which extended itself to some of the chief councillors and aligned the young Duke of Anjou on his mother's side. While Charles IX, who could be headstrong on occasions, seemed disposed to seize the favourable opportunity in the Low Countries for beginning war at once,³ Catherine, always fearful of war, was trying her best to hold him back. At least she did not wish to fight Spain single-handed. Coligny himself favoured joint action by England and France against Spain. Catherine probably regarded English co-operation as a *sine qua non*. On that account she attached great importance to the outcome of another matter at this time under discussion between France and England.

During the negotiations for the Treaty of Blois, Catherine again and again had urged upon Smith and Walsingham the desirability of cementing the Anglo-French league by a marriage between her youngest son, the Duke of Alençon, and their mistress. Elizabeth, her pride considerably wounded by the treatment which she had received at the hands of the French in the Anjou negotiations, for a long time refused even to consider the matter. When Burghley broached it to her in January she got in such a temper that he found it wise to change the subject at once. Notwithstanding, Catherine persisted. When

¹ Ibid. The words in italics are in cipher, not deciphered. The letter is printed with many errors in Digges, 188. Stählin's exposition of it (i. 468, n. 5) is excellent.

² Baumgarten, *Vor der Bartholomäusnacht*, 161.

³ Cf. his letter to Louis of Nassau of 27 April 1572, cited by Baumgarten, *op. cit.* 164, n. 1.

Montmorency and de Foix went over to England to receive the ratification of the Treaty of Blois, she instructed them to make a formal offer of Alençon's hand to the Queen.¹ By the time they had reached England political considerations had somewhat tempered the heat of Elizabeth's indignation. She had instructed the Earl of Lincoln, whom she had dispatched to France a little while before to ratify the Treaty of Blois, to refuse any offers which Charles might make to him in his younger brother's behalf,² but to Montmorency and de Foix she was not so uncompromising. She entertained them lavishly, sent them back to France laden with rich presents, and, although she gave them no definite answer, she promised to consider their proposals and to let them know her mind in the course of a month.³

Thereupon she sent instructions to Walsingham to gather information respecting Alençon's appearance, 'his stature, his conditions, his inclinations in religion, his devotion this way'. Burghley, who was not easily deceived, thought that she was at last seriously inclined towards marriage. 'I cannot see in her any lack towards this,' he wrote to Walsingham, 'but, in opinion of his age, which defect, if it might be supplied with some recompenses, it were meet to be thought of.' He suggested that the offer of Calais by the French with Alençon as governor for life might serve the purpose.⁴ Walsingham had just received these advices from England when he was called to court. De Foix and Montmorency had returned and the King wished to send thanks to Elizabeth for their courteous reception at her hands. In the course of conversation Charles reverted to the marriage project, expressing the hope that it might have a happy issue. Walsingham, having no commission to deal in the matter formally, could do no more than make polite replies.

He did, however, discuss the marriage privately with Coligny and de Foix, and, as Burghley had advised, suggested to them that the concession of Calais might incline his mistress to think more favourably of the proposal. Both of them declared that such a thing would be impossible. De Foix proposed the Isle of

¹ Instructions of Montmorency and de Foix, 25 April 1572; Fénelon, *Correspondance*, vii. 289.

² *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 116.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 2 July 1572; Digges, 219. This letter is undated in Digges and the original is missing, but Walsingham in his reply to it (Digges, 219) mentions it as of the date July 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Walcheren instead, but Walsingham cautiously refused to entertain the suggestion without commission.¹ At the same time he collected and dispatched to Elizabeth the data about the person and disposition of the young suitor which she had asked for. Alençon, he said, was seventeen years of age, of a tractable disposition, not so feather-headed as most Frenchmen, open-minded on the subject of religion, and to all appearance deeply enamoured of the Queen. This much for Elizabeth's perusal. In a private letter to Burghley he was not so sanguine. 'To be plain with your Lordship,' he wrote, 'the only thing that I fear in this match is the delicacy of Her Majesty's eye and of the hard favour of the gentleman, besides his disfiguring with the small-pox, which, if she should see with her eye, I misdoubt much it would withdraw her liking to proceed.'²

Walsingham himself strongly favoured the match. 'No match', he wrote to Burghley, 'that yet hath been offered her is every way so fit as this, notwithstanding the inequality of years.' But he was too well acquainted with Elizabeth's disposition to pin any faith to her intentions. 'The weighing of Her Majesty's natural indisposition to marry,' he wrote again to Burghley, and the corruption of those who have gained such a foot in Her Majesty's favour as were able to dissuade her from accepting the necessary remedy offered by Parliament, maketh me utterly to despair either of marriage or any other thing that tendeth to her safety.'³

In sending an estimate of Alençon's qualities to the Queen, Walsingham left it to Sir Thomas Smith and to the Earl of Lincoln, who were just returning to England with the King's ratification of the Treaty of Blois, to describe to her the young Duke's personal appearance. When they got home they made their report to Elizabeth upon the subject. They spoke of Alençon in very flattering terms, but they could not, for all that, conceal the fact that he was a short unhandsome man, with a face badly pock-marked. As Walsingham had surmised, these physical defects counted for more in the Queen's eyes than anything else.

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 13 July 1572; Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 103; in Digges, 219.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 13 July 1572; Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 107. ³ Ibid.

She had promised Montmorency when he made the formal proposal of Alençon's hand to her in June that she would send her answer within a month. On the 23rd of July accordingly she instructed Walsingham to thank the King for his proposal, but to tell him that the difference in age between her and his brother was too great for her to contemplate a marriage. It is perfectly obvious, however, from her letter to Walsingham, that age was not the real obstacle. Elizabeth, confident of her perpetual youth, never worried greatly about differences of age. It was the ill favour of the Duke which to her feminine eye made him ineligible.¹

But such a positive refusal was contrary to Elizabeth's nature. Four days after she had dispatched her letter to Walsingham she sent a second letter very much less positive in its tone. She said that the urgent letters which she had received from the King and his mother and especially from the young suitor had induced her somewhat to mollify her answers.² In this letter she instructed Walsingham to tell the King that she conceived the hindrances to the marriage to be two—the difference in religion, and the difference in age. As to the first, he was to say that she considered it might easily be removed. The second, he was to declare, she held to offer the greater difficulty, but thought it might be removed by a personal interview with the Duke of Alençon himself. If the King objected that such a course of action was without precedent, Walsingham was to reply that so splendid a match for the younger brother of a French King was without precedent also. The religious difficulty, she suggested, might be held in reserve and brought forward to preserve Alençon's honour if she did not find him to her liking. So Walsingham had two letters of instruction dated four days apart. He was directed by the one to inform the King that she considered the difference in age an insurmountable obstacle to the marriage: by the other that she was very well disposed to consider it. The curious thing about it is that Elizabeth did not intend the second of these instructions to cancel the first. She told Walsingham to show them both, one after the other, to the King. No wonder that

¹ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 23 July 1572, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 158; in Digges, 226.

² Same to same, 27 July 1572, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, 159; in Digges, 228, misdated 25 July.

Burghley wrote, 'I see your negotiation shall be full of perplexities.'¹

Walsingham must certainly have found it so. However, he could do nothing more than obey Elizabeth's instructions. He went to Montmorency and revealed to him the contents of the letters. To the first Montmorency answered that he was sorry that the Queen was resolved not to marry. To the second he declared that he could not consent to an interview between Alençon and the Queen unless he were assured 'that there might grow a liking'. He promised, however, at Walsingham's request, to lay the matter before the King.²

The next day Walsingham was called to court to confer with Catherine. He spoke with her as with Montmorency and received the same answers. But Catherine had no mind to dismiss the matter so. She told Walsingham that she was very anxious to bring the match about, and said she hoped that time would dispose Elizabeth's heart more favourably toward it.³

'They mean not', Walsingham observed to Burghley, 'to give over the matter utterly, but do hope that necessity in time may induce her Majesty in respect of her safety and the gratifying of her subjects to yield her consent.' He said if the interview would do any good, he thought that he could easily arrange it. But he was cautious. 'The experience I have had,' he wrote again to Burghley, 'how this case of marriage is subject to many things, maketh me to proceed warily, according as I shall receive direction.'⁴

Not unnaturally Charles and his mother were considerably perplexed by the contradictory nature of Elizabeth's two letters. They wrote at once to their ambassador at London to ask her to explain.⁵

As soon as Fénelon had received the letters he went to Elizabeth and put the question to her. She replied that the King had misunderstood her or else that Walsingham had misinterpreted her meaning. She had not meant, she said, in her first

¹ Burghley to Walsingham, 27 July 1572, in Digges, 230.

² Walsingham to Smith, 10 August 1572, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 527; in Digges, 231.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Walsingham to Burghley, 10 August 1572, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 124; in Digges, 232.

⁵ Charles to Fénelon, *Correspondance*, vii. 306 seq.

letter absolutely to reject the marriage, but to show how many and how great were the obstacles in the way.¹ Of course this was mere quibbling. Her statement to Walsingham had been plain enough, and he had been very scrupulous in repeating it at the French court. In fact Elizabeth was indulging her natural genius for equivocation. She neither wished to marry nor not to marry, or rather she wished to convey to the French King and his mother the impression that she would marry without committing herself to any straightforward policy. Catherine had sent over late in July La Mole, one of Alençon's friends, a young man of attractive personality, to talk over the marriage with Elizabeth. In England she spread banquets for La Mole and played to him romantic melodies on her spinet, until she convinced Smith and even wise old Burghley that marriage was not far off.² Abroad, she wrote ambiguous letters to Walsingham, from which he tried in vain to puzzle out her meaning.

She must at least have succeeded in persuading Catherine de Médicis that the prospect of drawing England into a war against Spain by the bonds of matrimony was at best a remote one. To that extent Elizabeth may be held responsible for the events which followed. Her dilatory tactics in the marriage question inevitably strengthened the hand of the party at the French court who opposed the Spanish war. Yet it is probably a mistake to assume that the success of Coligny's policy was altogether, or even mainly, dependent upon Elizabeth's attitude. To Catherine de Médicis it may have been so, but it was not yet clear in the early summer of 1572 that Catherine would succeed in imposing her views upon her son. Ultimately perhaps Coligny's success depended upon whether the King would resist his mother's importunities or would yield to them. For the time being he seemed disposed to defy her.

Walsingham's point of direct contact with the Dutch wars, as it had been during the previous year, was through young Louis of Nassau. During the early spring Louis had been conferring almost daily with the Queen Mother and the Duke of Anjou in the vain hope of winning their support to his

¹ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 22 Aug. 1572, Digges, 235.

² Hume, *Courtships of Elizabeth*, 163; cf. Fénelon's letters of July and August 1572 in *Correspondance*, vol. v.

plans.¹ Just after the Treaty of Blois was concluded he came to speak to Walsingham. The substance of this interview is set forth in Walsingham's letter to Burghley of 22nd April:

'In conference with *Count Louis* I perceive that the most part of the *towns* in *Flanders* have promised not to *receive* such *garrisons* as should be *sent* by the *Duke of Alva*, and contrary wise to *receive* such as by him [*Count Louis*] should be *sent*. The *French King* hath promised him what aid he himself can desire. I have advised him to employ as few of the *French* as he may, which he meaneth to do. *Flanders* hath offered him great force of *money*. Some of the *French* at the beginning he must needs employ at . . . Because he would be loath that the *French* should put in foot in *Flushing* or *Middelburg* and therefore he would desire your lordship to move the *Queen's Majesty* to suffer those *Walloon*s that are in *England* to *embark* for the said *towns* underhand as also to permit them to have *victuals*. He was not privy to the *Lord de la Marck's enterprise* and was very sorry he began so *timely*, but now necessity forceth them to proceed. If the *Queen's Majesty* will not grant his request then the *French King* hath promised him *500 men* to *embark* at *Dieppe* for the places aforesaid. I told him that things in *England* were far out of tune to hope much after anything. Notwithstanding I desired him to stay for a xv days if he might possibly, as by that time I hoped I should hear from thence. The *French King* hath some intentions to employ in this behalf the *Duke of Alençon*, if he change not his purpose, but this shall be done *à la dérobée*.' ²

It will be observed that in the interview the Count asked for nothing from Elizabeth except her permission to allow the Walloon refugees in England to buy provisions and to come over to him. There is no talk now of financial assistance as there had been a year ago. In fact Walsingham was apparently of the opinion that Louis could get all the help he needed from France, and he raised the question of English co-operation rather with a view to preventing that of the French than because he felt the Count's success to be any ways dependent upon it. This was obviously the line of reasoning most likely to appeal to Burghley and his mistress, and quite possibly Walsingham chose it with that in view. At all events it seems to have had its effects.

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 19 March 1571/2, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 184; in Digges, 182 ff., where it is misdated 29 March 1571.

² Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 56. The passages in italics are in cipher in the original.

The fear of France accomplished what the fear of Spain and the cause of Protestantism had failed to do. Late in May Burghley wrote to Walsingham, 'Notwithstanding Flushing which is not well governed for lack of a head, we have suffered as many of the strangers to depart from hence as would, but that is but a simple help.'¹ More was forthcoming. Early in July Sir Humphrey Gilbert crossed the Channel with a large company of English volunteers. Although Elizabeth was at pains to disclaim any official connexion with this enterprise, Gilbert undoubtedly went with her consent and approval. And it was plain enough that she did not intend him to dissipate his strength in indiscriminate campaigning. She sent him, in fact, express instructions that he was to occupy Flushing and Sluys, two of the important coast towns, and was, above all, to prevent the French from possessing them.² Such was the disposition of the English Government towards co-operation with the French at this critical juncture. Elizabeth was perhaps more ready to fight for the Low Countries than she had been, but it was not the tyranny of Alva which provoked her, it was the ambition of France.

All this, however, was very distinctly *à la dérobée*. On the surface of things the presence of English troops in the Low Countries looked very promising for Coligny's plans, and the general sentiment in Paris at the time was that affairs were going very well. Smith sent word from Paris to Killigrew on the 9th of May: 'Here all is well, thanks be to God, and I trust in

¹ Digges, 203.

² A very illuminating letter upon the objects of Gilbert's enterprise is given in *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 497-8. It is a memorial from the English Privy Council to Capt. Pickman, who went over in August 1572 with orders to Gilbert from the Queen. The burden of this memorial was that Gilbert should not have applied himself to promiscuous enterprises, but should have possessed himself of Flushing. 'You shall let him [Gilbert] know that we think the drawing of him and his from Flushing was that it might be possessed by the French, and if this happened the fruits of his journey would be void and we see no need for the abode of him or his company in these parts.' The memorial goes on to state that Gilbert must find means to recover the town from the French by trickery. It concludes with the statement that a letter was being sent to Gilbert to recall him to England, 'which letter he may use as he shall think good, if he be in any place distant from Flushing at the siege of any town, or otherwise in any camp and thereby take occasion to withdraw himself and his numbers to the enterprise of Flushing'. Adverting to Gilbert's demand for siege artillery, the memorial states, 'we do not desire Sir Humphrey and his company to spend their time in such attempts, but principally in keeping Flushing and in recovering and keeping Sluys'.

Flanders will shortly be better.' ¹ Late in the same month he wrote to his friend Thomas Heneage: 'Matters in Flanders begin to wax hot and the beginning of next month most part of the brood hereabouts will be fledged and go to pasture there, because it is a plain country and open as they say.' ²

Walsingham wrote to Burghley by the same post:

'Touching Flanders matters, if the long gowns had not done somewhat to impeach them, the matter had been so forward that the Spaniards had never landed in Zealand to have hindered the siege of Middelburg. I hope shortly to send you word of somewhat done and put in execution to divert the said Spaniards. . . . Count Louis departed this town the 19th of this month, with whom I have placed Mr. Morgan who will advertise from time to time how things do pass.' ³

Walsingham was not given to enthusiasm, but clearly his hopes ran high late in May. On the 29th he sent word to Leicester of Count Louis's success:

'Here at this present we are altogether entertained with Flemish matters, having received certain news from thence that certain by order of Count Ludovic are seized of Valenciennes and Mons in Hainault, where it is said the Count remaineth and that from thence he sent M. de la Noue in great diligence towards Brussels with 600 horses, where if he hap to find the Duke of Alva he hopeth to make short wars, the town of Brussels being better affected to the Count than to the Duke. It is said here that Douay and Lille should also be taken by certain appointed by him for the purpose, but that is not certain. If the Duke of Alva retire to Antwerp as it is thought he will, then those of judgment here are of opinion the whole country will revolt. . . . The number of his [Louis] horsemen are 1200, the most part of them gentlemen; of footmen he hath only 5000, the most part of them Gascons. It will shortly be seen to what issue this tragedy will come.' ⁴

To Burghley Walsingham wrote at the same time in about the same terms, though he called attention to another factor in the situation. 'The Prince of Orange most assuredly is onward on his way with 4000 horse, whose enterprise on the other side is like to have the better success upon this good beginning laid by his brother.' ⁵

Walsingham's optimism proved to be premature. On the very

¹ *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1583, Addenda, 487.

² Digges, 202.

⁴ *Ibid.* 204.

³ *Ibid.* 495.

⁵ *Ibid.*

day upon which he wrote the letter just quoted the Spaniards recovered Valenciennes and soon after laid siege to Mons. Louis was thrown on the defensive. As for his brother, the Prince of Orange, lack of funds kept him still in Germany, and he was not ready to cross the Rhine until early in July. Clearly things were not going so well. In May Walsingham had hardly attempted to enlist English support in the Dutch enterprise. He seems to have been confident then that Louis of Nassau would achieve his purpose without it. But in June he began to repeat his old arguments in his letters home. On the 28th he wrote to Leicester:

'I hope it shall manifestly appear unto you that upon the good success or evil success of this [enterprise depends] the common cause of religion. And besides, the same not well proceeding, her Majesty cannot promise to herself any great safety, having so dangerous a neighbor whose greatness shall receive no small increase if he overcome this brunt. I pray God therefore that her Majesty may incline to do that which may be for her safety.'¹

Upon Burghley he tried once more the anti-French argument.

'I perceive by him [M. Junius] that if there be no assistance given underhand by her Majesty they [the Dutch rebels] shall be driven to yield such inconveniences as shall be laid upon them by this nation, and further that they shall be forced to consent to have Strozzi in Zealand, unless they may have some supplies elsewhere.'²

He appeared, however, to be still confident that the French King would go ahead in his plans for war. The Florentine ambassador in Paris was not so sure of this, neither for that matter was the ambassador of Savoy.³ Even Walsingham had to admit that progress was slow, but he explained the King's cautious attitude on the grounds that Don John of Austria, who had mustered an army in Italy to attack the Turks, had not yet departed and that the French King wished to see him well on his way eastward before committing himself. On similar grounds he explained the King's proclamation recalling Frenchmen from

¹ Digges, 216. As is frequently the case, the text in Digges is evidently defective. I have supplied the two words in brackets.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 2 July 1572; Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 100; in Digges, 217.

³ Stählin, i. 503-4.

Mons and prohibiting the sale of Flushing plunder in France. To him the more significant fact was that on the 12th of July Charles had allowed the Huguenot Genlis to march to the relief of Mons with 4,000 foot and 600 horse. He wrote Burghley on the 13th, 'the King is so far forward in this matter that no disguising will serve', and four or five days later he sent word that the Prince of Orange had crossed the Rhine with 7,000 horse and 50 ensigns of foot.¹ Even in the Orient he found cause for encouragement. A messenger from the French ambassador at Constantinople brought word to Paris that the Turk was preparing to take the sea in force and had offered France great sums of money to declare war on Philip II. Walsingham was not unaware that the Duke of Anjou was still working hard to prevent an open breach with Spain and he suspected that the Queen Mother was exerting her influence in the same direction, but he still pinned his faith to the zeal of the King.

Late in July word reached Paris of the complete rout of Genlis's expedition, and Walsingham hopes turned again to fears. He wrote on the 27th of July to Leicester:

'Your Lordship by these enclosed occurrents may perceive that Genlis is overthrown, whose [failure though] it never could but breed danger to the cause so could it never breed more danger than presently upon the Prince of Orange's first entry into the country, a means to discourage him and to encourage the enemy. How much his well doing or evil doing importeth us I need not say anything to your Lordship, the thing being so apparent. How dangerous it were to suffer him to quail, it is no less evident. How little hope there is he shall receive relief from us, especially from the news of this overthrow, it grieves me not a little to think of it, considering what dependeth thereon, and I hope God will make my fear vain.

To suffer him to miscarry, knowing our own danger, were to lack both policy and magnanimity. We cannot deny but upon that that lately hath been discovered, that if God had not raised up the Prince of Orange to have entertained Spain, a dangerous fire ere this time had been kindled in our own home. To assist him therefore, is to assist ourselves, for that we are to run one fortune with him; the difference is that by miscarrying, the mischief shall first touch him and then consequently as many of us as profess one religion with him, for the supply that is given by the Pope, Florence and divers Catholic Princes in Germany

¹ *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, nos. 467, 488; Digges, 221-3.

sheweth that the quarrel is mixed and consisteth as well of religion as of state. They fail not to make demonstration thereof, and therein they shew their courage and zeal; contrarywise we do things underhand and thereby do discover both lack of zeal and courage. No Councillor's enterprise accompanied with fear had ever good success, for there can be no greater enemy to sound counsel than fear. The gentlemen of the religion here since the late overthrow of Genlis, weighing what dependeth upon the Prince of Orange overthrow, have made demonstration to the King that, his enterprise lacking good success, it shall not then lie in his power to maintain his Edict; they therefore desire him to weigh whether it were better to have foreign war with advantage or inward war to the ruin of himself and his estate. The King being not here, his answer is not yet received. They hope to receive some such resolution as the danger of the cause requireth. In the mean time the Admiral desired me to move your Lordship to deal with her Majesty to know whether she, upon overture to be made to the King, cannot be content to join with him in assistance of this poor Prince, seeing that as well in estate as religion it doth so nearly touch her. Surely though it import the King very much to look to it, yet it importeth more her Majesty who is to look for nothing else (Spain overcoming this brunt) than the extremity of such mischiefs as he can work her. My good Lord therefore, as you never lack'd to further such causes as concern God's glory and her Majesty's safety, so I do not doubt but that you will with that care and courage which this weighty cause requireth, yield what aid and assistance you possibly may.'¹

The failure of Genlis dealt a death-blow to Coligny's policy of open war against Spain. Charles IX's immediate impulse was to avenge the disgrace to the French arms, and for four or five days at the end of July, while the Queen Mother was away from court, Coligny had led him to the point of beginning the levy of troops.² But when Catherine got back to Paris early in August she succeeded in dampening his warlike ardour. At the meeting of the Council of State on the 9th she was able to secure a decision definitely opposed to aggressive action. Walsingham wrote to Leicester on the 10th:

'It may please your Lordship to understand, that upon advertisement come from the parties that her Majesty meant to revoke such as are employed in the Low Countries of her subjects, the King here, through the persuasions of such as are inclined to

¹ Digges, 225-6.

² Stählin, i. 518.

Spain, is grown cold, who before was very forward, in so much as commissions were granted ready to have been sealed for the levying of men in sundry Provinces; but herein nothing prevailed so much as the tears of his mother, who without the army of England cannot consent to grow to any open dealing. And because they are, as I suppose, assured by their ambassadors that her Majesty will not intermeddle, they cannot be induced to make any overture. Thus your L. sees that fear and mistrust, unless God sets to his helping hand, is like to overthrow all. To think that Spain will suffer us to overcome this brunt, to live long in peace hath no reason for grounds. To seek now reconciliation with him in this his necessity, there is likelihood he will yield thereto, for no man can speak fairer than a Spaniard when he is underfoot; but to think when the necessity is gone that he will forget what is past, surely he knows not the Spanish nature that is of that opinion. For the greatness of France, I see no such ambition here why we should have cause much to fear it. Pleasure and youth will not suffer us to take profit of advantages, and those who rule under us are fearful and irresolute. How perplexed the Admiral is, who forseeth the mischief that is like to follow if assistance come not from above, your Lordship may easily guess. And surely to say truth, he never shewed greater magnanimity nor never was better followed nor more honoured of those of the religion than now he is, which doth not a little appall the enemies. In this storm he doth not give over the helm; he layeth before the King and his Council the peril and danger of his estate, and though he cannot obtain what he would, yet doth he obtain somewhat from him. I am requested to desire your Lordship to hold him excused in that he writeth not, for that at this time he is overwhelmed with affairs. Furthermore he desired me [to say] from him that if her Majesty proceeded in revocation of those her subjects in Flanders, it will breed such discouragement in those of the country that are well affected to the cause, as it will to all likelihood hazard the whole enterprise. He therefore desireth your Lordship, as you wish well to the cause and to the safety of her Majesty, whose repose (whatsoever is said to the contrary) dependeth upon the good success of this enterprise, to procure a stay to be made of the said revocation.' ¹

Walsingham attributed the change in the French policy to news from England that Elizabeth was contemplating the withdrawal of the English volunteers from the Low Countries. But there is no evidence outside his own opinion to support this view of the matter. As a matter of fact, no such withdrawal was

¹ Digges, 233-4.

contemplated at this time,¹ and though false rumours to that effect may have reached the French court, it is hardly likely that they had the decisive effect which Walsingham ascribed to them. The abandonment of Coligny's war plans was the result of Catherine de Médicis' machinations and marked the final success of an effort extending over some months to discredit his policy in the eyes of her son the King. Ultimately, no doubt, Catherine's own attitude was partly determined by Elizabeth's vacillating policy. If she had been willing to accept a marriage alliance, or, failing that, had shown herself ready to co-operate vigorously in an aggressive war against Spain, the Queen Mother might have been less reluctant to follow Coligny's lead than she was. But Elizabeth made it sufficiently clear not only that she would not be drawn into a war against Spain herself, but also that she would oppose the acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands by France. She was willing to see France make war on Spain alone, but not willing to let her gather the fruits of victory. With no better support from her English ally than this it is not surprising if Catherine was strengthened in her determination to oppose war. A number of other factors entered into her calculations as well—personal jealousy of Coligny was probably not the least of them. No doubt she used every argument within reach to win her son to her way of thinking, and it is not impossible that she even manufactured rumours of a withdrawal of the English to strengthen her case. But Walsingham was mistaken in holding that to have been the decisive factor. His general position was, however, sound enough. The success of Coligny's policy depended in large measure upon Elizabeth's willingness to co-operate vigorously in its execution. Her refusal had a good deal to do with its failure, particularly when the ill success of Louis of Nassau and of Genlis demonstrated that the ejection of the Spaniard from the Netherlands was going to entail a lot of hard fighting.

Walsingham wrote to his cousin Brocket on the 10th of August:

'Touching matters of Flanders which toucheth us most, there is neither cause of hope nor of despair. When I look upon the coldness of those whom it behoveth to assist, then do I fear. When I consider how God is then readiest to show his omnipotency

¹ Digges, 236.

when things to the eye of the world seem most desperate, then I hope. And surely such is the state of this cause.' ¹

The issue to his mind was in God's hands indeed. He regarded it as God's cause, for he saw that not only the fortunes of the Dutch, but also the fortunes of Protestantism in France depended on the event. The Huguenots told him frankly that civil war would ensue if the Admiral's plans failed. With something like prophetic insight he wrote to Burghley, 'I fear there will follow fearful effects unless God put to His helping hand.' ²

Fearful effects followed sooner and in a more terrible form than he had anticipated. The 18th of August was the day appointed for the marriage of Henry of Navarre and Marguerite of Valois. It was a great day for the Huguenots. The wisest and the bravest of them had gathered from all corners of the land to witness the match which was to bind their cause, as they thought, to the French crown. The ceremony was performed with great splendour, and afterwards, for four days, Paris was one great carnival. ³ There were masquerades and banquets, much conviviality among the *bourgeoisie*, tilting and such courtly exercises among the nobility. It had been prophesied that the nuptials would be red. ⁴ The glow of the wine cup and the flushing cheeks of French maidens bade fair to confirm the truth of the prophecy.

Then suddenly an event happened which checked the laughter on the lips of the merry-makers. Coligny had been warned to be on his guard, but he trusted in the King's good faith. On the 22nd of August, in the morning, as he walked homeward from the Louvre, he was shot at and wounded by one Maureval, a hired assassin of the Guises. Fortunately it was only a slight wound ; a troublesome overshoe, which at the very moment of the firing he had stooped to arrange, saved his life. They carried him home and laid him on his bed.

The King was very angry. He sent his own physicians to

¹ Walsingham to Mr. Brocket, 10 August 1572, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 122.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 10 Aug. 1572, Digges, 232.

³ Walsingham was not present at the ceremony, nor were any of the other ambassadors. Charles IX had thought it best not to invite them, fearing to offend the Spanish ambassadors and Papal Legate by asking them to be present on such an occasion. Whitehead, *Coligny*, 257.

⁴ By the Duke of Sully's father ; cf. *Mémoires de Sully* (London, 1747), i. 20.

attend the Admiral, went personally to inquire after his health, and swore that he would cruelly repay those who had perpetrated the atrocious deed.

The Huguenots were alarmed. On the afternoon of the 22nd the chief of them held a council around the Admiral's bedside. The Vidame de Chartres urged him to fly from Paris, but Teligny, his son-in-law, thought that the King's word might be trusted. Coligny chose to remain and take the chance.¹

Walsingham at this time was lodging across the river in the Faubourg-Saint-Germain.² His wife and his young daughter were with him. Also he was entertaining a guest, the young Philip Sidney, who had come to France with the Earl of Lincoln intending to travel further south, but had lingered in Paris at the invitation of the French King.³ Unhappily Walsingham has left no connected account of these unquiet times. Events followed each other so quickly that he had no opportunity to write them down until it was dangerous to commit himself to paper. Doubtless he was dismayed at the attempted assassination of the Admiral. But Count Montgomery, one of the Huguenot leaders, who lived near him, paid him a visit the same evening which somewhat allayed his fears. The Huguenots, Montgomery said, were right sorry for the Admiral's hurt, but they rejoiced to see the King so careful for his cure, and so determined to avenge the wrong he had suffered.⁴ Nevertheless, Walsingham, who had not misread the signs of the time, must have laid an anxious head on his pillow during the nights which followed. A strange unquiet brooded over Paris. Although the merry-making over the marriage had practically come to an end, the town did not settle down to its ordinary routine. People who ought to have been busy walked about the streets and armed men were moving to and fro. The evening of the 23rd—St. Bartholomew's eve—passed quietly in the Faubourg-Saint-Germain. Revellers returning home late might have heard with some

¹ Whitehead, *Coligny*, 258 seq.

² De Thou, *Historia sui temporis* (French trans., London, 1734), vi. 408; but cf. Stählin, i. 527, n. 1.

³ Leicester to Walsingham, 26 May 1572, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 77.

⁴ Walsingham to the Privy Council, 24 Sept. 1572, Digges, 254. (Portions of Walsingham's draft of this letter are in Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 169 seq.)

surprise the church bells of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois ring out suddenly in the summer night. But it sounded faintly from far off up the river, not loud enough probably to disturb the slumbers of sober God-fearing folk like Walsingham and his family.

But the next morning it was evident that something was happening in the neighbourhood of the Louvre. Even across the river one could hear confused shoutings and ringing of bells, broken by pistol shots and the clash of arms. Walsingham sent one of his friends to Montgomery to inquire what was the matter. Montgomery replied that there was some disorder in the city, but that the King had promptly suppressed it, and had placed guards about the Admiral's house to ensure his safety.¹ Nevertheless, as the day wore on, the sounds became more ominous. Before night Walsingham had learned the true state of affairs from troops of terrified Englishmen who hastened from all quarters of the city to find shelter behind his doors.²

One can picture the anxious group of Protestants gathered together that August night in the English Embassy, on their knees probably, praying for their very lives. Each new-comer with his new tale of the horrors across the river added to their fears. Others came besides Englishmen, Germans and Dutch and one or two Huguenots who were later dragged forth again to meet their fate.

It is not necessary to tell again the story of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's. Walsingham's house was fortunately far removed from the centre of disturbance, a fact to which he and his fellow countrymen probably owed their lives, for the Catholic

¹ Ibid.

² Cf. Timothy Bright's *Abridgement of Foxe* (London, 1589). Epistle dedicatory to Walsingham: 'Among all your honorable favors, that especial protection from the bloody massacre of Paris, now sixteen years past, yet (as ever it will be) fresh with me in memory, hath always since bound me with all bonds of duty and service unto your Honor. The benefit as it was common to many (for your Honor's house at that time was a very sanctuary, not only for all of our nation, but even to many strangers then in peril and virtuously disposed), so it was therefore the more memorable and far more honorable, and bindeth me with straighter obligation of duty and thankfulness, who thereby had cause to rejoice, not only for mine own safety, but for so many of my countrymen, partly of acquaintance and partly of the noble houses of this realm, who had all tasted of the rage of that furious tragedy, had not your Honor shrouded them, and now are witnesses with me of that right noble act and companions of like obligation.'

mob was no respecter of persons, and hated the English as heretics and as friends of the Huguenots.

The King had sent a guard to protect the English Embassy, but this in itself was not very reassuring.¹ Coligny also had had a royal guard. At the very first opportunity Walsingham sent home his wife and daughter. The King would only give him a safe conduct to live unmolested,² and for weeks after the massacre he did not dare to leave his house without an escort. Even when he went abroad under royal protection, threats and abuses were heaped upon him by the Catholic rabble in the streets.³

On the 26th of August Paris had quieted down enough to allow him to send his secretary to the court to thank the Queen Mother for her care of him and of his countrymen. The next day he dispatched a messenger to England. He wrote guardedly, fearing that his letter might come before the eyes of those for whom it was not intended. He confided the account of the massacre to the messenger's memory.⁴

On the first of September the King sent Lansac and Mauvisière with a dozen gentlemen-at-arms to conduct Walsingham to the court. In the conference which followed Charles explained at length the details of what he called a hideous plot, devised by the Admiral and other chief Huguenots to destroy the royal family. He intended, he said, to have a trial made of Coligny and his coadjutors, in order that the world might understand the reason for their deaths. He would send the results of their trial to Elizabeth. He hoped that she would continue in friendship towards him.

It was Walsingham's first interview after the massacre. Considering how he must have felt, his self-control was remark-

¹ The King wrote to Fénélon on the 27th of August: 'Le Sr. de Walsingham a esté soigneusement conservé pendant ce trouble en son logis' (*Correspondance*, vii. 330).

² Walsingham to Burghley, 23 Sept. 1572, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 566.

³ Same to Sir T. Smith, 14 Sept. 1572, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 240; in Digges, 240. According to the Spanish ambassador at Paris, Walsingham's house was actually attacked by the mob and his life only saved by his concealing of himself. It appears also that the Spanish ambassador rather hoped to incite the mob to deal with Walsingham as they had dealt with the Admiral. Stählin, i. 530-1.

⁴ Walsingham to Smith, 27 Aug. 1572, Digges, 238; cf. Walsingham to Burghley, 3 Sept. 1572, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 549.

able. He made some polite replies about Elizabeth's care for the King's safety and about her kind disposition towards him. He said nothing of the massacre except to complain of the slaying of three Englishmen, to which Charles answered with the easy promise that if the murderers were produced they would be punished. Walsingham then went to the Queen Mother. His audience with her followed practically the same course as it had with the King. Catherine made one statement, however, which was significant. She said that it was the King's intention to continue the edicts of toleration as before, now that the heads of the conspiracy had been removed.¹

For all Walsingham's polite expressions of goodwill, Catherine was naturally not at all convinced that he cherished friendly sentiments towards her. Accordingly, a fortnight after their first audience, she sent Mauvissière to speak with him and find out how he stood toward the French crown in consequence of the massacre. Mauvissière told Walsingham that the Queen Mother hoped that she might still count upon his support in the Alençon match. Walsingham was not slow to reveal his feelings. He said he had very little encouragement to be friendly, and as for the marriage he began to doubt whether the King was really in earnest about it after all. Mauvissière asked him if he would state his scruples to the Queen Mother. He replied that he would be very glad to do so.

Later in the day Catherine called Walsingham to her and inquired the reason for his distrust. He told her frankly that the strange accident—for so he called it—had sown in his mind many doubts and suspicions. He saw three reasons, he said, to mistrust the King's good faith in the marriage. The first was the late breach of the Edicts of Toleration: the second, the strange conduct of the French in the negotiations for the Anjou match: the third, rumours of French expeditions against England and Ireland. Catherine disregarded the latter two. She challenged Walsingham on the first. The league, she hoped, had been made, not with the Admiral and the Huguenots, but with the French crown. Differences in religion had not interfered before with the good feeling between England and France, as the

¹ Walsingham to Smith, 2 Sept. 1572, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 163; in Digges, 239.

friendship which had existed between Henry VIII and Francis I testified. Walsingham replied that, while in faith the Treaty of Blois had been made with the ruler of France and not with any particular French faction, the Edicts of Toleration no less concerned the whole of France, nay more, all who professed the Protestant religion. 'Surely, madame,' he said, 'I fear that this late severity executed here will make all the princes of the Religion to repute the same a general denunciation of war against them. As for the friendship of King Francis and King Henry,' he continued, 'it had been made before the days of Trent and Bayonne.' In reply Catherine fell to inveighing against the Admiral. 'To the end', she said, 'you may see how little your mistress was beholding to him, you may see a discourse found with his testament, made at such time as he was sick at Rochelle, wherein amongst other advices that he gave to the King my son, this is one : that he willed him in any case to keep the Queen, your mistress, and the King of Spain as low as he could, as a thing that tended much to the safety and maintenance of this crown.' Thereupon she handed Walsingham the paper for his perusal.

He examined it with some care. It was unquestionably in the Admiral's hand. For a moment Walsingham was amazed, then recovering himself, he answered that, however the Admiral had been affected towards England, he had shown himself a true and faithful servant to the crown of France, for which the Queen of England would ever hold him in high esteem.

Catherine changed the subject. She wished the marriage question might soon be settled. Walsingham asked her to resolve his doubts upon two points—first, upon the religious obstacle to the match, and second, upon the attitude of the King toward the late Edicts of Toleration.

To the first Catherine answered that religion would offer no obstacle to the match : to the second, that the King, her son, meant to allow the Huguenots complete liberty of conscience.

'What, Madame !' Walsingham exclaimed, 'and the exercise of their religion too ?'

'No,' Catherine retorted, 'my son will have exercise but of one religion in his realm.'

'How then,' Walsingham inquired, 'can it agree that the

observation of the Edict, whereof you will me to advertise the Queen, my mistress, should continue in its former strength ? '

Catherine explained that certain things had been discovered which made it necessary to forbid the exercise of Protestantism.

'Why, Madame,' said Walsingham, 'will you have them live without exercise of religion ? '

'Even', said she, 'as your mistress suffereth the Catholics of England.'

'My mistress', Walsingham retorted with some warmth, 'did never promise them anything by edict. If she had, she would not fail to have performed it.'

Catherine got a little angry. 'The Queen, your mistress, is to direct the government of her own country, the King, my son, his.'

Walsingham hastened to explain that he did not question her out of idle curiosity, but that he might make his answer to Elizabeth.

He inquired how, in view of the late severities, the King meant to answer his promise to Elizabeth if she were attacked under colour of religion. Catherine swore that if the King of Spain himself attacked his good sister, she should not lack any aid which the French crown could give her.¹

On the 10th of September Walsingham was called again to the Louvre to receive the King's thanks for Elizabeth's kindness to La Mole, who had just returned home. After the usual formal exchange of compliments, conversation turned to the marriage question. Apropos of the interview which Elizabeth demanded, Catherine proposed that the Queen of England should repair to Dover, while she and her son went to Calais or Boulogne, from which point a meeting at Jersey or of a calm day on the high seas could be arranged. Walsingham replied that his mistress had given up wishing for an interview, fearing that, if nothing came of it, unfriendliness might arise between the two countries. Catherine replied that she would take the responsibility on her own shoulders. Whatever came of the interview, she would see

¹ Walsingham to Smith, 14 Sept. 1572 ; Digges, 240. (A draft of part of this letter in Walsingham's hand is in Vespasian F vi, f. 240.) Catherine's own account of this interview is given in a letter to Fénélon, 12-13 Sept. 1572 (*Correspondance*, vii. 347). It is more flattering to herself, but does not differ in any essential particular from Walsingham's account.

to it that the good feeling between England and France was not disturbed.¹

Walsingham did not regard Catherine's friendly attitude toward England at this juncture as sincere. For that matter, neither did any one else. The massacre of St. Bartholomew's was commonly considered in Europe to be a 'general denunciation' by the French crown against Protestantism and all its adherents. The Pope considered it as such; so did Philip of Spain, so did the German Protestant princes, so most emphatically did the French Huguenots. And yet it seems highly probable that Walsingham and all the rest of them were deceived as to the Queen Mother's intentions.²

A variety of motives have been ascribed to her to account for the massacre of St. Bartholomew's. Probably the one which influenced her most was her jealousy of the Admiral, who had threatened to supplant her in her position behind the throne. It is hardly likely that she contemplated such a general slaughter of the Huguenots as actually occurred. Her real intention apparently was to remove Coligny and the other leaders of his party. Possibly she hoped that the Huguenots would show more resistance than they did, and that in the struggle, not only their own leaders, but also the leaders of their opponents, would be destroyed. If so, she reckoned without her host. The Guises had made their plans too carefully, and she underestimated, as many since who have used that dangerous instrument have underestimated, the fury of the Parisian mob.

At all events, St. Bartholomew's, whatever it was intended to do, was an accomplished fact. Catherine was obliged for the moment to abide by its decision. The Huguenot party, as a political factor at least, was *hors de combat*. The Queen Mother of necessity had to turn for support, at least temporarily, to the ultra-Catholic, pro-Spanish party of the Guises. But she had no more fancy to submit to the domination of the Guises than she had had to endure that of the Admiral. In consequence, the

¹ Walsingham to Smith, 14 Sept. 1572; Digges, 243. (Draft of part of this letter in Vespasian F vi, f. 238 seq.) Cf. Catherine's account, Queen Mother to Fénélon, 11 Sept. 1572 (*Correspondance*, vii. 345).

² Cf. on this point M. Philippson, *West-Europa im Zeitalter von Philipp II*, 271. He gives a copy of a medal struck by Pope Gregory XII in honour of the massacre with the inscription 'Ugonottorum Strages, 1572'.

Massacre of St. Bartholomew's was hardly over before she began trying to extricate herself from its political consequences.¹ She accepted the congratulations of the Pope and the King of Spain because she could not very well do otherwise. But to England and the Protestants she told a very different story. In her communications with them she tried to explain away the massacre one way or another on grounds not religious. It will be remembered that she had told Walsingham that she did not mean to revoke the Edicts of Toleration. At one time she made out that Coligny had been an innocent victim of the Guisan hate,² but in general the attitude which she assumed was that the Admiral had been conspiring against the French crown and that his plot had gone so far before it had been discovered that extra legal measures had been found necessary to counter-check it. This story was doubtless untrue, but the fact that she took the trouble to invent it shows that she was not at all willing to identify herself with a policy of exterminating Protestants on the ground of their heresy alone. Indeed her interviews with Walsingham, within two weeks of the massacre, indicate that she was anxious to preserve the friendship of England and was no less eager, in fact rather more eager, than before, to arrange a marriage between her son Alençon and Queen Elizabeth.

Walsingham, however, is not to be censured for his shortsightedness if he distrusted Catherine's sincerity in this matter. The return of the Guises to power was naturally accompanied by all the old indications in France of a policy hostile to England. Walsingham observed that the Duke of Guise went about with his face wreathed in smiles,³ that the Spanish ambassador was making a very brave show in the streets of Paris,⁴ and that the Papal Legate appeared to be on the most intimate terms with the King.⁵ More than this, he learned that Mary Stuart's ambassador at Paris had been entertained for two whole days at

¹ Stählin, i. 572-7.

² Charles to Fénélon, 24 Aug. 1572, *Correspondance*, vii. 323.

³ Walsingham to Smith, 8 Oct. 1572; in Digges, 265; draft in Vespasian F vi, ff. 241, 183. These papers in Vespasian F vi have been bound up carelessly.

⁴ Walsingham to Smith, 1 Nov. 1572; in Digges, 278; draft in Vespasian F vi, f. 200 seq. 'The ambassador of Spain beginneth now to show great magnificency and hath lately clad fourteen of his servants with cloaks of scarlet, guarded with velvet, and given them other apparel suitable thereto.'

⁵ Same to same, 14 Sept. 1572; Digges, 243; draft in Vespasian F vi, f. 238,

the French court discussing secret matters.¹ He heard rumours of a project devised by the Queen Mother and the Cardinal of Guise to throw troops into England, release the imprisoned Scottish Queen, and set her on the throne at Westminster.² Indeed an expedition against England became common talk among the lesser folk at the French court. Carpet knights about the Louvre explained to one another in shrill tones how easy a matter it would be to invade England by landing forces simultaneously in Sussex and Wales and in the North.

All these things, to a strong Protestant like Walsingham, whose mind was already biased by the harrowing experiences of St. Bartholomew's Eve, seemed to have a very sinister significance:

'Your Honors,' he wrote, to the Lords of the English Privy Council, 'by the King and his mother's answers, may see great protestations of amity. I am sorry that I cannot yield that assurance thereof that heretofore I have done, wherein I may seem to have dealt overconfidently, but I know that your Honors do consider that my error in that behalf was common with a great many wiser than myself, and therefore I hope you do hold me excused.

Seeing now there is here neither regard had to either word, writing or edict, be it never so solemnly published, nor to any protestation made heretofore to foreign princes for the performance of the same;

Seeing the King persecuteth that religion with all extremity that her Majesty professeth, and now is like to be an instrument to execute anything by his people offered unto him to the prejudice of her Majesty;

Seeing that they that now possess his ear are sworn enemies unto her Majesty, and nourishers of the late amity are separated from him; seeing that the King's own conscience, so common a companion is fear with tyranny, maketh him to repute all those of the religion, as well at home as abroad, his enemies and so consequently not to wish one of them alive;

I leave it to your Honors now to judge what account you may make of the amity of this crown. If I may without presumption or offense say my opinion, considering how things presently stand, I think less peril to live with them as enemies than as friends.'³

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 24 Jan. 1572/3, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 729.

² Same to same, 2 Oct. 1572, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 589.

³ Walsingham to Privy Council, 24 Sept. 1572; draft in *Vespasian F vi*, f. 169 seq. (in Digges, 253). The Queen Mother appears to have been deceived as to Walsingham's attitude. On the 7th of September she wrote to Fénélon, 'je vous assure qu'il [Walsingham] est bien affectionné (à ce que j'ay cogneu)

It must have been hard for Walsingham to write these words for they registered the definite abandonment of all that he had worked for during nearly two strenuous years. It is no wonder if he asked to be recalled. He was rapidly becoming impoverished by excessive expenses,¹ he was in bad health, his nerves were on edge after the harrowing experiences of the massacre. His French friends were half of them massacred, he had lost his points of contact with affairs, and he had lost interest in his job. Whatever policy his mistress decided to pursue towards France, it was plain enough that in a French court dominated by the ultra-Catholics he could play nothing more than a formal part. How far the policy which he advocated was dictated by his own desire to be rid of France and all her perfidious ways it is not easy to say. But pretty clearly he favoured a definite break of diplomatic relations.

Had Elizabeth elected to follow that course, she could probably have counted upon the hearty support of her Protestant subjects. For the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's had struck the English people with horror. The clergy from the pulpits cried out for bloody vengeance, and the populace demanded that the Treaty of Blois be torn to bits, the French ambassador be driven out of

a entretenir la bonne paix et amitié d'entre elle et nous.' (*Correspondance*, vii. 341.)

¹ He wrote to Burghley on the 2nd of March 1571/2 that he had already spent a third of his substance, and again on the 3rd of March, that he had spent beyond his income £1,600, which had forced him to sell land to the value of £60 yearly, and had put him £730 in debt. He was driven to confess, he wrote, that he was 'one of those evil stakes that cannot stand above a year in a hedge' (*Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, nos. 151-2).

In June 1572 (Digges, 213) Walsingham wrote that his charge amounted to £200 a month 'in spite of a thin diet, a small service and a stable of only twelve'.

In July he was borrowing money of Cavalcanti in anticipation of his salary (S. P. Domestic, xlv, p. 62). On 15 July he wrote to a friend in London that he owed Cavalcanti £373 15s. and that it would be necessary for him to borrow in London to discharge part of the debt (*ibid.*, p. 63).

Burghley wrote to Walsingham on the 2nd of April 1572 (Digges, 187) that he hoped Elizabeth would not recall him but increase his allowance. But Elizabeth does not seem to have done so. It may not be insignificant to observe, however, that it was just at this time that the suit which Walsingham had instituted against Mr. Worseley (cf. Chap. I) was definitely decided in his favour in the Privy Council. Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 13 July 1572 (Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 107): 'By my friends' letters I am given to understand that by your Lordship's careful travail, my cause with Mr. Worseley is grown to some good conclusion. I can say no more but that I owe myself and all that I have to your Lordship.'

England, and defiance hurled at the French King. But Elizabeth hardly dared. For two years her foreign policy had been based upon the friendship of France. Meanwhile her relations with Spain had been strained almost to the breaking-point. Her seizure of the Spanish pay ships in the Channel in 1569 had been followed by a suspension of trade with the Spanish Netherlands. Close on the heels of that had come the discovery of Spain's implication in the Ridolfi Plot and the consequent dismissal of the Spanish ambassador from England. In the early spring of 1572 she had let loose the Sea Beggars against Brill, and a little later had covertly sent English troops to occupy the maritime ports of Zealand. She had come indeed perilously near the verge of open war with Spain. Under these circumstances, whatever the provocation, she could not risk a definite break with France. 'It is her Majesty's desire', Burghley wrote to Walsingham on the 9th of September, 'that you were here from that place, and so her meaning is to devise for your revocation, but presently it cannot, without some note of the breach of amity, be done.'¹ Elizabeth was almost forced to the conclusion that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's marked a definite break of the French crown with the English alliance, and probably the beginning of a definitely hostile policy in conjunction with Spain and the Pope against Protestantism in general. And she took at once defensive measures to withstand the blow when it came. But she dared not invite it. As always in a crisis she preferred to mark time. How much of her attitude was the result of far-sighted statesmanship, and how much merely an inherent inability to follow any vigorous course of action, it is always difficult to say. At any rate she was evidently determined to avoid a breach with France if it could be managed, while at the same time she set about to patch up her differences with Spain.

In March, when the Treaty of Blois was still in process, Burghley had begun negotiations with Antonio de Guaras, the Spanish agent in London, for the restoration of commercial intercourse between England and the Spanish Netherlands. At that time a large part of the English Council, particularly Leicester and his henchmen, had opposed them. These negotiations were

¹ Privy Council to Walsingham, 9 Sept. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 157; in Digges, 249.

now reopened, and thanks to the prevailing fear of France even Leicester was ready to lend them his countenance.¹ Walsingham had nothing to do with them, and had nothing to say about them, though it is rather surprising to discover that he was not so averse from a *rapprochement* with Spain at this juncture as one would expect to find him. Indeed, he broached the subject on his own initiative to an envoy of the German Emperor in Paris early in February.² The negotiations did not progress very fast, but in the following April an agreement was finally reached, and on the 18th of May 1573 commercial relations between England and the Spanish Netherlands were resumed.³

But this is to anticipate matters. On the morrow of St. Bartholomew's Spain looked more like an enemy than a friend, and a definite breach with France would have left England isolated in Europe. A sudden breach then was to be avoided, though

¹ *Cal. S. P. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568-79, nos. 351, 355.

² On Walsingham's interview with Rudolph Khuen von Belasti, an imperial envoy sent to represent the German Empress at the baptism of the new daughter of the French King, cf. Walsingham to Burghley, 6 Feb. 1572/3 (Vespasian F vi, f. 273). A full account of the interview is given in Stählin, i. 614 ff. Walsingham's plan, as defined in the interview, was to induce the German Emperor to mediate between England and Spain. Stählin argues that Walsingham came forward as an advocate of religious toleration at this time, but the evidence hardly supports this view of the case. Walsingham was discussing the international situation and simply argued that it was wiser for Catholic states and Protestant states to admit differences of opinion upon religious questions between themselves than it was for either of them to attempt to coerce the other to religious conformity by force of arms. Walsingham, in fact, was simply urging the application to Europe at large of the principle *cuius regio, eius religio*, which, as between Catholics and Lutherans at any rate, had been recognized in Germany at the Peace of Augsburg. This was quite a different matter from urging religious toleration as a principle to be applied by princes in the government of their own dominions. No doubt Captain Franchiotto, an acquaintance of Walsingham, was arguing in favour of this kind of toleration a little later (*Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 1186), but Stählin is hardly justified in assuming as he does that Franchiotto was expressing Walsingham's own views. It would not be surprising to find a *Politique* like Burghley endorsing toleration, but to establish such an advanced position in so fervent a Protestant as Walsingham demands better proof than Stählin has adduced.

As a whole, Stählin seems to attach greater significance to this interview between Walsingham and Khuen than it deserves. It is more likely that Walsingham made his proposal more with a view to picking up information than with any expectation of promoting peace with Spain. His comment to Burghley on the interview rather bears out this view of the matter. He had gathered, he wrote, from Khuen's reply that the Spanish hoped to do greater things under colour of religion and that something was a brewing which was not yet thoroughly concluded.

³ Stählin, i. 583.

clearly Elizabeth and her councillors agreed with Walsingham that France was not to be trusted, and that the foreign policy which found expression in the Treaty of Blois was to be thrown overboard as soon as it safely might be.

The immediate reaction of the English Government when the news of St. Bartholomew's first reached England was to prepare for trouble. An ambassador was sent north to Scotland to warn the Government there. Shrewsbury was directed to look well to Mary Stuart. The musters were called out, the fleet ordered into the Channel. Anticipating that the blow would fall from Spain first, money was made ready to send to the Prince of Orange, troops hastily prepared for the Low Countries, and Sir John Hawkins dispatched with twenty ships to the Azores to lie in wait for the Mexican plate fleet.¹ It was not until the 8th of September that Elizabeth would consent to speak with the French ambassador. When he was finally admitted to her presence he found the whole English court dressed in mourning and the courtiers silent and solemn. Elizabeth herself received him in her most majestic manner. He explained and protested, dwelt upon the necessity of hasty action, upon the ungovernable fury of the Catholic mob. The Queen answered him in measured tones. The King, she said, was an honourable gentleman and she was bound to accept his explanation. She hoped he might clear himself before the world in general and establish without a doubt the fact that the Admiral had indeed been guilty of a conspiracy against him, and had not fallen an innocent victim to the malice of his enemies. She feared that, in any case, his murder while wounded and under the royal protection would stain the King's reputation. And as for the innocent women and children who had perished on that dreadful night, she knew that there was a God in Heaven who would avenge their deaths if the King did not make every reparation in his power.²

The English Privy Councillors in a joint letter communicated the substance of this interview to Walsingham and instructed him to find out whether the French King had been a party to the massacre or not. If not, he was to offer the Queen's assistance in

¹ Froude, x. 415 ff.

² Privy Council to Walsingham, cited p. 230, n. 1. Fénélon's account of this interview is given in his letter of 14 Sept. 1572, *Correspondance*, v. 120.

punishing the murderers. They charged him further to find out if he could what the King meant to do with the large fleet which had been mobilized under Strozzi's command on the west coast of France, and to procure the King's protection for the English merchants who were just about to sail to Bordeaux for the autumnal vintage.

In another letter of the same date Burghley disclosed to Walsingham Elizabeth's attitude toward the French King in consequence of the massacre. She was disposed, he said, to accept Fénélon's excuses, but she was nevertheless anxious about Strozzi's fleet. 'Therefore,' wrote Burghley, 'we do presently put all the sea-coasts in defence and mean to send the Queen's Majesty's navy to the seas with speed and so to continue until we see further whereunto to trust.'

Burghley himself was plainly in favour of more radical measures. 'If I could have had my mind,' he wrote further to Walsingham, 'you had been presently revoked and only a secretary left there.'¹

The day after he wrote these words messengers arrived in England from Paris who related in greater detail the horror of the massacre. They said that Walsingham's own life was in great danger. Their news added strength to Burghley's arguments, so that, on the 12th of September, Elizabeth was finally induced to write a letter to the French King requesting that her ambassador be sent home.²

This letter, along with Burghley's letter of instructions written two days before, reached Walsingham on the 17th of September. He went to court on the 21st. As usual he repaired first to the Queen Mother. His mistress, he said, was not a little amazed at the news of St. Bartholomew's Massacre. She marvelled that the King could have countenanced such measures against those who had come to Paris under his express protection. If they were indeed guilty of conspiracy against his life, she thought he might have punished them according to law and so spared the lives of many innocent persons. They could not have been very formidable, they had been murdered so easily.

¹ Burghley to Walsingham, 9 Sept. 1572; Digges, 250. Digges dated this letter the 19th, but it seems likely that this is a misprint.

² Burghley to Walsingham, 12 Sept. 1572; Digges, 251.

Catherine replied that the danger had been so immediate that it could not have been avoided by the slower process of the law. The conspirators, she said, had intended that very night to seize the gates of the Louvre and to lay hands upon the royal family. She cited as evidence certain forces which Count Montgomery had collected in the Faubourg-Saint-Germain. Walsingham showed her that Montgomery had only forty horsemen all told, of which only four had been armed with pistols. She replied that doubtless he had been less guilty than many of the others. Finally, she protested that her affection for the Queen of England was as great as it ever had been, and that she was more anxious than ever to enjoy Elizabeth's goodwill.

Walsingham then went to the King. Considering his interview with Catherine, he did not see fit to offer Elizabeth's assistance in punishing the murderers of St. Bartholomew, as Burghley had suggested, but confined his remarks on this subject to a formal expression of the Queen's condolences. After securing the King's assurances that the Bordeaux merchants would be protected, Walsingham opened the subject of his revocation. He said that his mistress, in view of his private necessities, and particularly of the dangers in which he lived at Paris, had consented to his recall. He showed the King Elizabeth's letter in that behalf. Charles, after reading the letter, replied that if he consented to Walsingham's revocation, he would be forced also to revoke his own ambassador, to the great disadvantage of the friendly relations between France and England. Walsingham argued that the same thing had been done before in the case of Sir Nicholas Throgmorton without breach of friendship. But the King was not to be persuaded. He promised Walsingham adequate protection, but desired him to say nothing more about leaving France for the present at least. In fact Charles made it plain that he would construe such an action as a breach of diplomatic relations between France and England, if not a declaration of war.¹

Nothing was said at this interview about the project of marriage between Alençon and Elizabeth. One would have

¹ Walsingham to the Privy Council, 24 Sept. 1572 (Digges, 253), cited above. Cf. the French King's account of this audience in his letter to Fénélon, 22 Sept. 1572 (*Correspondance*, vii. 363).

thought that, in view of the strained relations between the two countries, that matter would have been dead and buried. But the Queen Mother, as we have seen, had no such thought, and it was not very long before the question came up again for serious consideration.

Early in October Walsingham received a letter of instructions from Elizabeth upon the subject. The French ambassador had been to see her and had spoken about the King's good intentions towards the Huguenots, about his fixed intention to keep the Treaty of Blois and his great desire for the marriage between his brother and the Queen. Elizabeth had answered that as for the King's disposition towards the Huguenots, she would suspend her judgement for the verdict of time: that as for the league, she was no less anxious to maintain it than was the King himself. Upon the question of marriage she had spoken more at length. The late slaughter of the Huguenots, she had said, had filled her mind with doubts. She would suspend her decision until she observed further the conduct of the King towards her brothers of the religion in France. 'If that religion of itself be so odious to him,' she wrote to Walsingham, 'that he thinks he must root out all the possessors of it, how should we think his brother a fit husband for us? Or how should he think that the love may grow, continue and increase betwixt his brother and us, which ought to be betwixt the husband and the wife?'

She charged Walsingham to convey these, her answers, to the King and to inquire of him again what he meant to do with Strozzi's armies; the more especially because some of Strozzi's men had recently plundered several English merchants.¹ 'You may perceive', Smith wrote to Walsingham, 'by her Majesty's answer that she will not refuse the interview or the marriage, but yet she cometh near to them *tam timido et suspenso pede*, that they may have good cause to doubt.'²

Walsingham was so ill when this letter reached him that he could not go in person to present it to the King. Wherefore Charles sent Mauvissière and his secretary Brulart to receive the message from him. Walsingham conveyed to them the substance of Elizabeth's letter with especial emphasis upon the

¹ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 28 Sept. 1572, *Vespasian Fvi*, f. 137; in Digges, 259.

² Smith to Walsingham, 27 Sept. 1572; Digges, 263.

impossibility of harmony between her and Alençon so long as the King displayed such great intolerance towards the Huguenots. He did not forget to allude to Strozzi's warlike preparations and to complain about his treatment of the English merchants.

This interview took place on the 4th of October. On the 7th Charles sent Brulart to Walsingham with his answer. Brulart said that the King was investigating the conspiracy of the Huguenots against him, that he had placed the dead Admiral on trial, and that so soon as the trial was terminated he would inform Elizabeth. He confined himself to formal expressions of goodwill upon the subject of the marriage. Fénélon had told Elizabeth that Catherine and Alençon were willing to go to England and to hold the desired interview there. In this, Brulart said, Fénélon had exceeded his commission. The King's meaning was that Elizabeth should proceed to Dover and Alençon to Boulogne or Calais, from whence some middle point for conference convenient to both parties might be arranged. Strozzi's army, Brulart said, was for internal defence along the borders. The King would see to it that the indignities offered to English merchants did not occur again.¹

Walsingham, however, was none the more convinced of the good meaning of the French because of those friendly passages.

'It may be alleged,' he wrote, commenting on his interview with Brulart, to Smith, 'that the offer of marriage sheweth they have no evil meaning towards her Majesty. First, it may be doubted, whether, considering how nowadays their speech and meaning disagreeeth, they offer as they mean; secondly, whether their intention of offering the said match tend to our benefit or no. I was not heretofore so forward in believing all friendly offers to proceed of sincerity as I am now ready to think the same to proceed of abuse, only to lull us asleep in security. For anything that I can perceive, the best way not to be deceived by them is not to trust them. The gentleman himself who is offered, I think honorably of him, and if I could think so well of the rest, I would then believe that their outward speech did consent to their inward meaning. But the case standing as it doth I know not what to think. I cannot therefore in this doubtful case but make her Majesty and my Lords of the Council acquainted with these proceedings, and leave to them to gather what may be their meaning here.'²

¹ Walsingham to Smith, 8 Oct. 1572; Digges, 265.

² Ibid. 267.

Walsingham indeed pinned no faith to the French at all. He advised Elizabeth strongly not to be deceived by their 'fair speaking' but to regard them as enemies. He anticipated a concerted action of the Catholic powers against her, and he thought she ought to strengthen herself to meet them by allying herself more firmly with the Protestant powers and by dealing more resolutely with the dangers which threatened her within her borders.

'If that postern gate [Scotland] were shut up,' he wrote to Smith in October, 'and other inward medicines applied, and her Majesty strengthened with the outward amity of the Almain princes, she should be the more esteemed and feared of those that mean her not great good. And though the remedies may seem chargeable, yet considering the necessity of the same and that they may avoid both great charges and no small danger, I hope her Majesty will prefer safety before cost, especially when the disbursing of one pound may save a thousand.'¹

In another letter written earlier in the same month he enlarged on the same theme:

'If her Majesty stick now, to spend or put in execution all those things that tend to her safety, she must not long look to live in repose, nay she must not long look to keep the crown upon her head. The cause of her former quietness proceeded of her neighbors' unquietness, which being removed, she must now make another account. The Admiral is now dead, and the Duke of Guise liveth: the Prince of Orange is retired out of Flanders, but the Duke of Alva remaineth there still. I need not conclude, for that to man's judgment it is apparent what will follow. Is it time now, think you sir, to stir, or is it time to omit any remedy that may tend to her Majesty's safety? As far as I can learn, there is none yet sent to deal with the Princes of Germany, and yet there is here almost daily conference between the Pope's Nuncio and the Ambassador of Spain and them here. They omit nothing that may tend to our peril. I would we were as careful not to omit anything that may tend to our safety. It may be said that I fear too much. Surely, considering the state we stand in, I think it less danger to fear too much than too little. It may be said also, that the jealousy that Spain hath of the greatness of France, will not suffer him to endure to let France have any footing in England, and that like affection reigneth in France, if Spain should attempt anything. I confess it to be true, and yet I see

¹ Walsingham to Smith, 25 Oct. 1572; Digges, 276.

no reason but that they both may consent to advance a third person, who pretendeth right to the crown (especially being provoked thereto by the Pope) which is my chief fear.' ¹

The allusion to Mary Stuart is clear enough. It was not unnatural that Walsingham's thoughts should have reverted to the danger to be feared from her now that her relatives, the Guises, were once more in the saddle in France. Presuming as he did that the French entertained a hostile purpose towards England, he expected to find them tampering not only with Mary Stuart but also with Scotland. In one of the first letters he sent home after the massacre he wrote :

'I hope her Majesty will establish such things in Scotland as the French shall have no footing there, and will not suffer herself to be abused with their fair speech, having had so late experience of his faithless dealing. When the King is once possessed of Rochelle which he hopeth to have shortly, Strozzi's voyage is then directly to Scotland.' ²

Late in October he spoke of the Scottish matter again in a letter to Smith. 'Surely,' he argued, 'considering how things do proceed here, and weighing the great presumption there is, how that the two Monarchies of Europe are bent, not only to disquiet, but also to displace her Majesty and to substitute some other, it were no more than necessary policy to cut them off from so convenient a footing place as Scotland is ; which thing might easily be brought to pass if her Majesty would proceed roundly. Weighing that the Scots are not a little alienated from this nation upon this late accident, if her Majesty would join pensions with persuasions, the thing in my opinion might easily be brought to pass, not only to unite them under the Government of the King, but also to divide them from such league and alliance as they have with this crown.' ³

Indeed Walsingham went so far as to write a letter himself to the Regent of Scotland upon this subject, urging him to restore civil peace in that country and to unite with England against the common foe.

'I am not a little aggrieved,' he wrote, 'to understand that notwithstanding the late miserable accident happened here in France is known to you there, yet you remain as far from agree-

¹ Cf. p. 236, n. 2.

² Digges, 245. The original draft of this letter is in Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, ff. 135, 135b, where the passages printed in Digges in cipher are deciphered.

³ Digges, 267.

ment as you did before. If there were that regard had to the maintenance of the Gospel there amongst you that ought to be, private grudges and interests would give place, whereas they may be lets to God's glory. Or if there were that love had to your country and to your general safety that reason and policy requireth, though religious zeal took no place, the evident danger that else is like to ensue would cause you to hasten a friendly union amongst yourselves. Can we think that the fire kindled here in France will extend itself no further? That which was concluded at the late Council of Trent, as also that which was agreed on at Bayonne (things not unknown) for the rooting out of the professors of the Gospel, may in reason induce us to think the contrary. Let us not deceive ourselves but assuredly think that the two great monarchs of Europe together with the rest of the Papists do mean shortly to put in execution that which in the aforesaid assemblies was concluded. It is seen that when two brothers are at discord, yet when a stranger or a third person shall offer them any injury, nature teacheth them to agree to withstand the stranger. Methinks that Christian alliance and the natural law of your own country should be of no less force with you to bring you to an agreement. If the zeal we ought to bear to God's glory, if the love we ought to bear to our country, if the love we ought to bear to ourselves, our wives, children and kinsfolk cannot move us I know not what can move us. . . . In a ship's dissension, when the mariners through quarrels upon regard of honour or for partition of booty do grow to division, yet in the time of tempest and storm they forbear not, each man to set his hand to the tackling, leaving private grudges aside in respect of a common danger. I would the mariners of your ship, whereof God hath placed you governor under the King, could in this great tempest drawing on, grow to like union.' ¹

Walsingham was no less insistent that the Queen should deal promptly and effectively with the dangers which threatened her within the realm, should apply 'inward medicines' as he put it. He wrote to Leicester on the 8th of October, 'If England and Scotland be united and such unsound members cut off as have been the cause of inward corruption, both her Majesty's enemies shall have less will to attempt anything against her safety, and she remain in less peril of such mischief as otherwise are like to fall on her.' ² No doubt the unsound member which he

¹ Walsingham to the Regent of Scotland, 7 Oct. 1572, B.M. Additional MSS. 33531, f. 111.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 8 Oct. 1572, B.M. Additional MSS. 32091, f. 262.

chiefly had in mind was Mary Stuart. He was clearly alluding to her again when he wrote to Leicester in December :

' If her Majesty like to live in peace and safety . . . the time now serveth fit for the purpose, the two great monarchs being entertained as they are. It may be that they here will use some brave speech, which will prove but a French brag, having so many irons in the fire as they have. Her Majesty may well say unto them, if they find fault with the matter, that they have no more cause to mislike her proceedings there, the same tending to her safety, than, as they say she hath to mislike of the King's late doings here, who holdeth it for a rule that the jealousy of a kingdom must leave nothing unexecuted that tendeth to surety.'¹

Meanwhile the French King, guided by his mother, who had no desire to submit herself to the domination of the Guises, nor to further their pro-Spanish policy, in spite of Walsingham's convictions to the contrary, was doing his best through his ambassador at London to re-establish himself in Elizabeth's good graces. Since his notable reception after St. Bartholomew's, Fénélon had found cold comfort in England.* In spite of the Queen's friendly words she showed him plainly that his master was unpopular at the English court. Indeed her treatment of him was such that he complained to the King about it.²

Nevertheless, the project of marriage between the Queen and the Duke of Alençon was not abandoned. Catherine and her son were plainly very eager to bring it to pass. Elizabeth, as Smith had written to Walsingham, was not altogether averse from it. She said very plainly, however, that she could not consider a French marriage until the French King showed more tolerance to the Huguenots, and she insisted upon having a personal interview with the young Duke before she would consent to entertain his suit.

Upon these two points, religion and the interview, the matter for the moment turned. In regard to the first, Elizabeth wished the French King to punish the perpetrators of St. Bartholomew's

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 5 Dec. 1572, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 218. Part of this letter is printed in Digges, 293, but the passage here quoted is omitted. Possibly Walsingham included it in his first draft of the letter, but omitted it from the letter as sent.

² Walsingham to Smith, 26 Nov. 1572 ; Digges, 291. (Draft corrected by Walsingham in Vespasian F vi, f. 217.)

Massacre. In regard to the second, she wished him to send Alençon over to England.

Charles plainly wished to conciliate her on both these points. He could not very well punish the perpetrators of the massacre, for the very simple reason that he himself had given his consent to it in the first place. But he promised to prove beyond doubt that Coligny's murder was justifiable. He protested further that he was very kindly disposed towards the Huguenots in general, and that he meant to re-establish the Edicts of Toleration in full force. He was also perfectly willing to grant the interview. But he was not at all inclined to let his brother go over to England without 'some hope of speed'. His mother had suggested a compromise, proposing that the interview should take place either on the high seas between England and France, or on one of the Channel Islands.

That such was the attitude of the French crown appears clearly in the conversation which Walsingham held with the King and his mother at the French court, as well as in the letters of Charles to Fénélon, his ambassador at London. Fénélon stated as much explicitly in an interview which he had with Elizabeth on the 8th of October. He assured her of his master's kindly disposition towards the Huguenots. He suggested that the difficulties as to the interview might be solved if she would agree to meet the Duke in the Isle of Jersey, and he said that his master desired the interview to take place before the 20th of October. At the same time he proposed that she should renew the oath of friendship which she had made to the King when she had ratified the Treaty of Blois. He finally conveyed his master's wish that, in view of the expected accouchement of the French Queen, she would send either the Earl of Leicester or Lord Burghley with her congratulations.

Elizabeth answered Fénélon point by point. As to the King's intentions towards the Huguenots, she said no more than to wish him good success. Probably the reports which she had got from Walsingham in France led her to distrust his fine promises. Fénélon's proposal for the interview she declared to be absurd. The 20th of October was hardly two weeks distant, the Island of Jersey far away, and the perils of the time so great that she dared not commit herself to the high seas. She saw no reason, she said,

for the renewal of the oath of friendship. She did not intend to violate it and she was confident of the good intentions of the King. She could not consider for an instant the sending of Leicester or Burghley or any one she loved to France, when it was evident that no man's life was safe there. Obviously Elizabeth was not in a very conciliatory mood. Directly after the interview she caused a report of it to be dispatched to Walsingham, directing him at the same time to convey her answers to the French crown.¹

As soon as Walsingham had received these instructions he went at once to the Queen Mother and told her what his mistress had written. Catherine received his communication in very good part. She apologized for seeming to dictate terms to Elizabeth. The designation of a particular time for the interview, she said, had not been meant to be absolute. The season of the year and the expected accouchement of the young Queen had made an early meeting appear desirable, but of course the fixing of a date rested entirely with Elizabeth. In regard to the place of meeting, she had never intended, she said, to go over with her son to England. The ambassador had misinterpreted her meaning when he had conveyed such an idea to the Queen. She had suggested the Isle of Jersey because it was midway between the two realms and for no other reason. As to the renewing of the oath of friendship, she declared that she saw no reason for it either if Elizabeth was satisfied. She was sorry, she said, that her suggestion about sending over Leicester or Burghley had offended Elizabeth. It had been at the advice of Fénélon, who had thought it would be agreeable to her. If they had come, Catherine protested that the King, her son, would have provided amply for their safety.

Walsingham replied drily that it would be pretty hard to convince his mistress or any one else of that, considering the disorder which reigned in France, where any murderer might pursue his trade without fear of punishment. Catherine retorted that the Huguenots by their conduct had roused a fury in the

¹ Smith to Walsingham, 13 Oct. 1572, Vespasian F vi, f. 186 (in Digges, 274). Elizabeth's answer to the ambassador follows this letter in Vespasian F vi, f. 189 (in Digges, 271). Cf. Fénélon's account in his letter of 13 Oct. (*Correspondance*, v. 164).

Catholics which had been hard to curb. Nevertheless, she said, ample provision had been made for the protection of ambassadors and other public persons. The interview terminated without any further mention of the marriage project.¹

Some days afterwards Walsingham was at court again on the occasion of the birth of a daughter to the young Queen. He expressed Elizabeth's congratulations as was customary, and made some formal protestations of her friendship. The King answered him in kind, but as he turned to go detained him.

It will be remembered that directly after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's the Huguenots in La Rochelle, Sancerre, and some other towns in south-western France had taken up arms and bade defiance to the King. The Rochelois particularly began to prey upon French commerce and to make open war upon the crown. It was to speak about this matter that the King had detained Walsingham.

Charles told Walsingham that the Rochelois were setting afloat rumours to the effect that Elizabeth meant to send forces to their assistance. He said he hoped that these rumours were without foundation. Walsingham replied that there was no doubt about it whatever. He said that the King would greatly wrong Elizabeth if he thought otherwise. Charles expressed his satisfaction and Walsingham left him.

He conferred a little later with Catherine upon the same subject. She declared that letters had been intercepted from La Rochelle which spoke of promised assistance to come from England under Count Montgomery, but that she held too high an opinion of Elizabeth's honour and wisdom to believe such tales. Walsingham answered her as he had answered the King.²

Nevertheless, in spite of Walsingham's protestations, Count Montgomery, who had fled to England after the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's, was organizing a force there for the relief of the Rochelois.³ More than this, Elizabeth had already been having underhand dealings with certain of the King's

¹ Walsingham to Smith, 25 Oct. 1572; Digges, 276.

² Same to same, 1 Nov. 1572; Digges, 278. (Draft, corrected by Walsingham, in *Vespasian F vi*, f. 200.)

³ Cf. Montgomery's letter to Burghley, 24 Dec. 1572, requesting aid for the relief of La Rochelle, *Cal. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 674.

subjects, who, if not yet in open rebellion, were contemplating nothing less.

The Huguenot *bourgeoisie* of La Rochelle and the south-west were not the only persons in France who were disposed to resent the death of Coligny and his partisans. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's had its political as well as its religious aspect. It was not only a triumph for the Catholics, it was also a triumph for the Guises. However much Catherine de Médicis and her son may have objected to the domination of this faction, they were obliged in some measure and for a time at least to submit to it.

The return of the Guises to power meant of course the confusion of their opponents—those notably of the Houses of Bourbon and Montmorency. Coligny, who was affiliated with the Bourbons by religious ties and with the Montmorencies by ties of blood, had enjoyed the support of both families, and both had consequently suffered from his fall. Bourbons and Montmorencies alike had been at swords' points with the Guises long before the Admiral's brief term of power—and their alliance with him had only been one expression of an old rivalry. The Bourbons were opposed to the Guises on religious as well as political grounds. Their leaders at the moment were King Henry of Navarre and Prince Henry of Condé—both of them young men, in fact hardly more than boys, and neither of them efficient leaders. Consequently the House of Bourbon was not regarded by the Guises at this time as a very dangerous rival. The Montmorencies, on the other hand, were Catholics. They were opposed to the Guises on personal and political grounds. Four sons of the old Constable of Montmorency survived: Francis, who inherited the title Duke of Montmorency; Henry, surnamed de Damville; and two younger boys known as the Count de Méru and the Count de Thoré. Francis and Henry, both of them Marshals in the royal army, were the recognized leaders of the family. As Catholics of course they did not suffer from the consequences of St. Bartholomew's to nearly the same extent as did Navarre and Condé. While these two princes were practically prisoners after the massacre, the Montmorency brothers retained their offices. Yet they were out of touch with the court and were distrusted by the Government as potential opponents at least.

There was another discontented man in France at this time,

namely the young Duke of Alençon. He was a mere youth, without ability and without experience, but he had plenty of ambition and wanted to play a larger part in affairs than either the King or his mother were willing to assign to him. He was rather indifferent upon the question of religion and was opposed to the Guises. For these reasons he naturally identified himself with the faction in opposition. His attitude is of considerable importance because he was of the blood royal and next but one to the throne of France.¹

Here then were the elements for the spirit of discord to work upon—Navarre, Condé, Alençon, and the two Montmorencies. At the end of September 1572 Navarre and Condé were at court under surveillance. Alençon was there also, but little regarded as a political factor. The two Montmorencies were about their official business. There were no apparent signs of revolt from any one of them. But two things were fairly certain: first, that if revolt did come, one or another of them would be involved in it; second, that if they were, they would follow an old practice of rebellious Frenchmen and appeal for aid to England. That indeed is exactly what happened early in October.

On the 14th of October Lord Burghley wrote to Walsingham a letter in cipher. A man named La Ferté, he wrote, had come to him purporting to have been sent by Count de Thoré, the youngest of the Montmorency brothers, in the name of Alençon and the Marshal de Montmorenci, and had declared that these princes were disposed to organize a party in Normandy and elsewhere in France to avenge Coligny's death, provided that England would assist them. Burghley wrote that he had spoken with the Vidame de Chartres about the matter and had been assured by him that if Elizabeth would lend a hand she might have not only Normandy but Gascony and all the other old English territories in France at her devotion. Burghley directed Walsingham to send a trusty agent to de Thoré and investigate the story.²

As soon as Walsingham had received this letter, he dispatched a messenger at once to de Thoré, but he learned very little. 'It

¹ H. de la Ferrière, 'Les dernières conspirations du Règne de Charles IX', *Revue des Quest. Hist.* xlviii. 2.

² Burghley to Walsingham, 14 Oct. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 185; cf. Stählin, i. 600.

would seem', Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 25th of October, 'that the party employed passed the bounds of his commission or that such as employed him have altered their purpose.' Still he was inclined to believe in their good faith. He had learned some time before from La Mole, a close friend of Alençon's, that the young Duke had meant to send a messenger to Elizabeth on important business. Walsingham observed, moreover, that the Queen Mother, suspecting something of the sort, was setting spies on her young son.¹

In reply to this letter of Walsingham's, Burghley wrote on the 3rd of November a letter revealing a new development in the negotiations. He was at a loss, he said, to know what to believe, for La Ferté had offered his head in pledge of the truth of his message. Moreover, another messenger, named Maisonfleur, had arrived from Alençon to explain the dangerous position of his master in France and to request the Queen's consent that he might repair to England. Burghley charged Walsingham to discover and to advise him as quickly as he could whether Maisonfleur was a bona fide messenger of Alençon or not. If not, he thought it necessary for the honour of Elizabeth and the safety of the young Duke that the French King be warned at once.²

Four days later Burghley wrote again that the Queen had spoken with Maisonfleur and that he had convinced her of his good faith. 'But yet', Burghley continued, 'I cannot for certain respects but be jealous of such practices and therefore I am willed to require you to use some secret means how to understand the truth.'³

Walsingham, as soon as he had received these letters, set about investigating the matter. On the 12th of November he wrote to Burghley that he had known Maisonfleur ever since he had been in France. The man was a Huguenot and, although not very zealous, was reputed to be honest. Alençon had intervened to save his life on St. Bartholomew's Eve. Walsingham told

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 25 Oct. 1572, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 620.

² Burghley to Walsingham, 3 Nov. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 205. Digges prints this letter, but he makes no attempt to decipher the ciphered passages, and so his copy is of little use. He attempts to reproduce the cipher, but he does so very inaccurately.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 7 Nov. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 207.

Burghley that he had sent for La Mole and questioned him about Maisonfleur and that La Mole had declared Maisonfleur to be a bona fide messenger.¹

Walsingham had further conversation with La Mole a little later in the month, who told him that Alençon was resolved to avenge the death of his friends come what might. He warned Elizabeth to look well to Scotland and promised that anything which Alençon learned that might concern Elizabeth Walsingham should know of.

'I see more great cause now to nourish this humour,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 'contrary to my opinion in my last letters, for surely there are great mischiefs a brewing. I am assured that within these eight days the *King of France* protested that he should never be quiet so long as the exercise of religion continued in any one place of Christendom. I know further particularly that he said he will never forget New Haven until revenge be made. I never knew so deep a dissembler. I am sure that the murder of the Admiral should have been executed at Blois but that they saw him too well accompanied. It is agreed that both he and Spain shall, for the avoiding of suspicion of the Legates coming, entertain *her Majesty* with good words and that Spain should make some show to grow to some accord.'²

Nevertheless, despite all these reasons for action, the matter made little headway. Maisonfleur remained in England, but apparently did little. He seems to have been very anxious to conceal his purpose from the French ambassador, but on the 11th of December he came to Burghley and told him that the object of his mission had been discovered. He swore that Alençon was in great danger and he begged Burghley to send a ship to the port of Saint-Valery at the mouth of the Somme in Normandy so that the Duke might escape to England.³

Burghley sent the ship. He also sent an account of his interview with Maisonfleur to Walsingham. Walsingham at once consulted with La Mole and found that Alençon was not so sensible to the dangers which threatened him as Maisonfleur seems to have been. La Mole told Walsingham, in fact, that,

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 12 Nov. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 211.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 26 Nov. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 194; printed, but not deciphered, in Digges, 290.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 11 Dec. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 222; in Digges, 301; cf. also Maisonfleur to Burghley, 11 Dec. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 226.

in spite of what had been discovered, the Duke meant to 'stand upon his denial'. He asked Walsingham to request the Queen to do likewise. He promised that Alençon would shortly send another envoy to Elizabeth with 'his full mind'.¹

So the ship at Saint-Valery went home without its passenger and the negotiations dragged on without accomplishing anything. In France Walsingham held two or three conferences with La Mole during January and February. He very soon got disgusted with the haphazard way in which Alençon's agent dealt with him.

'Considering his loose kind of dealing,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 20th of January, 'I cannot tell what to judge of the matter. If the party that cometh over do not deal more orderly and roundly than I am dealt with here, I think it were well if it were at some end, for that I fear the issue will prove such as the parties are that deal in it, who are over young and lack experience that were fit to guide a matter of so great weight. . . . I mean not to deal any further with them unless I see they proceed more orderly.'²

In England also both Burghley and Leicester began to suspect Maisonfleur's good faith. At his urgent insistence that Alençon's life was in imminent danger and that he only wanted an opportunity to escape to England, Burghley had sent a ship over to the French coast. Instead of taking advantage of the ship, Alençon had calmly declared, or rather La Mole had declared for him, that he had no need of it, and the ship had cruised for twenty-three days off the coast of France waiting in vain for its passenger.³ This seemed to the English like strange dealing indeed. Maisonfleur apologized for it in a letter which he wrote to Burghley on the 22nd of January. He said that he had done his best to induce Alençon to come over to England and had told him that a ship was waiting for him. He even confessed that he had promised the Duke that Elizabeth would marry him if he did come.⁴ But his apology did not at all strengthen Maisonfleur's position. It merely revealed the fact that he had been acting without any warrant from the Duke. Leicester told Walsingham that for his part he believed the whole matter to

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 22 Dec. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 235.

² Same to same, 20 Jan. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 266.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 12 Jan. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 255.

⁴ Printed in H. de la Ferrière, *Le XVI^e Siècle et les Valois* (Paris, 1879), 341.

be nothing less than an artifice of the French crown. 'I dare venture my arm to be cut off,' he wrote, 'that it will fall out a plain practice and in the end the King may take his advantage of her Majesty when he list, and say justly that she was willing to offer him such an injury by entertaining such practice against him.'¹ And Burghley, although not quite so positive, was inclined to share his opinion. He instructed Walsingham to deal very cautiously since there was some reason to suspect that the whole matter was known to the Queen Mother.²

Walsingham's own experience with the dalliance of La Mole led him to endorse these suspicions very heartily. On the 5th of February he wrote to Burghley:

'I perceive there is no sincere or sound dealing in the matter and (as your Lordship sayeth) it cannot be but that the King should be made privy unto the matter and meaneth to use the same for an entertainment to serve their turns for a time. Of La Mole since I last wrote to your Lordship I heard nothing. . . . If the matter imported them so much as they pretend they would not proceed so slenderly as they do. If they do import them, then surely are they not fit to deal in matters of importance considering their vain and slender proceeding, whereof the issue there is like to be dangerous to themselves and dishonorable to her Majesty.'³

By the same post he wrote to Leicester:

'As your Lordship findeth the party that dealeth there halting and diverse in his tales, even like unconstancy and doubleness do I find in him here that dealeth with me. To disguise the matter they borrow certain names out of Amadis de Gaul, wherein they deal most aptly, to add to a feigned thing feigned names. They judge us to be very gross, and do think that every fair and colored speech is able to abuse us. I cannot be otherwise persuaded, but some here that rule all are acquainted with the matter, for otherwise the party that last came over would never have meddled in the same. God send it a better end than I look for.'⁴

It is difficult to get at the real truth of this matter. That Maisonfleur and La Mole were guilty of 'vain and slender

¹ Leicester to Walsingham, 18 Jan. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 261. (Digges prints this letter very imperfectly, 321.)

² Burghley to Walsingham, 29 Jan. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 271.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 5 Feb. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 278.

⁴ Walsingham to Leicester, 6 Feb. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 282.

proceedings is past dispute, but that they were actually playing false is a more difficult matter to prove. Like their master, they were young, inexperienced and ambitious. Like him, they were discontented at their insignificant position at the French court and they probably aroused his discontent and suggested to him the idea of joining fortunes with the Huguenot rebels. It seems as if Maisonfleur himself had proposed that Alençon should fly to England. He wished to make a match between his master and the English Queen, and although Elizabeth gave him practically no encouragement, he boldly promised the Duke that, if he would come to England, the Queen would marry him.¹ Probably La Mole connived at all this. They both appear to have gone ahead without much warrant from Alençon. Burghley soon found out that this was the case and his suspicions were aroused at once. So were Leicester's and Walsingham's. Nevertheless there is hardly any ground for presuming that Catherine de Médicis was behind the whole plot. She certainly knew that Maisonfleur was in England. It is not unlikely that she knew what he was there for.² But this is no proof that she sent him. She had probably gauged his abilities as a conspirator and knew how to guard against him without exposing his practices at a time when she had no desire to increase the estrangement between France and England.

¹ This appears from Maisonfleur's letter to Burghley of the 22nd of January already cited, and from another which he wrote to Alençon (2 Dec. 1572), printed in *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, pt. ii. 29.

² This appears from a letter which the King wrote to Fénélon on the 1st of March 1572/3, *Mémoires de Castelnau de la Mauvissière* (ed. Le Laboureur, Bruxelles, 1731), iii. 304.

In this letter the King protests against Elizabeth's overt assistance to the Rochelois rebels and speaks of the necessity of taking measures against it. Therefore he sends Fénélon a letter which he charges him to lose in some place where it will be found and carried to the Queen. Whether this letter was composed by the King himself, or whether it was actually written, as it purported to be, by an English rebel, is outside the present discussion. The letter contained record of a proposal made to the King to come to the assistance of the English Catholics, together with the King's refusal to entertain any project to break the league so long as Elizabeth remained true to it. If she broke it, then he would accept their services. 'But', the writer goes on to say, 'it is not necessary that Monsieur de Maisonfleur should know anything about the matter, for he is dangerous and untrustworthy since he writes in that court all that is done there in our interests.'

This letter reads very much like a fabrication of the King designed to frighten Elizabeth off from assisting the French rebels. At all events it establishes without a doubt the fact that the King was aware of Maisonfleur's presence at the English court.

Whether this be the true explanation of the matter or not, at all events it came to nothing. Alençon was forced to join the royal army which lay before La Rochelle. Maisonfleur remained in England for some time longer, but he was plainly under a cloud, and he did little more than write protestations of his innocence and sentimental ballads to the Queen, who, in some unromantic mood, had them filed away among the state papers.

And yet, although Maisonfleur accomplished nothing, Elizabeth's reception of him throws much light upon her sentiments towards the French crown at this time. She gave him audience, she listened to his proposals, she even went so far as to send a ship to France in order to assist his master, the Duke of Alençon, in his plans. Those plans were nothing less than open rebellion against the King of France. Clearly Elizabeth was not playing quite the friend's part towards Charles IX.

Her dealings with Maisonfleur are not the only signs of this. At the same time she was sheltering many Huguenot refugees in England. She was receiving some of them at court. She was permitting one of them, the Count Montgomery, to make preparations for a descent upon the coast of Normandy from the Island of Jersey. The citizens of La Rochelle had appealed to her for aid—had, in fact, offered their town to her if she would assist them.¹ She did not give them any direct encouragement, but she certainly connived at much that was being done for them by English sympathizers.

None of these things perhaps, nor all of them taken together, could have been construed by the French King as a *casus belli*, but they are nevertheless significant because they suggest, indeed foreshadow, Elizabeth's return to her old policy of supporting rebellion in France. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's had been a triumph for her enemies, the Guises. Elizabeth could not interpret it in any other light, in spite of the friendly protestations of the French King. The Guises in power, she knew, would mean eventually a foreign policy in France hostile to herself. So she began to reconsider the advisability of exciting civil strife in that country as a measure of self-defence.

But in matters of this sort Elizabeth always moved slowly

¹ Mayor and Council of La Rochelle to Elizabeth, 13 Nov. 1572, printed in La Ferrière, *Le XVI^e Siècle et les Valois*, 336.

and, meanwhile, her relations with the French King, although somewhat strained, continued to be not unfriendly. Charles IX of course was well aware that the St. Bartholomew's Massacre had profoundly affected Elizabeth's attitude towards him and, as we have seen already, he made every effort to recover her goodwill. The birth of a daughter to him in October gave him an opportunity to send a special envoy to Elizabeth. He chose for the purpose Mauvissière, a man well liked in England. Mauvissière was sent primarily to invite Elizabeth to stand sponsor for the new royal princess. He also had commission to do all that he could to increase the good feeling between the two realms and to renew the Alençon marriage project.

He went over to England late in November and conferred upon these matters with Elizabeth. She answered his proposals somewhat ungraciously. After adverting to the St. Bartholomew's Massacre, she said that she could not understand why the King desired her, who was of the same religion as those whom he persecuted, to act as godmother to his child. She had been advised by many, she declared, to sever relations altogether. Nevertheless, she did not mean to take their advice. She loved the King too much to think ill of him. To show her love, she would consent to stand sponsor for his daughter, and would very shortly send a nobleman to France to perform the office for her.

In speaking of the marriage, she recalled again the impediments of age and religion. She had already, she said, answered the King upon this subject through Walsingham to the effect that an interview with the Duke would be a necessary preliminary to all negotiations and that her ultimate decision would depend upon the King's conduct towards those of the religion in France.¹

Elizabeth sent an account of this interview to Walsingham, and he in turn, on the 24th of December, communicated it to the French King. Charles of course returned thanks. He took advantage of the occasion also to complain of the preparations which he had heard were being made in England to assist the Rochelois. Walsingham replied that he should pin no faith to such rumours. But the next day Pinart, one of the King's secretaries, sent word to Walsingham that a fleet of fifty English

¹ Elizabeth to Walsingham, 11 Dec. 1572; Digges, 297.

vessels had been intercepted by the Baron de la Garde in an attempt to enter the harbour of La Rochelle. Walsingham answered him very much as he had answered the King. He told Pinart that if there had actually been fifty English ships outside La Rochelle harbour, de la Garde would never have been able to stop them from entering. A quarter of that number would have been sufficient to dispose of him. Walsingham denounced the tale as an artifice of de la Garde to excuse his plundering of English merchants.¹

Nevertheless, although Walsingham may have been right in this particular instance, it has been made plain that the French had some grounds for complaint. If Elizabeth herself was not sending aid to La Rochelle, she was winking at many people in England who were. Fénélon in London protested against this many times. As early as the 25th of October Catherine de Médicis had complained to Walsingham. The King had words with him upon the subject on several occasions.

Walsingham at first answered these complaints by denouncing the stories of English assistance to the rebels as idle rumours. But as time went on and the facts became more patent, he was forced to assume another line of defence. He said that the breach of commercial relations between Spain and England had thrown many English mariners out of employment. Deprived of legitimate trade, they very quickly turned their hands to any adventure which presented itself. They were a hard race of men to govern and the French must not censure Elizabeth too much if they sometimes escaped her control and went to the assistance of the Huguenots. This was the answer which Walsingham made to Mauvissière when he came early in 1573 to complain that a fleet of fourteen vessels were preparing in England to carry supplies to La Rochelle.² Walsingham utilized the same arguments on many occasions, and there was doubtless considerable truth in them. Mauvissière himself admitted as much. But this did not greatly relieve the situation. The English continued to offend and the French to protest. Some effort was made to induce Walsingham to persuade Elizabeth to act as

¹ Walsingham to Smith, 25 Dec. 1572; Digges, 304. (Draft, corrected by Walsingham, in Vespasian F vi, f. 237.)

² Walsingham to Smith, 11 Jan. 1572/3, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 709 (Digges, 307).

mediator between the French crown and the rebels. But he declared flatly that he would have nothing to do with it. He remembered, he said, that the last peace between the King and the Huguenots had been followed by evil effects. He did not wish to make his mistress a party to a second 'Bartholomew breakfast'.¹

These difficulties over the Rochelois rebels were not, however, of a serious enough nature to disturb very much the relations between England and France. Elizabeth had promised Mauvissière that she would send a nobleman over to France to stand sponsor in her place for the new princess. Accordingly in January she sent over the Earl of Worcester. He was instructed to confine his speeches to the ordinary courtesies connected with the christening, but Elizabeth primed him on two or three topics which she thought it likely that the French King or his mother would wish to discuss. If the King protested to Worcester about Elizabeth's harbouring the Huguenot rebels, he was to answer that she had found no trace of rebellion in them, but only a desire to preserve their lives from the fury of the French Catholics. If the King brought up the question of the Alençon marriage, Worcester was to say that she refused to proceed any further in the negotiations until the religious questions which had interrupted Anjou's courtship were definitely settled.²

Worcester reached France early in February. The vessel which carried him was attacked by pirates on the way across the Channel. He himself escaped, but some of the gentlemen who were with him and a great deal of his finery were captured. In France he was lavishly entertained.³ On the 7th of February he and Walsingham had audience at the French court.⁴

Their conference with the King was largely formal and complimentary. Very much more significant was their interview with the Queen Mother afterwards. At this interview Catherine brought up the marriage question at once. She confessed that

¹ Walsingham in a letter to Smith, 8 Oct. 1572 (Digges, 267), spoke of the massacre as 'a Bartholomew breakfast or a Florence banquet'.

² Instructions for the Earl of Worcester, 11 Jan. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 247 (Digges, 318).

³ Walsingham to Leicester, 5 Feb. 1572/3, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 279.

⁴ For the date cf. *Mém. de Castelnau* (ed. 1731), iii. 288.

she was very anxious to bring the match to pass. She inquired why Elizabeth had suddenly seemed to lose interest in it. Worcester replied that his Mistress was waiting for the King's reply to the conditions which she had submitted to him through Walsingham. Catherine said she did not recall any such conditions. Thereupon Walsingham spoke up and said that he had already, in Elizabeth's name, declared that she would not consider Alençon's suit until she had seen him and until the old religious difficulty was settled. The King's attitude towards the Huguenots, Walsingham said, had made her the more insistent upon a definite understanding on the religious question. The interview she continued to regard as a *sine qua non*. Catherine answered that she had no doubt that Elizabeth would allow to Alençon the same religious privileges which she had been disposed to grant to the Duke of Anjou. Walsingham said that he could not recall that any privileges had been conceded to Anjou. 'And if they were, madam,' he continued, 'we see that a thing tolerable at one time is not tolerable at another.' Worcester thereupon requested that she would define in writing her attitude upon the religious question. She promised to do so. She then took occasion to protest against the open assistance which was being rendered by the English to the Rochelois. Worcester said that he knew of no such assistance. Walsingham added that if there were such, it was a private enterprise, and he spoke again of Elizabeth's difficulties in restraining her seafaring men. So the conference ended with little gained on either side. Shortly afterwards Worcester returned to England.¹

His interview with the Queen Mother marks the revival of the Alençon marriage negotiations which dragged on with some interruptions for almost ten years to come. Walsingham, as French ambassador, saw only the very beginning of them. Indeed, he held only one more conference on the subject while he was in France. Late in March, acting on instructions from Burghley, he went to the Queen Mother and defined to her Elizabeth's attitude towards the match. His mistress, he said, assuredly would not marry any one whom she did not first see,

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 12 Feb. 1572/3, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 768. Cf. the King's account of this interview in a letter to Fénélon, 7 Feb. 1572/3, *Mém. de Castelnau*, iii. 289.

nor would she permit any husband of hers to worship in England contrary to the direct word of God. Walsingham said that, although he had no commission to interpret the Queen's meaning, he thought she meant to debar any worship contrary to the laws of the realm. Catherine said that neither the King, her son, nor she herself could allow the Duke to go over to England unless he was assured 'of speed'; otherwise his visit might work his dishonour. She proposed that the marriage might be agreed to in secret, promises exchanged, and then the Duke might go to England under pretext that he merely went to try his chance. 'For religion,' she said, 'we only require that he may have some secret exercise for himself.' Walsingham promised to convey her answers to Elizabeth, although he confessed that he did not think the Queen would yield upon either point.¹

Walsingham, as we have seen before, favoured the Alençon marriage, but he was not at this time at all hopeful of its success. In a letter to Burghley of the 1st of April he analysed the whole situation with considerable acuteness.

'Touching my private opinion of the marriage,' he wrote, 'the great impediment that I find in the same is the contentment of the eye. The gentleman sure is void of any good favor, besides the blemish of small-pox. Now when I weigh the same, with the delicacy of her Majesty's eye and considering also that there are some about her in credit who, in respect of their particular interests, having neither regard unto her Majesty nor to the preservation of our country from ruin, will rather increase the misliking by defacing of him, than by dutifully laying before her the necessity of her marriage. . . . I hardly think that there will ever grow any liking. For the gentleman himself (his favor excepted) he hath many of those good parts that I would desire to be in one whom I would wish to be her Majesty's husband, if the other impediments were removed. And as for his religion, I do not doubt, upon conference had with some, but that he would be reduced to any conformity, so that the sticking in that matter proceedeth rather from others than from himself, and yet they not moved thereto of conscience. But, for other respects, whether this marriage be sincerely meant or no, is a hard point to judge where dissimulation taketh so deep root. In my opinion, I think rather no than yea: not for that they desire it, not only as a thing both honorable and profitable, but also necessary in respect to have a vent for the separation of the brethern; but

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 1 April 1573, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 867.

because they are altogether persuaded that her Majesty hath no intention to marry, a thing partly proceeding from her own disposition and partly through the dissuasion of others who are not unknown to them; and therefore partly do use the same but for an entertainment in respect of their troubled state at home.' ¹

The rest of the story of Walsingham's embassy to France is short and on the whole unimportant. It is rather surprising to discover that apart from his share in the Maisonfleur affair he does not seem to have established any close contact either with the Huguenot rebels in the west or with the Dutch rebels in the Low Countries. Probably the practical difficulties in the way were too great and his agents too closely watched.² After the collapse of the Maisonfleur conspiracy he had little to occupy his attention. At his audience with Catherine late in March he was called upon to defend once more Elizabeth's dealings with the Huguenots, and he did it with the help of his stock arguments. On this occasion also he exchanged some words with the Queen Mother in regard to her policy towards Scotland. Walsingham succeeded in getting Catherine somewhat entangled in her talk, but the whole matter was quite by the way and virtually amounted to nothing.³

This was the last audience which Walsingham had at the French court as English ambassador. When he went to the Louvre again it was to present his successor, Dr. Valentine Dale.

For months Walsingham had been incessant in his requests to be recalled. After St. Bartholomew's, Elizabeth, as we have seen, had seriously contemplated recalling him. She had even gone so far as to write a letter to that intent to the French King. But Charles had answered that if the Queen recalled her ambassador, he would have to recall his. Elizabeth had no mind to press the point to such a conclusion, and so Walsingham remained.

But he continued to press the Queen to send some one else to take his place. His health was bad, his purse was in a worse state. His wife at home was heavy with child.⁴ Smith and

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 1 April 1573; Digges, 343.

² Letters coming to him from Louis of Nassau in Germany were intercepted on one occasion; cf. Digges, 332.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, cited p. 256, n. 1.

⁴ Smith to Burghley, 7 Jan. 1572/3, B.M. Harleian MSS. 6991, no. 9.

Leicester and Burghley all seconded his appeal, but Elizabeth was slow. In October 1572 Smith wrote that he hoped to see him at home shortly.¹ On the 27th of October Leicester wrote, 'I will forbear to write somewhat now which, when you come home, I will tell you.'² Elizabeth, indeed, was beginning to look around for a suitable person to succeed Walsingham. 'I think Francis Carew shall be the man,' Leicester wrote,³ and Fénélon, on the 9th of November, informed his master that Carew was coming to replace Walsingham within a month.⁴ But Carew was not at all eager. He made copious excuses and worked upon the Queen through some of her ladies in waiting. 'All your friends have not only been diligent,' Smith wrote to Walsingham on the 11th of December, 'but more than importunate to bring you home, and your wife with tears and lamentations. And the Queen's Majesty seemeth to incline and grant our requests. But when a pin is set fast in a hole, till we have another to thrust that out and tarry there itself, it is hard to get it out. Your successor cannot yet be found; yea, find enough, but we cannot get one that will stick fast till he might be thrust in indeed, and so you to be thrust out. You know how long we be here a resolving and how easy to be altered.'⁵

Carew succeeded finally in begging off, 'slipped his head out of the collar', as Walsingham expressed it. Then Sir John Hastings was hit upon, but he pleaded sickness and was excused.⁶ Thereupon Burghley commended Dr. Valentine Dale, a doctor of laws and a member of Parliament, who was induced to accept the position.⁷ But when Dale had bought his horses, engaged his servants, and was about ready to leave England, the Queen changed her mind. She was just in the midst of the secret negotiations with Alençon, and she hesitated to entrust them to an inexperienced man. In vain Smith pleaded Dale's expensive preparations, the necessities of Walsingham, his ill health, the lamentable condition of his wife. Elizabeth said that she was very sorry but that in such a delicate piece of business she could

¹ Smith to Walsingham, 13 Oct. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 186.

² Leicester to Walsingham, 27 Oct. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 195.

³ Same to same, 2 Nov. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 204.

⁴ Fénélon to the King, *Correspondance*, v. 199.

⁵ Smith to Walsingham, 11 Dec. 1572, *Vespasian F vi*, f. 224 (Digges, 299).

⁶ Fénélon to the King, 23 Dec. 1572, *Correspondance*, v. 226.

⁷ De Guaras to Alva, 22 Dec. 1572, *Cal. Spanish*, 1568-79, 453.



Lady Ursula Walsingham
From the original in the National Portrait Gallery

not dispense with Walsingham's services, who was handling the matter with great wisdom and discretion. In a month or two, when the affair had been settled, he might return.¹ 'You may write to him,' she said to Smith, 'that he shall certainly return at Easter.'²

And so Smith wrote. 'You are a wise man,' he added, 'and can comfort yourself with wisdom and patience.' Walsingham replied that, if the cause of his stay was for her Majesty's service, he was content to abide the time as one 'that thinketh both his travail, substance and life as well employed in her service as any other subject she hath'. He hoped, he said, that when his service was no longer needful the Queen would allow him to return.³

Yet even when the Maisonfleur negotiations had proved but 'shallow dealing' he was not recalled. In February he came into such financial straits that he was unable to follow the court when it moved from Paris to Moret. 'I shall be driven to remain here,' he wrote to Smith on the 6th, 'and not to follow the same for lack of ability, having neither furniture, money, nor credit.'⁴

Finally, on the 19th of March, Smith succeeded in inducing Elizabeth to sign the letter authorizing his return.⁵ He sent the good news to Walsingham and instructed Dale to get ready to depart at once. On the 2nd of April Dale left London for France.⁶ 'I daresay you will wish him a speedy passage', Burghley wrote to Walsingham.

Dale reached Paris about the 15th of April,⁷ and Walsingham presented him at court on the 19th. The audience was purely formal. No diplomatic business was discussed. Walsingham promised to do all he could to further the Alençon marriage in England. The King thanked him heartily, expressed his entire satisfaction with Walsingham's service, and presented him with a gold chain worth a thousand crowns.⁸

¹ Smith to Burghley, 7-8 Jan. 1572/3, Harleian MSS. 6991, nos. 9, 10.

² Smith to Walsingham, 12 Jan. 1572/3, Vespasian F vi, f. 255 (Digges, 310).

³ Walsingham to Smith, 21 Jan. 1572/3; draft corrected in Walsingham's hand in Vespasian F vi, f. 265.

⁴ Same to same, 6 Feb. 1572/3; Digges, 326; draft in Vespasian F vi, f. 281.

⁵ Smith to Walsingham, 19 Mar. 1572/3; Digges, 333.

⁶ Letters from London (unsigned), 7 April 1573, *Cal. Spanish*, 1568-79, 467.

⁷ He was in Rouen on the 12th (*Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 887), and in Paris before the 18th (*ibid.* 902).

⁸ King to Fénélon, 21 April 1573, *Mém. de Castelnau*, iii. 322-3.

Walsingham departed at once for home. On the 22nd he was at Paris. He journeyed north from there by post and had reached Abbeville when a messenger from the King, the Sieur de Riz, who had been riding hard after him, caught up with his train. De Riz presented the King's letter which desired Walsingham to return to receive an important communication which Charles wished him to convey to England. Walsingham reluctantly turned his horse's head around. De Riz and he travelled back to Paris together. To avoid any suspicion that he was under arrest, de Riz left Walsingham at Paris and returned to the court at Fontainebleau alone. The next day the King sent his own coach to conduct Walsingham to his presence.

It appeared that Montgomery had arrived outside La Rochelle harbour with a large fleet and, what was worse, that some of his vessels carried the flag of England. This was one reason, as the King admitted to his ambassador in England, for recalling Walsingham. But when Walsingham came to confer with him, Charles said that he had recalled him to say that he had at last consented to allow the Duke of Alençon to go to England. He had chosen Walsingham to be the bearer of the good news. Walsingham expressed his delight in appropriate terms. He thought the interview would be successful. He would do all he could to make it so. Then Charles spoke of Montgomery's fleet and of the English vessels discovered in the midst of it. Walsingham protested that if this was so, it was assuredly without Elizabeth's knowledge or consent. He promised that she would greatly resent it, and would deal with Montgomery in such fashion as would fully satisfy the French. Therewith he took his leave.¹

Subsequent events show clearly that this promised visit of Alençon to England was nothing more than a 'practice'. The coincidence of Walsingham's departure and the arrival of Montgomery's fleet appears to have frightened the King into the belief that Elizabeth was calling one of her valuable servants out of danger before she declared open war on the French. He possibly suspected a pre-arranged plot between the English crown and the French Huguenots, in which Walsingham was concerned. It must have been this which made him instruct

¹ The King to Fénélon, 29 April 1573, *Mém. de Castelnau*, iii. 328.

de Riz so carefully to give Walsingham no ground for suspecting that he was under arrest. Walsingham's behaviour at his audience at Fontainebleau evidently allayed the King's fears.

Catherine thought it wise to send Walsingham away with a good impression. She wrote a letter in her own hand to Elizabeth expressing her entire satisfaction with Walsingham's behaviour while in France. She sent presents to his wife and daughter and offered him the use of the royal coach to travel in as far as Boulogne.¹

Walsingham left Fontainebleau on the 30th of April. He reached London about a week later and on the day of Pentecost (May 10th) he went to court to make his report to the Queen.²

So he finished his first important public service. He had been ambassador to France for two years and just under four months.

His embassy came at a very important time in the history of the two countries. It was just at the time when Elizabeth was making up her mind finally to give up the pro-Spanish policy which she had inherited from her sister and to look with more favour upon France, her hereditary enemy. In this *rapprochement* between England and France, Francis Walsingham played an important part. It is true that he failed to compass the Anjou match, which was intended to establish a close Anglo-French alliance, but it was largely through his efforts that the Treaty of Blois, designed to the same end, was successfully negotiated. The Anjou marriage may indeed be reckoned as the great failure of Walsingham's embassy, a failure for which he was in no way to blame; and the Treaty of Blois the great success.

The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's to a large extent destroyed the work which Walsingham had done in strengthening the friendship between England and France. It threw Elizabeth back to her old policy of weakening the French crown by encouraging the Huguenot rebels. In this policy Walsingham played a large part also and his Protestant proclivities made him a zealous actor. Sir Robert Naunton indeed described him a little later as 'chief of those who laid the foundations of the French wars'.³

¹ Catherine to Fénélon, 29 April 1573, *Lettres de Cath. de Médicis*, iv. 210.

² Fénélon to the King, 12 May 1573, *Correspondance*, v. 327.

³ Sir R. Naunton, *Fragmenta Regalia* (ed. Arbor), 37.

From the point of view of Walsingham himself, his embassy to France is significant because, in the course of it, he defined his attitude once and for all upon many of the large problems with which he had to deal in his later life. At this time he expressed his conviction that Spain was the arch enemy of England, to be opposed on all occasions, and that the rebellion against Philip in the Netherlands was Elizabeth's great opportunity, as he expressed it, 'to cast the proud Spaniard into the fire'. His earnest pleas to the Queen to help the designs of Louis of Nassau and of Admiral Coligny against the Low Countries are the first whisperings of long sermons which he afterwards preached on this topic before Elizabeth and the English Privy Council. So likewise in France, split in two by the opposing factions of Guise and Huguenot, Walsingham came to believe that the Queen's best policy was to lend vigorous support to the Protestants. Towards Scotland, divided in like fashion, between a Catholic-English party, he reached a similar conclusion, of which the corollary was that the imprisoned Mary Stuart was a 'devilish woman' and ought to be put out of the way.

As a diplomatist Walsingham was a conspicuous success. 'It will fall under the careful observer's eye', wrote the editor to Sir Dudley Digges' collection of Walsingham's letters, 'how vigilant he was to gather true intelligence, what means and persons he used for it, how punctual he was in keeping to his instructions where he was limited, and how wary and judicious where he was left free, still advancing upon all occasions the reputation and interest of his great mistress with a most lively and indefatigable devotion.'

His contemporaries are scarcely less eloquent in their praise. Charles of France, who had a very good opportunity to judge of him, declared him to be 'in truth a very wise person'. Elizabeth herself, who was somewhat sparing of her praise, commended him personally on several occasions. Perhaps the most expressive tribute to his skill lies in the fact that, whenever again during Walsingham's lifetime Elizabeth had a diplomatic mission to be performed which demanded exceptional astuteness, she chose Walsingham for the place. Moreover, it was in consequence of Walsingham's conduct while in France that very shortly after he returned home he was made one of the Queen's principal secretaries.

V

FRENCH AFFAIRS, 1573-8

WALSINGHAM returned from his embassy in France at the end of April 1573. In December of the same year he became Principal Secretary and a member of the English Privy Council. During the intervening months there is little record of him. He took up his residence in London and probably spent the time in something like retirement, recuperating his health and readjusting his finances, which had been put sadly out of joint by his excessive expenditures and consequent borrowings in France.¹

It is clear, however, that he did not altogether withdraw himself from public affairs. His correspondence, although it is scanty enough at this time, reveals the fact that he was constantly receiving information from abroad. Thomas Wilkes, secretary to Dr. Dale, Walsingham's successor as English ambassador to France, wrote him letters about French affairs.² A gentleman whom he had commended to William of Orange kept him informed as to the state of things in the Low Countries.³ He got news from Germany through Duplessis Mornay, then a refugee in London.⁴ It is difficult to judge whether Walsingham received this information merely as an English gentleman well acquainted abroad and interested in foreign affairs or whether he received it in a semi-official capacity. He does not appear to have held any office under the crown at this time. Nevertheless he certainly communicated the information as he got it to Lord Burghley. He was also corresponding with Burghley at this time about matters connected with the secret service.

'If your Lordship', he wrote on 20th August, 'have any suspicion of any unsound meaning in the Low Countries towards her Majesty, I think he [Capt. Sasseti] would be a very good instrument to decipher the same, having as he hath, great familiarity

¹ It was at this time probably that his wife bore him a second daughter—Mary. She died in 1580.

² Cf. Wilkes to Walsingham, 31 July 1573, *Cal. S. P. Foreign, Eliz.*, 1572-4, no. 1107 *et al.*

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 3 Aug. 1573, *S. P. Domestic*, xcii, 17.

⁴ *Ibid.*

with Chiapin Vitelli. Your Lordship wrote unto me to find out one to be employed in Spain. If you think any such employment presently necessary, I think I could find the means to place my old servant Jacomo in the French King's ambassador's resident's house in Spain.'¹

This sort of letter indicates that whatever Walsingham's precise position may have been, he was plainly deep in the confidence of the Government.

Indeed, some important personages outside of England evidently believed that he had considerable influence at court. William of Orange requested him to use his influence with Elizabeth to thwart those in England who were contriving hostile measures against the Dutch.² The Duke of Alençon wrote him a personal letter soliciting his friendly offices and assuring him that any services which he might render would be gratefully received and properly rewarded.³

If Walsingham was in a position to perform services of this sort for men like Alençon and Orange, he must have been playing an important part in the affairs of England even out of office. In fact, he seems virtually to have taken his position as Councillor to the Crown as soon as he returned to England from France, although he was not actually made a Privy Councillor until the end of December 1573. His admirable conduct of the embassy in France had proved him well qualified for the position. There is good reason to believe that his appointment as Privy Councillor had been practically determined upon while he was still in France: 'You know what opinion is here of you,' Leicester had written to him in January 1573, 'and to what place all men would have you unto, even for her Majesty's sake. Besides that, the place you already hold is a Councillor's place, and more than a Councillor's place for a time, for oftentimes Councillors are not made partakers of such matters as you are acquainted withal.'⁴

It is not easy to say why Walsingham's appointment was delayed until the end of the year. Possibly he himself craved a recess from the arduous duties of public office. Possibly we

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 20 Aug. 1573, B.M. Harleian MSS. 6991, no. 39.

² Orange to Walsingham, 12 Nov. 1573, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 1222.

³ Alençon to Walsingham, 21 Dec. 1573, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, no. 1256.

⁴ Leicester to Walsingham, 18 Jan. 1572/3, *Vespasian F.vi*, f. 261 (Digges, 321).

have here only one more example of the Queen's procrastinating habits. At any rate, on the 20th of December Elizabeth named Walsingham one of her 'principal secretaries'. The next day he was sworn in a member of the Privy Council.¹ From that day until the day of his death, over sixteen years later, Walsingham served the crown as Privy Councillor and as Secretary. It was in these offices that he made his name memorable, so it may be well to stop and consider what it meant to be Privy Councillor and Principal Secretary under Elizabeth.

During Elizabeth's reign the Privy Council, as the executor of the royal will, exercised very extensive powers, not only in the executive, but also in the legislative and judicial departments of government. Throughout the land its proclamations had almost the force of law. In certain parts of the kingdom, as in Ireland and the Channel Islands, its word was law. Its executive powers over the kingdom at large were extended and increased in particular localities by the Councils of the North, of the West, and of Wales, and by its special control over the County Palatine of Chester and the Royal Duchy of Lancaster. It exercised very wide judicial powers, civil and criminal, through the Courts of Request, of High Commission and of the Star Chamber. It regulated trade, enforced religious conformity, directed foreign affairs, made peace and war, and in general applied the almost unlimited power of the crown.²

Into such a body as this Walsingham was ushered when, in

¹ Dasent, *Acts of Privy Council*, viii, p. 169.

² Upon this point cf. Dicey, *English Privy Council*, and the unpublished thesis of Dr. Viles on the Privy Council under Elizabeth, in Harvard University Library. Sir Thomas Smith, Walsingham's colleague, in his *De Republica Anglorum* writes: 'His private counsel be chosen also at the Prince's pleasure out of the nobility or barony, and of the Knights and Esquires, such and so many as he shall think good, who doth consult daily, or, when need is, of the weighty matters of the Realm, to give therein to their Prince the best advice they can. The Prince doth participate to them all, or so many of them as he shall think good, such legations and messages as come from foreign Princes, such letters or occurrents as be sent to himself or to his secretaries, and keepeth so many ambassades and letters sent unto him secret as he will' (Cambridge, 1906, reprinted from the London edition of 1583), p. 59. One of the best accounts of the English Privy Council under Elizabeth is given by E. P. Cheyney, *A History of England, from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth*, i, chap. 5; cf. also Lord E. Percy, *The English Privy Council under the Tudors*, and D. M. Gladish, *The Tudor Privy Council*. The latter contains many useful details, but it is very inaccurate and should be used with caution. Cf. also A. F. Pollard, 'Council, Star Chamber and Privy Council under the Tudors', *E. H. R.* xxxvii, pp. 337-60, 516-39; xxxviii, pp. 41-60.

December 1573, he swore to be 'a true and faithful councillor to the Queen's Majesty as one of her Highness' Privy Council'.¹ At that time the Council consisted of seventeen members, but of these two, Dr. Wotton, Dean of Canterbury and York, and Sir John Popham, the Lord Chief Justice, seem to have been members only by courtesy, for they never sat at the Council table. Two others, Lord Buckhurst and the Earl of Shrewsbury, although nominally members, do not appear in council until 1585. This reduces the active members of the Privy Council in December 1573 to thirteen. Of these, seven were peers and six commoners. It is significant to observe that there were no prelates.²

The peers were the Earls of Bedford, of Arundel, of Lincoln, of Sussex, of Leicester, and of Warwick, and the Lord Burghley. Of these, all except Bedford and Arundel held important offices at court. Lincoln was Lord High Admiral; Sussex, Lord Chamberlain; Leicester, Master of the Horse; Warwick, Master of the Ordnance, and Burghley, Lord High Treasurer. Lincoln and Arundel had sat in the Council of Queen Mary; Bedford and Burghley in the Council of Edward VI. The rest began their careers as privy councillors under Elizabeth.

The six commoners all held office at court. Sir Nicholas Bacon was Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, Sir James Crofts was Comptroller of the Household; Sir Francis Knollys, Vice-Chamberlain and Treasurer of the Household; Sir Walter Mildmay, who sat only occasionally, Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir Ralph Sadler was Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; Sir Thomas Smith, Principal Secretary. Of these, Sadler had sat in the Council of Henry VIII, and Smith had been Principal Secretary under the Protector Somerset. The rest were new men.³

Such was the group of men that sat round the council table when Walsingham took his seat there at the end of the year 1573. They represent fairly well the character of the Privy Council during his sixteen years of service. There were, however, several important changes in its personnel during this period

¹ The oath of a Councillor is printed in Prothero's *Select Documents* (Oxford, 1898), p. 165.

² Cf. J. R. Dasent, *Acts of the Privy Council*, *passim*. A list of the attendances at the council meetings is printed at the end of each volume.

³ Cf. for this data the lives of these men in the *Dict. of National Biography*, *passim*.

which should be noted. Bacon and Smith both died before 1580, and Sir Thomas Bromley and Sir Thomas Wilson took their places. Sussex died in 1583, and Lord Howard of Effingham succeeded him as Lord Chamberlain the next year, to become Lord High Admiral upon Lincoln's death, in 1585. Lord Hunsdon, first cousin to the Queen, was made privy councillor in 1577; Sir Christopher Hatton in 1578. The Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Cobham were added early in 1586. There were other changes also; but these were the most significant ones.

It must not be supposed, however, that all the Councillors of the Crown played an equal part in the administration of the Government. One or two, as we have seen already, were councillors only by courtesy. Others, like Sadler and Mildmay, attended very infrequently. There is not on record a single instance in which all the Councillors assembled together, and the actual business of government seems to have been conducted by a group of five or six.¹ Of these the principal figure was Burghley, who during his whole term of service occupied a commanding position, though Leicester at times pressed him hard; and the others, Leicester, Sussex, Walsingham, Bacon, Hunsdon, and Hatton. Even in this smaller group Bacon, Hunsdon, and Hatton were less important than the rest. There appears to have existed in fact within the Privy Council a kind of informal cabinet of men who enjoyed a larger measure of Elizabeth's confidence. Some of these men, like Burghley and Walsingham and Bacon, were singled out because of their ability; others, like Leicester and Hatton, because they were dear to the Queen's heart. Officially they were on the same plane with the other councillors; practically they dominated the council and determined, so far as their imperious mistress permitted, the policy of the crown.² Elizabeth herself never sat at the council table,³ and it was only indirectly and by personal conference with individual members that she conveyed her wishes to it.

Looking backwards from the point of view of the modern highly organized English cabinet system, one of the things which

¹ The average attendance at meetings of the council was seven. Viles, *op. cit.*

² This appears from a careful examination of the actual course of affairs at the English court over a period of twenty years.

³ Cf. Viles, *op. cit.*

strikes us most about Elizabeth's Privy Council was its singular lack of organization. Up to the year 1590 it seems even to have lacked a presiding officer. In spite of the multitude of its duties, both in domestic and foreign affairs, we find little or no trace in it of that nice distribution of functions which so eminently characterizes the modern English Cabinet. Now and then temporary committees were appointed on particular business, and probably, in a rough sort of way, members of the council were set to the tasks for which they seemed best fitted, but this is as much as can be said. There was a constant tendency to load down the abler councillors with all sorts of matters, independent of the nominal positions they held.¹

This was particularly true in the case of Francis Walsingham. Partly by virtue of his position, but chiefly because he was a capable man, he was regarded by the Queen as a Jack o' All Trades.

On this account it is difficult to define exactly what kind of position Walsingham was assuming when Elizabeth made him one of her principal secretaries.² The office, like the office of Councillor which included it, lacked exact definition of function. It varied in power and influence with the character of the sovereign and the character of the secretary.

Until the middle of the reign of Henry VI the Secretary seems to have been little more than a royal amanuensis. From then onward he was regularly a member of the Privy Council, but even in that position he probably served chiefly as the mouth-piece of the sovereign. As late as the reign of Henry VIII the position ordinarily carried with it very little independent power.³ Under Elizabeth the Secretary occupied a position of greater importance. This was certainly true in the case of Cecil and of Walsingham. But not all of the Queen's secretaries enjoyed so large a measure of her confidence as did these two. Here again one must be careful not to attribute to the office what

¹ Viles, *op. cit.*

² The title Secretary of State does not appear until the end of Elizabeth's reign. Sir H. Nicolas, *The Ordinances and Proceedings of the Privy Council*, 1386-1542, vol. vi, pp. xcviij seq.

³ Cf. Sir H. Nicolas, *ibid.* During Elizabeth's reign there were generally two Principal Secretaries. The annual fee was £100 with a table. (Cf. *Collection of Ordinances for the Royal Household* (ed. 1790), p. 408.) On the office of Principal Secretary in general cf. F. M. G. Evans, *The Principal Secretary of State* (Manchester, 1923), which appeared after these pages were in the press.

really belongs to the man. It cannot be too often emphasized that Elizabeth used those of her advisers who proved most apt to her purpose without regard to the exact position which they held.

This fact makes it difficult a priori to define the duties which confronted Walsingham as Secretary. Two of his successors in office have, however, made some observations on the subject which, if not conclusive, are suggestive. Sir Robert Cecil, son of the great Cecil, who was Elizabeth's Secretary of State from 1596 until her death, left behind him a paper which he entitled 'The State of a Secretary's Place and the Peril'. The point which he makes in this paper is that a Secretary's duties are so numerous that he can have no commission broad enough to cover them all, and so no warrant for his actions except the confidence of his sovereign. In making this point Cecil illustrates by example. 'To them (the secretaries)', he says, 'out of confidence and singular election there is liberty to negotiate at discretion at home and abroad, with friends and enemies in all matters of search and intelligence.' And again, 'Only a Secretary hath no warrant or commission in matters of his own greatest peril, but the virtue and word of his sovereign, for such is the multiplicity of occasions and the variable motions and intents of foreign princes, and their daily practices, and in so many points and places, as secretaries can never have any commission so large and universal to assure them.'¹

These remarks throw some light upon the general nature of a secretary's duties. Dr. John Herbert, Cecil's colleague in office, has left a paper also on the same subject. In April 1600, Herbert wrote down, apparently for his own use, a brief statement of his secretarial duties. This statement he called 'Titles of matters whereof I am charged to have regard as a Councillor and a Secretary'. He enumerated the titles as follows :

'First, to inform myself of all treaties with foreign princes. . . .

'To be acquainted with the particular actions and negotiations of ambassadors to her Majesty and from her ;

¹ There are several copies of this paper in existence. I quote from one in the Bodleian Library. Ashmolean MSS. 826, f. 29. On the organization of the staff of the Principal Secretary cf. the paper by N. Faunt, one of Walsingham's secretaries, in the Bodleian Library, Tanner MSS. 80, f. 91, printed in *English Hist. Review*, xx. 499 f. A very interesting treatise on the office of Principal Secretary by Robert Beale, Walsingham's brother-in-law, is printed in the appendix to this volume.

'To inform myself of the power and form of proceeding at the Council of the Marches in Wales and the Council in the North, and to understand the manner of the warden's government ;

'To be informed of the state of Ireland. . . .

'The charge of the Low Country Wars. . . .

'To oversee the order of the Council book and the Muster book of the realm ;

'To have the custody of letters from foreign princes to the Queen and the answers made to them ;

'To have care to the intelligence abroad.' ¹

Neither this paper of Herbert's nor the paper of Cecil's can be regarded as comprehensive statements of the Secretary's duties, but both make it evident that the Secretary had much to do with foreign affairs.

Their testimony is borne out by Walsingham's own career. The merest glance at the Foreign State Papers during his term of office shows that he was very intimately concerned with foreign affairs. There is scarcely a paper among them which does not bear his endorsement or some other sign of his handling. Practically all the letters which came from ambassadors and other diplomatic agents abroad passed under his eyes. Almost all the letters which were dispatched abroad went over his signature. He drafted a great many of them with his own hand. The merely clerical part of his work must have been enormous. Besides, he took a leading part in all debates in council which had to do with foreign affairs. When some particularly difficult diplomatic problem arose he went abroad himself to solve it. In a word, he handled most of the business which in these days would fall to the lot of a Foreign Secretary, adding to it, from time to time, the special tasks of an Envoy Extraordinary.

But this was only a part of his duties. He also prepared all sorts of matters for the consideration of the Privy Council, acting in this regard as the mouthpiece of the Queen. He looked after the affairs of Ireland. He settled disputes over town charters and in Oxford colleges. He oversaw the construction of Dover Harbour. He hunted down Recusants and Papists, he ferreted out plots against Elizabeth's life, he brought Mary Stuart to the block. In short, there were very few things connected with the

¹ In Prothero, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

political history of England during his time with which he was not in some way concerned.¹

But it cannot be maintained for an instant that all these duties were necessarily incident to the office of Secretary. Walsingham accumulated burdens because he was able to bear them. His office grew as he grew, and it had not completely defined itself until his death.

It has appeared that Walsingham as Secretary had much to do with foreign affairs. During his first ten years in the office—that is to say, down to the beginning of the year 1584—they occupied most of his attention. To be sure, he was busy at the same time about many domestic matters, but throughout this decade they were, so far as he was personally concerned, relatively unimportant. It seems therefore advisable to neglect them for the time and to consider at once the part which Walsingham played between the years 1574 and 1584 in the affairs of England abroad.

When Elizabeth made Walsingham her Secretary in December 1573 her position was comparatively strong both at home and abroad. The discovery of the Ridolfi Plot, with the execution of the Duke of Norfolk which followed it, had crushed the hopes of the discontented Catholics in England, so that, for the time being at least, they were little inclined to make trouble. In Ireland there was as much tranquillity as could be expected in that disorderly country. Shan O'Neill was six years dead and no one else had yet appeared who was strong enough to threaten Elizabeth's position in the island. The revolt under Fitzmaurice in 1569 had been put down without much difficulty. In Scotland the last stronghold of the Marian party had fallen with the fall

¹ In Harl. MSS. 6035 is preserved a manuscript book endorsed 'A Leiger Book out of the Secretary's Office, 1583'. This book is in fact Walsingham's rough memorandum book of letters to be dispatched and other matters to be attended to. A good deal of it is in Walsingham's own hand. It contains 118 folios written on both sides. It is generally but not invariably dated from day to day. The first date in it is the 25th of March 1583, the last 3rd of December 1584. Among other items it contains memoranda of Privy Council business which are particularly valuable since the Privy Council register is missing for the dates covered by it. On folio 20 are a few notes in graphite lead in Walsingham's hand which furnish a very early example of the use of the graphite lead pencil. The book is interesting in this connexion, as it illustrates very strikingly the multifarious character of Walsingham's duties. It should be carefully edited and printed.

of Edinburgh Castle in May 1573. Maitland of Lethington and Kirkaldy of the Grange, two of Mary's ablest partisans, had passed away. Morton was regent. He was a strong man, and though in no wise a churchman, he was, politically speaking, a strong Protestant. As a Protestant and as a vigorous opponent of the Marian French party in Scotland, he naturally looked upon England as his surest ally, and so was anxious to keep in Elizabeth's good graces. The 'two postern gates', Ireland and Scotland, were in fact pretty well secured.

On the continent of Europe, Spain and France remained Elizabeth's most dangerous neighbours.

Her relations with Spain were a good deal better than they had been for some years past. The four years following Elizabeth's seizure of the Spanish pay ships in December 1568 had been extremely critical ones. Trade had been suspended. In 1571 the Spanish ambassador had been expelled from England for complicity in the Ridolfi Plot. In 1572 the two countries had been on the verge of war and Englishmen and Spaniards had actually been fighting one another in the Low Countries. But after St. Bartholomew's the situation had distinctly improved and in the spring of 1573 a treaty re-establishing trade relations had been successfully negotiated. This did not mean that all matters of difference had been adjusted. Far from it. But tension was at least relieved and the danger of any immediate breach between the two countries sensibly diminished.

With France also Elizabeth's relations were somewhat easier than they had been. The crisis produced by the massacre of St. Bartholomew's had passed, and though the Treaty of Blois was virtually a dead letter it was at any rate clear that Charles IX did not intend the general crusade against his Protestant neighbours which at one time had been feared. He had, of course, many old scores to settle with England. There was the imprisonment of his sister-in-law Mary Stuart, there was the weaning away of Scotland from her old friendship with France. More than these, there was Elizabeth's encouragement of the Huguenots in their rebellion against the French crown. But Charles IX at the beginning of the year 1574 was too much occupied with domestic troubles to measure swords with England on these accounts. He protested against Elizabeth's treatment of Mary

Stuart and her dealings with the Scots—but he could do no more. As for the Huguenots, he was much more concerned with preventing the English Queen from giving them further aid than he was with resenting aid which she had given them in the past.

Elizabeth, then, at the time when she made Walsingham her Secretary, was apparently in no immediate danger from her two most dangerous neighbours. It was sufficiently evident to her, however, that their peaceful attitude sprang from their weakness and was no indication of a friendly disposition towards her. She had very good reason to fear that as soon as Philip had reduced the Dutch to obedience, and Charles the Huguenots, both kings would turn to settle old accounts with her. It was this fact in large measure that determined her foreign policy for the next ten years. She did not at all like the idea of encouraging rebels against their sovereign. It was against her principles to call into question the right of monarchs to govern their subjects as they pleased. Besides, it established a dangerous precedent which might one day be used against herself. But she had practically no choice. The safety of her throne was at stake. And so we find her, certainly with great reluctance, giving encouragement and aid, now to the Dutch and now to the Huguenots, in order that she might disable Spain and France from doing her harm.

To such a policy Francis Walsingham very readily lent himself. His conduct of the embassy in France had proved him to be a very skilful diplomatist. It had proved him also to be a staunch Protestant not only in his religion but also in his politics. In France he had made it clear that he identified the cause of England with the cause of Protestantism. Elizabeth was aware of this fact. Probably it did not altogether please her, for she had no notion of linking the fortunes of England with the fortunes of the reformed religion. And yet it may have had something to do with Walsingham's appointment as royal secretary, for she was aware also that Walsingham's manifest religious bias had established him firmly in the confidence both of the Huguenots and of the Dutch Protestants. Since she was forced to depend upon these two factions for assistance in the execution of her foreign policy, she may have thought it advisable to have a man by her side and in her counsels who was closely in touch with

them. At all events it was in connexion with the Protestants in the Low Countries and in France that Walsingham played his great part in the affairs of England abroad.

It will be remembered that, during the last few months of Walsingham's stay in France, indeed from the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's until he returned to England in the following April, the relations between the French crown and Elizabeth had been strained. Walsingham, like most of the rest of the world, had regarded St. Bartholomew's as a proclamation of war by Charles IX and his mother against Protestants at home and abroad, and the Queen, on the whole, had shared his opinion. It is pretty certain that he was wrong, and that, whatever Catherine de Médicis intended towards the Protestants in France, she was more anxious than ever to maintain the friendship of England. It was with this in view that she had done her best to reopen the negotiations for a marriage between her youngest son Alençon and Elizabeth. But Elizabeth had regarded these approaches with suspicion. She had toyed with the marriage project, giving the French just enough encouragement to lead them on. At first she had objected that Alençon was much too young and that he was a Catholic. Later she had said that she was willing to compromise the question of religion on the basis of the terms offered to Anjou, and that she thought the difficulty of age might be settled by an interview. Still later, she had given the French to understand that, if Alençon came over to England, all would go well. Then when Alençon had said that he would come, she had refused to grant him a passport until he had promised not to be offended if she disliked him.

Meantime she had returned to her old practices of encouraging the Huguenots in rebellion. The Rochelois, closely besieged by the royal army, had found her well disposed towards them. If she had not actually lent them the money or the men which they asked for, she had certainly connived at much which had been done for them by others in England.¹ So, too, when Alençon, with rebellious intent, had purposed to flee from the royal camp before La Rochelle, she had offered to provide a vessel for his conveyance to England.²

¹ La Mothe Fénélon, the French ambassador at London, complained of this more than once; cf. his letter to the King, 6 June 1573, *Corresp.* v. 346.

² Cf. Chapter IV.

Elizabeth was in fact in April 1573 dealing with both parties in France at once. Meanwhile the royal trenches crept nearer the beleaguered city of La Rochelle. In May 1573 an assault was delivered, and although it was valiantly repulsed, it became evident that the Huguenots could scarcely withstand another such attack. Up to this time Elizabeth herself had done little or nothing for the rebels. But now the situation became alarming. The capture of this last Protestant stronghold in France would mean the complete triumph of her enemies the Guises. She sent Burghley to Fénélon, the French ambassador, to tell him that if his master persisted in his policy of exterminating the Huguenots, he could no longer count on her friendship.¹ A little later she dispatched an envoy, Edward Horsey, to France on very much the same errand. He was to proffer her assistance in composing the differences between the crown and the Huguenots and to say that, until these differences were composed, she could not consider an alliance with Alençon.²

Catherine de Médicis received Horsey graciously, listened to his message, and, as though acting at his instigation, called the royal Council together at once to discuss the question of peace.³ Peace, in fact, was signed early in July, a few weeks after Horsey's arrival. But his offers of mediation were not utilized, and probably his remonstrances had little to do with bringing it about. In May 1573 Henry, Duke of Anjou, the brother of the French King, had been elected King of Poland. As a condition of his election, Catherine's agent, Monluc, had been forced to swear that the new king would 'maintain the peace between the different religions'. This promise made Anjou's position as commander of the army before La Rochelle no longer tenable. He learned of his election on the 19th of June. On the 24th he arranged with the besieged the preliminaries of a treaty. Two weeks later the siege was raised.

The terms of the peace were not very satisfactory. It granted freedom of conscience to Protestants throughout France, but it only admitted freedom of worship in La Rochelle, Nîmes, and Montauban. It was not accepted by the Huguenots at large.

¹ Fénélon to the King, 20 June 1573, *Corresp.* v. 353.

² Cf. Horsey's instructions, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1069.

³ Cf. Horsey to Burghley, 30 June 1573, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1067.

They refused to accept it and continued in arms. In the south, particularly, they made elaborate preparations for renewing the conflict.¹

So far as Elizabeth's relations with the Huguenots were concerned the peace affected the situation very little. Huguenot ministers from La Rochelle no longer importuned her for aid. Other Huguenots, however, indignant at the partial peace, remained in England and continued to plan attacks upon France. Montgomery, for instance, was still there. He made his headquarters in the Isle of Jersey and kept in close touch with Lord Burghley at court.²

The peace, however, did affect the relations of Elizabeth with the French crown. Horsey had been sent over to say that she could not think of a marriage with Alençon so long as the French King continued to persecute the Huguenots. By the peace Catherine might fairly say that these persecutions had ceased. She said so, and more. She told Horsey that the peace had been made chiefly with the desire to please Elizabeth and that Alençon himself had been the 'chief persuader of it'. Wherefore she said that she hoped Elizabeth would offer no further excuses but would speak her mind freely about the match. In this regard, indeed, the peace had brought Elizabeth to the wall. It looked as if she would have to commit herself one way or the other. Catherine hastened to press her advantage. She offered to concede the personal interview which Elizabeth had so incessantly demanded. She even offered to yield upon the point of religion. Elizabeth, she said, in this matter, might rule the Duke at her pleasure.³

Elizabeth did not receive these concessions with great enthusiasm. When Fénélon in England urged her to agree to the interview she would not definitely commit herself. But she did give him some encouragement, so that on the 9th of August he wrote to his master that he found her pretty well disposed towards it.⁴

This was enough for Catherine. Immediately she prepared to send an embassy to England. There can be no doubt that she

¹ Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, vi, pt. 1, p. 140 seq.

² Cf. Letters of Montgomery to Burghley in *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, *passim*.

³ Dr. Dale to Eliz., 7 July 1573, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1084.

⁴ Fénélon to the King, 9 Aug. 1573, *Corresp.* v. 387.

was very eager for the marriage at this time, otherwise, knowing Elizabeth as well as she did, she would hardly have pushed forward on such slight encouragement. As a matter of fact she wanted to get her young son out of France. He was continually quarrelling with his brother the King and was becoming a rallying point for discontented elements at court. At first the Queen Mother thought of sending Mauvissière to England, but she finally decided upon de Retz, one of her Italian favourites. Dale, the English ambassador at Paris, wrote to Burghley that de Retz was going to find out definitely how Elizabeth stood upon the marriage question, and to see if there was any use in Alençon's going to England.¹

De Retz reached London early in September 1573. He was cordially received by the Queen, but got very little encouragement in the marriage matter. The well-worn objections of age and of religion were brought forward once more. But apparently the uncomeliness of Alençon's person was the point upon which Elizabeth really stuck. De Retz advised her to send some trusty agent over to France who could make personal observations and fetch back a portrait of the Duke.²

Acting upon this suggestion Elizabeth dispatched Thomas Randolph to France late in October. He was sent ostensibly to treat concerning the establishment of staple towns in France. But his principal business was 'to observe the Duke's personage, complexion, speech, and behaviour' and to get an authentic portrait of him.³ Randolph was delayed in France some time by the confusion attendant upon the departure of the new King of Poland to his kingdom, but he accomplished his mission finally and returned to England late in December 1573.⁴

There is no record of the report which he made to Elizabeth. At any rate, it is certain that his mission did very little to advance the match. Throughout January and February 1574 Fénélon continued to importune the Queen for a definite answer, and she continued to procrastinate.⁵

¹ Dale to Burghley, 22 Aug. 1573, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1138.

² Cf. instructions to T. Randolph, 24 Oct. 1573, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1206. For the details of the de Retz audience cf. Fénélon, *Corresp.* v. 403.

³ Cf. Randolph's instructions, cited above.

⁴ Fénélon reports him back on the 24th of December, *Corresp.* v. 468.

⁵ Cf. Fénélon's *Corresp.* vi. 1 seq.

It was just at this point that Walsingham entered once more into public life. Practically the first diplomatic business with which he had to do after he became Secretary was this matter of the marriage. At the time the match had first been broached he had endorsed it, and though his enthusiasm for it, as for all things French, had been considerably dampened by the St. Bartholomew's massacre, he was still inclined to favour it. He held Alençon to be a fit husband for the Queen. He evidently had a better opinion of the young man than had most of his contemporaries. But he was well aware that Alençon was ugly, and though he was disposed to weigh this objection somewhat lightly himself, he knew what a large part it played in the reckonings of Elizabeth. So while he favoured the match and probably did his best to further it, he had little hope of bringing it to pass.

He held several conferences with Fénélon on the subject during January and February 1574. In those conferences his business was apparently to temper the hardness of the Queen's answers. For Elizabeth, for one reason and another, continued to place obstacles in the way of the match. She now refused point blank to consent to a public interview, fearing, as she said, that she would be dissatisfied with the Duke's person.¹ The portrait which Randolph had brought home was evidently not altogether to her liking. She was even half-hearted about a private interview and insisted that in any case the Duke must come over with a small train.² Nevertheless, she did not wish to break off the negotiations altogether, and it was probably at her own prompting that Walsingham spoke in such optimistic terms to the French ambassador. He told Fénélon that he had never seen the Queen so well disposed towards marriage as she was at present, that he thought everything could be accomplished by a private interview. He said that the Duke should regard Elizabeth's heart as a strong castle which he might boldly carry by storm. For himself, Walsingham promised to lend any assistance in his power.³

But these brave words availed very little. The French King began to lose interest in the match,⁴ partly because he saw little

¹ Elizabeth to Dale, 3 Feb. 1573/4, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1309.

² *Ibid.*

³ Fénélon to Catherine, 20 Feb. 1573/4, *Corresp.* vi. 37.

⁴ Dale to Elizabeth, 19 Feb. 1573/4, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1321.

hope of carrying it through, partly for another reason which will presently appear.¹

The departure of the Duke of Anjou for Poland affected very materially the political situation in France. Anjou was never a strong man, but he was the heir presumptive to the crown, the favourite of his mother and the figure-head of the Guisan faction. So he exercised an influence out of all proportion to his ability. Without doubt his departure was a distinct loss to the ultra-Catholic party. Furthermore it left Alençon, his youngest brother in France, the nearest to the French crown. This was a fact of particular significance at the end of the year 1573, because it was becoming apparent that Charles IX had not a great while longer to live. For this reason both Catherine and the Guises had done their best to delay Anjou's departure. He did indeed linger over his leave-taking until November, but he got away at last, leaving Alençon one of the most important personages in the kingdom. Now Alençon, as we have seen, was discontented with his position at court. He was in close touch with the Huguenots, with Navarre and Condé, and with Méru and Thoré, the youngest two of the Montmorency brothers. All those factions, which were gradually drawing together in opposition to the Guisan régime, began to regard him as their leader. But Catherine distrusted her youngest son. With Navarre and Condé she held him a virtual prisoner at court and kept close watch upon all his actions. It consequently became the purpose of Huguenots and Politiques alike to release the young Duke and place him at their head. Up to the death of Charles IX, indeed up to the actual escape of Alençon from court in September 1575, the internal history of France is in large measure a history of various plots which had this end in view.²

Alençon in short began to be regarded as the potential leader of the opposition in France. As Elizabeth in England was always regarded as the potential ally of the opposition, it appeared to Catherine in the highest degree dangerous to permit

¹ Dale to Smith, 3 Sept. 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 320. At this time, when the Alençon suit was resumed, Dale drew up a summary of the course of the negotiations in 1572-4.

² H. de la Ferrière, 'Les dernières conspirations du Règne de Charles IX', 1573/4, *Revue des Quest. Historiques*, xlviii. 2 seq.

a conjunction of her youngest son and the English Queen. Consequently, from the time of Anjou's departure from France, the Queen Mother began to regard the marriage project with increasing coldness. Before, she had done her best to bring it about, because she saw in it an excellent opportunity to link together the interests of the English and French crowns. Now she opposed it because she feared it would mean an alliance between England and the French rebels.

The approaching dissolution of the French King also changed somewhat Elizabeth's attitude towards France. The death of Charles IX meant normally the accession of Henry of Anjou. Now Anjou by his ultra-Catholic proclivities and by his friendship for the Guises was closely allied with that party in France which was most hostile to Elizabeth's interests. Consequently she did not at all welcome the prospect of his accession to the French throne.

If for any reason Anjou did not succeed to the French throne, Alençon, of course, was next in line. It is possibly too much to say that at the end of the year 1573 the factions in France which regarded Alençon as their leader meant to debar Anjou from the throne, and yet perhaps some such idea was already in process of formation. At any rate, Alençon was the one hope of all parties domestic and foreign who were opposed to Anjou, and consequently we find Elizabeth playing her part in the various attempts which were made during the years 1574 and 1575 to free the young Duke from his mother's tutelage and to place him at the head of his partisans.

The first attempt of the kind was made in consequence of Alençon's election as chief of the Huguenot armies of the west in December 1573. It came to nothing. A second, more elaborate plot, was arranged in February. The Huguenots on the feast of Mardi Gras—February 28th—were to rise simultaneously throughout the west. Ten days later Alençon, with the assistance of a certain de Guित्रy, was to escape from court. The Huguenots rose on the day appointed and in the confusion of the carnival seized several towns. Owing, however, to the precipitation of de Guित्रy, Alençon failed to make good his escape. Catherine got wind of the plot in time and hustled him off, along with the King of Navarre, from Saint-Germain to Paris. A third attempt

in April 1574 met with no better success. Once more the Queen Mother was forewarned. La Mole and Coconnas, the chief conspirators, were taken, tortured and executed. Alençon and Navarre were placed under close surveillance in the château in the Bois de Vincennes, and there they remained until the death of Charles IX on the 31st of May 1574.¹

The part which Elizabeth played in these various plots is somewhat obscure. She had been carrying on underhand negotiations with Alençon ever since St. Bartholomew's, but these negotiations never amounted to much, and after the siege of La Rochelle they dwindled down to the silly love letters of Maisonfleur. In the first plots to set Alençon free Elizabeth does not seem to have had any hand. She did, however, continue to shelter Montgomery—the refugee Huguenot captain—in Jersey, notwithstanding the protests of the French ambassador, and when, early in March 1574, Montgomery, in conjunction with the Huguenot rising of Mardi Gras, led an attack into Normandy, he plainly did it with her connivance, if not with her assistance.²

Apparently it was not until after the failure of Alençon to escape from court in April that she began to interest herself in his cause. His close confinement in Vincennes and the cruelties which were practised upon his followers made her fear that he would be dealt with very severely, perhaps put to death. Walsingham shared her fears; 'those who call to mind,' he wrote to the Earl of Rutland on the 31st of March, 'how the Florentine entertained the late Admiral at his first coming to Blois with a double kiss, think the young gentleman in great peril.'³ It may have been at Walsingham's suggestion, it was certainly with his approval, that Elizabeth instructed Dale to intercede for the young Duke and his followers.⁴

But Walsingham was not satisfied with these small measures. He set about establishing a means of communication with Alençon himself and with the King of Navarre, his fellow prisoner. For this purpose he had two secret agents ready at hand. One of them was Jacomo Manucci, who had been in his service when he was ambassador in France. The other was

¹ On these plots cf. H. de la Ferrière, *op. cit.*

² Montgomery to Burghley, 23 March 1573/4, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1351.

³ Walsingham to Rutland, 31 March 1574, *Cal. Belvoir MSS.*, i. 102.

⁴ Dale to Burghley, 22 April 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1394.

Thomas Wilkes, Dale's secretary. Wilkes was in England early in April.¹ He departed for France before the middle of the month bearing secret instructions from Walsingham. What these instructions were we can only guess from his subsequent conduct. On the 16th of April he wrote to Walsingham that he had 'acquainted himself with a gentlewoman' whom he could trust, and that she had promised to carry any messages to the prisoners which he wished to send.² By the 22nd of the month he had succeeded in speaking with the King of Navarre himself. Wilkes wrote Walsingham that he found both Navarre and Alençon close prisoners, but in no immediate danger.³

This message reassured Elizabeth. It gave her time, a very desirable commodity under the circumstances. She was ever averse from violent measures, and now she made up her mind to send a special envoy to remonstrate with the Queen Mother. The ill health of the King gave her an excuse for so doing. Captain Leighton, Governor of Jersey, was chosen for the purpose. He was directed to express Elizabeth's sorrow at the King's illness and at the late commotions in his realm. He was to counsel peace and to advise Catherine to avoid hasty and violent measures.⁴

Leighton went to France and had audience with the King in bed on the 15th of May. Both Charles and his mother asserted that they were on the best of terms with Alençon and that he was not a prisoner at all. But their actions belied their words. They gave Leighton permission to speak with the young Duke, but they saw to it that neither he nor his fellow captive Navarre dared grant the interview.⁵ Nevertheless, Leighton contrived to communicate with Alençon secretly.⁶

By this means Alençon informed Leighton that the approaching dissolution of the King greatly imperilled his position. His

¹ Dale to Walsingham, 22 April 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1397. Both Wilkes and Jacomo were shrewdly suspected by Catherine. Jacomo was cast into prison when the King died and Catherine complained of Wilkes's conduct to Elizabeth.

² Wilkes to Walsingham, 16 April 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1390.

³ Same to same, 22 April 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1395.

⁴ Instructions for Thomas Leighton, 2 May 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1404. Fénélon tried his best to induce Elizabeth not to send this envoy; cf. Fénélon to Catherine, 3 May 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 101.

⁵ Dale to Elizabeth, 17 May 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1415.

⁶ Leighton to Walsingham, 22 May 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1423.

mother, fearing that he would interfere to prevent the peaceable accession of his brother, the King of Poland, was watching him closer than ever. He told Leighton that he was afraid that at the King's death he would be cast into the Bastille, if indeed nothing worse happened to him. He said he thought he might escape if he had money to bribe his guards, and so he prayed Elizabeth to send him thirty or forty thousand crowns for that purpose.¹

Leighton informed Walsingham of this at once and he and Burghley together set about making plans for the Duke's deliverance. Burghley wrote to Walsingham on the 26th of May that it was necessary that Alençon's person should be preserved 'to counterpoise the tyrant that shall come from Poland'. He fell in with Alençon's own suggestion about corrupting the guards, and proposed a device for sending money to him secretly.² This apparently was as far as the matter got. Four days afterwards Charles IX died and Catherine hurried her prisoner from Vincennes to the Louvre. There she held him fast until she left Paris on the 8th of August to meet the new King come from Poland.³

When Anjou took his seat on the French throne as Henry III it seemed as if Elizabeth's fears of him were to be realized. Dale reported from France manifold signs of the King's unfriendly disposition towards her. English merchants, he wrote, were being tormented in their trading, and English ships seized. There were rumours of a Catholic league between Henry III and the Pope.⁴ In London La Mothe Fénélon reopened the old questions of Scotland and Mary Stuart, the broaching of which always suggested, if it did not always imply, a hostile intention on the part of the French crown towards Elizabeth.⁵

Elizabeth was clearly alarmed. At one time matters got to such a pitch that she asked Fénélon if she was to construe the action of the French as a declaration of war. She probably did not contemplate anything like war herself. If she had, the disordered state of things in France certainly offered to her a ripe opportunity.

¹ Ibid.

² Burghley to Walsingham, 26 May 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1431.

³ H. de la Ferrière, *op. cit.*

⁴ Cf. Dale's Corresp. in *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, for the latter half of the year 1574.

⁵ Cf. Fénélon, *Corresp.* vi, *passim*.

The Huguenots, under La Noue, had broken out into open war again in March 1574. Condé had escaped to Germany and was negotiating for assistance with the German Protestant princes. What was worse, the Montmorency had gone over to the rebel camp. Because of a supposed complicity in the plot of April 1574 to liberate Alençon, Francis, the Marshal de Montmorency, had been thrown into prison. Thereupon his brother Damville, who was governor of Languedoc and occupied a very strong position in the south, had signed a truce with the Huguenots in May, and two months later had definitely allied himself with them. La Noue, with the Huguenots at his back, and Damville, with the Moderate Catholics—or Politiques as they came to be called—made an imposing alliance. With Elizabeth of England behind them they would have been well nigh invincible.¹

They appealed to her for aid. Alençon and Navarre, the natural leaders of the rebels, whom the Queen Mother still kept close beside her, asked Elizabeth to help them get free.² Méru came to England to seek her assistance in liberating his eldest brother, Francis de Montmorency.³ Envoys from La Noue asked her to lend them men and money to help fight their campaigns. Other envoys from the Prince of Condé besought her to lend them money to raise troops in Germany.⁴ Certainly it was not for the lack of invitations that Elizabeth held aloof from the civil war in France. She received them all graciously and made large promises right and left, but she sent no troops and she sent no money.

She did, however, frighten La Mothe Fénélon, the French ambassador, into the belief that she was quite prepared to resent any further display of hostility on the part of his master. She told him that if the French seized any more English ships she would let loose her sea dogs upon French commerce.⁵ With great ostentation she prepared the Channel fleet for the seas.⁶ Perhaps, from Fénélon's point of view, the most alarming thing which she

¹ H. de la Ferrière, *op. cit.*

² Cf. Dale to Burghley, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1461.

³ Méru to Elizabeth, 8 Sept. 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1541.

⁴ Cf. Fénélon to Catherine, 19 Sept. 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 238; same to same, 3 July 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 167.

⁵ Fénélon to Catherine, 8 July 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 171.

⁶ Same to same, 18 June 1574, *ibid.* vi. 145.

did was to cultivate the friendship of Spain. It happened very opportunely for her that just at this time Philip II sent Bernardino de Mendoza, one of his ablest diplomatists, to England. Elizabeth made up to Mendoza at once and held confidential audiences with him on several occasions. She convinced Fénélon that she thought seriously of throwing over the French alliance and of coming to terms with Spain.¹

Fénélon wrote to his master that there was a large party in England which wanted to go to war with France. He said that the party was made up partly of Spanish sympathizers and partly of 'passionate Protestants'. The Queen, he thought, was for the time being rather French than Spanish, but he saw great danger of her being won over to the side of the enemy.²

Fénélon was probably not far wrong. Elizabeth herself did not want to go to war with France or even run the risk of going to war by giving the French King a *casus belli*. But there were many in her council who thought differently, and they pressed their arguments upon the Queen at every opportunity. Some of these, among them Leicester—if we are to believe Fénélon—favoured an alliance with Spain against France. Others—the 'passionate Protestants'—opposed an alliance with Philip II on religious grounds, but wished Elizabeth to join forces with the Huguenots and such other Protestant allies as she could find in Europe.³

To this latter group Walsingham himself belonged. He wanted the Queen to ally herself boldly with the Huguenots. He distrusted the 'Spanish compliments' of Mendoza as much as he did Catherine de Médicis' ardent protestations of friendship. He counselled Elizabeth to send money for the raising of troops in Germany, to assist Alençon and Navarre to their freedom, and to lend men and arms to La Noue. He thought she ought to use her Channel fleet against France. When Elizabeth would not take his advice he was in despair. To his thinking the safety of England, and what was still more important in his eyes, the welfare of the reformed religion, depended upon her prompt action.

¹ Same to same, 28 July 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 197 *et alia*.

² Fénélon sent to the King of France (24 Aug. 1574) a long memoir on the situation in England; cf. *Corresp.* vi. 217 seq.

³ Cf. Fénélon's Memoir cited above.

'The parties you wot of' [our friends in France], he wrote to Burghley on the 13th of July, 'hearing that the navy stayeth and that nothing is done in Germany to their favour and assistance are much dismayed withal, whereon they builded much, and therefore, that hope removed, they think their case now desperate. If they quail, besides the dishonour, the danger that is like to light on us is evident. We seek neither to conserve friends nor to provide for withstanding our enemies. If this kind of government might carry continuance withal, then should we have less cause to lament. But surely it is so loose as in reason it cannot last. God be merciful unto us.'¹

The Huguenots recognized that Walsingham was one of their staunchest friends in England. Through his secret agents in France, Wilkes, Jacomo, and Captain Sasseti, they kept in constant touch with him. Their envoys who came to England to seek the Queen's assistance generally approached Elizabeth through his means, and they always found in him a ready advocate of their cause.

And yet for all this it is to be observed that during the whole year 1574, and indeed for long afterwards, the King of France did his best to secure Walsingham's goodwill. Fénélon conferred with him constantly. Both Henry III and his mother wrote personal letters to him expressing their love of him and soliciting his friendship.²

Walsingham replied to all these advances in kind. He told Fénélon that he was most amicably disposed towards the French crown, and he promised in every possible way to promote friendship between England and France.³ Yet it hardly seems possible that either Fénélon or his master were deceived as to Walsingham's real attitude towards them. They knew he was a staunch Protestant. On one occasion they remonstrated

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 13 July 1574, B.M. Harleian MSS. 6991, no. 46. About a month later Walsingham wrote to the Earl of Huntingdon: 'It is thought that by the 20th of this month the French king will be at Lyons. He is received at Venice with great pomp, where the most part of the Princes of Italy or their ambassadors do meet him. I fear that assembly will breed some dangerous conspiracy against the professors of the gospel. Whatsoever they conspire against us, there is not that zeal nor care in us for the withstanding of their malice that necessarily were to be required. Security doth altogether possess us and policy beareth no sway. Unless God mercifully do defend us our peril is not far off.' (S. P. Domestic, xlv, p. 33, misdated Aug. 17, 1579.)

² Henry III to Walsingham; Catherine to Walsingham, 23 Nov. 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1599, 1600.

³ Fénélon to Catherine, 17 Nov. 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 294.

gently with him about his religious views.¹ He on his part made no secret of the fact that he was conferring constantly with the Huguenot agents in England. He went so far, more than once, as to urge their cause to Fénélon.² Possibly the French crown hoped one way or another to gain him over to their side. Possibly they regarded him as in some sort their friend because of his rooted hostility towards Spain. Possibly they dealt with him because they recognized that his intimate knowledge of French affairs gave him an influential voice in the consideration of Elizabeth's policy towards France. This latest surmise seems on the whole the most probable, and it bears testimony to Walsingham's progress in the confidence of the Queen. His advancement in public service had been phenomenally quick. It is here to be observed that in less than a year after he was made Privy Councillor he had come to be recognized as one of the principal persons to be reckoned with in dealing with the English government.

Nevertheless, for the time being at least, Elizabeth, in her dealings with France, rejected his bellicose counsels and followed the counsels of peace. Instead of a sword she sent another ambassador to France. This time she chose for the purpose Lord North, one of Leicester's henchmen. He left England early in October 1574. He was sent nominally to congratulate the new King on his accession. But he was also directed to urge Henry III to restore civil peace in France. He was further charged to give an encouraging answer if he were questioned about the renewal of the Anglo-French alliance.³ His secret instructions, which Walsingham himself drafted, reveal the real object of his mission. These directed him to feel out the disposition of the French court towards England. Among Elizabeth's friends he was to speak in favour of peace. But if he found the Guises dominating everything, he was to pretend great friendship for the Spanish ambassador, to be seen often in his company, and to hold frequent conferences with him.⁴

North reached France about the middle of October. His

¹ Cf. p. 286, n. 3.

² Fénélon to the King, 12 Dec. 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 317.

³ Instructions for Lord North, 5 Oct. 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1573.

⁴ Secret instructions for Lord North, 5 Oct. 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1576.

embassy seems to have injured rather than improved the good feeling between France and England. Wilkes notified Walsingham on the 4th of November that North had been received with scant courtesy.¹ When North himself made his report he more than confirmed this statement. He complained not only of the small honour with which he had been received, but also of the positive indignities which he had suffered. The Guises had taken occasion to rebuke some members of his train in public. Catherine de Médicis had shown him two dwarfs dressed up to imitate Queen Elizabeth, and in his presence had mocked at them. Indeed, if we are to believe Fénélon, North did his best to convince Elizabeth that she was well hated in France.²

Perhaps North was biased. He was hand in glove with Leicester, who was at this time hostile to the French crown. Nevertheless his words had their effect, especially those which referred to scornful compliments made upon Elizabeth's beauty. Perhaps nothing could have irritated her more, for she had a very high idea of her physical charms. Consequently after North's return she began to listen more thoughtfully to the advice of those who urged her to intervene actively in favour of the French Huguenots. She summoned her war captains to court. She held long conferences with Méru and other French rebels.³ It looked to Fénélon as if she were preparing to make trouble for his master. He wrote home that he was doing his best to prevent war between England and France, but he warned the King to look well to his seaports. He advised Henry to send an envoy to England in return for North, and to desist from advocating the cause of Mary Stuart or from doing anything else likely to irritate Elizabeth.⁴

Henry III so far took his ambassador's advice as to send an envoy, La Chastre, over to England in March of the following year. La Chastre was instructed to invite Elizabeth to renew the Treaty of Blois. She received him with great honour and sent him home with her confirmation of the Treaty.⁵ About a month later—on 30th April—Henry III at Paris, in the

¹ Wilkes to Walsingham, 4 Nov. 1574, *Cal. Foreign*, 1572-4, 1591.

² Fénélon to the King, 28 Dec. 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 329.

³ *Corresp.* vi. 337.

⁴ Fénélon to the King, 18 Dec. 1574, *Corresp.* vi. 320.

⁵ Fénélon to the King, 7 April 1575, *Corresp.* vi. 407.

presence of Dale, the English ambassador, in like manner confirmed it.¹ This interchange of pledges seemed to augur well for a renewal of cordial relations between England and France. But on the part of Elizabeth at least it was nothing more than a blind to conceal her real intentions. As a matter of fact she was at this very time, and even before it, very seriously considering a project to send money to Condé in Germany.

She procrastinated as usual and Walsingham feared that when she finally made up her mind, even if she decided to send the money, it would be too late. 'For the love of God, madam,' he wrote to her on the 15th of January, 'let not the cure of your diseased state hang any longer on deliberation. Diseased states are no more cured by consultation, when nothing resolved on is put into execution, than unsound and diseased bodies by only conference with physicians, without receiving the remedies by them prescribed.'²

These plain words appear to have reached home. Elizabeth decided in February 1575 to send an agent secretly into Germany in order to see what might be done there to help the Huguenots. Thomas Wilkes was the man chosen for the purpose. He was dispatched to Frederick III, the Count Palatine, at that time easily the principal exponent of Calvinism in Germany.³ Elizabeth instructed Wilkes to consult with Frederick about the possibilities of peace in France. If Frederick was of the opinion that peace there was impossible Wilkes was to say that she would lend him money to go to the assistance of the Huguenots.⁴

This was not the first time that Elizabeth had sought to aid the Huguenots by lending them money to raise forces in Germany. She did it in the First Civil War. She did it again in the Third. And as time went on it came to be the one course which she always took when she wanted to help French rebels. In pursuing this course she almost invariably resorted to the Palatinate—to Frederick the Pious while he lived, and after his death (1576) to his younger son John Casimir.⁵

So the dispatch of Wilkes was no new departure in Elizabeth's

¹ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 107.

² Walsingham to Elizabeth, 15 Jan. 1574/5, S. P. Scotland, xxvi, 66.

³ Cf. Klückhohn, *Friedrich der Fromme*, *passim*.

⁴ Instructions for Thomas Wilkes, 16 Feb. 1574/5, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 27.

⁵ Cf. *Cal. Foreign*, *passim*.

diplomacy. It was the very thing which a priori one would have expected her to do. Wilkes got back to England early in May 1575.¹ The report which he made upon his return is missing, but the general purport of it can be gathered from the events which followed in consequence. The Count Palatine, it appears, told Wilkes that he saw no prospect of peace in France and demanded a loan of 150,000 crowns as the price of his going to the assistance of the Huguenots.²

Elizabeth at first seems to have been willing to advance such a sum. On the 13th of April instructions were drafted for Sir William Melville to be sent to the Palatinate. These instructions were to the effect that she would send 150,000 crowns at once in ready money if Frederick would guarantee to restore Calais to her.³ But Melville for some reason or other was not dispatched until late in May, and then his instructions were changed. Instead of the 150,000 crowns Elizabeth now offered to lend 50,000 crowns on condition that her part in the transaction be carefully concealed and that she be given ample security for repayment.⁴ When Frederick heard of this offer he told the Queen that he did not think so small a sum as 50,000 crowns would be of any use. Elizabeth's reply, in which she excused herself for not lending the amount demanded, is illuminating. She said she could not in honour lend 150,000 crowns because she had lately renewed the Treaty of Blois with the French King.⁵ Her conscience was disturbed, not by the fact of the loan, but by the size of it. In a half-hearted way she wanted to be true to her treaty obligations. In a half-hearted way she wanted to assist the Huguenots. Always she wanted to save money. Between these conflicting desires she tried to steer a middle way, and in consequence she neither kept the faith nor gained any advantage in breaking it by rendering the Huguenots effective assistance.

The 50,000 crowns were, nevertheless, sent into Germany.⁶ Every attempt was made to keep this fact a secret, but Fénélon

¹ Fénélon to the King, 12 May 1575, *Corresp.* vi. 425.

² It appears, however, from a letter of Alençon to Elizabeth dated 20 May, which probably belongs to the year 1575, that the Queen had offered to loan 50,000 crowns, and that the Huguenots wanted her to loan 150,000 more. *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 98-9.

³ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 93.

⁴ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 151.

⁵ The Queen's answer to Sir William Melville, 10 June 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 172.

⁶ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 249.

got wind of it and complained about it to the Queen.¹ Elizabeth was probably induced to send even so small a sum by rumours of hostile preparations against her which Dale and others sent from France. Fitzmaurice, the leader of the late rebellion in Ireland, was in France seeking the King's aid for further enterprises in the island. It was said that Henry III meant to help him. At any rate it was certain that ships were being fitted out in Normandy and Brittany.² It was equally certain that three English ships had been seized at St. Malo.³

It is difficult to say whether Henry III at this time actually contemplated an attack upon England or not. If he did he soon thought better of it. He promised reparation for the commercial losses which the English had sustained. He turned Fitzmaurice away in spite of the importunities of the Guises.⁴ It seems that he even contemplated a renewal of the negotiations for marriage between Alençon and Elizabeth.⁵

These friendly advances on Henry's part relieved the strain in the relations between England and France. Fénélon found Elizabeth more kindly disposed towards his master. She confessed herself satisfied with his behaviour towards Fitzmaurice. She told Fénélon that she would maintain the Treaty of Blois. On the 6th of August he reported that she was even well disposed towards the marriage.⁶

Encouraged by this news Henry directed Mauvissière, who replaced Fénélon as ambassador at the English court in August 1575, to make a formal proposal of Alençon's hand to the Queen. As soon as Mauvissière reached England he began conferring with Walsingham about the matter.⁷ Walsingham did not believe that the King was sincere in his proposal. 'For the matter [of marriage],' he wrote to Burghley on the 7th of August, 'wherein you desire to confer with him [the French ambassador],

¹ Fénélon to the King, 8 July 1575, *Corresp.* vi. 461. Yet Walsingham said later that no one in the Council except himself, Leicester, Sussex and Burghley knew that the money had been sent; cf. Walsingham to Smith, 18 August 1575, S. P. Domestic, Eliz., cv. 28.

² Dale to Burghley, 15 July 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 228, and other letters on the same subject of earlier dates.

³ Fénélon to the King, 4 July 1575, *Corresp.* vi. 457.

⁴ Dale to Burghley, [July] 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 266.

⁵ Fénélon to the King, 13 July 1575, *Corresp.* vi. 465.

⁶ Cf. Fénélon to the King, 8, 19 July, 6 August 1575, *Corresp.* vi, *passim*.

⁷ Mauvissière to Walsingham, 4 Sept. 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 323.

I see no reason, considering the suspicion that daily increaseth in the King of his brother, that he should mean any such matter.' Walsingham went on to say that he was led to this opinion by a report which he had received from France to the effect that Alençon was planning to escape to England.¹ But Dale, in France, was very much more optimistic. He wrote home about a month later that, as far as he could make out, the King, his mother, and Alençon were all strongly in favour of the match.²

Elizabeth's own attitude impressed Mauvissière very favourably. He informed his master that she seemed well disposed towards the match. But Walsingham, who knew the Queen better, did not share the French ambassador's optimism.

'I do daily', he wrote to Burghley on the 27th of September, 'more and more discover her Majesty's affection towards marriage to be such as until necessity shall press thereto, for the saving of her crown and the avoiding of the contempt of her people, I can no way hope to see that take effect that we have all over just cause to desire; and therefore to God we must commit it and ourselves become better reformed Christians than we are, for our sins are the true cause of these her Majesty's indispositions and therefore to help the second cause we must begin with the first cause.'³

So matters stood until the escape of Alençon from the French court in September 1575 changed their complexion somewhat. He at once took command of the forces of the rebels. His presence among them added dignity and strength to their cause. On the other hand, of course, his own position was greatly strengthened. Alençon at the head of the joint forces of Huguenot and Politique was a different fellow from Alençon, the prisoner at the Louvre. Henry III had no choice but to come to terms with him, and in November, largely through the efforts of the Queen Mother, a truce of seven months was signed between the two brothers.⁴

It appears that Alençon had been forced to agree to a truce because he lacked funds to carry on the war. He had asked Elizabeth for a loan and Walsingham had urged her to grant

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 7 Aug. 1575, Harleian MSS. 6992, f. 8.

² Dale to Smith, 3 Sept. 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 320.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 25 Sept. 1575, Harleian MSS. 6992, 11.

⁴ Lavissee, vi, pt. 1, pp. 168-70.

it.¹ But she could not make up her mind what to do and so she did nothing. Walsingham had tried to induce her to send two ships cruising along the coast of France in order to take off the young Duke if he were hard pressed. But even in this he was unsuccessful.²

In November, after the truce was signed, Alençon sent a gentleman named La Porte to England. His real purpose in sending was apparently to get Elizabeth to join in a league with him.³ But La Porte went through Paris on his way to London, and Catherine, who suspected the reason for his journey and who yet did not dare to detain him for fear of angering her son, adroitly attached La Mothe Fénelon to his train.⁴ So La Porte and Fénelon went to England together, and instead of talking to the Queen about leagues with rebels they talked about the marriage.⁵

The marriage seemed for the moment to the Queen Mother the easiest way of getting rid of her rebellious son. So she pressed the suit more vigorously than ever. It is clear from what La Porte and Fénelon said to Elizabeth that the King and his mother were willing to concede everything to bring the marriage to pass. They promised to grant the interview on the terms which Elizabeth had imposed. They even went so far as to fix a time for Alençon's coming to England, and they asked that a royal ship might be sent to escort him on his way.⁶

The King and Catherine and Alençon all wrote letters to Walsingham requesting him to do what he could to further the match.⁷ Doubtless he would have done their bidding had he been at court. But just about this time a touch of his old malady forced him to withdraw temporarily from public affairs. It is not to be supposed that he could have done much in any case. Elizabeth was determined not to commit herself. She told La Porte and Fénelon that she could not consider the marriage until Alençon and his brother the King were openly at peace.⁸ This reply naturally brought matters to a standstill.

¹ Randolph to Walsingham, 27 April 1576, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 759.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 6 Oct. 1575, *S. P. Domestic*, Eliz., cv. 57.

³ Instructions to La Porte, 27 Nov. 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 471.

⁴ Dale to Elizabeth, 19 Dec. 1575, *ibid.* 504.

⁵ *Ibid.* 597.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.* 474, 483, 497.

⁸ Elizabeth's answer, *ibid.* 596.

It seems likely that Elizabeth really did desire to see peace restored between the two contending brothers in France. She certainly said she did, and when Alençon sent an agent over to her secretly in February 1576 to ask her for money to carry on the war she would not lend him any.¹ In March she made up her mind to send an envoy to France. She thought at first of sending Walsingham,² but he stoutly refused to go,³ and she did not press him. Early in April she dispatched his uncle, Thomas Randolph.

Randolph went to France ostensibly to mediate for peace. He was directed not to encourage Alençon to hope for aid from England and he was to have nothing at all to say about marriage. But his principal commission and perhaps the real reason why Elizabeth sent him had reference to the Low Countries.⁴

The death of Requesens, the Spanish governor of the Low Countries, in March 1576, had left them in great disorder. The lawlessness of the Spanish troops had driven even the Bar-banters and the Flemings to take up arms.⁵ Orange at once came to the front and Elizabeth heard that he had appealed to the French King and his brother for aid.⁶

Elizabeth was very much afraid that Henry III would give him the aid he asked for. There was a large party in France which favoured a war against Spain in the Low Countries. It had been the keynote of Coligny's foreign policy and the Politiques regarded it as the great panacea for the cure of domestic ills. It appealed to the young King very strongly at this moment because it afforded him an excellent opportunity to get rid of his troublesome younger brother by setting him to campaigning in foreign wars.

¹ This envoy was Philip Duplessis Mornay; cf. Alençon to Walsingham, 1 Feb. 1575/6, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 601. Only a very brief mention is made of this mission in the *Mémoires* of Duplessis Mornay.

² Dale evidently expected him on the 31st of March, Dale to Walsingham, 31 March 1576, *ibid.* 709.

³ Champagny to the Council of State in the Netherlands, 15 March 1575/6, in K. de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de l'Angleterre*, viii, p. 268. Champagny says that Walsingham's enemies were very anxious to get him out of England, although who those enemies were and what they intended does not appear.

⁴ Randolph's instructions, 2 April 1576, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 719.

⁵ Blok, *A History of the People of the Netherlands* (trans. by R. Putnam), ii. 94 seq.

⁶ Cf. instructions to Randolph cited above.

It has appeared already how strongly Elizabeth was opposed to the active intervention of France in the Low Countries. Her fears on that score had been one of the principal reasons for her reluctance to co-operate with Coligny's plans just before St. Bartholomew's. It was to forestall the French rather than to attack the Spaniards that she had sent Sir Humphrey Gilbert over to Zealand in 1572. Not enough has been made of this factor in what has heretofore been written about her dealings in the affairs of the Low Countries at this time. Probably it had more to do with determining her policy towards the Dutch rebels during the next ten years than either her fear of Spain or her zeal for Protestantism. It certainly was of prime importance in shaping her relations with the King of France and with his younger brother.

Thomas Randolph had very precise instructions upon the subject when he was dispatched to France in 1576. Elizabeth bade him tell the French King flatly that if he set on foot any project against the Netherlands she would at once throw all her strength upon the side of Spain.¹ She may have wished Henry III and Alençon to come to terms, but she very clearly did not wish them to come to terms upon the basis of a war for the conquest of the Netherlands.

It is interesting to observe that Elizabeth instructed Randolph to tell Alençon privately that if he would proceed against Spain in the Low Countries in conjunction with her, she might be willing to lend him some assistance. If he were to go into the Netherlands she wished him to go as her agent, not as the agent of the King of France. This suggestion, not acted upon at the time, reveals in faint outline a policy which she afterwards followed.

The mission of Randolph did not amount to much. Peace between the King and his brother was too far advanced for Elizabeth's envoy to do much either to advance or retard it. The only thing which Randolph really accomplished was to make

¹ Ibid. Mauvissière wrote to Henry III on the 27th of March 1576 that the English after their old manner favoured defending the Low Countries against the assault of any Prince who could in time become their match. He added that the English feared the French quite as much as they did the Spaniards, particularly in Flushing and Holland. (P. R. O. French Transcripts, Bundle 27.)

sure that she would get back the 50,000 crowns which she had lent to the Elector Palatine.¹ There is no record of the effect which Randolph's remarks upon the subject of the Low Countries had upon the designs of the French King. At any rate no French expedition went into those regions for two years to come.

As regards the marriage nothing apparently was said. The project in fact fell asleep at this time and was not aroused until the spring of 1578.

Peace was signed in France between the King and the rebels on the 6th of May 1576. In consequence of the peace Alençon and Damville went over definitely to the King's side. The Protestants gained much in the way of formal concessions, but they lost in real strength.² As Randolph wrote to Walsingham (27th April), much more permanent advantage would have been secured had Elizabeth been willing to maintain the rebel armies two months longer in the field.³

During the rest of the year 1576 very little occurred in the relations between England and France that is worth noticing. In September, Sir Amias Paulet, sometime Governor of Guernsey, an austere Protestant, replaced Dr. Dale as English ambassador at Paris.⁴

Peace did not last long in France. The terms of the treaty were not carried out, and before the end of the year 1576 civil war had broken out again. As was to be expected, it was not very long before the Huguenots appealed to Elizabeth for aid. In January 1577 Paulet wrote to Walsingham that they wanted to borrow money. 'A penny spared at this time', he added, 'might perchance save a pound.'⁵

Walsingham, unfortunately for the Huguenots, was taken

¹ Cf. Randolph to Walsingham, 27 April 1576, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 759; also *ibid.* 836, dated July 8, which is the King's promise to pay the 50,000 crowns.

² Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, vi, pt. 1, p. 171.

³ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 759.

⁴ Paulet's instructions, dated September 1576, are in *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 933. It has already been observed that the wording of the general instructions given to Paulet are almost identically the same as those given to Walsingham in December 1570. They may be taken to embody fairly well the current conception of the ordinary duties of an English ambassador in France and are commended on that account to the attention of students of the history of international law.

⁵ Paulet to Walsingham, 15 Jan. 1576/7, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1182.

down with his old malady in the early spring of 1577, which, although it did not entirely cut him off from public business, prevented him from taking as large a part in the direction of foreign affairs as he would otherwise have done. 'I am sorry to hear', Paulet wrote to him on the 16th of February, 'that you leave court for a season, fearing lest the poor churches of God in France and Flanders shall repent your absence.'¹

Walsingham made clear his attitude on the question of helping the Huguenots in a letter which he wrote to Leicester on the 20th of May on hearing that the Protestant town of La Charité had fallen into the hands of the royalists. It is obvious that he continued to cherish with unabated ardour his old opinions on this subject.

'Navarre's and P. of [Condé's] case', he wrote, 'I fear me groweth [worse by the] loss of La Charité, being [cut off] from such succours as they [expected from] Casimir. If the peril [fell] only upon themselves yet [were it] a matter greatly to be pitied considering] their profession, but [since their] overthrow (a matter [to be] feared) cannot be without [very] manifest and apparent d[anger to us it] were well it were soundly weighed. So hard construction [hath] been lately made of my deal[ing in these causes] as I am forced to [refrain] otherwise to deal than by d[irection]. I see a general discoura[gement among] her Majesty's best affected subjects [who have] set their course to run [one with] her without having regard [to the] time, which cannot be without evident peril, consider[ing that] she is beset both at hom[e and abroad] with great multitudes evilly af[fected towards] her.'²

And yet for all these impending dangers Elizabeth did practically nothing. The Huguenots continued to importune her through Paulet, her ambassador at Paris. Messages passed between them continually, but these served to no other purpose than to alarm the French King, who complained on more than one occasion of what he called Paulet's disloyal dealings.³ Paulet transmitted the messages of the Huguenots with some cogent comments to Elizabeth. To give them greater force he transmitted also news of hostile preparations against her in

¹ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1271.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 20 May 1577, Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 37. This letter has been badly injured by fire. The words in brackets I have supplied myself. They are burned away in the original.

³ Paulet to Elizabeth, 22 June 1577, *Letter Book of Sir Amias Paulet* (Roxburghe Club, 1866), 32.

Brittany¹ and of a project under consideration for a marriage between Don John of Austria and Mary Stuart.² But Elizabeth answered with vague assurances.

Some time in the spring the King of Navarre sent Duplessis Mornay to England to press the Queen for aid in person. Not long afterwards two other Huguenot agents, La Personne and La Huguerye, landed in England on their way to Germany with the same end in view. If we are to believe La Huguerye, who is not always the most reliable of informants, Elizabeth was not at all generous in her treatment of Mornay. But to La Huguerye himself, who was acting as agent of Condé, she made large promises, agreeing to lend Duke John Casimir 50,000 crowns with which to raise troops in Germany for the Huguenots, and also to let him keep the 50,000 crowns which were due to her of her loan to him during the previous civil war.³ Elizabeth was in no hurry to substantiate these promises.

She did, however, in another way, do something indirectly in Germany for the cause of the French Protestants.

Ever since the close of the Council of Trent there had been among the Protestant princes throughout Europe an increasing fear that the Catholic powers had already leagued together, or were about to league together, for the purpose of annihilating Protestantism. Such events as the Conference of Bayonne and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's lent colour to these fears. In consequence there was among the Protestants a growing feeling in favour of a counter Protestant league. There had been talk of such a league ever since the accession of Elizabeth. The great obstacle in the way of it was the dissensions among the Protestants themselves. In the first place, of course, there was the deep and ever-widening gulf between Lutherans and Calvinists. Then there were various minor sects in England, in Bohemia, in the Netherlands, and elsewhere, which added so many additional elements of discord. In Germany the Lutherans themselves were splitting into two mutually hostile camps.⁴

¹ Paulet to Elizabeth, 22 June 1577, *Letter Book of Sir Amias Paulet* (Roxburghe Club, 1866), 32.

² Paulet to Walsingham, 28 April 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1408.

³ *Mémoires de la Huguerye*, i, p. 447. The *Mémoires* of Duplessis Mornay make only a brief mention of his presence in England at this time.

⁴ Ritter, *Die Gegenreformation*, i, *passim*.

All these divisions boded ill for the cause of Protestantism as well in France as elsewhere. So Elizabeth of England early in 1577 proposed to check disintegrating tendencies by summoning a general council of the Protestant churches in Europe for the purpose of forming a defensive league. Her first steps in this direction were taken in Germany.

In February 1577 she sent Philip Sidney¹ to Rudolph II, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, in order to condole with him upon the death of his father, the late Maximilian II, and to congratulate him upon his accession to the imperial throne. On his return home Sidney was directed to stop at the courts of Duke John Casimir of the Palatinate, and of William, Landgrave of Hesse, and to broach the project of a league to them.²

Sidney returned to England early in June 1577 bringing with him encouraging replies from these two princes.³ In consequence of this Elizabeth, on the 26th of June, dispatched Dr. Daniel Rogers to Germany with instructions to deal further in the matter of the league.⁴ Walsingham set forth the object of Rogers's mission in a letter to the Regent of Scotland.

'Because the contrary faction [the Catholics]', he wrote, 'has not been long time without their conjured combination, confederating themselves with their conspiring consorts to work our destruction, her Majesty has thought good by the same messenger [Rogers] to move the said Casimir for a counter league and confederation on our parts against their wicked and mischievous attempts, being in some good hope the matter will have good success, for that overtures of the same were made by Casimir himself, laying down the good likelihood he had to encompass it and to bring it to some good effect.'⁵

Rogers saw Casimir at Heidelberg and William of Hesse at Ems. To both of them he urged the necessity of a league. But

¹ Sidney was dispatched on 7 February; cf. Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 30.

² Heppel, *Geschichte des deutschen Protestantismus*, iv. 5 seq. Walsingham had some correspondence with John Sturmius on this subject; cf. Zurich Letters (in Parker Society Publications), Second Series, pp. 256-8.

³ Cf. William of Hesse to Elizabeth, 20 May 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1437; John Casimir's answer, 8 May 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1425.

⁴ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 31. The purpose of Rogers's mission is expressed in a letter of Elizabeth to Casimir, 24 June 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1486.

⁵ Walsingham to the Regent of Scotland, 27 June 1577, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book, clxiii, p. 16. Rogers's instructions are given in Lettenhove's *Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de l'Angleterre*, x. 66.

he found them not so eager as they had been when Sidney had spoken to them. Both professed their willingness to join in the league, but both declared that they were unwilling to go forward with the matter until they found out how the other German Protestant princes felt about it.¹

When Elizabeth had heard of their answer she sent over a third envoy, Robert Beale, Walsingham's brother-in-law, to Germany in August. Beale had commissions to all the Protestant princes in Germany. In brief he was to lay before them the following propositions :

1. That they lay aside all religious contentions with their neighbours until the calling of a general synod ;
2. That they join in league with their brother Protestants and with them contribute to the common treasury ;
3. That in case one member of the league was attacked they join to defend him.²

Beale wandered from court to court in Germany submitting these proposals to the different Protestant princes. Except in the Palatinate and in Hesse he got very little response. Everywhere he was treated with great respect, but for one reason or another none of the German princes would definitely agree to enter into a league. The real obstacle in the way was the doctrinal differences between the princes, and these Beale could not overcome. Consequently Elizabeth's efforts in this regard failed.³

This idea of a Protestant league was entirely in accord with Walsingham's own convictions. He argued for such a league from the first. 'Her Majesty can only wash her hands of blame', he wrote to Rogers on the 31st of October 1577, 'if the Germans allow Christendom to be divided. The enemy is well persuaded that the dissolution of his kingdom is grounded on our unity. Our perseverance is but small if we cannot see that this is his intention, for when they have shut out their fellow princes and friends from the peace of the Empire, what have they prevailed more than the weakening of the Empire and given the upper hand to that part which was before much inferior.'⁴

¹ Heppe, *op. cit.* iv. 7.

² *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1509.

³ Heppe, iv. 15.

⁴ Walsingham to Rogers, 31 Oct. 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 392.

In a personal letter to Beale, Walsingham expressed more clearly his views upon the situation. 'For my own part', he wrote, 'if I had thought that the success would have proved no better I would not have been so forward in advising her to send as I was. The hope that Casimir put her in of some good fruit to follow drew me to be so earnest in that behalf. I fear his credit is not so great in Germany as some I lately saw from thence bare in hand it was; for we were made to believe that the chief colonels and rittmeisters in Germany were at his command and that he had so great a party among the inferior nobility of the Empire that he was able to make himself a party even against the great ones.'¹

Meantime Huguenots and Catholics in France were busily engaged in civil war. The King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé, leaders of the rebellious Protestants, continued to importune Elizabeth to come to their assistance. By the late spring of 1577 Walsingham, Leicester, and the other staunch Protestants in the English Council had succeeded in persuading Elizabeth to assist Navarre and his partisans by lending Casimir money to raise troops for them. When Dr. Rogers went over to Germany in June he carried to Casimir vague promises to this effect. But she made no definite offers. Apparently she merely directed Rogers to look over the ground and report to her.²

Walsingham for his part had little hope that she would do anything more. On the 4th of July he wrote to Leicester, '[touching the sending] of money for the [German] reiters without whose ass[istance] of diversion the state [of the religion in France is like to be desperate, I find [her Majesty not] so well inclined to the [same] as she was at the dispatch [of Rogers], and yet I see cause rather to [urge] her forward than to draw [her back].'³

What Walsingham seems to have feared particularly from the Queen's delay was a split in the already weakened ranks of the Huguenots. Reports ran current that Henry of Navarre had been offered large inducements to go over to the royal camp, and the young King's apparent indifference in matters of religion

¹ Walsingham to Beale, 2 Nov. 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 403.

² Cf. Rogers's instructions in Lettenhove, ix. 356.

³ Walsingham to Leicester, 4 July 1577, Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 55. This letter has also been greatly damaged by fire.

gave some grounds for fearing such an event. Walsingham at all events was certainly alarmed, and on that account was particularly irritated by the cold reception which Elizabeth gave to Duplessis Mornay, whom Navarre had sent over to solicit aid. He thought that everything should have been done to conciliate Navarre at a time when his allegiance to the cause was doubtful.

'This bearer informeth me', he wrote to Leicester on the 25th of July, '[of the frequent] and large offers made unto [Navarre by] the King, which, when he shall [perceive] what is to be looked for from [hence in answer] to the hope he was not long [ago] put in, cannot in reason [but induce] him to yield to some compo[sition] with the] King, which taking place, I do not look that her Majesty shall live many months in peace.

'Poor du Plessis, who [came] to visit me, did with tears [repeat to me] the hard speeches [which her Majesty used] against the King of Nava[rrre and his] associates. I would to God [that if her] Majesty is not disposed to [assist them] that they had been foreborne. . . .

'I have advised the gent[leman to con]ceal them, who of himself [appeared in]clined thereto. It were better that Rogers were countermanded from putting Duke Casimir in [hope] of relief from hence towards the levying of troops. For who[soever] shall see her Majesty [abandon] the cause, the defense whereof, [by her] support heretofore yielded, hath won her so great reputation amongst them, they will be found, no doubt of it, coldly affected to enter into any league.

' . . . Surely, my lord, this our art of saving twenty thousand pounds is accomplished with so many mischiefs like to ensue hereby as I fear will not be put off with the expense of a million. But seeing God doth not dispose her Majesty's heart so to judge of the matter, we that are her faithful servants must prepare our corselets and carcasses to sacrifice them in her service.' ¹

This letter leaves very little doubt of Walsingham's attitude. He thought the necessity of giving immediate aid very great, and the danger in delay no less so. Possibly he exaggerated somewhat in his letter to Leicester for the sake of emphasis, yet certainly the situation from his point of view looked desperate.

On the same day on which he wrote his letter dispatches came

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 25 July 1577, Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 41, much damaged by fire, words in brackets my own.

out of France which showed that the Huguenot cause there had indeed come to a desperate pass. Walsingham apparently cherished a hope that this ill news would induce the Queen to give the aid which she had promised.¹ This indeed was just about what happened. Four days after the arrival of the French dispatches Elizabeth sent a letter to Dr. Rogers in the Palatinate instructing him to offer Casimir £20,000 for the raising of troops, on condition that her part in the transaction should be concealed and that she should be given ample security for its repayment.²

Upon the receipt of these instructions Rogers went at once to Casimir and transmitted the Queen's offer to him. He declared that he could not think of marching into France unless he was provided with £60,000 at least.

Rogers communicated this answer to Elizabeth on the 24th of August.³ Early in September it was being considered by the Privy Council. But before anything could be done, news came that peace had been signed between the Huguenots and the French King.⁴

It was unwelcome news to Elizabeth. She had just about come to the conclusion that civil war was a better thing for her in France than civil peace. It was for that reason that she had at last reluctantly consented to send £20,000 into Germany. Her relations with Henry III were not so cordial that she could face the prospect of a reunited France with equanimity. The French King was well aware of her dealings with the Huguenots,⁵ and though he had not been in a position to resent them, they certainly did not increase his goodwill towards England. The negotiations for a marriage between Alençon and Elizabeth had been abruptly broken off after the Peace of Monsieur in May 1576, and there was no talk of renewing them. Very recently Lansac, a French sailor, who occupied an ambiguous position between royal admiral and buccaneer captain, had seized a fleet of English ships, and though Elizabeth protested, threatened

¹ Same to same, 26 July 1577, Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 43.

² 30 July 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 61.

³ *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 138. On Rogers's negotiations in the Palatinate there is some interesting information in Bezold, *Briefe des Johann Casimir*, i, pp. 274 seq.

⁴ The Peace of Bergerac, signed 17 September 1577.

⁵ Henry III to Mauvissière, 20 June 1577, *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, v. 258 note.

war, and even laid hold of the French shipping in English harbours, Henry III was very loath to give up the English ships.¹ All these things had strained the relations between England and France, and had convinced the Queen that the longer she kept her neighbour across the Channel busy at home the better it would be for her.

As soon as the news of the peace reached England Walsingham wrote to Paulet, the English ambassador at Paris, that Elizabeth was very angry with Navarre for treating of peace without her knowledge. He instructed Paulet, if the treaty was not actually signed, to urge Navarre to insist upon having it ratified by foreign princes.² But it was past the time when such methods for preventing peace could prove effective. If Elizabeth had decided to send her £20,000 to Casimir a little earlier something might have been done. As it was Paulet wrote that the treaty had actually been signed.³ So Elizabeth was left to digest the matter as best she might. Naturally Casimir did not get his £20,000.

The return of peace in France brought Elizabeth face to face once more with the problem which had faced her after the Peace of Monsieur in 1576. On the 7th of November Paulet reported that there were envoys from the Dutch rebels in France seeking the King's assistance in their struggles against Spain. Paulet seemed to think it not unlikely that they would get what they asked for.⁴ It very soon appeared that his judgement was sound. After the Peace of Bergerac the danger of French interference in the Low Countries became more imminent than it had ever been before. It was just as Elizabeth had feared. She set herself at once to prevent it. For the next few years her dealings with France were directed chiefly to that end.

At this point her relations with France mingle themselves with her relations with the Low Countries. Until the end of the year 1577 it has been possible, and it has seemed on the whole most desirable, to keep these two threads of her foreign policy distinct.

¹ Cf. on this, among other letters, English Privy Council to Paulet, 18 Nov. 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 440.

² Walsingham to Paulet, 17 Sept. 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 229.

³ Paulet to Walsingham, 27 Sept. 1577, Paulet's *Letter Book*, p. 131. In this letter Paulet makes some interesting comments on the peace.

⁴ Paulet to Walsingham, 7 Nov. 1577, *ibid.*, p. 170.

Now they become so entangled that they must be considered as one.

But before this double thread can be followed it is necessary to trace with some care the earlier course of the other strand which goes into its making, namely the strand of Elizabeth's relations with the Dutch rebels. Walsingham revealed himself in dealing with French affairs an ardent supporter of the French Huguenots. It will appear that he was no less zealous in urging the cause of the Protestant Dutch.

VI

DUTCH AFFAIRS, 1573-8

At the time Francis Walsingham became principal secretary in December 1573, William of Orange had been engaged in intermittent warfare against the Spanish government in the Low Countries for over five years. His original plan of action had been to raise money among his friends, to recruit mercenary armies in Germany, and to attack the Spaniards from without. He had pursued such a plan in the spring of 1568 and again in the summer of 1572. Both times he had met with complete disaster. It is hard to believe that he had ever expected to drive out the Spaniards by methods of this sort. More probably he counted upon putting up a sufficiently strong fight to rally the discontented Netherlanders at large to the standard, and to win the support of the European powers. He realized that the fate of the Low Countries was then, as it always had been, a matter of considerable interest to the Empire, to France and to England, and he calculated that one or the other of them would welcome a favourable opportunity to strike a blow at the over-weening power of Spain. At first, being a prince of the Empire, he sought assistance in Germany, and he did indeed secure some loans of money from one or two of the Protestant princes,¹ but from the Empire on the whole he got nothing. After the failure of 1568 he turned to France. At the time France was in the midst of Civil War, but after the peace of Saint-Germain in 1570 his hopes of French aid ran high. It will be remembered how eager Admiral Coligny was to attack Spain and how nearly he came to inducing the French King to join forces with the Dutch rebels against the Spanish government in the Low Countries. It was indeed the expectation of French co-operation which had led the Prince of Orange to attempt a second invasion of the Low Countries in the summer of 1572.² The massacre of St. Bartholo-

¹ Ritter, *Die Gegenreformation*, &c., i. 390.

² *Cambridge Modern History*, iii. 232.

mew's dashed that hope to the ground and indirectly was perhaps the most important contributing factor to his second great failure. But Orange soon discovered that the death of Coligny did not involve the complete abandonment by the French crown of a policy hostile to Spain. The blood of the Huguenots was scarcely dry in the streets of Paris before Catherine de Médicis resumed negotiations with William's brother, Louis of Nassau. In November 1573 she conferred secretly with Louis at Blamont, and went so far as to offer him the loan of 300,000 crowns for the levy of troops.¹ This was enough to convince Orange that French assistance might still be hoped for. As a matter of fact from this time onward he seemed to have been of the opinion that France was the most promising of his possible allies.

At the very start of the rebellion he had undertaken to explore the possibilities of aid from England, and there is some reason to believe that he received some financial assistance from Elizabeth as early as the year 1568.² It will be recalled that his brother Louis of Nassau appealed to her again in 1571 when Walsingham was ambassador in France. Walsingham at the time had recommended his cause in strong terms to his mistress, but had received no very encouraging response. It was not until the spring of 1572, when the French began to interest themselves pretty actively in behalf of the Dutch rebels, that Elizabeth had shown any positive disposition to come to their assistance. Mention has already been made of the part she played in the seizure of Brill by the Sea Beggars in April of that year. A little later she had allowed companies of English volunteers to cross the Channel for the purpose of strengthening the hold of the rebels on the maritime towns. But she had made it sufficiently clear that her purpose was rather to forestall the French than to strike at the Spaniards, and when the French after St. Bartholomew's definitely withdrew from active intervention in the affairs of the Low Countries she called her forces back again. Walsingham took the position that, French or no French, the cause of the Dutch rebels was one which she could not afford to abandon. He pointed out that the purposes of the Spanish king towards

¹ Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, vi, pt. 1, 145.

² Froude, *History of England*, ix, 333-4.

her, especially since the Ridolfi Plot, were too evidently hostile to be allowed to develop unchecked. He saw too many reasons to believe that if Philip once established his position securely in the Netherlands he would use them as a base of operations against herself. But Elizabeth was not so sure. The Dutch rebels appeared to her to be a broken reed to lean upon. So far the Prince of Orange had accomplished no more than two dismal failures. The occupation of the maritime towns by the Sea Beggars had been little more than a piratical adventure. It was against all reason to suppose that they could maintain for long their unequal struggle against the power of Spain. To lend them open assistance would simply serve to increase the hostility of Spain towards her, and after St. Bartholomew's that was the last thing she wanted to do. Abandoned as she supposed she was by her French ally, she felt strongly the necessity of coming to terms with Spain. Her fear of isolation or, what was worse, of a combination of France and Spain against her, plainly indicated such a course, and there were cogent commercial reasons as well. Her merchants never allowed her to forget that the English woollen industry was suffering severely from the interruption of trade with Antwerp. And the consequence was, as we have seen, that Elizabeth during the months which followed St. Bartholomew's turned her back resolutely upon the Dutch rebels and addressed herself seriously to the adjustment of outstanding differences with the Duke of Alva. The outcome was the so-called Convention of Nymwegen, signed in March 1573, which re-established commercial relations between England and the Spanish Netherlands.¹ It cannot be said to have made England and Spain good friends again, but at least it brought them back to speaking terms. When Requesens, the new Spanish governor in the Low Countries, sent over two envoys to England in December 1573 to arrange some details of the treaty, Elizabeth received them with considerable cordiality and succeeded in persuading one of them at least that she was strongly pro-Spanish in her sympathies.²

Requesens himself, and wise heads about him like Bernardino de Mendoza, were not so sure of this ; but it is clear enough that

¹ Lettenhove, *Relations politiques*, &c., vi, Introd., p. xii.

² J. de Boissot to Requesens, Dec. 1574, *ibid.* vii. 358.

when Walsingham became principal secretary at the beginning of the year 1574 she was disposed to cultivate the goodwill of Spain and was in no mood at all to assist the Dutch rebels. The news of the approaching dissolution of Charles IX of France, which reached her in the early spring, simply served to convince her of the wisdom of such a policy, for the death of Charles meant the accession of his brother Henry, whose antipathy to her was notorious.

She had occasion to define her attitude in the early summer when she heard that Philip was preparing to send a fleet up the Channel in order to re-establish his naval power in Dutch waters. Walsingham and his anti-Spanish colleagues in the Council pointed out to her how easy it would be for such a fleet to throw troops into Ireland or even into England itself. In June they had so far aroused her fears that she gave orders for her fleet to be prepared to take the seas.¹ But she soon changed her mind. Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 8th of July that she could not decide what to do,² and five days later he wrote: 'Her Majesty hath made full resolution not to arm by sea and therefore her pleasure is that your Lordship should take order with Mr. Basche for the sale of the victual already provided with least loss.'³

Walsingham was disposed to attribute the Queen's change of face to her inveterate wilfulness, but the truth appears rather to be that she did not wish to take any action at this juncture indicative of hostility towards Spain. On that account also she welcomed cordially Bernardino de Mendoza, who came over from the Low Countries in July with a message of goodwill from Requesens. Indeed, she even went so far as to promise Requesens that she would allow the Spanish fleet to victual at English harbours.⁴ She even gave permission to his envoys to travel through southern England in order to make sure that such victuals could be obtained. She did this, however, with some reluctance. 'Walsingham told me', wrote Sweveghem, Requesens' envoy in England, to his master 'that the Queen had made some difficulty about the matter because the ports

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 10 June 1574, Harl. MSS. 6991, 40.

² B.M. Harl. MSS. 6991, 42.

³ Ibid. 45.

⁴ Elizabeth to Requesens, 22 July 1574, Lettenhove, vii. 222.

were ill defended—not out of any mistrust for me, but lest her subjects along the south should cherish any apprehension or sinister suspicion, seeing that one of the King's ministers is allowed to travel so freely along the coast where so powerful an army is shortly expected.' ¹

It must have been pleasant work for Walsingham, apologizing to Spanish Ministers for not letting them inspect English ports. He did not trust Spain; he never could be brought to trust her. From the first he had urged Elizabeth to make ready her fleet against the Spaniards, and this business of letting Sweveghem, Requesens' envoy, travel through South England must have struck him as playing right into the hands of the enemy. In much the same light he regarded the courteous reception which was tendered to Mendoza when he came. 'What Mendoza bringeth', he wrote, 'is not unknown, but men of judgement think that the chief end of his coming is to entertain us with Spanish compliments to lull us asleep for a'time, until their secret practices be grown to their due and full ripeness.' It was in this same letter that he wrote the words which have been quoted already in another connexion. 'We seek neither to conserve friends nor to provide for withstanding our enemies. If this kind of government might carry continuance withal, then should we have less cause to lament, but surely it is so loose as in reason it cannot last. God be merciful unto us.' ²

To a man of Walsingham's way of thinking, who wanted Elizabeth to join openly with the rebels in the Low Countries and to throw bold defiance into the teeth of Philip of Spain, her course must indeed have appeared disastrous. Nevertheless she held to it for a year or more, and in spite of his predictions England somehow or other managed to survive. Throughout the fall of 1574 she continued negotiating commercial matters with the envoys of Requesens on a most friendly basis. So far as the cause of the Dutch rebels was concerned, she did nothing further than to reiterate her offers of mediation between them and the King. When Sweveghem took his leave for home in November 1574 she spoke with him in most cordial terms, protesting her

¹ Sweveghem and Boissot to Requesens, 6 July 1574, Lettenhove, vii, p. 201.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 13 July 1574, Harl. MSS. 699 .

friendship for Philip of Spain, and saying how glad she would be to entertain a Spanish ambassador once more in England.¹

In the same month of November she sent over an envoy—Dr. Thomas Wilson—to Requesens to arrange some commercial difficulties still in dispute. At the same time she directed Wilson to demand that the English Catholics who had taken refuge in the Spanish Netherlands should be expelled.² Requesens was wise enough to conciliate her by acceding to her wishes in this matter. The English refugees were driven out of the Low Countries and England and Spain were on better terms than ever. ‘You understand full well,’ Elizabeth said to de Guaras, the Spanish agent in England, a little while after this, ‘old wine, old bread and old friends should be valued, and if only for the sake of showing these Frenchmen who are wrangling as to whether our friendship is firm or not, there is good reason to prove outwardly the kindly feeling which inwardly exists.’³

It is not to be supposed that Walsingham and those who shared his opinion in the English Council assented to this turn of affairs without remonstrance. Such scraps of evidence as survive on the subject point to the fact that he opposed the Spanish *rapprochement* tooth and nail, not only because he strongly favoured the Protestant cause in the Low Countries, but also because he utterly distrusted the amiability of the Spaniards. ‘I fear’, he wrote to Daniel Rogers in the Low Countries on the 3rd of January 1575, ‘that the offer that is made by the governor

¹ Report of Sweveghem’s audience, 1 Nov. 1574, Lettenhove, vii. 344.

² Wilson’s instructions, Nov. 1574, *ibid.* 349. Not long before Dr. Wilson’s departure Walsingham wrote to some English agent in the Low Countries whose name is not indicated in the copy of the letter which is preserved:

‘Touching the Ambassadors that are come from the towns of Ostland [Hansa Towns], what the end of their coming is yet I know not. Of this you may assure yourself that if we be drawn to traffic in other places the fault shall be in you. Therefore you shall do well to do your endeavour to remove all impediments and lets which, in sum, be these: the entertaining of our rebels, the not suffering of such public ministers as have been employed in the Catholic King’s dominions to enjoy for themselves and such as appertain to them that freedom that the King’s Catholic ambassadors hath here, and lastly in the forcing of such of our subjects as traffic into Spain, contrary to their conscience, to be present at the prayers, rites and ceremonies of that country. Surely if these three impediments were removed and taken away I see here a general inclination in the subjects of this land to prefer the amity of Spain before all other amities.’ (S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlv, p. 25, from Walsingham’s Letter Book, not dated or addressed.)

³ De Guaras to Zayas, 29 March 1575, *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 409.

to banish them [the Catholic refugees] that country, according to the ancient treaties, is but an entertainment for a time. Surely hardly will there follow any thorough reconciliation between us, unless we may be drawn to one unity of religion, for Christ and Belial can hardly agree.' ¹

Walsingham insists again and again upon this incompatibility of Christ and Belial. Behind all other causes of disagreement, the question of religion always remained for him the supreme factor.

It is clear that the Spaniards were already recognizing in him their chief opponent. 'This Walsingham', wrote de Guaras, 'is of all heretics the worst. He was ambassador in France, and as he is in authority here and is the right hand of Orange, any evil may be expected from him and his friends in Council.' ²

But other counsels for the time held sway over the Queen's mind. One consequence of Wilson's embassy, which goes far to show how cordial was her attitude towards Spain at this juncture, has yet to be mentioned. When Requesens agreed to eject the Catholic refugees from the Low Countries, he did it apparently on condition that Elizabeth would give no further shelter to Dutch rebels. In accordance with this he instructed John de Boissot, one of his envoys who was still in England, to demand from the Queen the execution of this condition.³ Elizabeth, having gone so far, could do nothing more than comply. Accordingly on the 16th of April 1575 she issued a proclamation to the effect that Orange and other rebels whom she expressly named should be driven from her realm if they were in it, and that no further traffic should be held with them.⁴

It is hardly to be assumed that Elizabeth seriously meant to live up to the letter of this proclamation. She issued it as part of the terms of her agreement with Requesens, after reiterated demands on the part of his agents. But she had by no means reached the point in her *rapprochement* towards Spain where she was willing to abandon the cause of the Dutch rebels altogether.

And yet the relations between her and William of Orange were

¹ Lettenhove, vii. 402.

² De Guaras to Zayas, 7 Nov. 1574, *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 404.

³ Requesens to Elizabeth, 21 March 1574-5, Lettenhove, vii. 475.

⁴ Ibid. 489.

certainly strained. The Prince had already begun to despair of getting any effective assistance from her. He had sent Calvart, one of his agents, to England in January 1575 to lay his desperate case before her.¹ The proclamation against him had followed in April and, although it was not issued with that intent, it looked very much like Elizabeth's answer to his appeals.

In consequence he dispatched two of his agents to France in May to see if assistance could not be got from that quarter.² Elizabeth heard of this and was by no means pleased.

At about the same time another event occurred which provoked her still further against the Prince.

The second result of Wilson's mission had been that Requesens granted the English merchants permission to carry on their trade freely up the river Scheldt to Antwerp. Now Orange was doing his best to check the trade up the Scheldt in order to prevent the Spaniards from receiving supplies and reinforcements by sea. In May 1574 he had put forth an edict forbidding trade with Flanders altogether, but subsequently he had modified this somewhat and granted licences to trade, under certain limitations, to merchants who were willing to pay for them. Consequently when a fleet of English merchantmen, without licence, attempted in March 1575 to make sail up the Scheldt they were stopped and held at Flushing.³ Probably if Orange had not just about given up all hope of receiving aid from England he never would have countenanced an act so well calculated to stir up Elizabeth's resentment. As it was he not only countenanced it but he set about justifying it, and made no motion to release the ships.⁴

Because of this and because of his dealings with France he got Elizabeth into a fine rage. She stormed violently against the Dutch and against all their abettors in the English Council. Walsingham came in for his share of it. Early in June she wrote to Orange telling him that if he did not give her instant satisfaction she would be obliged to take steps little to his liking.⁵ At the same time she sent Dr. Daniel Rogers to Holland to demand the release of the ships forthwith. Rogers was also instructed to

¹ Orange to Burghley, 26 Jan. 1574-5, Lettenhove, vii. 424.

² Cf. Chester to Burghley, 8 July 1575, *ibid.* 543.

³ Wilson to Orange, 27 March 1575, *ibid.* 477.

⁴ Rogers to Burghley, 29 Aug. 1575, *ibid.* 562.

⁵ Elizabeth to Orange, 7 June 1575, *ibid.* 530.

tell Orange that she knew all about his dealings with France and that she considered them perilous to her estate. If they went any further she would join with Spain against him.¹

But Orange was in too desperate a situation in the summer of 1575 to be coerced by threats. He told Rogers that he was sorry about the ships but that he was obliged to maintain his blockade at all hazards. As for the French he frankly admitted that he had appealed to them for assistance, but he pointed out that Elizabeth had left him no choice. Had she been willing to help him he might have got on without the French. As it was he was forced to look for support wherever he could find it. His tone was gentle, friendly, even mildly regretful, but the substance of his answer was that Elizabeth had lost any claim she might have had to dictate his course of action to him.²

The effect of his resolute attitude upon Elizabeth was, curiously enough, to cool her temper and to increase her fears. There is very little reason to suppose that the French King contemplated any active intervention in behalf of the Dutch at this time, yet Elizabeth seems to have been more concerned about that than about any other factor in the situation. One is tempted to believe that Walsingham and other friends of the Dutch around the Queen were playing adroitly upon her fears. Anyway she reached the conclusion that she must either help Orange herself or prepare to see the French do so. Neither alternative appealed to her at all. The only way out of the predicament at all satisfactory to herself was to arrange a peace between the rebels and their sovereign. With that end in view she dispatched Sir Henry Cobham to Madrid in August and late in October sent two envoys to the Low Countries—one Robert Corbet to the Spanish governor, the other John Hastings to Orange. The substance of her message to the Spaniards was to urge upon them the necessity of coming to terms with the rebels. She offered her services as a mediator; but she called their attention to the fact that Orange was negotiating with the French, and she plainly intimated that sooner than see the French come in she would help the rebels herself.³ Her tone

¹ Instructions for Dr. Rogers, 8 June 1575, Lettenhove, vii. 531.

² Cf. Rogers's Correspondence, July-Sept. 1575, Lettenhove, vii, *passim*.

³ Cobham's instructions are dated early in July 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 199; but de Guaras says that he did not leave England till late in August.

both to Philip and to his governor came near to being menacing. To Orange she spoke in milder terms. Hastings was directed to point out to him how unlikely it was that the French would lend him effective aid. He was to show why she could not risk a war with Spain in his behalf, but to express her affectionate interest in his welfare and to explain what steps she had taken to arrange a peace between him and his sovereign.¹

Both Corbet and Hastings had performed their missions and were back in England early in January 1576. Corbet reported that Requesens was very willing to accept Elizabeth's offers of mediation provided that the matter of religious freedom was not broached.² Hastings had found the Prince somewhat sceptical upon the subject of mediation. He could not treat, he said, upon any terms which did not admit freedom of religion, and upon that point he was sure the Spaniards would not yield. He besought the Queen to come at once to his assistance.³

Along with Hastings Orange sent an embassy to press his demands for aid. The principal members of this embassy were Philip de Marnix de St. Aldegonde, the Prince's most trusted adviser, and Paul Buys, the Advocate General of Holland. They were prepared to offer to the Queen the sovereignty of the Low Countries with all the revenues thereto appertaining. If she refused this they meant to ask for an immediate loan of £100,000.⁴

At just about the same time Cobham got back from Spain. He reported that Philip had kept him waiting over a month for audience, had received him with marked coolness, had discredited Elizabeth's offer of mediation, and in general had shown himself far from friendly.⁵

Elizabeth now had all the data in her own hands which she needed in order to shape her policy. She knew how Philip felt towards her; she knew the attitude of Requesens. Orange in pretty plain terms was giving her a choice between assisting him

(*Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 419.) Corbet's instructions, dated 29 Oct. 1575, are in Lettenhove, viii. 2.

¹ Hastings's instructions, same date, *ibid.* 10.

² Corbet to the Council, 2 Dec. 1575, *ibid.* 82.

³ Hastings to Burghley, 2 Dec. 1575, *ibid.* 59.

⁴ The instructions of these envoys are missing. The substance of them may be gathered in Herle to Burghley, 11 March 1575-6, *ibid.* 250.

⁵ Cf. Cobham to Burghley, 14 Nov. 1575, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 452, and *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 510.

and watching the French do so. It was obvious to the Queen as well as to all her councillors that she must come to some prompt decision.

She was frightened by the awful necessity of making up her mind. It looked as if war was waiting for her either way. If she decided in favour of Orange, war with Spain; if against him, war with France. 'Her Majesty is troubled with these causes,' wrote Henry Talbot on the 4th of January, 'which maketh her very melancholy, and seemeth greatly to be out of quiet.'¹ De Guaras wrote that when she heard that St. Aldegonde and his partisans were coming over, she cried out that they were ruining her over this business, and rushed into her chamber and slammed the door, and would not even let her ladies-in-waiting enter until they threatened to break the door down.²

But there was no escape from the situation behind bolted doors, and so Elizabeth called her council together and submitted the matter to them. For a time the Council met every day.³ They discussed the question from every possible angle. Leicester and Bedford, Knollys and Mildmay, the acknowledged Protestant wing of the Council, as we should expect, spoke in favour of assisting the rebels. Nicholas Bacon, though opposed to open war with Spain on the ground of lack of resources, nevertheless recommended that the Prince of Orange be secretly assisted.⁴ Even Burghley, always cautious, came to the conclusion that it would be dangerous to allow either Spain or France, and specially France, to dominate in the Netherlands. He advised, therefore, that assistance be rendered either underhand or openly, suggesting that the realm be made ready for the event of a possible war with either Spain or France, or with both combined.⁵

Walsingham's opinion, which he expressed at some length, is more to the purpose. He wasted no time with disputing this way and that. He thought that the only safe course was to recognize Philip of Spain as an enemy and deal with him as such. He said that he hesitated to give his voice for war, because he knew that wars were inevitably mischievous and the outcome of them uncertain. Nevertheless he believed that oftentimes it

¹ Lodge, *Illustrations*, &c., ii. 59.

³ Lodge, ii. 59.

⁵ *Ibid.*; cf. also *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 439.

² *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 433.

⁴ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 550.

was more dangerous to avoid war than to seek it. Wars grounded on ambition he heartily opposed, but wars 'that are grounded on necessity, not for sovereignty but for safety, not to enlarge but to retain', he conceived to be just and right. And so he believed the present case to be. It was well known, he said, that a league had been formed among the Catholic princes at Trent, 'for the rooting out by violence of all such as professed the gospel'. It was known likewise that the Duke of Alva had been sent to the Netherlands not only to repress troubles there, but also, things there being settled, to invade England as 'the appointed executor of the said confederacy in this part of Europe'. Nay, more, it was certain that the King of Spain had already taken steps to this end by tampering with disaffected subjects in England. His high-handed treatment of English merchants in Spain and his open threats against England made still more evident the nature of his disposition towards her. 'What juster cause', Walsingham inquired, 'can a Prince that maketh profession of the Gospel have to enter into wars than when he seeth confederacies made for the rooting out of the Gospel and religion he professeth. All creatures are created to advance God's glory; therefore, when His glory is called in question, no league nor policy can excuse if by all means he seek not the defence of the same, yea, with the loss of life.'

But Walsingham was well aware that all these high-flown religious arguments would carry little weight with Elizabeth, and so he proceeded to consider and meet her chief objections. He knew that she was opposed on principle to assisting rebels, and so he set forth at large the history of the struggle in the Netherlands to prove that the Dutch were not, so to speak, rebels, but patriots fighting for their lawful privileges.¹

To sum up all his arguments, he maintained that it was wise and proper to help the rebels, that the Spaniards were confessed enemies of England, and that their presence in the Netherlands was a menace, not only to the integrity of the realm, but also to the Protestant religion, and so should be dealt with sword in hand.

¹ Cf. S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxxxvi, f. 461. This paper is not signed nor dated, but it is obvious from the context that it belongs to just about this time. The handwriting appears to be that of one of Walsingham's secretaries, and the sentiments expressed make it probable that he was the author of it.

But the Council did not follow Walsingham in his argument. The more conservative element, supported doubtless by the Queen herself, won the day, and the advice which they submitted to Elizabeth on the 16th of January was in favour of further procrastination. They agreed that the Netherlands should be secured in their ancient privileges. They agreed that the absolute supremacy of Philip in the Netherlands would be a positive menace to England. But they thought it wiser for the Queen to try once more to re-establish peace between the King of Spain and his rebellious subjects. If she was again unsuccessful, then she ought to seek some other remedy.¹

This response was very much to Elizabeth's liking if only because it saved her from the necessity of an immediate decision. In accordance with it the Dutch envoys were informed that the Queen had decided to try for peace once more.² It seems probable that some kind of assurance was given them that in case this new effort at mediation failed Elizabeth would come to their assistance.³ At any rate they were persuaded to linger on in England, though Walsingham told them frankly that in his opinion they would simply be wasting their time.⁴

But whatever Elizabeth's ultimate intentions were it was clearly her immediate purpose to convey the impression that she was favourably inclined to assist the Dutch. Late in January Burghley told de Guaras flatly that the Queen would not tolerate any encroachment upon the ancient privileges of the Netherlands either by the French or the Spanish—foreign intruders he called them. When de Guaras objected to the phrase, Burghley replied angrily, 'You people are of a sort that wherever you set foot no grass grows and you are hated everywhere.' He swore that the Dutch were entirely justified in taking up arms. 'From this conversation', de Guaras wrote, 'it may be concluded that they have agreed with Orange, and if no change is made in their intention they will help the rebels secretly. If, however, they see Orange in danger of complete defeat and ruin they will aid him openly.'⁵ De Guaras was certainly mistaken when he assumed that matters between Elizabeth and the Dutch had gone so far as that. But to Spanish eyes the situation looked

¹ Lettenhove, viii. 121.

² Ibid. 118.

³ Ibid. 127 ff.

⁴ Cf. *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, no. 668.

⁵ *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 439.

grave, and Requesens in the Low Countries came to the conclusion that something must be done.

Accordingly he dispatched an envoy, the *Sieur de Champagny*, Governor of Antwerp and one of the leading noblemen in the Low Countries, to Elizabeth on the 12th of January 1576. Champagny was instructed to tell the Queen that Requesens had heard that she meant to assist the Dutch rebels with money and men. He was to ask her point blank—yes or no—if this was true. If she answered no, he was to demand that she give her assurance to that effect in writing. If she answered yes, no matter with what qualifying phrases, he was to tell her plainly that her answer meant war.¹

Champagny was delayed by storms at sea and did not reach England until the 24th of January.² When he did arrive he met with a cool reception. When he asked for an audience with the Queen he was put off with one excuse after another. Even Burghley hesitated to speak with him and wrote to ask Elizabeth whether he had not better make his gout an excuse.³ Those with whom Champagny did confer spent their time in dilating on the grievances of the English against Spain and on the righteousness of the Dutch cause.⁴ He began to despair of accomplishing anything. 'When all is said,' he wrote to Requesens on January 31st, 'after my commission is discharged I believe it will be time wasted to tarry here longer, for it is easy to conjecture that their malice is sifted and kneaded and all ready for the baking, wherefore I desire nothing more from your excellency than permission to return as soon as possible, for my longer tarrying will seem only for a mockery.'⁵

On the 5th of February Champagny finally had audience. Elizabeth did not receive him very graciously. She complained that she had received no letters from the King of Spain in answer to Cobham's embassy. She vehemently defended her reception of the Dutch envoys. Then she began to storm against the Spaniards and swore that she would never allow them to

¹ Champagny's instructions, 12 Jan. 1576, Lettenhove, viii. 99.

² Champagny to Requesens, 24 Jan. 1575-6, *ibid.* 133.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 27 Jan. 1575-6, S. P. Domestic, Eliz., cvii, no. 28.

⁴ Champagny to Requesens, 31 Jan. 1575-6, Lettenhove, viii. 151.

⁵ *Ibid.*

impatronize themselves in the Low Countries. When Champagny ventured to interject something about the neighbourliness of the King she interrupted him abruptly. 'Yes,' she exclaimed, 'I know all about that. Your master's intention is to draw a girdle around my realm, thinking that he has only to do with a woman, and that the English are a nation of women. My father would never have allowed you to go so far as you have done, and I, woman that I am, will know how to look to it.' Then after a little she changed her tactics and stormed with equal fervour against the Dutch, calling them pirates and malefactors and breeders of sedition. Then, in a gentler vein, she spoke of her obligations to the King of Spain and smiled as if in mockery of what she had said before. In consequence she left Champagny in a pretty chaotic state of mind.¹

He took occasion in conference with Leicester some days later to say some pretty plain things which he had not ventured to say to the Queen herself. He told Leicester that the Queen must stop lending assistance to the rebels, that it was not for her to sit in judgement on his master's treatment of his subjects. His master most emphatically would not tolerate it. When Leicester tried to draw him into discussion about the matter, Champagny answered that he had already expressed himself to the Queen, and all that he wanted to know was, in unvarnished terms, whether she meant to stand by her treaty obligations to the King of Spain, or whether she meant to help the rebels.²

If we are to believe Champagny's own report these plain words had their effect. He said that Leicester repeated them to Elizabeth and that they led her to alter her opinion somewhat about giving aid to the rebels. In further speech with Leicester and with Sussex Champagny found them less violent and more inclined to discuss the question dispassionately.³

The fact of the matter, however, appears to be that Elizabeth followed a well-defined course of action in her dealings with Champagny from the first. She wished to convince him that there was imminent danger that she would assist the Dutch if the King of Spain did not come to terms with them. From that

¹ Champagny to Requesens, 5 Feb. 1575-6, Lettenhove, viii. 157.

² Same to same, 11 Feb. 1575-6, *ibid.* 170.

³ Same to same, 15 Feb. 1575-6, *ibid.* 174.

point she led up by degrees to her plea for mediation. The attitude of her councillors therefore grew more friendly towards Champagny as time went on.¹ On the 2nd of March she summoned him to a private audience and received him with a cordiality which bordered on familiarity. She bade him draw up a chair and sit down and talk over the whole matter with her as a friend. She swore that not a living soul, *non pas sa propre chemise*, should know what he said. And in that vein she proposed to him her project of mediation. It is not impossible that she hoped to discover in Champagny himself some latent antagonism to the Spanish rule in the Low Countries. But he apparently failed to respond to her advances, and he told some of her councillors later that he wanted a plain answer to his plain question.

In consequence Elizabeth felt constrained to give him some kind of an answer. She sent him one on the 3rd of March formally written in Latin. In it she said that she would not assist the Dutch if the King made them fair offers of peace in accordance with their ancient privileges. If he did not she would have to consult the interests of the people.² In a word she refused to give a categorical answer. She said neither yes nor no—she proposed mediation once more.

That was the sum and substance of the message which Champagny carried back with him to the Low Countries at the end of March.

Walsingham never apparently concerned himself very much with Champagny's mission. It is true that along with Burghley, Leicester, and Sussex he formed one of a select committee which Elizabeth appointed to deal with Requesens' envoy, but the part which he played on that committee seems to have been in the main a perfunctory one. Champagny regarded him as his chief opponent in the council of the Queen. On the 15th of March Champagny wrote to Requesens that there was some talk of sending Walsingham over to France. 'From our point of view', he added, 'he is the worst man who could be sent. Our friends are even trying to get him dismissed. . . . I hear that the

¹ Hatton at the Queen's command entertained Champagny on rather a magnificent scale, Champagny to Requesens, 3 March 1575-6, Lettenhove, viii. 221.

² Lettenhove, viii. 227.

Queen has said that he favours more the Calvinists or Puritans than those who counsel for her welfare as I do.' ¹

Again he wrote on the 17th of March, 'Walsingham is not so much a Calvinist as a Puritan—or even worse. He is hostile to foreigners and self seeking.' ²

If Champagny is to be believed Walsingham made himself very unpopular with the Queen by his firm attitude in support of the Dutch rebels. 'He had words with the Queen of England', Champagny wrote again, 'about my negotiations, whereupon the Queen, speaking in my defence, got very angry, and gave him such a browbeating that he went to complain to Leicester.' ³ And again, 'The Queen spoke very bitterly to Walsingham, and was so provoked that she struck one or two of her women.' ⁴ Of course Champagny's testimony must be taken with a grain of salt. Elizabeth was trying her best to convince him of her friendly disposition towards his master, and storming at Walsingham and boxing the ears of ladies-in-waiting may simply have been the methods she selected for displaying her earnestness. Nevertheless, even if her anger was only simulated, the fact that she directed it against Walsingham and that Champagny regarded this as a good sign is sufficient to define Walsingham's attitude towards Anglo-Dutch affairs at this juncture.

While Elizabeth was playing her game with Champagny, the envoys of the Prince of Orange remained in England and laboured manfully to win her support to their policy. There is good reason to believe that some of the Queen's privy councillors were secretly encouraging their hopes. Leicester evidently favoured a policy of active intervention in behalf of the Dutch, and Walsingham was undoubtedly of his way of thinking. There is some reason to believe that the Earl of Sussex also threw his influence on the same side.⁵ Burghley, on the other hand, stood opposed. If the whole story were known it would probably appear that a good deal of the Queen's uncertainty at this juncture is to be accounted for by the conflict of opinion among her own councillors.

¹ Lettenhove, viii. 265.

² Ibid. 275. This letter contains some interesting comments on several members of the Privy Council.

³ Lettenhove, viii. 265.

⁴ Ibid. 288.

⁵ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, no. 668.

Champagny certainly believed this to be the case. He observed, for example, indications of a sharp disagreement between Burghley and Walsingham. 'It is held here', he wrote, 'that Burghley is wary of Walsingham, who begins to encroach far upon his credit. Walsingham is young while Burghley is much troubled with the gout and with other ills.'¹

Possibly Champagny attached more importance to court gossip than it deserved, but Walsingham and Burghley clearly held divergent views upon the Dutch question, and it is not unlikely that Burghley resented a little the opposition of his quondam protégé. In any event Champagny's observation is interesting, for it reveals almost the first trace of a breach between the Lord Treasurer and the Secretary which was to grow wider as time went on.²

Evidently at this particular juncture Elizabeth preferred Burghley's temporizing policy before the more vigorous and dangerous course which Leicester and Walsingham advocated. Yet the envoys of the Prince of Orange were encouraged to believe that her mood might change. St. Aldegonde, it is certain, held secret conferences with the Queen on several occasions, and there is good reason to believe that during the months of February and March a good deal of assistance in the form of munitions of war was sent to Orange underhand.³ More than that the Dutch could not get. When they pressed Elizabeth for the loan of £100,000 she bade them wait until Parliament had assembled. When Parliament had assembled, and the question of assisting the rebels came up in the Commons for consideration, she promptly quashed the debate.⁴

Early in March Paul Buys went to William Herle, an agent of Burghley's, and complained bitterly of the treatment they had received. The Queen, he said, had sent for them, had virtually promised to assist them, and had ended by telling them that while she would do nothing more for them than offer her services as a mediator, they must on no account seek aid from the French. It was only left to them, he concluded bitterly, to 'depart without thanks, and yet threatened also if they do not

¹ Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, iii. 848; cf. on this subject *E. H. R.*, xxviii, p. 37, n. 15.

² *E. H. R.*, xxviii, p. 39 ff.

³ Cf. de Guaras on this subject in *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, *passim*.

⁴ Champagny to Requesens, 10 March 1575-6, Lettenhove, viii. 245.

voluntarily yield their own throats to be cut at the arbitrament of others.' ¹

But all this availed nothing. A little later Buys asked the Queen to advance £30,000 underhand.² He did not get it, and in the end he and his colleagues left England with no warmer comfort than a bare promise of mediation.³

Walsingham's sympathetic attitude towards the demand of the Dutch envoys was undoubted. The fact was so patent to every one at the English court that it is surprising to discover that in the Low Countries some of the followers of the Prince of Orange regarded him with distrust. Daniel Rogers had seen signs of this when he was in the Low Countries in the summer of 1575, and he had attributed it to French intrigue. Under Walsingham's direction Rogers had complained to Orange about the matter and Orange had assured him that he regarded Walsingham as 'the chiefest friend he had in England'.⁴

There is no good reason to believe that the Prince did not mean what he said. In fact he directed St. Aldegonde and his colleagues when he sent them to England in January to put themselves in Walsingham's hands.⁵ On that account it is surprising to find very little evidence of any direct dealings between them and him during their sojourn in England. Such evidence as there is is provokingly obscure, but it reveals the fact not only that he was in constant touch with them, but also that much more passed between him and them than ever appeared in their formal negotiations at the English court. The Dutch envoys themselves declared that he was the one man in the English council who had dealt honestly with them, since he had told them from the first that they were merely wasting their time in England.⁶ But he possibly told them even more than that. There is some reason to believe that he advised them secretly that the best way to secure help from England was to arrange for help from France.⁷

¹ Herle to Burghley, 23 March 1575-6, Lettenhove, viii. 296.

² Same to same, 20 March 1575-6, *ibid.* viii. 290.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Lettenhove, vii. 565.

⁵ *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, no. 468; but cf. no. 469, in which Orange also commends his envoys to Burghley's care.

⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 668.

⁷ The evidence in support of this surmise lies first in the fact that Walsingham indubitably gave advice of this sort later (cf. *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, no. 1007. The original manuscript of this paper, in S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxl, no. 869, is in Walsingham's own hand); second, in a curiously obscure letter

If this was so it must be admitted that Walsingham's sympathies with the Dutch Protestants were leading him into a course dangerously near double dealing with his sovereign. Possibly Elizabeth suspected something of the sort. That may be the underlying reason for her evident animosity towards Walsingham at this juncture. It may also explain why Burghley began to cherish a distrust of him.

In any case the official policy of the English government was for the time being to be that of attempting mediation between the rebels and the Spanish King. With that end in view William Davison, an ardent Protestant and a close friend of Walsingham, was dispatched to the Low Countries late in March. He was

which M. Calvart, one of the Prince of Orange's intimates, wrote to Walsingham, 31 Jan. 1576. (Printed in Lettenhove, viii. 153.) The original of this letter is in French. It is imperfectly calendared in *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, no. 591. The gist of it is as follows: 'In accordance with the resolution which your Honour took with M. de St. Aldegonde on the question of sending to Holland about the point of which your Honour knows, it has been found good that I should make the voyage. I do not know how much good it will do, for although, with your usual good will, you have answered and advised roundly according to the necessities of our affairs, yet it seems to me that we do not make so much profit of it as we ought, and out of all reason we conceive new hopes, based upon the statements of those who do not see to the bottom of the bag. . . . I humbly pray you (according to that which M. de St. Aldegonde has written you) to continue to advise us as often as you think it necessary, and also to notify me of anything which can give greater confirmation to the reason for my voyage, the which if you do not wish to do by writing, you can dispatch by M. de Villiers.' In attempting to fathom out the meaning of this letter it must be borne in mind that the Estates of the province of Holland were evidently much more disposed to seek help from England than the Prince of Orange was. They had, indeed, appealed to Elizabeth without the knowledge of the Prince some time before. (*Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, no. 425.) It is not unlikely that the mission of Calvart to Holland mentioned in the letter just cited was designed to dissuade the province from hopes of English assistance by direct appeal. When it is recalled that Calvart belonged to that group around the Prince who favoured an alliance with France rather than with England, it may be conjectured that Walsingham was urging the Prince and the Hollanders both to exploit Elizabeth's fears of French intervention. At any rate it is clear enough from Calvart's letter that Walsingham was involved in some sort of secret intrigue with him.

It is rather surprising to discover that on the 23rd of February 1576 Walsingham went to visit Mauvissière, the French ambassador, early in the morning and talked with him for almost four hours on Dutch affairs. Walsingham told Mauvissière that he favoured a marriage between Alençon and Elizabeth as a condition of which France and England were to intervene jointly in the Low Countries and Holland and Zealand were to come with Alençon as a marriage portion. (Cf. Mauvissière to Henry III, 29 Feb. 1576, P. R. O. French Transcripts, Bundle 27.) Probably these remarks were simply designed to feel out the French position in the whole matter or to discourage independent action in the Low Countries by Alençon.

instructed to demand from the Spanish government and from the Prince of Orange a cessation of arms pending negotiations for peace, and to threaten each one in turn that she would join forces with the other if they refused.¹

Shortly before Davison's departure from England, Don Luis de Requesens, the Spanish governor in the Low Countries, died, and the powers of his office passed into the hands of his Council of State. It was to them that Davison presented the Queen's demands early in April. They replied that they could not make any answer until they had consulted with the King their master. In consequence Davison's mission came to nothing.² Walsingham had expected no less. 'I do not look that Mr. Davison shall have any good answer,' he wrote to Burghley on the 12th of April. 'In this case words will not help. It is too publicly known that her Majesty meaneth not to be a dealer. If it might have been held in suspense it might have brought forth some good effect.'³ In a word, as Walsingham implied, Elizabeth's threats had been worn threadbare. Men had got so used to hearing them that they were no longer frightened.

Apparently, however, the Queen was not staking on the effect of her threats alone. The death of Requesens had left the Low Countries in a state of considerable confusion. It was not certainly known what would happen, but there were some grounds for the opinion that the nobles in the Low Countries, even those that were Catholic, would take advantage of the occasion to stand on terms with Spain. Doubtless one of the reasons which led Elizabeth to send over Davison when she did was a desire to find out just what the state of affairs in the Low Countries was, and, if the chance offered, to fish in troubled waters. Walsingham himself, it appears, counted on this also to some extent. On the 23rd of April he wrote to Davison ordering him to return home. 'I cannot mislike her Majesty's revocation of you,' he added. 'I find by your letters that there is neither courage nor judgment in the nobility there, in that they overslip so apt a time to purchase their own liberty, who, contrary to all reason, do prosecute the wars against the Prince

¹ Davison's instructions, 29 March 1576, Lettenhove, viii. 303.

² Davison to Walsingham, 16 April 1576, *ibid.* 344.

³ B.M. Harl. MSS. 6992, 23.

with more extremity than the Commendator [Requesens] did. Whereby it is most evident that that country is in his declination and will shortly fall under the Spanish yoke to their utter undoing and our great peril, having an eye either to the Spanish malice or the corruption of our own estate. Our sins will no longer suffer us to nestle in this our long continued security.' ¹

The failure of Davison's mission had little effect apparently upon Elizabeth's attitude towards the Low Countries. The measures which she had threatened to take in case Davison returned with an unfavourable answer she did not take. She did not even make a pretence of taking them. Quite the contrary, she very soon got into trouble with the Dutch on another score, to such an extent that it seemed for a while as though she would take up arms against them, instead of in their favour.

This trouble arose in consequence of the depredations which the Sea Beggars of Holland were making upon commerce in the English Channel. In part these depredations were purely piratical attacks; in part they represented the attempts of the Dutch to maintain a blockade of Antwerp, Ghent, and the other ports on the Scheldt in possession of the Spaniards. The piracies of course were deplored by the Dutch, and Orange himself made some rather ineffectual attempts to stop them. The question of the blockade was a matter upon which the Prince and Elizabeth took different sides. Orange claimed the right to blockade the ports of the enemy, or at least to collect a tribute from all vessels trading to those ports, and to dictate what kind of commodities they should carry. Elizabeth denied this right. Trouble had arisen, it will be remembered, over this matter once before, but Orange had practically carried his point and had only admitted the right of the English merchants to trade with the Spaniards under special licence from him. Of course this was not at all to the Queen's liking, nor to the liking of her merchants, but they accepted the conditions because they could do no better. The real difficulty was that Orange was not strong enough to maintain an effective blockade. Consequently, many English merchantmen contrived to slip in and out of the Scheldt without so much as a 'by your leave' to Orange. Some of them were caught and

¹ S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxxxviii, f. 647. (Lettenhove prints this letter, viii. 357, with verbal mistakes.)

disposed of by the Dutch Admiralty as fair spoil. Elizabeth complained to the Prince on several occasions and threatened reprisals, but he put her off with vague promises or with protestations against what he maintained to be the illegal trading of the English.

Finally, in the spring of 1576, the Queen determined to take matters into her own hands, and she ordered the seizure of several Dutch ships which were in English harbours at the time. Orange at once retorted by the detention at Flushing of the Merchant Adventurers' fleet, bound for Antwerp. When Elizabeth protested the Prince replied that he did it for the security of the Dutch ships arrested in England. This answer put the Queen in a stormy rage, and she at once dispatched Robert Beale, Walsingham's brother-in-law, to Orange to demand that the ships be released instantly.¹

Beale was dispatched on the 17th of April 1576.² He carried with him a letter to Orange signed by Burghley, Leicester, Sussex, and Walsingham, in which they protested vigorously against the treatment of the English merchantmen by the Flushingers, and advised the Prince to see these grievances redressed at once if he did not wish to suffer the full measure of the Queen's wrath.

It is plain that not only the Queen, but also her Council, even those friendly to the cause of the Dutch, were greatly irritated by the arrest of the English ships. Walsingham told Beale plainly that if the Dutch continued to interfere with English trade 'by arrest and otherwise' the Queen had made up her mind to join the King of Spain against them. 'This,' he said, 'you may assure the Prince from me, will fall out to be true.'³

But in spite of these warnings Orange continued to stand on terms. Instead of releasing the ships he handed Beale a long list of grievances which Dutch merchantmen had suffered at the hands of the English.⁴ A little later he told Beale that the English ships would be detained until the Dutch ships arrested in England were released. 'I do what I can', Beale wrote to Walsingham, 'to get an answer and to be dispatched, and when I am earnest with St. Aldegonde about it, I have no answer but

¹ Beale's instructions, 16 April 1576, Lettenhove, viii. 339.

² Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 25.

³ Walsingham to Beale, 11 May 1576, B.M. Egerton MSS. 1694, f. 3.

⁴ Memoir of Orange, 7 May 1576, Lettenhove, viii. 375.

that such things cannot be resolved in so short a time, and I must have such patience as they had in England. Briefly, I see that they make no account of us, but that they are turned all to France.' ¹

The attitude of the Prince naturally exasperated both Elizabeth and her councillors beyond measure. Walsingham himself was greatly provoked.

'Both your letters and the letters I received from St. Aldegonde', he wrote to Beale on the 28th of May, 'do give me great cause to doubt that without the giving of some piece of money our ships under arrest are not like to be released, which means of proceeding of theirs will marvellously exasperate her Majesty against them and draw her to make herself a party perforce against them. Surely men's minds here generally, even they that were best affected towards them, are greatly aliened from them through their barbarous manner of dealing. I am sorry that you have cause to stay so long amongst them. Touching the hope they seem to have of relief by France, they shall find themselves therein altogether deceived, for the King's poverty there is so great as he is no way able to deal withal; and as for Monsieur and they of the Religion, without her Majesty's consent, they protest they will not deal withal. Duke Casimir hath made the like protestation, so that now, if they do think well of the matter, having no relief by France, and drawing on them the hatred of England, they cannot but evidently see their own ruin at hand. But with unreasonable men, no reason that can be showed will prevail. Their villainous behaviour deserveth a present plague which cannot be long deferred. I would it might be without our peril.' ²

But the trouble was that it might not be 'without our peril'. Indignant as the Queen and her councillors were at the conduct of the Prince, they could not help seeing that if he fell a prey to the Spaniards, England was bound to suffer for it in the long run. The danger from French interference, which Elizabeth greatly feared, in spite of Walsingham's affirmations to the

¹ Lettenhove, viii. 385. Mauvissière wrote to Henry III, 24th of June 1576, that Beale had informed Elizabeth that Orange had sent envoys to the Duke of Alençon, which news, Mauvissière said, 'a mis bien estroit le feu soubz le ventre de la dicte Royne . . . considerant fort bien que la Flessingue, ses ysles et autres portz et havres de ce coste là brideroyent trop estroitement, ez mains d'un grand Prince, l'Angleterre, s'il ne vouloit vivre en parfaicte amitié avec eux, pour le commerce et traffique qui yest presque forcé et necessaire.' (P. R. O. French Transcripts, Bundle 27.)

² B.M. Egerton MSS. 1694, f. 12.

contrary, was scarcely less apparent. Wherefore, although Elizabeth was determined to have the merchant ships set free, she did not venture to push Orange to the wall. In June she dispatched William Winter to the Prince with orders to secure the release of the ships by hook or crook, but Winter was charged to proceed rather by persuasion than by threats. He did not go with the peremptory message which has sometimes been attributed to him.¹ It was not until every other method of appeal had been tried in vain that he was to denounce the Queen's speedy vengeance upon the Dutch.²

Winter left England on the 22nd of June. On the 20th of July Edward Chester wrote to Burghley that the ships with their cargoes had been released.³ Six days afterwards Winter and Beale returned to England together.⁴ They had made an agreement with Orange by which he promised to release the ships of the Merchant Adventurers taken at Flushing and also certain other ships which had been detained in various Dutch ports. In return Winter had promised to release certain Dutch ships which had been arrested in English ports.

On the face of it this appears to have been just what Elizabeth was after. But there was more to it than showed on the face, and this came out when Winter and Beale made their report to Elizabeth. The Merchant Adventurers had been dealing with Orange on their own account through Dr. Rogers, and had agreed to loan the Prince 253,000 florins if he would release their ships. Orange had taken them at their bargain, and it was on this account that he had yielded to the persuasions of the English envoys.⁵

The results of Winter's mission were consequently far from satisfactory to Elizabeth. She openly declared that she would be avenged upon Orange for his excesses, she ordered that Dutch ships in English harbours should be seized, and she granted Letters of Reprisal right and left on Dutch commerce.⁶ For

¹ Cf. Froude, xi, p. 62.

² Winter's instructions, 19 June 1576, Lettenhove, viii. 399.

³ Lettenhove, viii. 413.

⁴ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 26.

⁵ This agreement is printed in Lettenhove, viii. 417.

⁶ Cf. instructions of Taffin, sent over by Orange later to justify his conduct. (Lettenhove, viii. 467.) Cf. also de Guaras to Zayas, 28 July 1576. (*Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 448.) Froude makes no mention of this transaction.

a time something very like a state of war existed between England and the Dutch. Seizures were made on both sides. Ships were arrested and merchants imprisoned.

And yet, even in the very heat of her wrath, Elizabeth did not wish to push matters to extremes. Although she was taking every measure short of open war against Orange, she was too much afraid that he would call in the French to his aid, to let him believe that he could look for nothing except unkindness from England. On the 7th of August William Herle, one of Burghley's semi-official agents, wrote a letter to Edward Chester, an Englishman in the Low Countries, close in the counsels of the Dutch. He told Chester that Elizabeth was so moved at the insolent dealings of Orange and the Zealanders that she meant to revenge herself upon them and 'to exterminate them out of the world rather than endure it any longer'. He advised Chester to let Orange know that he could hope for nothing from the French, and that he must not think that Elizabeth was obliged by necessity to help him. Nevertheless, Chester was to say that if Orange would excuse these former foul acts and spoils, praying the Queen to attribute them to necessity and not to any malice, and would promise that no such acts should be committed in the future, the Prince's friends in England that favour his cause would join together to qualify the Queen's just displeasure, so that no doubt he would be reconciled again and some means be found to help him underhand.¹

This letter in itself, written by such a man as Herle, would not seem to be of particular significance. But Herle did not write it on his own account. He wrote it at the dictation of Elizabeth and Walsingham.² Consequently it throws much light upon the attitude of the Queen towards the cause of the Dutch at this time. From it we may read that Elizabeth was so much afraid that Orange would call in the French to his aid that she was willing to pass over what had happened, provided he gave her assurance that the like would not happen again.

It was probably in consequence of a hint from Chester that St. Aldegonde wrote a long letter to Walsingham on the 24th of

¹ Lettenhove, viii. 423.

² Herle himself says this in a letter to Burghley of the 18th of October 1576, *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 426.

August in which he sought in humble terms to extenuate the conduct of the Prince.¹ Other letters in a similar vein followed from Orange himself to the Queen and to the principal councillors.² They obviously accord with the wishes of Elizabeth as expressed in Herle's letter and, as Herle had promised, they had the desired effect. On the 6th of September Walsingham replied to St. Aldegonde :

' I have received your letter, which has very much pleased me as well as the other Counsellors to whom I have shown it. The modesty and good will which you show in these affairs have gone far to assuage the bitter feelings which they have called forth and have so disposed matters that the memory of all that is passed can yet be buried as something which never saw the light. And you may be sure that so long as it will please you to follow that course and to maintain the same attitude as you display in your letters that everything will come out all right in the end, though there still remains some slight reason for offence because of those things which your followers continue to do day by day.' ³

On the same day Walsingham wrote to Villiers, a Huguenot refugee minister who was serving at the time in Middelburg as a semi-official mediator between the Queen and Orange, that Elizabeth was willing to make certain concessions to the Prince because of the friendlier attitude towards her which he had displayed in his letters, and because of the difficulties in which he found himself. She promised that all Dutch ships which had been seized by the English up to the time when Winter had made his agreement with the Prince should be restored, that no further depredations should be made on Dutch shipping for twenty days, and finally that all Dutch ships seized since Winter's agreement should be restored so soon as she had assurance that English shipping should no longer be molested by the Flushingers. ' This is all ', Walsingham added, ' which I have been able to wring, or I might say to pluck, with much labour, from a heart which has very just cause to be offended. Nevertheless, I intend, although I see small hope of speed, to continue my efforts, provided that the Dutch will conduct themselves in such fashion as to give her Majesty the satisfaction she ought to have and to secure her subjects against the disturbance and molestation of

¹ Lettenhove, viii. 437.

² Ibid. viii. 451, in French.

³ Ibid. viii. 433.

their traffic which they have suffered in the past, and which to my great regret they suffer still.' ¹

Walsingham, in gaining this, had gained something, but at best the Queen had granted little more than an armistice and some hope of better things to come. The main point at issue remained unsettled. It was with a view doubtless to settling them that Walsingham wrote a long letter of advice to the Minister Villiers. In this letter the Secretary, writing it seems unofficially, laid down the lines upon which Orange should proceed in order to satisfy the Queen. He must confess his fault, Walsingham said, in restraining the merchants and exacting a forced loan from them, and he must release them from their contract; he must set free all English ships detained, and he must allow the English ships free traffic to and from the Low Countries. In return for these concessions he might very well ask of the Queen that the Dutch ships held in England be released and be permitted to trade freely with English ports. He might further ask permission from her to restrain the Flemish trade and prevent her merchants from trafficking with the Spaniards. Apparently what Walsingham wanted Orange to do was to yield his right to place restrictions on English trade and then request Elizabeth's permission to impose such restrictions. There was a great deal of difference between a rebel like Orange restraining English trade of his own free will and restraining it by Elizabeth's consent. The first, Walsingham knew, the Queen would never concede; the second, he thought, might be hoped for. Indeed it seems likely that this part of his letter was written at Elizabeth's prompting, because in the end the difficulty was solved in accordance with Walsingham's suggestion.

But this was only part of Walsingham's letter. The rest of it is written in a more intimate style, and the tenor of it shows very clearly that it proceeded from Walsingham himself, not in his capacity of Principal Secretary but in that of an English sympathizer in the cause of Orange.

'In my opinion, therefore,' he proceeded, 'the Prince shall do well to write his letters unto the Lord Treasurer, the Lord Admiral, the Lord Chamberlain, the Earl of Leicester, and to the secretaries jointly, and in the same to lay before them briefly,

¹ Ibid. viii. 452, in French.

first, how sorry he is for the evil opinion which her Majesty has conceived of him; secondarily, that he would be glad to do anything for the recovery of her favour that might stand with his honour and the safety of those whom he hath taken to his protection; thirdly, that he would desire them to be mediators unto her Majesty for the same, appealing to their consciences as men of wisdom and judgment, how much his overthrow importeth her Majesty's peril; fourthly, to lay before them his excuse for his doings . . . and to make it appearent unto them that the same hath been no less void of malice than grounded on necessity. Fifthly, to set down his requests which the necessity of his estate forced him to be an humble suitor unto her Majesty for, without the obtaining whereof he must let them know, with some earnest protestation, that he must either be enforced to abandon the cause by retiring into Germany, or to reconcile himself with Spain upon any conditions, or to yield those countries absolutely into the French King's hands, who if he might have had an absolute offer of them would ere this have received them into his protection. . . . It were convenient that this letter should be sent over by some discreet person and such as here noted to be well affected to this crown.'¹

If this letter were not in Walsingham's own handwriting one would suppose it had been written by an agent of Orange himself in England. Walsingham not only advised Orange how to proceed in order to propitiate Elizabeth and her council, he even suggested that the Prince threaten to call in the French in order to give strength to his plea. It can hardly be said that Walsingham was guilty of treachery to the Queen in writing such a letter as this, but certainly his sympathies with the cause of the Dutch Protestants were leading him far away from his duties as the royal amanuensis.

Throughout this period we get here and there suggestions, in contemporary records, which indicate that he was sending to the Prince secret advice from time to time as to how he should proceed in dealing with the Queen; and sometimes, as in the present case, this advice does not seem to have been dictated by a consideration for or a sympathy with the royal policy. Some inkling of this manner of proceeding reached the ears of his enemies at court, and they used it more than once to his prejudice

¹ S. P. Foreign, Eliz., cxl, f. 869, dated 1576, a draft in Walsingham's hand. The date affixed in the calendar, 7 Nov., does not appear on the original. Probably the paper belongs earlier.

with the Queen. Indeed they even went so far as to say that he had himself advised Orange to detain the fleet of the Merchant Adventurers, a charge which they could not prove, and which he himself indignantly denied, but which nevertheless helped to increase the suspicions which the Queen already entertained as to his loyalty towards her.

'The evening your Lordship departed hence,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 16th of October 1576, 'I had a long talk with her Majesty touching the points wherein she broke with your Lordship before your departure. I found her very well calmed by your Lordship's persuasions and willing enough to hear what I could say. Amongst other informations against me, I gathered by her speech that some have gone about to persuade her that the arrest of the Merchant Adventurers' ships made by the Prince of Orange grew by advice given by me, wherein I protest before God I am as innocent thereof as Guaras. For as I never gave the advice, so did I never allow of the fact. If the advice of others about her, unto other foreign princes that are her enemies, do her no more harm than the advice I gave the Prince, her Majesty shall live long in repose. Thus, your Lordship seeth, that as I am your successor in place, so am I of the hardships you had, to be subject to malicious and slanderous reports. The assurance of God's protection and my own innocency shall, I doubt not, deliver me from the fruits of their malice that are authors of these reports.'¹

It is a pity that Walsingham is not a little more explicit in denouncing his enemies. On such a slender accusation it would be unfair to charge any one specifically, and yet suspicion must fall on those in the Council who were most bitterly opposed to his policy—on the Spanish sympathizers, of whom perhaps Sir James Crofts was the leading figure.

Whoever the enemies of Walsingham were, if they thought to defeat his purpose of reconciling Orange with the Queen they failed utterly. The Prince took Walsingham's advice. He wrote letters to the Council and to the Queen, and he dispatched Taffin, one of his trusted agents, to England late in October with instructions to proceed along practically the same lines as Walsingham had laid down.² It was in this wise that the difficulties between Orange and the Queen were in the end settled, although it must be confessed that the English merchants

¹ B.M. Harl. MSS. 6992, 29.

² Taffin's instructions, 13 Oct. 1576, Lettenhove, viii. 467.

themselves, whose trade was suffering greatly from the unstable condition of affairs, contributed much to bring matters to a satisfactory conclusion.¹

Meanwhile the course of events in the Low Countries produced a situation there which altered very materially the whole character of Elizabeth's problem in dealing with them. It will be recalled that Don Luis de Requesens, the Spanish governor, died on the 4th of March 1576. In April Philip II named as his successor Don John of Austria, the victor of Lepanto. But it took some time for Don John to get to the Low Countries, and in the meanwhile the government was carried on for King Philip by the Council of State. At first this Council pushed forward vigorously the war against the rebels. It was during their administration that Ziericksee fell, in spite of all that Orange could do to save it. But the Council was hampered in their action, in part by disagreements among themselves, but in much larger measure by the growing discontent of the Spanish troops. The troops indeed very soon broke out into open mutiny. They chose leaders from their own ranks and began to concentrate their forces. The Council of State was helpless. Consequently the provincial estates, particularly those of Brabant and Flanders, began to take measures for their own safety by organizing militia companies and by strengthening the fortifications of the towns. Those measures were in no sense directed against the sovereignty of King Philip of Spain, they were simply measures of self-preservation made necessary by the inability of the Spanish Council of State to control its mutinous soldiery.

And yet of course their action was essentially a protest against the Spanish method of government, and in this sense their cause was the cause of Orange himself. He saw this at once and hastened to take advantage of it. It is not necessary to describe here the various measures which he took to foment the discontent in the Spanish Netherlands and to urge upon them the desirability of union with him. By October 1576 he had succeeded so well that a Congress composed of representatives from Holland, Zealand, and from the Estates General of the Spanish provinces had assembled together at Ghent. They

¹ Cf. Walsingham to Leicester, 20 Nov. 1576, Cotton MSS., Galba C v, f. 307.

began their deliberations on the 15th of the month. The two grave questions which arose at once were as to the reception of the new Spanish governor and as to the settlement of the religious difficulty. It seemed for a time as though those two points would form insurmountable obstacles to any project of union. But the course of events determined otherwise. Late in October news reached the Congress that the Spanish mutineers had sacked Maestricht, and on the 17th of November came the much more terrible news that Antwerp itself had fallen into their bloody hands. It was no time to stand on terms. The next day, 8th November, the Pacification of Ghent was signed. It made peace and established free intercourse between Holland and Zealand and the remaining provinces of the Low Countries. It provided for an assembly of the Estates of all the provinces to which all matters still in dispute, particularly the question of receiving Don John and the question of religion, were to be referred. Above all, it pledged the contracting parties to do everything in their power to drive out the Spanish soldiers.

The Pacification of Ghent changed the whole complexion of affairs in the Low Countries. For four years Holland and Zealand alone, under the Prince of Orange, had been doing their best to maintain an unequal struggle against the forces of Spain, assisted by the resources of the richest provinces in the Netherlands. Year by year the Spanish armies had advanced against the two little Dutch states, and year by year they had been driven back; but the struggle was too unequal to be prolonged indefinitely, and by the summer of 1576 the end seemed to be very near at hand. But in a few months something very like a miracle had been wrought. The Spanish government had become scarcely more than an idea, the Spanish army a band of dangerous mutineers, and the Low Countries, north and south, Protestant and Catholic alike, were joined together to rout them out of the land. The Prince of Orange was no longer the leader of a desperate band of ragamuffins, he was one of the most important figures in a league which looked strong enough to dictate terms to Philip of Spain and to treat on an equal basis with the other great powers of Europe.

As a matter of fact this league was nothing like so strong as it looked. It was, indeed, nothing more than a treaty of peace

between two factions in the Netherlands, which had been wrought hastily in the face of a danger common to them both, and which left the main points at issue between them still unsettled. But its essential weakness was not at the time apparent.

Meanwhile on the 23rd of November the new Spanish governor, Don John of Austria, had arrived at Luxemburg, and the first problem which the league had to solve was the problem of dealing with him. Orange was in favour of treating him as an open enemy, but the Estates General was strongly opposed to such a radical policy. In fact they opened negotiations with him in November, and after some interruption they came to an agreement with him in February of the following year. By the agreement, commonly known as the Perpetual Edict, Don John ratified the Pacification of Ghent and agreed to dismiss the Spanish troops within twenty days overland. The Estates General in return pledged themselves to raise 600,000 guilders to pay off the Spanish troops and to maintain the Catholic religion everywhere. They signed the treaty, without referring it to Orange, on the 17th of February. He was later asked to sign it, but he refused, and so Don John's government was established without his concurrence.

All these happenings had a profound effect upon the policy of Queen Elizabeth of England towards the Low Countries. Ever since the death of Requesens and the assumption of control of the Low Countries by the Council of State she had been watching affairs across the Channel with a very careful eye. She had rather expected, and Walsingham had shared her expectations, that the Duke of Aerschot and the other great nobles who formed the national element in the Council would take advantage of their position to extort concessions from Philip of Spain. It was on this account that she had sent Davison over in April 1576. She wanted to find out how matters stood there and to take advantage of any occasion which might arise. But her expectations, for the time at least, had been disappointed. Davison found the great nobles disinclined to do anything, and the impression which he gathered was that the Council meant to continue the policy of Requesens until Don John of Austria arrived to take his place. So matters continued for a time, but the mutiny of the Spanish soldiery and the appearance of a strong party in

opposition to the Spanish government, as we have seen, changed the complexion of affairs greatly. No man could say what the outcome would be, but certainly it was a matter of great moment to the Queen of England.

Walsingham and her other councillors strongly urged her to send over an ambassador to the Low Countries to keep an eye on the course of events there, and to watch over her interests. Early in October she thought she would send Dr. Wilson, afterwards one of her principal secretaries. But as usual she procrastinated. 'Her Majesty', Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 16th October, 'beginneth now to waver in her determination of sending over into the Low Countries Mr. Dr. Wilson, and hath ordered that I should will him to stay his preparation. I know no other cause of this alteration but only the ordinary cause, which is the respect of charges.'¹ But the necessity of the occasion, this time at least, overcame her inveterate thriftiness, and Dr. Wilson was dispatched to the Low Countries on the 25th of October.²

'For as much', Elizabeth wrote to him in his letter of instructions, 'as we find it very necessary in the present troublesome and broken state of the Low Countries to be truly informed of the course and manner of their proceedings, for that divers vain and uncertain bruits are given out in that behalf, we have therefore made a special choice of you to use your service therein.'³ To afford a pretext for his mission he was charged to solicit, both from the popular party and also from the Spaniards, securities for the safety of the English trade.

Meantime the Estates General, assembled at Brussels, had made up its mind to dispatch an envoy to Elizabeth, to solicit her friendly offices. They chose for the purpose Baron d'Aubigny. He received his dispatches on the 18th of October⁴ and reached the English court on the 4th of November, just nine days after Wilson had left for the Low Countries.⁵ D'Aubigny told Elizabeth that the Estates General had been compelled to take up arms in the defence of their lives and property, and that on this account they had joined with the Estates of Holland and Zealand from whom they had long been divided by the tyranny of

¹ B.M. Harl. MSS. 6992, 29; cf. Walsingham's discussion of the situation in S. P. Domestic, cviii, 82.

² Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 26.

³ Lettenhove, viii. 484.

⁴ Instructions in Lettenhove, viii. 481.

⁵ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 29.

the Spaniards. He said that they had no intention of renouncing their obedience due to their sovereign nor their loyalty to the faith in which they had been born, but that they had resolved not to become the slaves of 'the Spanish soldier and his rabble'. He besought Elizabeth to be their good friend and to intercede for them with the King of Spain.¹

A few days before the dispatch of d'Aubigny, the Estates General had dispatched another envoy, James Harvey, an English merchant living in Antwerp, to Elizabeth, to ask for a loan of money. They wanted some two or three hundred thousand angelots for the purpose of strengthening their forces and promised to give good security for its repayment.² Harvey reached England on the 29th of October, some five days before d'Aubigny, and laid his request before the Queen.

So Elizabeth was faced with the old problem once more. Should she help the Netherlanders or should she not? This time the problem presented itself in a somewhat different aspect than before. Requests for aid from the Netherlands had come hitherto from a body of men who were manifestly in rebellion against their anointed sovereign and against the religion by law established—objections of considerable moment to Elizabeth's royal conscience. Now they came from the recognized representative assembly of the whole country, in the form of a plea for assistance in performing the proper functions of government, and they were coupled with the strongest protestations of loyalty both to their sovereign and to his religion. Hitherto, the requests had come from a small band of men, fighting desperately on a small strip of sand and marsh against the embattled armies of Spain. Now they came from the strong, rich, and, as it seemed, the united provinces of the Low Countries, fighting against a band of outlawed mutineers.

These considerations led Elizabeth to regard d'Aubigny's mission with much more favour than she ordinarily extended to envoys on similar errands. His request that she would intercede for the Netherlanders with the King of Spain she granted very readily. She was always willing to play the part of mediator. In less than three weeks after d'Aubigny was

¹ Discourse of d'Aubigny, 11 Nov. 1576, Lettenhove, ix. 23.

² Harvey's instructions, 16 Oct. 1576, *ibid.* viii. 474.

received at court she dispatched Sir John Smith to the King of Spain with instructions to request him to withdraw the Spanish soldiery from the Low Countries and to restore to them their ancient privileges.¹ She was not quite so ready with a loan of money, and it seems that James Harvey was unable to get from her the sum which he was sent to ask, or indeed any sum at all.² But presumably he got considerable encouragement, because the next month the Estates sent another envoy, Sweveghem, to England on the same mission, who fared much better.

Sweveghem was received at the English court on the 15th of December 1576. As Harvey had done before he asked the Queen to loan them 'two or three hundred thousand angelots' on good security.³ The Queen called her Council together and laid the matter before them. As a whole the councillors favoured making the loan,⁴ but the Queen herself did not wish to go so far until she knew just what stand Don John meant to take in his negotiations with the Estates General at that time under way. She accordingly told Sweveghem that she could do nothing until she was more exactly informed as to the state of things in the Low Countries.⁵ With this answer he was not at all satisfied. It looked as though he would have to return home with nothing more than one of the Queen's usual promises in his pocket. But some of the Privy Council, of whom probably Walsingham was one, urged him to press the Queen once more for a smaller loan in ready money, and to this request, after much haggling, she acceded, although not without conditions. She finally promised to loan the Estates £100,000 for eight months in case Don John refused to agree to their reasonable demands. In the meanwhile she paid over to Sweveghem £20,000 in ready money, which he was only to expend with the consent of Dr. Wilson, at that time her agent in the Low Countries.⁶ By a letter of the 30th of December she instructed Dr. Wilson

¹ Cf. Elizabeth to Philip in *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 450. Smith's mission came to nothing. (*Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 460.)

² Jas. Harvey to Estates General, 4 Nov. 1576, Lettenhove, ix. 3. Also Elizabeth to same, 12 Nov. 1576, *ibid.* 26.

³ Sweveghem to Estates General, 24 Dec. 1576, *ibid.* 99.

⁴ De Guaras wrote, 3 Dec. 1576, 'The Councillors of this Queen are trying their hardest to bring it about by offers of money and forces to assure and assist the States.' (*Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 453.)

⁵ Sweveghem to the Estates General, cf. n. 3 above.

⁶ Sweveghem's Report, 15 Jan. 1576-7, Lettenhove, ix. 145.

that he was only to grant this permission in case the Estates actually went to war against Don John, or in case the money was needed to pay off the Spanish troops in order to get them out of the country.¹

The comparative ease with which Sweveghem got £20,000 from Queen Elizabeth is little short of amazing. He reached England on the 12th of December. On the 30th he left again with the money actually in his chests, and the promise of a lot more in his pocket. It was not the Queen's custom, even under the most propitious circumstances, to pay out money in such large sums on such short notice. A score of envoys in Holland and France could testify to that. She must have had some very good reason for so doing. That reason is not far to seek; it was in fact her old fear of France.

Throughout the autumn of 1576 she kept hearing both from her agents in France and from her agents in Holland that Monsieur, the brother of the French King, was very seriously considering the project of going to the aid of the Dutch. Villiers wrote to Walsingham on the 17th of October that French troops were already being concentrated on the borders of Hainault and Artois.² On the 23rd of November Wilson sent Burghley copies of letters exchanged between Alençon and the Estates General which very clearly showed that negotiations were in progress between them.³ It was known also that d'Aubigny, after he had left England, had gone to France and had requested aid from the French King in much the same fashion as he had requested it from Elizabeth.⁴ Dr. Dale, the Queen's ambassador to France, wrote from Paris that the King was willing enough to set his brother forward into the Low Countries in order to get him out of the way.

On top of all this came Sweveghem with his requests for assistance. He made it perfectly clear to Elizabeth that if she did not give it they would seek it in France.⁵

It was without doubt on this account that Elizabeth was so quick to respond to the requests of the Estates General for a loan

¹ Privy Council to Wilson, Lettenhove, ix. 124.

² Lettenhove, viii. 475.

³ Ibid. ix. 2.

⁴ Muller and Diegerick, *Documents concernant les relations entre le duc d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas*, i. 2.

⁵ Sweveghem to Sussex, Lettenhove, ix. 96.

of money. For very much the same reason she made up her mind to dispatch an envoy to Don John of Austria.

It will be remembered that at this time the Estates General were trying to come to terms with Don John. Orange was opposed to their treaty-making, and it is clear that Walsingham agreed with him. On the 25th of November he wrote to Leicester, 'Mr. Villiers is returned out of Zealand, by whom I gather that the good or evil success of those countries standeth now upon marring or making, the matter being presently in deliberation amongst them whether they shall accept for governor Don John or the Prince of Orange. If they choose the former, what will become of those countries is over apparent; but if they choose the other, there is good hope, notwithstanding the disorders committed both in Maestricht and Antwerp, all will do well.'¹

In any event it was certainly highly desirable for Elizabeth to keep in close touch with Don John's movements and to find out what he meant to do. Both Walsingham and Leicester had for some time been pressing this fact upon her, but as usual Elizabeth had been slow in taking action.

'Not long after your departure,' Walsingham wrote to Leicester on the 20th of November, 'accordingly as you advised me, I dealt with her Majesty about the sending unto Don John d'Austria. And this day upon the receipt of your Lordship's letter which I read unto her, the same being very substantially and groundedly written, I took occasion to renew my former motion of sending, whereunto though I find her well inclined, yet I see her not bent to use that expedition herein that were most convenient, considering how necessary it were to discover what course Don John shall bend himself to take. Her Majesty thinketh it necessary to stay until she hear from Dr. Wilson once again, from which opinion I sought by sundry allegations to remove her, but could not prevail. And what will be in the end done I am doubtful; notwithstanding, knowing how much it importeth her to send and that speedily, I mean to put in a readiness instructions for him that it shall please her to appoint for the voyage, whereby there may be no stay or impediment when her Majesty's resolution in that behalf shall be known.'²

In the end, but it was not until almost a month later, Elizabeth did make up her mind to send an envoy to Don John. She chose for the mission Edward Horsey, her Governor of the Isle of Wight.

¹ Cotton MSS., Galba C v, f. 308.

² Ibid. f. 307.

Horsey was directed to urge upon Don John the desirability of his coming to terms with the Estates, not only for the general cause of peace but more particularly from fear of the French. If Don John showed no inclination to follow this suggestion, Horsey was to tell him plainly that Elizabeth would not tolerate either the presence of the French in the Low Countries or the suppression of their ancient liberties by Don John himself. In either case she would assist the Dutch with all the power she could command. On the other hand, if Don John could prove that the Estates were unreasonable in their demands and manifested an intention to renounce their allegiance to the King, she would join her forces with his to oppose them. Horsey was further instructed to stop on his way to Don John at Brussels and make clear her attitude to the Estates. Above all things he was to do everything he could to keep out the French. 'For you shall understand that of all the perils we can imagine, this conjunction with France is most dangerous for us.'¹

Horsey left England on the 20th of December and he reached Brussels two days afterwards. After delivering his message to the Estates General he proceeded at once to Don John, to whom he spoke bold words. Don John was inclined to be conciliatory. He declared that 'the Spaniards should away, and that he was very willing to yield to the peace, but some points and difficulties did rest which as yet were not resolved, and he trusted very shortly they should be'.² In fact he sought to give Horsey the impression that all matters in dispute between him and the Estates would presently be adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties.

But when Horsey passed through Brussels on his way home he heard quite a different story from the Estates. They spoke in very much less certain tones of peace.³

Elizabeth was not satisfied with the results of Horsey's mission. He had returned to England on the 15th of January. Three days later he was dispatched to the Low Countries again.⁴ He reached Brussels for the second time on the 23rd of

¹ Horsey's instructions, 14 Dec. 1576, Lettenhove, ix. 85.

² Horsey to Burghley, 29 Dec. 1576, *ibid.* 108.

³ Walsingham to Burghley, 16 Jan. 1576-7, S. P. Foreign, cxlii, no. 1025.

⁴ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 29.

January 1577. A day or so later he presented himself to Don John with the Queen's offer of mediation. But the peace between Don John and the Estates was already well under way, and early in February it was signed. Horsey apparently had nothing whatever to do with the negotiations.¹ He returned home on the 5th of February 1577.

The weak point of the treaty between Don John and the Estates was that it left out of account the Prince of Orange. He had been asked to ratify it and he had refused. In consequence the situation after the signing of the Perpetual Edict appeared on the face of it to be not so very different from what it had been before the death of Requesens. On the one side was ranged the Spanish government and the Estates General, on the other side the Prince of Orange supported by the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland. But this was only apparently so. Orange had taken advantage of the interim, and in fact his position was much stronger on the 1st of March 1577 than it had been on the 1st of March 1576. The three northern provinces of Friesland, Groningen, and Ommelands had gone over to him. In February 1577, by the capitulation of the Spanish governor in Utrecht, he had gained control of the Sticht. What was more to the point, he had

¹ Wilson to Walsingham, 24 Jan. 1576-7, Lettenhove, ix. 158. There were two or three matters which seem to have been embodied in Horsey's letter of instructions which throw further light upon the attitude of Elizabeth to Don John. On the 30th of December 1576 de Guaras, the Spanish agent in London, had written, 'Since it is publicly stated in Court, to incense people against us, there is no harm in my writing freely that they say that Don John of Austria has come to the States, not only with the intention of conquering them, but also to marry the Queen of Scotland and change religion and government here.' (*Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 455.) There certainly was a fear in England at this time that Don John had designs upon the English throne. Men said that it was for the purpose of invading England that he wished to deport the Spanish troops by sea. The suspicion seemed to gather confirmation from the fact that Don John was becoming very intimate with English Catholic refugees in the Low Countries. In point of fact the secret instructions given to Don John by the King reveal very clearly that he had such a project in view. (Lettenhove, ix. 15.)

In consequence of Elizabeth's suspicions upon this point, Horsey was charged to protest vigorously against the deportation of the Spanish troops by sea and against Don John's dealings with the English Catholics.

What is very much more amazing, it seems that Horsey was also instructed to suggest indirectly to Don John the possibility of a marriage between himself and Elizabeth. At least Don John told Philip that Horsey had approached him on the subject, and it is hardly likely that Horsey would have made any such suggestion without some prompting from his mistress. (*Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II*, v, p. 134.)

built up for himself a strong popular faction among the Southern Provinces and in the Estates General itself which made Don John's following much weaker in fact than it appeared on paper. So that when the Prince of Orange and Don John in March 1577 stood face to face they were not ill-matched antagonists. The conflict which followed between them was a conflict of intrigue, in which the Spanish governor did his best to build up a strong following for himself in the Low Countries and Orange did his best to prevent it.

In this game of intrigue Queen Elizabeth played some part. She had done her best to bring about peace between the Estates and Don John, but when peace was finally made she was not so well pleased with it as one might have expected. In the first place she was angry because her offers for mediation had not been accepted. In the second place she feared that now that Don John was established in his position he would pursue some of the nefarious designs against England which were attributed to him. Elizabeth knew that he was having a great deal to do with English Catholic refugees. She suspected that he was in communication with Mary Stuart. Finally she realized that the exclusion of the Prince of Orange from the treaty was greatly to her disadvantage. She did not regard Orange as her friend, but she knew well enough that the bonds which bound him to her service were stronger than those which connected her with any other faction in the Low Countries. Consequently when she sent Dr. Wilson late in March 1577 to congratulate Don John upon the conclusion of the peace, she coupled with her congratulations complaints against his indifference towards her offers of mediation, and of his entertainment of the English Catholics. If he kept on 'in that unfriendly and strange manner of proceeding', Wilson was to tell him that she might be forced to deal with him in some other way than by offers of friendly mediation.¹

At the same time Elizabeth directed Wilson to sound a note of warning in the ears of the Estates General at Brussels. He was to say that she was glad that peace had been made, but she advised them nevertheless 'to be wary and circumspect, knowing (as they are wise to consider) that there is no worse kind of treason

¹ Instructions for Dr. Wilson, Lettenhove, ix. 254.

than that which lieth hidden under the show of friendship'. He was further directed to protest against their behaviour towards the Prince of Orange. He was to tell them that she thought it very strange that they had made peace without consulting the Prince. His long and heroic efforts in behalf of their liberties deserved better at their hands. They ought to have availed themselves of his rare judgement.¹

It is evident from this that Elizabeth was not altogether hopeful of the good effects of the peace and that she was in greater sympathy with the cause of Orange than she would have Don John believe.

Walsingham for his part looked for no good to follow from the peace. He had hoped that the Estates would reject Don John's leadership and accept that of the Prince of Orange. When they did practically the reverse he saw very little to hope for in the future. 'For the state of the Low Countries,' he wrote to the Regent of Scotland on the 26th of February 1577, 'your Grace may see by these last advertisements I send you herewith how the States are dallied with and like to be abused with a long and colourable treaty.'²

As the war of intrigue between Orange and Don John of Austria progressed both leaders appealed from time to time to Elizabeth, Orange for help, Don John to prevent Elizabeth from giving help. Before the Perpetual Edict was ratified the Prince had sent an envoy, M. de Famars, to England to protest against the peace and to ask Elizabeth's help against Don John.³ The only practical result of his mission, it appears, was the protest in favour of Orange which Wilson, as we have just seen, was directed to make to the Estates.⁴ It was not until some months later that Orange renewed his request. The Queen had dispatched Philip Sidney to Vienna in February 1577 to congratulate the new Emperor Rudolph II on his accession. On his way home, late in May of the same year, Sidney stopped and held conference with the Prince of Orange. Orange took advantage of the opportunity to lay before him the project of a secret treaty which he thought desirable between Holland and Zealand

¹ Ibid.

² S. P. Scotland, xxvii, 15.

³ Instructions of Famars, 10 Feb. 1576-7, Lettenhove, ix. 185.

⁴ Cf. answers made to Famars, *ibid.* 192.

on the one hand and England on the other. The inducements which he had to offer were valuable trading privileges with Holland and Zealand in time of peace and a useful ally in case of war. In return Orange demanded that Elizabeth should close her ports against the Spaniards if they came up by sea against the Dutch, that she should forbid trade between England and those ports of the Low Countries hostile to the Dutch, and that she should, in case of war, lend the Dutch £50,000 a year on good security.¹

Elizabeth sent her answer to this proposal by Daniel Rogers, who was dispatched from England on the 26th of June.² He was directed to thank the Prince for his friendly proposal but to say that she hardly felt justified in entering into a league with him. It would be inconsistent, she thought, with her efforts to bring peace and amity to the Estates of the Low Countries. She hoped that he would not be in need of her aid, that Don John would be true to his promise. If he was not, if he returned to the old oppressive practices of the Spaniards, she gave her word that she would not let the cause of the Dutch perish.³

Rogers reached Alkmaar on the 1st of July. The next day he had conference with Orange. As was to be expected, the Prince was not very well satisfied with the Queen's answer. He said it was too general, and her promise too vague. The King of Spain himself, Orange maintained, had given her very good precedent for treating with rebels, as the Ridolfi Plot testified. He thought that the Queen ought to be more careful of her own safety. It was obvious, he said, that Don John had hostile intentions towards her. Letters of his, which had been intercepted and deciphered, easily proved that. He showed these very letters to Rogers. He intimated that if the Queen would do nothing for him he would perhaps be forced to treat with Don John.⁴ But curiously enough he said nothing about dealing with France, a threat which he usually employed to stimulate Elizabeth's interest in his welfare.

This was as far as the dealings between the Queen and Orange got for a time. It was suspected in all quarters that she was

¹ Relation of Philip Sidney, May 1577, Lettenhove, ix. 309.

² Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 31.

³ Instructions for Dr. Rogers, Lettenhove, ix. 356.

⁴ Rogers to Walsingham, 20 July 1577, *ibid.* 405.

secretly assisting him during this period with money and supplies, but these suspicions appear to have been without foundation in fact.¹ Since the signing of the Perpetual Edict her attitude towards him had been friendly. She had spoken more than once on his behalf to the Estates General. But she does not seem to have encouraged him in rebellion, although she was urged to do so by many of her councillors.

Walsingham was not in sympathy with her policy of neutrality. He pinned no faith to the Perpetual Edict. He wrote to Wilson on the 7th of March that he was sure there was some 'hid matter in hand to overthrow the State', and so he thought it best for the Queen to support Orange and to cease dealing with Don John.² But, as usual, his opinion did not have much effect on the Queen. This was probably due in part to the fact that Walsingham was taken down again in the spring of 1577 with his old malady, which kept him pretty closely confined for two or three months. Indeed his condition got so bad at one time that Mr. Somers, one of his secretaries, was appointed temporarily to supply his place.³

Nevertheless, he did not get entirely out of touch with affairs, and there is some reason for believing that, outside his official correspondence, he was in close touch with Orange and was advising him from time to time as we have seen him doing before. There is, for instance, an interesting passage in one of Daniel Rogers's letters to Walsingham, dated 24th July 1577, which shows the sort of advice he was sending to the Prince. Rogers wrote, 'Concerning the intercepting of the party your Honor spake, the Prince hath thought of the matter, and thanketh your Honor for your friendly advices which concur with his resolutions. He hath taken order, and the letters which of late he intercepted of Don John's will hasten this device. He hath good means to compass it, being generally favoured of the people in Brabant and especially by them of Brussels, besides sundry of the nobility which are at his devotion.'⁴

It looks very much as though Walsingham had been advising

¹ Wilson to Walsingham, 8 May 1577, *ibid.* 291.

² This letter I have not been able to find. I gather the gist of it from Wilson's reply (March 17). (Lettenhove, ix. 242.)

³ Wilson to Somers, 20 April 1577, Lettenhove, ix. 274.

⁴ Rogers to Walsingham, 24 July 1577, *ibid.* 416.

Orange to lay hands on Don John of Austria.¹ Rogers's letter is not conclusive upon this point, but it is well known that Orange had such a project in mind at this time,² and it seems likely that it was to it that Rogers referred. This supposition is borne out by a letter written by de Guaras, the Spanish agent in London, in which he says that he had discovered a plot between the Estates and the English to deprive Don John of his liberty.³

It is hardly likely that the Queen had her hand in any such matter. More likely Walsingham was acting on his own responsibility. The idea of capturing Don John was plainly not original with him. The Prince, as Rogers intimates, had had it in mind for some time. It never came to anything, but the fear of it was one of the principal reasons which drove Don John to seize the fortress of Namur and so to precipitate the impending struggle.⁴

Meantime Don John was negotiating with Elizabeth on his own behalf. He was well aware of Orange's efforts to get assistance from England. He was even deceived into believing that some measure of assistance had already been sent. He suspected that plots were being hatched across the Channel against his own person. In his various interviews with Wilson he took occasion to protest again and again against the Queen's dealings with the rebels. Early in June he went so far as to send an envoy to England in order to make these protests to the Queen in person. The man chosen for the purpose was Robert de Melun, the Viscount of Ghent, 'a valiant person', as Wilson described him, 'and of great stomach, yet very courteous'.⁵

The Viscount of Ghent really went to England with a double purpose. From Don John he carried formal news of the signing of the Perpetual Edict, and a long speech in justification of his dealings with Orange. In view of these things he laid before the Queen an urgent request from the Spanish governor that she would not assist the Dutch in their rebellion nor permit them

¹ Lettenhove accepts this interpretation, ix. 417.

² Namèche, *Le règne de Philippe II et la lutte religieuse dans les Pays-Bas au xvi^e siècle*, vi, pp. 64-5.

³ De Guaras to (Zayas ?), 20 Sept. 1577, *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 464.

⁴ Motley, iii. 221.

⁵ Wilson to Walsingham, 8 June 1577, Lettenhove, ix. 327.

to be assisted from England.¹ From the Estates he brought a request for a further loan of money, or at least, for an extension of time on the £20,000 which she had loaned them and which fell due on the last day of July 1577.²

The Viscount was courteously received in England. He had audience with the Queen on the 24th of June. She did not give him a very satisfactory answer to either of his requests. While she thanked him for the message he brought from Don John, she said that she could not believe the Dutch were working against the peace until she heard them in their own defence. Touching her own attitude towards them she said no more than that everybody knew that all her efforts were directed towards the maintenance of peace. When he asked her for an extension of time on her loan to the Estates, she said that such an extension would be very inconvenient. She promised to consider his request, but in the end she gave him no definite answer one way or the other. He left England on the 23rd of July having accomplished practically nothing.³

Obviously Elizabeth was playing a waiting game. It was clear enough to her and to everybody else that the situation in the Low Countries could not last long as it was. Don John's position was becoming daily more and more desperate. The party opposed to him in the Estates General was growing larger day by day. The Prince of Orange was steadily increasing his strength. It was not clear what would come out of it all; but Elizabeth did well to bide her time.

Early in June Don John, in fear for his personal safety, fled from Brussels to Mechlin, and on 24th July, upon pretext of entertaining the Queen of Navarre, he seized the citadel of Namur and sent demands to the Estates General that they should take an oath of fealty to him and join him in making war on the Prince of Orange.⁴ There appeared to be little else left for the poor man to do, and yet the effect of his action was to throw the Estates General, which had for some time been

¹ Address of the Viscount of Ghent to Elizabeth, 24 June 1577, *ibid.* 366.

² Instructions of Viscount of Ghent, 12 June 1577, *ibid.* 342.

³ Cf. Elizabeth's reply to V. of Ghent, *ibid.* 379; also V. of Ghent to Estates General, 2 July 1577, *ibid.* 383.

⁴ Blok, *History of the People of the Netherlands* (trans. R. Putnam), iii, p. 117.

swinging in the balance, over to the side of the Prince of Orange. It left Don John alone, without his Spanish veterans, faced by the united forces of the Netherlands.

His *coup d'état* had a marked effect upon the attitude of Elizabeth. On the 27th of July 1577 she dispatched William Davison to the Low Countries to take the place of Wilson, whom she had recalled early in the same month. She did not wish to make it appear that she had sent him in consequence of Don John's action. She instructed him to pretend that he had come in the ordinary way to look after the interests of the Queen just as Wilson had done before him. Nevertheless it is apparent, from the tenor of his instructions, that Elizabeth was already aware of Don John's seizure of Namur and that she meant to take a different course with the Low Countries in consequence. She told Davison to communicate with Don John if he could, and to offer her services in mediation of the difficulties between him and the Estates. But his main business was with the Estates. He was to assure them that in case Don John broke the Perpetual Edict she would support them against him. Privately, to those of the Deputies who were friendly to England, he was to whisper that she was sure that Don John meant to reduce them to servitude if he could. He was further to advise them to send for the Prince of Orange and to place matters in his hands, 'letting them understand that whosoever shall oppose themselves to him (though perhaps they may pretend religion) are to be held suspected persons'.¹

From these instructions it is clear that the Queen was at last persuaded to take Walsingham's advice, give up her attempts at mediation and go to the assistance of the rebellious Netherlanders. She practically told Davison to inform the Estates that if they wanted her aid they had only to ask for it. She did more than that. She instructed Davison to communicate with Orange as soon as he could, to inform the Prince how willing she was to befriend his cause, and to tell him that she had some five or six hundred troops ready about London which she would send at once to his assistance if he desired them.²

It is hard to say why Elizabeth, ordinarily so procrastinating,

¹ Davison's instructions, 2 Aug. 1577, Lettenhove, ix. 444.

² Lettenhove, ix. 452.

was so ready with her offers of assistance. Probably she was once more afraid that, if she did not forestall them, the Estates would appeal for aid to France.

At this time the Seventh Civil War was still in progress in France, but peace was not far off, as Elizabeth saw, and she had good reason to believe that with peace would come a renewal of the Duke of Alençon's projects in regard to the Low Countries. The Queen of Navarre, ostensibly travelling for her health, had visited the Low Countries in July. What she went there for Elizabeth did not precisely know. She feared that it was to give Don John assurance of assistance from France. At any rate she was certain that Marguerite of Valois was not in the Low Countries for her health, and that somehow or other the French were trying to meddle again in the affairs of the Netherlands.

Leicester, Burghley,¹ and Walsingham were all warmly in favour of going to the assistance of the Dutch at once. De Guaras indeed said that he found the whole Council disposed that way.² From the contents of Davison's instructions it appears that Elizabeth was in agreement with them.

With such sentiments prevalent at the English court it is not surprising that when the Estates General sent over an embassy composed of the Marquis of Havrech and Alphonse de Meetkerke to England in September to ask for aid, they met with a very cordial reception. They had audience with the Queen on the 22nd of the month. They explained to her why they had broken with Don John. They asked her to loan them £100,000 for eight months and to send over 5,000 foot and 1,000 horse under the Earl of Leicester to assist them.³

Elizabeth did not give them her answer at once. The day after she had received them she departed for Windsor, leaving Walsingham behind to consult with them.

Very shortly afterwards Havrech had a long conference with Walsingham. Walsingham, as was to be expected, showed himself very anxious to assist him in his mission. He spoke to Havrech very freely, revealing to him the dispositions of the different Councillors and directing him how to deal with the

¹ Cf. Burghley's Memorial. 'I see no way so sure for your Majesty as to keep the Prince of Orange in heart and life.' Lettenhove, ix. 515.

² *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 464.

³ *Mémoire of Havrech*, 27 Sept. 1577, Lettenhove, ix. 540.

Queen. He advised Havrech not to press the demand for soldiers and not to suggest Leicester's name for leader. Above all, he urged him to persuade the Estates to look to the Queen as their one sure means of bringing the King of Spain to reason.¹

How far Walsingham was acting on his own judgement and how far he was prompted in his speech by the Queen it is difficult to say. There can be little doubt that he was willing and anxious to befriend the cause of the Netherlanders. It would have been inconsistent with all that he had done and said before had he not been. His remarks respecting the sending of soldiers under Leicester smacks of the Queen's prompting. Probably he was not anxious to have Leicester leave England, because Leicester was one of his best and surest friends beside the Queen. But Leicester, he knew, was very anxious to go, and he would hardly have ventured to work against him underhand in this manner, unless the Queen had explicitly instructed him to do so. For Elizabeth, of course, who loved Leicester as much as she ever loved any man, did not want him to go. When Walsingham counselled Havrech to look to the Queen as his surest aid, he doubtless had in mind the possibility of an appeal on the part of the Estates to France, a thing which both he and the Queen wanted to countercheck.

Havrech was to some extent guided by Walsingham's advice. But Elizabeth for once in her life acted so promptly that she did not give much time for diplomatic intrigue. Within four days she directed Sussex, Leicester, and Walsingham to deliver her answer to the demands of the Estates. She would send over the troops they asked for and more, too, if the Duke of Guise went to the assistance of Don John as he threatened to do. She would lend them £100,000 on condition that the £20,000 which they still owed her be reckoned as part of it and that they would give ample security for its repayment within eight months, or, in case they came to terms with Don John in less time, before they actually signed a treaty with him.²

It looked as though everything was settled. Havrech thought so at any rate and he sent an envoy at once to the Estates with

¹ Cf. Havrech's Report, 31 Dec. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 190.

² Havrech and Meetkerke to the Estates General, 28 Sept. 1577, *ibid.* ix. 542.

the good news, urging them to give him full powers to conclude a treaty with the Queen on the basis of her offers.¹ But the envoy had scarcely left England before Elizabeth began to reconsider her position. It occurred to her that she had been very rash. The French danger might be pressing, but she had no mind to go to war with Spain. Philip II might easily construe her action in lending money to his rebellious subjects as a *casus belli*. In any case he was pretty sure to retaliate. What, then, was to become of the English goods and shipping in Spain? If she was willing to assist the Estates, they in their turn ought to secure her against the possibility of any such disastrous consequences.

Walsingham himself, it appears, suggested these considerations to the Queen, not because he wanted to check her in a course which he entirely favoured, but because he feared that such arguments might be used to dissuade her altogether from helping the Estates if some security were not provided for the property of her merchants trading in Spain.² Elizabeth very willingly entertained his suggestion. She directed him to write to Davison to see if some such security could not be obtained. She suggested that the Estates might give bond for £400,000 additional to secure her shipping. Walsingham of himself hinted that they might even pledge the provinces of Holland and Zealand to her.³

Davison received these instructions on the 7th of October. He consulted Orange about the matter at first, and received such a discouraging answer from him that he decided to delay a little and feel his ground before he spoke to the Estates.⁴

Meantime Elizabeth waited in England for the answer of the Estates to her offers of assistance. They were slow in sending them, so slow that the English Council began to think that they did not want England's aid. And when the answer did come on the 16th of October it was not very definite nor very much to the

¹ Ibid.

² Leicester to Davison, 14 Oct. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 14. Leicester, it seems, did not sympathize with Walsingham's views. He advised Davison to qualify somewhat the demands which Walsingham had instructed him to make.

³ Davison to Walsingham, 8 Oct. 1577, *ibid.* ix. 567. Cf. Tomson to Davison, 3 Oct. 1577, *ibid.* 556. Lettenhove speaks of Tomson as Leicester's servant; he was Walsingham's.

⁴ Davison to Walsingham, 8 Oct. 1577, cited n. 3 above.

Queen's liking. They thanked her for her proffered loan. They would see how much money they could raise on her bonds in Antwerp. They were grateful for her offer of troops, but they thought the season too far advanced to bring them over, and besides they wished to be quit of the German mercenaries before they engaged more forces.¹

This answer, with its indefiniteness about the loan and its refusal of the troops, did not assist their cause in England. Their own envoys were indignant. 'We are sure', they wrote to the Estates General, 'that the Queen and lords of this realm will not take in good part your coldness and your delay in sending upon such important matters.'²

Walsingham himself was very much provoked about the matter. 'I may not forget to let you understand', he wrote to Davison on the 20th of October, 'how greatly the States refusal of our men is misliked here by honest and well-affected gentlemen; and surely they show themselves therein to lack judgment, for, besides the strength they should have received thereby, considering how well accompanied the Earl would have come over, the countenance of the matter would have more appalled the enemy than 20,000 of any other nation.'³

But these were all small matters compared with another question which arose at this time to make the Queen pause in her course of action towards the Netherlands. On the 23rd of September the Prince of Orange had been received with great demonstrations of affection in Brussels. Two weeks later, on the 8th of October, the Estates had informed Don John in insulting terms that they no longer acknowledged him as their governor. It was practically a declaration of war between the Spanish Governor on the one hand and the Estates on the other, with the Prince of Orange easily the leading man among them. But the Catholic nobles of the south, notably the Duke of Aerschot, and his brother the Marquis of Havrech, the Counts of Lalaing, Bossu, and Egmont, had no mind to submit to the domination of William of Orange. For some time they had been treating on their own responsibility with Matthias, the younger brother of the Emperor Rudolph, to see if they could not get him to come

¹ Havrech and Meetkerke to Estates General, 17 Oct. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 18.

² Ibid.

³ Lettenhove, x. 41.

and take charge of the Low Countries. He did not require much urging. On the night of October 2nd he fled secretly from Vienna. A few days afterwards Aerschot and his colleagues made known what they had done to the Estates General and urged them to recognize Matthias as their Governor.¹

All this came to the ears of Davison, Elizabeth's agent at Brussels, and he immediately transmitted it to the Queen. It was on this account that Walsingham, at Elizabeth's command, held a long conference on the 18th of October with de Meetkerke. He probably spoke with him and not with Havrech, his colleague, because Havrech, who was the brother of the Duke of Aerschot, was personally involved in the calling of Matthias. Walsingham told Meetkerke that the Queen had heard of Matthias's coming. She had heard also that the Estates were in great dissensions about the matter, a condition of things which she thought very dangerous when Don John's forces were increasing daily and when the French were on their borders. She could not therefore but view the coming of Matthias with surprise and alarm. She knew he was a good-natured, promising youth, but she knew also that he possessed neither experience nor power nor financial resource, qualities which he could not very well dispense with in the difficult task he was about to undertake. It was to be feared that he would be suborned by his uncle, the King of Spain, who would doubtless have great influence over him through his mother. Walsingham said that on those accounts the Queen's Council would be chary in advising her to lend money and troops to the Estates, fearing that by so doing she would bring war upon herself without any compensating advantage. She had been induced, he said, to offer the Estates her assistance because she was sure that, with the Estates in accord among themselves and with the Prince of Orange, much good might be done. Now that discord ruled among them and that the Prince was about to abandon them she could not expect any other result from assisting them than disaster.

Meetkerke answered that the necessity of the times had induced them to call Matthias to their aid. He did not think there was any danger of his being suborned by the King of Spain. Neither did he think that the diversity of opinions which were

¹ Blok, iii, 120 seq.

bound to arise in such a large body as the Estates necessarily indicated serious dissensions among them. He said that Havrech had consulted with Orange about the coming of Matthias before leaving the Low Countries and had gained the Prince's consent to it.

To this Walsingham replied that since matters had gone so far there was no use lamenting about them. The best thing to do was to provide a remedy against any dangers which might arise in consequence. Meetkerke asked Walsingham what remedies he would suggest. He answered that in the first place Archduke Matthias ought to be made to give pledges that he would respect the ancient privileges of the Low Countries. In the second place the assistance of the Prince of Orange ought to be secured by making him the Archduke's lieutenant. In this way, Walsingham said, the young man's inexperience would be supplied by the Prince's sufficiency, the alliance of the popular party would be secured, and the English, seeing their affairs in the hands of such an efficient man, would be more inclined to assist them. In the third place the 'evil and suspected parties' who were the instigators of all dissensions ought to be removed from the Council and confined to their homes. If these things were done, Walsingham said he thought all might yet go well.¹

The general purpose of Walsingham's suggestions may be gathered from his own comment on them in his letters to Davison of 20th October. 'We seek', he wrote, 'by all the means we may to make it apparent unto him that no favour is to be had here without the mediation and furtherance of the Prince of Orange, to the end, that if through envy they cannot be drawn to honour him for his virtues, they may at least be moved to make much of him for necessity's sake.'²

From this and from Walsingham's conversation with Meetkerke, the attitude of Elizabeth towards the importation of the Archduke Matthias may be pretty easily gathered. She did not like the idea of Matthias's coming. She would have preferred that the charge of affairs had been given into the hands of Orange. But she was prepared to accept him if Orange could be

¹ Walsingham to Davison, 20 Oct. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 41. Cf. Meetkerke's Report, 18 Oct. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 23.

² Cited n. 1 above.

induced to endorse him and to enter into his service as lieutenant-general. She meant to withdraw her offer of aid until she saw how matters would dispose themselves.

The first thing she did was to write to Orange and ask him what he thought of the coming of the Archduke.¹ His reply was not very enthusiastic, but he plainly meant to accept things as he found them, and to stand by the decision of the Estates General. Elizabeth asked him what she should do respecting the money which she had promised to lend the Estates. He replied that he hoped she would continue her gracious favour towards them and abide by the promises she had made.²

It is interesting to observe how Elizabeth in a crisis like this turned at once to Orange. She was shrewd enough to see that he was the one man whom she could trust in the Netherlands. Doubtless she saw too that Orange held in his own hands the key to the whole situation. We may attribute this in part to her extraordinary ability to size up a man and a situation. In part, doubtless, we may attribute it to the influence of Walsingham and those in sympathy with him in the Council. Throughout he had urged Elizabeth to join her fortunes with those of the Prince. The fact that at this time she did so is to be recorded as a temporary victory for Walsingham's policy.

Nevertheless, in spite of Orange's advice, Elizabeth was inclined to go a little bit slower in proffering her aid to the Estates. The dissensions in the Low Countries which arose upon the question of the Archduke's reception made her fear that their government was unstable and that it would shortly dissolve of itself. The seizure of the Duke of Aerschot and others of his train by the Gantois, news of which reached her early in November, increased her fears. She had no wish to bind herself in alliance with such a kind of government. Moreover, the Estates were very slow about sending their answer to the offers which she had already made them. They were jealous of the Prince and did not wish to augment his forces by an English alliance.³ Havrech urged them again and again from England to send their answer; ⁴ Davison urged them in the Low Countries. Orange

¹ Walsingham to Davison, 20 Oct. 1577, cited p. 358, n. 1.

² Orange's reply, 26 Oct. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 45.

³ Davison to Walsingham, 15 Nov. 1577, *ibid.* 85.

⁴ *Ibid.* 60, 94.

told them that they had better accept the Queen's friendship while they could get it.¹ But still they delayed. On the 15th of November 1577 they had not yet committed themselves.

On all of these accounts the Queen became less and less willing to lend them her money and her men. In consequence, when on the 19th of November Havrech brought her at last the answer of the Estates, he did not find so friendly a reception waiting for him as had greeted him in September. Havrech told her that the Estates accepted her terms with thanks. They besought her to lend them the £100,000 in ready money and to send over the troops she had promised. They offered in return to make no treaties without her advice and consent, to assist her in case of war, and to extend full trading privileges to her merchants.² The Queen gave him his answer on the following day. She told him that for a great many reasons she thought she had better proceed more cautiously in offering her assistance. The development of affairs in the Low Countries had made her pause. She would like to know first what the Estates meant to do regarding the Archduke, and how they meant to settle their dissensions, and why Orange had left Brussels, and why they were so long in making answer to her and what prospect they had of success in case she did aid them.³ Havrech tried his best to resolve her doubts on these points, but he was not very successful.

While Elizabeth still hesitated as to what she should do, an envoy arrived in London from Don John in the person of one de Gastel, who had been in England before on a similar mission.⁴ On the 1st of December he had audience with the Queen.⁵ According to his instructions he proceeded to justify the conduct of Don John. He said that his master had done his best to satisfy the Estates, that he had tried by every measure in his power to come to terms with both them and Orange, and in return they had sought to abuse his confidence and lay strong hands upon his person. On that account he had taken up arms in his own defence. He had heard that the Queen meant to assist the rebels with arms and money. He prayed her therefore

¹ Lettenhove, x. 87, 90.

² Memorial of Havrech, 19 Nov. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 101.

³ Lettenhove, x. 109.

⁴ Ibid. 122.

⁵ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 33.

to remember her treaty obligations to Spain and to consider how dangerous a precedent it was to help subjects against their anointed lord. He swore that he never had had any intention to invade England as some of his detractors had said. He begged her to send an ambassador to him in order that any matters in dispute between them might be satisfactorily adjusted.¹

Elizabeth answered him briefly and to the point. She had done her best, she said, to bring peace between Philip and his subjects, and had more than once offered her services in mediation. In reply, her offers had been rejected and her rebellious subjects abroad supported and encouraged in their designs against her. Accordingly she meant to speak no more in dulcet and courtly tones, she meant to look out for her own welfare. She had made up her mind that she would not allow the Low Countries to be oppressed any longer by the Spaniards. On that account she had already lent them money. She thought it likely that she would lend them more. Don John had made friendly protestations very readily, but he had proved clearly enough how evilly intentioned he was towards her. She did not think she would send an ambassador to him. The last ambassador she had sent had been treated with very scant courtesy.²

Yet for all her brave words, it is clear that de Gastel's mission, coming at the time it did when the Queen was provoked at the conduct of the Estates, had its effect. The idea of mediation was always more congenial to her than war, and she began to think that something might yet be gained that way. The envoys of the Estates did their best to dissuade her. They showed again and again how futile offers of mediation had been in the past. They pointed to Don John's letters as proof positive of his hostile intentions towards her. They reminded her that Philip of Spain was at that very moment maintaining her rebels and devising against her throne.³ Leicester and Walsingham both added their pleas to those of the envoys. Burghley himself brought forward copious arguments to show that the Queen was very well

¹ De Gastel's instructions, 28 Oct. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 52. In spite of Don John's protestations, it is certain that he had had very definite intentions of invading England. I treat of this aspect of de Gastel's mission more at length in a later chapter.

² Havrech gives the details of this audience in his report, Lettenhove, x. 190 seq.

³ Cf. Havrech's Report, cited above.

justified in assisting the Estates.¹ But it was no use. Elizabeth had got the idea of mediation into her head, and nothing would do but she must try the old, useless expedient again. The upshot of the whole matter was that de Gastel was sent back to Don John on the 9th of December² with the Queen's promise that she would send an envoy to King Philip and another to Don John. On the same day in the evening she called Havrech and his colleague to her and told them that she had changed her mind. It was too grave a matter to be decided so hastily. She had enjoyed nineteen years of peace, she did not know what war might bring. King Philip was powerful. The Estates were weakened by dissensions. She would try the effect of mediation once more. If King Philip would not listen to her representations, she would without further delay come to their aid with the men and money which they asked for.³

This was in substance the answer Havrech and Meetkerke carried with them when they left England on the 12th of December.⁴ The total result of their three months' labour was Elizabeth's promise to mediate in their behalf with the King of Spain and with Don John. The money and the men which the Queen had at their first coming led them to hope for they did not get. Without doubt the Estates General were largely to blame for this. If they had acted promptly on Elizabeth's offers, they might have been £100,000 the richer. But their delays and dissensions put the Queen on her guard and so far strengthened the arguments of their opponents, that they won her back once more to a policy of inaction. When Elizabeth offered to lend money, it was unwise to give her time for second thoughts.

Elizabeth proceeded at once to fulfil her promises of mediation. On the 21st of December she dispatched Thomas Wilkes to the King of Spain.⁵ Wilkes was instructed to tell Philip that the only way to remedy the evils which afflicted the Low Countries was to recall Don John, to appoint a Governor of the blood royal more agreeable to the Estates, and to ratify the Pacification of Ghent. If this were done, he was to say that peace would be secured. On these terms she was willing to assist the King with

¹ Burghley's note, 7 Dec. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 152.

² Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 33.

³ Havrech's Report, cited above.

⁴ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 34.

⁵ *Ibid.*

arms and money to secure it. If it were not done, she meant to assist the Estates in their struggle for their lawful rights.¹

Two days afterwards she dispatched Captain Leighton to the Low Countries to demand from the Estates and from Don John a surcease of arms. She based this demand upon the ground that she had sent Wilkes to the King to see if peace could not be restored, and she desired the combatants to cease from fighting until the results of Wilkes's mission were known. Leighton was to press this point both upon the Estates and upon Don John. But it is obvious from the terms of his instructions that whether the Estates agreed to an armistice or not, he was to treat for the matter with Don John, and was to tell him plainly that if the King did not yield to her entreaties she meant to make war on him. If he then refused to agree to an armistice, Leighton was to return home without delay.² He was incidentally to get what information he could about Don John's forces and his readiness to carry on the war.³

The missions of both Wilkes and Leighton were in the nature of ultimatums. Elizabeth plainly gave to the King and to his governor the choice of peace or war. Never had she spoken in such plain terms before, and it is evident that, for the moment at least, she meant business.

Leighton reached the Low Countries and had conference with the Estates General early in January. They told him they were not in favour of a suspension of arms. They thought it would do great harm to their cause. Still they were perfectly willing that he should make the proposal to Don John and see what he thought of it.⁴

With this not very encouraging response Leighton proceeded to Don John and laid the proposal of an armistice before him. Don John said that he was willing to treat with the Estates on two conditions: first, the maintenance of the Catholic religion; second, the maintenance of due obedience to the King. If the Estates would meet him on those terms, he would deal with them.

¹ Wilkes's Instructions are missing. The substance of them may be gathered from Philip's instructions to Mendoza, 26 Jan. 1578, *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 476.

² Leighton's instructions, 20 Dec. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 174.

³ Memorandum for Leighton, 20 Dec. 1577, *ibid.* 171.

⁴ Answer of the Estates to Leighton, 7 Jan. 1578, *ibid.* 218.

In the meantime, he said, his duty to his master compelled him to press on the war with all vigour. He could not think of a suspension of arms.¹

With this answer Leighton returned to England on the 5th of February 1578.²

Meantime the Estates kept pressing Elizabeth to send over the men and money she had promised. On the 8th of January they dispatched M. de Famars to reside in England as their agent, and they gave him instructions by all means to hasten the men and the money.³ Famars received a cordial welcome in England.⁴ Elizabeth called her full Council together to consider his requests,⁵ but she was in no great hurry to answer him. More than a week after his first audience he asked Walsingham if the Queen had come to any decision. Walsingham answered no—that she was still deliberating. Next day he visited the Secretary again and put the same question to him. Walsingham told him that he had spoken to her many times and she had declared that she did not mean to abandon the Estates, but that she must wait until she heard from Leighton. It was apparent that she attached more importance to her offer of mediation than the Estates themselves thought.⁶

Walsingham himself was anxious for her to waste no time in such futile proceedings, but to send money and men to the States at once. But he took sick just at this time, 'being pained both in his head and stomach', and so could not urge his views in person.⁷ In consequence those in the Council who opposed him persuaded the Queen to wait a little longer at least before she did anything.⁸

But once more the course of events forced the Queen into a bolder policy. Leighton got back, as we have seen, on the 5th of February, bringing with him Don John's refusal to consent to an armistice. On the same night news of a very alarming nature

¹ Don John to Eliz., Lettenhove, x. 245.

² Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 34.

³ Famars's instructions, 8 Jan. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 225.

⁴ Wilson to Burghley, 23 Jan. 1577/8, *ibid.* 244.

⁵ Wilson to Davison, 19 Jan. 1577/8, *ibid.* 238.

⁶ Famars to Estates General, 1 Feb. 1578, *ibid.* 265.

⁷ Wilson to Burghley, 23 Jan. 1577/8, S. P. Domestic, Eliz., cxxii, no. 15.

⁸ L. Tomson to Davison, 2 Feb. 1577/8, Lettenhove, x. 267. This letter is given more at length in *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 622.

reached England from the Low Countries, to the effect that Don John had met the army of the Estates on the 31st of January and had completely overthrown them.¹

Elizabeth called her Council together at once.² They were practically all agreed that the policy which Walsingham advocated was the policy to be followed, and that to prevent worse disasters the Queen ought to send present assistance both in men and money to the Low Countries.³ It was decided that Leighton should be returned to the Estates at once, should give them assurance of her friendship, look into their affairs, and find out what security they were willing to give her for a loan of money.⁴

Before Leighton had returned, however, the Queen had found a way out of the difficulty which was more to her liking than any which had yet been proposed. On the 1st of February Dr. Daniel Rogers, who had been on a mission to Duke Casimir of the Palatinate to see if he could not arrange a Protestant league in Germany, returned to court. With him came Dr. Beutrich, Casimir's favourite councillor.⁵ Rogers brought with him Casimir's assurance of goodwill to the Queen, and his expressed desire to serve her and the Protestant cause in any way that he could. These protestations suggested to Elizabeth the idea that she might use Casimir to fight her battles in the Low Countries.⁶ She knew that the Estates had already appealed to him for aid.⁷

The idea pleased her on more accounts than one. It saved her from making an open declaration of war on Spain by sending her own forces to the Netherlands. It assured her that the money which she lent would go to the purposes for which she intended it. She determined that she would proceed in this way and no other. On the 14th of February Walsingham announced her intention to Famars, the agent of the Estates General in England.⁸ It was not until almost a month later, however, that she finally made up her mind to act.

Perhaps even then she would have cried off her bargain if she had not been afraid that the Estates would call the French to

¹ Walsingham to Randolph, 4 Feb. 1577/8, B.M. Harl. MSS. 6992, 47.

² Walsingham to Bacon, 4 Feb. 1577/8, Cotton MSS., Vespasian F xii. 217.

³ Walsingham to Randolph, 21 Feb. 1577/8, Harl. MSS. 6992, 48.

⁴ Instructions for T. Leighton, 6 Feb. 1577/8, Lettenhove, x. 274.

⁵ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 34.

⁶ Lettenhove, x. 281.

⁷ Davison to Leicester, 19 Oct. 1577, Lettenhove, x. 34.

⁸ Lettenhove, x. 281.

their aid. She knew that negotiations had been secretly going on between the Low Countries and France for some time. Just how far they had progressed she did not know, but her very uncertainty in this regard made them the more to be feared. Davison wrote her on more than one occasion that the young Alençon was gradually building up a party for himself in Hainault and Artois and that he was constantly sending offers of aid to the Estates which they hardly dared ignore from fear that he would go over to the other side.¹ There had been rumours on the other hand of dealings between Don John and the Duke of Guise. There had been the Queen of Navarre's visit to Spa, the import of which, though not definitely known, was certainly ominous.²

And now, while Elizabeth still hesitated as to what she should do, Davison wrote home on the 8th of March that Alençon had learned how matters stood between her and the Estates and that he had sent once more an envoy to them to offer them his assistance on the most liberal terms. Davison said that the Queen's delay in sending aid had greatly strengthened the French party in the Estates, and that it was to be feared, if she did not assist them at once, they would embrace the young Duke's offers.³ It was news like this which, coupled with other arguments already advanced, finally induced Elizabeth to take action, in accordance with the decision which she had reached a month before.

On the 10th of March 1578 she dispatched Dr. Rogers to the Low Countries with her answer to their requests for aid. He was instructed to say that she could not assist them in the way they desired because she did not wish so far to weaken her own defences. She feared that when the King of France saw her interfering in the Low Countries he would make war upon her. (This was gross exaggeration, but it served her turn.) Therefore she had made up her mind to assist them indirectly through the means of Duke Casimir of the Palatinate. She had accordingly asked him to enlist a force of 6,000 Swiss and 5,000 horse to be

¹ Cf. Lettenhove, x. 184, 189.

² Cf. on the dealings of Alençon in the Low Countries at this time, Muller and Diegerick, *Documents concernant les relations entre le Duc d'Anjou et les Pays-Bas*, i. 50 ff.

³ Davison to Walsingham, 8 March 1577/8, Lettenhove, x. 313.

employed in their defence. She had agreed to pay him £20,000 at once and a further £20,000 at the time of the muster. In order to meet this expense she was willing to stand their bondsman for £100,000, or indeed to advance them the £40,000 outright if they could not raise it elsewhere, upon condition that they would repay her within a year.¹

In due time Rogers presented himself to the Estates and laid before them Elizabeth's proposals. After some debate they accepted her offers. But they accepted them with a very bad grace. As Elizabeth anticipated, they did not want so many men as she had provided for them. Moreover, they wanted men at once, and it would take two or three months to get them out of the Palatinate. Davison wrote that they felt so desperate about the matter that they even contemplated coming to terms with Don John.² However, for all their wry faces, they did accept the offer, and Rogers hastened on to the Palatinate to arrange matters with Casimir.³

The Estates, however, cherished a hope that the Queen would do something more for them at once, for the state of their affairs after the defeat of Gemblours was so desperate that they were fairly driven to the wall. It was on that account that they kept the Marquis of Havrech, who had been sent over to Elizabeth on another errand, in England and urged him to do what he could for their cause.⁴ Just what Havrech tried to do is not quite clear. It seems probable that he wanted to get a loan of ready money from the Queen.⁵ In his efforts he appears to have had the support of most of the councillors. Certainly Leicester, Walsingham, and Wilson, lately made Principal Secretary, did their best for him.⁶ He finally succeeded in wringing from the Queen a loan of £5,000, and permission to export 'a large quantity of munitions of war'.⁷ Possibly he might have got more if it had not been for the arrival of another person in England at that time with a bag full of Spanish arguments.

It will be remembered that Elizabeth had sent Thomas Wilkes

¹ Rogers's Instructions, 10 March 1577/8, Lettenhove, x. 319.

² Davison to Walsingham, 23 March 1577/8, *ibid.* 342.

³ Declaration of the Estates General, 22 March 1578, *ibid.* 339.

⁴ States to Havrech, 22 March 1578, *ibid.* 339.

⁵ Estates to Havrech, 5 April 1578, *ibid.* 393.

⁶ Mendoza to Philip, 19 March 1578, *Cal. Span.* 1568-79, 483.

⁷ Report of Havrech, 1 May 1578, Lettenhove, x. 437.

to Spain in December 1577 to demand of Philip in her name that he come to terms with his rebellious subjects. Philip had received him graciously and had sent him back with the promise that he, the King, would shortly send an envoy to the Queen with his reply.¹ It was this envoy that reached England in March² and who succeeded in thwarting Havrech's efforts. He was no other than Bernardino de Mendoza, one of the most adroit of Spanish diplomatists. He came with soothing messages, making out that the King had done everything in his power to maintain the peace, that he had every desire to preserve to the Estates General their privileges, that he was even willing to recall Don John. He said that the root of the trouble lay in the obstinate Netherlanders who were fomenting disorders, not because they had real grievances, but because they loved trouble better than peace.³ He did not, however, bring any commission from the King to make peace on the terms which the Queen had specified to Wilkes. Elizabeth's interview with him was rather a stormy one. She defended the conduct of the Estates, laying the blame for all the disorders which had arisen upon the Spaniards, and she ended by declaring that she would suffer neither Spain nor France to tyrannize over the Low Countries, and that unless the King made peace she would go to their assistance.⁴

But she had said that a great many times before, and for all her stormings it was soon evident that Mendoza's smooth words had had their effect.

This appears very clearly in a letter which Walsingham wrote to Davison on the 20th of March. 'Your letter of the 8th of March,' he wrote, 'touching your opinion what assistance you thought fit, in honour and safety, to be given to the States, very gravely and substantially deduced, was imparted to her Majesty, and greatly approved by her touching the manner, but as for the matter she takes daily less taste thereof, especially since the arrival of Don Bernardino who has put us in a vain hope of

¹ Cf. Mendoza's instructions, 26 Jan. 1578, *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 476. A good brief life of Bernardino de Mendoza by A. Morel-Fatio is printed in *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de Bordeaux, Bulletin hispanique*, viii. 20-70, 129-47.

² Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 35.

³ Mendoza to Philip, 19 March 1578, *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 483.

⁴ Walsingham to Davison, 27 March 1578, Lettenhove, x. 361.

peace by her mediation. Such as are evil affected and inclined to Spain take great hold thereof to the grief of those who are best devoted to her Majesty's service and foresee the peril of her relying on so vain a hope.' ¹

Walsingham obviously pinned very little faith to Mendoza's representations. 'When anatomy shall be made,' he wrote to Burghley, 'and the particulars of the matter looked into, I fear it will prove an offer of abuse to gain time.' ² But Elizabeth was more sanguine. She was always ready to listen to counsels of mediation and delay. It was probably due to Mendoza's influence that the Marquis of Havrech returned to the Low Countries in April with so little reward for his pains. Unquestionably it was due to him that the Queen decided once more to try her old expedient of mediation.

With this in view she dispatched Thomas Wilkes to Don John on the 4th of April to urge him to ratify the Perpetual Edict and to grant an armistice, so that the question of a treaty of peace might be debated. ³ Wilkes was ordered to make the old threats of intervention if Don John did not accede to these demands. It is a little hard to believe that Elizabeth expected any good result from this embassy. She must have known by this time how futile such offers of mediation were. Possibly she chose this method of concealing what she had already done for the Estates in Germany. But if this was her motive, she certainly deceived Walsingham, who believed that she was acting in good faith. He himself was certain that nothing would come of what he called Wilkes's 'sleeveless errand'. ⁴

The event showed that he was right. Wilkes returned out of the Low Countries on the 29th of April, ⁵ bringing with him vague messages of goodwill from Don John and general protestations of his desire for peace. But the Spanish Governor absolutely refused to grant the armistice which Elizabeth demanded. Moreover, he said plainly that if the Queen assisted the rebels, he would turn his sword against her. ⁶ And so Wilkes's mission

¹ Walsingham to Davison, 20 March 1577/8, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 714.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 17 March 1577/8, *ibid.* 704.

³ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 36.

⁴ Walsingham to Davison, 5 April 1578, Lettenhove, x. 399.

⁵ Walsingham's *Diary*, p. 36.

⁶ Wilkes's Report, April 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 830.

came to nothing as Walsingham thought it would. It came, in fact, to worse than nothing. It wasted time and money. It made the Estates despair of further assistance from England and so drove them once again to look for aid to France, which was just what the Queen had all along been trying to avoid.

With the re-entry of France into the problem of the Low Countries begins a new chapter of Elizabethan diplomacy which is presently to be described. It seems fitting now to interrupt the course of affairs for a little while, here at the 1st of May 1578, and to reconsider briefly what Francis Walsingham had been doing since he became Principal Secretary in December 1573, and what place he had come to occupy in the counsels of the Queen.

Walsingham's connexions with the relations between England and France on the one hand and England and the Low Countries on the other reveal him invariably as a strong sympathizer with the Protestant cause. Throughout the underhand negotiations which the Queen carried on with the French Huguenots, he was the one man above all others to whom they looked for sympathy and advice and assistance. Similarly in the Queen's dealings with the Dutch rebels he was throughout the steadfast friend of Orange and his cause. On more than one occasion this friendship led him to do things which were not quite compatible with the offices of trust which he held under the Queen. In consequence he made himself very unpopular with Elizabeth, who called him a Calvinist and a Puritan and who declared that he was more interested in the cause of Protestantism than he was in the safety of England. Probably these charges were not altogether without foundation. 'Above all things,' he wrote on one occasion, 'I wish God's glory and next her Majesty's safety.' In reality he identified the two. His conviction had been from the first and he held to it steadfastly that the cause of England and the cause of Protestantism were one and the same.

Upon Walsingham's position in the Privy Council the comment of Bernardino de Mendoza is so illuminating that it deserves to be given in full. 'Although there are seventeen councillors,' he wrote to Philip II on the 31st of March 1578, 'with the two secretaries, Hatton and the new ones, the bulk of the business really depends upon the Queen, Leicester, Walsingham and

Cecil, the latter of whom, although he takes part in the resolution of them by virtue of his office, absents himself on many occasions, as he is opposed to the Queen's helping the rebels so effectively and thus weakening her own position. He does not wish to break with Leicester and Walsingham on the matter, they being very much wedded to the States and extremely self-seeking, as I am assured that they are keeping the interest of the money which the Queen has lent to the Estates, without counting the presents they have received out of the principal. They urge the business under cloak of preserving their religion, which Cecil cannot well oppose. Nor can he afford to make enemies of them, as they are well supported. Some of the Councillors are well disposed towards your Majesty, but Leicester, whose spirit is Walsingham, is so highly favoured by the Queen, notwithstanding his bad character, that he centres in his hands and those of his friends most of the business of the country.' ¹

A great deal of what Mendoza says in his letter is untrue. It is certain that Walsingham was perfectly sincere when he urged the question of religion as the principal reason for the Queen's assisting the Dutch. There is absolutely no proof that he was being bribed by the Dutch to put the loan through, as Mendoza suggests. The interesting part of Mendoza's letter is not his recriminations against Walsingham and his party which are common to all the Spanish correspondence of the time; it is rather the testimony which he brings to the fact that

¹ Mendoza to Philip, 31 March 1578, *Cal. Span.*, 1568-79, 486. With regard to Sir Christopher Hatton, who had become Vice-Chamberlain and a Privy Councillor in November 1577, Walsingham wrote to Davison on the 16th of May 1578: 'I am informed that there are hard speeches given out against Mr. Vice-Chamberlain by men of the best countenance there [in the Low Countries] as over much inclined to Spain, wherein I do assure you the gentleman receiveth great wrong, for of my own knowledge I know that he most earnestly hath dealt most effectually with her Majesty in furtherance of the States, without whose mediation things I know had not taken that effect that they do. And therefore it were well that such like speeches were suppressed, for being so interested as he is in her Majesty's favour, it were more policy to make of an enemy a friend than to make him of a friend an enemy.' Lettenhove, x. 473. Regarding Mendoza's charge that Walsingham was bribed by the Dutch, Mauvissière had something to say on this subject in a letter to Henry III on the 21st of April 1576: '*Les ennemys luy [Walsingham] veulent jeter le chat aux jambes et imposer ou qu'il participe au butin [of the Dutch pirates] ou qu'il a pensions et estatz dud. Prince d'Oranges. Mais je croy qu'il n'y a rien que la seule haine qu'il porte aux Espagnolz et la grande volonté qu'il a d'avancer sa religion qui luy ait tant fait embrasser cest affaire.*' (French Transcripts, Bundle 27.)

Walsingham at this time was one of the most important and most influential councillors of Elizabeth. This is perhaps the most significant fact concerning him which is to be gleaned from the complicated diplomacy of Elizabeth between the years 1574 and 1578. The actual information which we possess about his life during that time is lamentably little. But we catch occasional glimpses of him through the maze of intrigue, and those glimpses reveal him in constantly enlarging proportions. It was a formative period, a trying out period for him, those first four years in the office of secretary. The conclusion is, after a review of his life at the time, that he was in the modern cant phrase distinctly 'making good'. In fact, he was making so good, that at the end of four years he was reckoned by foreign diplomatists in England as one of the three or four principal advisers in the counsels of the Queen.

VII

THE EMBASSY TO THE LOW COUNTRIES

QUEEN ELIZABETH was induced to help the rebels in the Low Countries by two considerations. In the first place, she did not wish the King of Spain to re-establish his power over them to such an extent as to be a menace to England from across the Channel. In the second place, she did not wish the French to take advantage of the disorder in the Netherlands to extend their dominion in that direction. It was on these two accounts that, after much hesitation, she had been persuaded to lend the Estates £100,000 and to invoke the aid of Duke Casimir in their behalf. On the other hand, she did not wish to go so far in assisting the rebels as to force the King of Spain into war with her, and she did not wish so far to oppose the ambitions of France as to arouse the enmity of that country. Above all things else she wanted to keep England out of war. She was then between the two horns of a dilemma. She dared not help the States either too much or too little. She must contrive if possible to steer a middle way. That was what she had been trying to do between the years 1574 and 1578, and although her course had been a very tortuous one she had been on the whole successful.

But she was a long way from a point of safety yet, and in the spring of 1578 the danger from France, which up to that time had been comparatively small, began to assume alarming proportions. The treaty of Bergerac, signed in September 1577, restored some semblance of civil peace to France. With peace the dissensions between King Henry III and his younger brother Francis, Duke d'Alençon, had broken out again. They had their root apparently in the petty jealousies of the King and his brother, but they were aggravated by the intrigues of courtiers and dependants. Early in February 1578 they had grown to such dimensions that Henry placed his brother under guard and threw two or three of his favourites in prison. A few days later Alençon, with the assistance of his sister Marguerite, Queen of Navarre,

escaped from the Louvre and fled to Angers, the chief city of his apanage.¹

It looked as though civil war was going to break out in France once more. Both the King and his mother were greatly alarmed. Catherine de Médicis hastened after her younger son to see if she could not patch up a peace. She did not succeed in getting him to return to court, but at least she got his assurance that he did not mean to disturb the peace of the realm.² He told her that he merely wanted to enjoy a little hunting. As a matter of fact, however, he had another project in view of a much more serious nature.

This appears in a letter which he sent to his agent, Mondoucet, on the 10th of March 1578.³ He wrote that he had fled from court in order to go to the assistance of the rebellious Netherlanders.

For some time he had been carrying on negotiations with the Estates General with that end in view. In the fall of 1576 he had sent an agent of his to the Estates to offer them his assistance. At that time they had refused his offers, but not apparently in such terms as to give him offence, or to preclude the possibility of appeals to him in the future.⁴ The peace between the Estates and Don John, signed in February 1577, had interrupted these negotiations for a time. They were resumed again later in the year. It was with the intention of stirring up a party favourable to her brother in Artois and Hainault that Marguerite of Navarre had made her journey to Spa in July of that year.⁵ When the breach between Don John and the Estates became an accomplished fact in October 1577, envoys were sent to Alençon to request his aid and to make him a present of valuable tapestry.⁶ The young Duke sent back their tapestry, but he renewed his offers of aid, saying that he was disposed to employ himself in their behalf if they would make him a definite proposal.⁷ The Estates were not inclined at the time to go so far as that. It was probably in part their fear of French interference which induced

¹ Lavissee, vi, part 1, 193.

² *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vi. 10.

³ Muller and Diegerick, i. 108.

⁵ *Memoirs of Marguerite de Valois*, p. 84 ff.

⁶ Muller and Diegerick, i. 59.

⁷ Alençon to the Estates General, 25 Oct. 1577, *ibid.* i. 74.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. 8.

them on the 8th of December to recognize the Archduke Matthias as their governor.¹

The election of Matthias placed a large obstacle in the way of Alençon's ambition. He seems to have used what influence he had to prevent it.² Even though he failed in this, however, he did not relinquish his efforts. He took advantage of the desperate situation in which the Estates found themselves after the defeat of Gemblours (31 Jan. 1578) to send his agent, Mondoucet, once more with his offers to the Estates General. At the same time he began to deal separately with Count Lalaing and the other leading nobles in Hainault, where he knew that there was a strong feeling in favour of the French.

His efforts were so far successful that the Estates General on the 24th of March³ appointed commissioners to negotiate an agreement with commissioners to be appointed by him. They did this apparently, not because they wanted Alençon's aid, but because they feared that if they did not enlist his friendship he would join himself with the enemy, or else lay a strong hand on the provinces of Hainault and Artois. They delayed their negotiations as long as possible, and when at last on the 19th of April they did make a definite proposal to him their offers were hardly calculated to win his approval.⁴ They proposed in fact that he should confine his campaign to Burgundy and Luxemburg and the regions beyond the Meuse—that is to say, that he should not lead his troops into the Low Countries proper. They promised to guarantee to him all conquests which he made in that region and to pay him a pension of 200,000 francs annually.

What they wanted to do apparently was to involve him in war with Spain without any risk and with almost no expense to themselves. Naturally the Duke scoffed at such offers. He demanded instead that he should be named their protector, that he should be given two strong towns as security for the good intentions of the Estates, and that in case they renounced their allegiance to the King of Spain he should be chosen their

¹ Blok, iii. 123. It is to be noticed throughout these negotiations between Alençon and the Estates that he was very much more anxious to press his aid upon the Low Countries than they were to receive it from him.

² Muller and Diegerick, i. 104, n. 1.

³ Ibid. i, p. 111, n. 1.

⁴ Instructions for the deputies of the Estates General, *ibid.* i. 138. Cf. on this subject Japikse, *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal*, ii. 53 ff.

governor.¹ The Estates were not inclined to go so far. Nevertheless, on the basis of these offers, negotiations were continued between their commissioners and the commissioners of Alençon for some months to come.

Meantime, William Davison, Elizabeth's agent in the Low Countries, got wind of all these negotiations and reported them promptly to the Queen. The Estates assured him that they had only consented to deal with Alençon because they feared that he would go over to the enemy, and they promised to make no treaty with him without the Queen's knowledge and advice.² But Elizabeth was not altogether satisfied with these assurances. Every letter from Davison brought news which indicated that the negotiations between the Estates and Alençon were moving on apace. She made up her mind that unless she acted promptly the fears which she had long cherished of French intervention in the Netherlands would be realized.

She was more or less puzzled by the whole situation. She could not tell whether Alençon was acting on his own responsibility or whether he was being secretly supported by the King. Paulet, her ambassador at Paris, wrote at one time that the King was altogether opposed to the expedition,³ but a little later he contradicted himself.⁴ She was not sure, either, whether the Duke was acting in good faith with the Estates or whether, as it was rumoured, he meant to betray them into the hands of Don John. Either way, she thought his presence in the Low Countries highly undesirable. So she called her Council together and asked them what she ought to do to prevent it.

Sir Nicholas Bacon was of the opinion that she had better let the Estates come to terms with Alençon. He thought this could be done without great danger if they were careful about the terms they made with him. Otherwise he was afraid that the Duke would join forces with Don John and destroy them.⁵ Burghley opposed this policy. He thought it would be better for the Queen to send envoys of 'quality and sufficiency' to the Estates to dissuade them from dealing with Alençon and to

¹ Response of Alençon, 26 April 1578, Muller and Diegerick, i. 153.

² Davison to Burghley, 20 April 1578, Lettenhove, x. 422.

³ Paulet to Elizabeth, 13 May 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 864.

⁴ Paulet to the Secretaries, 23 May 1578, *ibid.* 908.

⁵ Bacon's Memorial to Elizabeth, Apr. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 384.

promise them assistance of men and money in case their refusal of his offers led him to join with the enemy. If the Estates would not be dissuaded, then the envoys were to declare that Elizabeth would join with Don John against them. These same envoys should deal with Don John to see if they could not bring him to terms. At the same time Burghley advised that other messengers be sent to the King of France and his brother to protest against their assisting the Estates and to threaten them with war unless they desisted.¹

What advice Walsingham gave on this occasion is not recorded. He stated his opinion on the situation, however, in a letter to Davison of 11th May.

'Presently,' he wrote, 'we are in consultation what were fit to be done in the Low Country causes, which we find subject to so many difficulties as we know not what to resolve, especially for that we are doubtful what should be Monsieur's meaning touching his late offers made to the States. Many arguments there are to induce us to think that all is but abuse, and I see it a common fear in the best affected and that are of best judgement. It will behove the Prince, therefore, to look substantially into the matter, and not to forget the late accident on St. Bartholomew's Day. I am greatly in doubt that those that were authors in that banquet have their hand in the pie in this new intended matter. On the other side, many reasons there are that lead me to think that a French King, being so jealous of his brother as he is, his realm so full of martial men, and the Low Countries a morsel worth the having, would be glad to set him awork abroad to live the more quietly at home in his own realm. Notwithstanding, whether he mean sincerely or to abuse, it is high time for us to look to the matter if it be not already too late. And surely it is hard to judge in whether is the greater peril, either in joining with Don John or with the States, saving the first bringeth a present mischief, the second, a future, that is rather to reach to our posterity than unto us.'²

It is clear from this that Walsingham believed that the negotiations of Alençon with the Estates were very dangerous to the safety of England, and that, whether he was acting in good faith or treacherously, he ought to be stopped. Apparently he was in considerable doubt as to just what ought to be done, but he was certainly in favour of doing something quickly. There is

¹ Burghley's Memorial, s. d., Lettenhove, x. 465.

² S. P. Foreign, Eliz., Holland and Flanders, vi. no. 56.

reason to believe that he was at one with Burghley as to the course which ought to be pursued.¹

It was Burghley's plan—the plan of sending 'personages of quality and sufficiency' to the States—that the Queen finally made up her mind to follow. On the 11th of May Walsingham wrote to Davison, 'I find some disposition in her Majesty to send out of hand some personages of quality to the States to deal effectually with them in devising some good way for their safety, wherein I see some inclination in her to use my services. And if it so fall out I doubt not but that we shall bring over matter of contentment. The Earl of Leicester doth labour greatly to be employed in this journey and is not without hope to win the same at her Majesty's hands.'²

A week later Elizabeth had definitely decided to send Walsingham to the Low Countries and along with him Lord Cobham, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports.³ So that Leicester did not get his will after all. Walsingham himself was not at all anxious to go. 'I am moved upon very great cause', he wrote to Davison on the 16th of May, 'to seek to rid my hands from the voyage.' But the Queen would not let him off. She knew her man.⁴

But before she sent her envoys she determined to find out whether the States had actually come to terms with the Duke of Alençon. She accordingly instructed Davison to make inquiries to that effect. If he found that Orange and the Estates 'were altogether given over to the French', he was to inform them that she would recall the loan of money which she had offered to them and would restrain Duke Casimir from coming to their assistance. If, on the other hand, they had not yet come to terms with the French, he was to make them liberal offers on her behalf. He was to promise that she would not only abide by the agreement which she had already made with them, but would also send them speedy assistance direct from England.⁵

Davison laid this message before the Estates and a few days

¹ In his letter just cited he speaks of the plan of sending ambassadors to the Low Countries in approving tones.

² Ibid.

³ Walsingham to Davison, 18 May 1578, Lettenhove, x. 479. 'The coming over of my Lord Cobham and myself is now concluded.'

⁴ Lettenhove, x. 472.

⁵ Elizabeth to Davison, 22 May 1578, *ibid.* 486.

after received their answer. They said that they saw no reason why the Queen should be indignant at them for their dealings with Alençon. They had appealed to her and she had refused to give them the assistance they required. In desperation they had been forced to seek aid where they could find it. However, they had not yet come to an agreement with the Duke and they would be glad of her co-operation in their negotiations.¹

This was not a very satisfactory answer, but it gave Elizabeth the assurance that she wanted, and as soon as she had received it she bade Walsingham and Cobham make ready to take their journey. On the 2nd of June Burghley was busy preparing their letter of instructions.² Three days later the Queen wrote to Davison announcing her intention of sending them over at once, and bidding him to request the Estates not to come to any agreement with Alençon until they arrived.³

But meanwhile other matters had been in debate in England which had profoundly affected the whole situation.

It will be recalled that in the past the Duke of Alençon had been a suitor for Elizabeth's hand. The courtship had begun early in the year 1572, and had continued in a desultory fashion until the middle of the year 1576. During a large part of this time Elizabeth had been secretly assisting the young Duke in his rebellion against his brother. The Peace of Monsieur, signed in May 1576, had put an end at once to the rebellion and to the courtship. From that time on, for almost two years, Elizabeth and Alençon had been as strangers. The Queen on more than one occasion had complained of her suitor's neglect, and he had promised to make good his deficiency, but nothing whatever had come of it.⁴

When Alençon, in the late winter of 1578, began to formulate his plans regarding the Low Countries, his thoughts turned to Elizabeth once more. It may be that the returning spring reawakened his dormant passion. More probably he saw that the Queen of England was likely to be the great obstacle in the

¹ Response of the Estates General to Davison, May 1578, *ibid.* 490. Cf. Japikse, *op. cit.* ii. 101.

² Burghley's draft of the letter of instructions dated 2 June, in *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii, p. 179.

³ Elizabeth to Davison, 5 June 1578, Lettenhove, x. 510.

⁴ Cf. Catherine to Mauvissière, 19 Apr. 1577, *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, v. 250; Mauvissière to ?, 15 May 1577, *Cal. Foreign*, 1575-7, 1496.

way of the success of his projects in the Netherlands, and that it was necessary to conciliate her before he could hope to accomplish anything. This seems to have been the chief motive which induced him to send envoys to the Queen early in March 1578, and it shows that other people besides Elizabeth knew how to turn courtship to the uses of diplomacy.

Alençon sent his envoy to Elizabeth early in March 1578.¹ It was just about the time that he was resuming negotiations with the Estates of the Netherlands.² Who it was that Alençon sent is not recorded. He was charged apparently to apologize to Elizabeth for the Duke's neglect in the past, to offer his friendship and alliance on such terms as she deemed honourable, and to assure her that he meant to direct all his doings by her advice.³ But it is difficult to gather much meaning from assurances of this sort. They might mean much or little. Probably the envoy had more specific instructions which are not on record. It seems likely that he had something to say about the Low Countries.⁴ He may have brought some messages of a more tender sort. The talk of a marriage between the Duke and Elizabeth was revived very shortly after this time. The purposes of this mission must remain largely a matter of surmise. It seems likely, however, that what Alençon wanted to do was to conciliate Elizabeth, either by a show of love-making or in some other manner, so that she would assist him, or at least would not interfere with him, in his project in the Low Countries.

Elizabeth, it is plain, did not want Alençon to interfere in the Low Countries, but she probably realized by this time, in consequence of the messages which she was receiving both from the Low Countries and from France, that it would be pretty hard to stop him. In consequence she started to shape her policy accordingly. After all, Alençon in himself was not a very dangerous man. By this time she had gauged his calibre. If this was merely a hare-brained project of his own, she began to think that it might be turned to good advantage. What she

¹ Alençon to Paulet, 9 Mar. 1577/8, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 706.

² Cf. Alençon to the Estates General, 9 Mar. 1577/8, Muller and Diegerick, i. 108.

³ Paulet to Elizabeth, 19 Mar. 1577/8, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 706.

⁴ Davison wrote to the Secretaries on the 5th of April (*Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 768), 'for the gentlemen arrived in England from Monsieur, the Prince of Orange is of advice there is nothing in it but fraud.'

feared was that his brother with the power of France was backing him. If this was so, she meant to oppose him tooth and nail. If this was not so, as she had some grounds for believing, she thought she might ally herself with him and direct his expedition in such a wise that it would bring no harm to herself. Whether or not at this time she seriously considered marrying him as a means of getting him on her side, it is difficult to say. At any rate she saw that a renewal of the old courtship would serve her turn, and so she welcomed it.

On the 16th of May she dispatched Sir Edward Stafford to France. He was directed both to the King and to Alençon. The primary object of his mission was to find out the King's attitude towards Alençon's purposes and to do everything he could to induce Henry to prevent his brother from entering the Low Countries. He also carried both to the young Duke and to his mother assuring messages of Elizabeth's willingness to resume the old negotiations for marriage.¹ Stafford saw the King and his mother, and they both declared to him in most positive terms that they were doing their best to prevent Alençon from carrying out his project in the Low Countries. Catherine de Médicis gave him a letter to deliver to Elizabeth, in which she welcomed with great enthusiasm the idea of a marriage.² He saw Alençon also. There is no record of what passed between them, but it was evidently to the Queen's satisfaction.

The effect of Stafford's mission was to alter somewhat Elizabeth's attitude towards the problem of the Netherlands. In a draft of instructions for Walsingham and Cobham, prepared early in June, she had directed them by all means in their power to put a stop to the negotiations in progress between Alençon and the Estates.³ In a letter which Walsingham wrote at her dictation to Sir Amias Paulet, English ambassador in France, on the 7th of June she had already changed her tone. Walsingham in his letter instructed Paulet to inform Alençon 'that in some sort her Majesty would be content that he should deal in the

¹ Stafford's instructions are missing. The substance of them may be gathered from Paulet to Elizabeth, 26 May, 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1577-8, 914, also Catherine to Elizabeth, 8 June, *ibid.* 1578-9, 8.

² Catherine to Elizabeth just cited.

³ Draft of instructions for Cobham and Walsingham, n. d., *Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, 16.

Low Countries, and therefore, if he would give authority to his deputies there to treat in that behalf with such ministers as she would shortly send thither, something might be done to both their contentments.' ¹

It was in accordance with this change of face that the instructions for Walsingham and Cobham were finally drawn up on the 12th of June.²

These instructions are of particular importance, not only because they set forth the attitude of Elizabeth towards the Low Countries at this time, but also because they were, so to speak, the chart by which Walsingham and his colleagues steered their course in their negotiations in the Low Countries. It will therefore be expedient to examine them with some detail.

First of all, the envoys were commanded to do everything they could to bring about a 'peace and good agreement' between the States and Don John. To this end they were directed to confer with the Prince of Orange and with other members of the nobility, and to find out what obstacles stood in the way of peace, and how these obstacles could be removed. They were then to confer with the Imperial ambassador who was at that time in the Low Countries seeking to restore peace and see if they could not get his co-operation in their efforts. Having done this, they were to go to Don John, assure him of her friendship, call to his attention the dangers of French interference, and desire him to grant an armistice and to undertake negotiations for peace. If he would do this, well and good. They were to assist him with all means at their command. If he would not, they were to tell him plainly that the Queen would no longer suffer the Low Countries to be overrun and laid waste as they were at present.

This was the first part of the envoy's instructions. If, for all their efforts, they could not effect peace, they were to proceed to the second part—that is to say, they were to look closely into the 'condition and ability' of the Estates, to find out how well they were agreed among themselves and what resources they had in men and money.

They were further to speak with the Estates about their

¹ Walsingham's letter is missing. It is referred to and described in Paulet to Secretaries, 15 June 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, 21.

² Cotton MSS., Galba C vi, pt. 2, no. 174.

dealings with Alençon, and while not opposing him, to advise them to limit the aid he should bring, so that he would not be in a position to 'overrule' them.

Finally, if the combined forces of Casimir and Alençon with such forces as the States already had at their command appeared to the envoys to be insufficient to withstand Don John, they were to promise the States that Elizabeth would send other forces out of England to their relief. In security for these they were to demand of the States that some towns, preferably Sluys and Flushing, should be delivered into her hands.

These were the things which Elizabeth was sending Walsingham and Cobham across the Channel to do. Judging from their instructions, she had decided to make one more try for peace, and that failing, to go openly to the assistance of the States. The event will show how well she lived up to the letter of her intentions. There can be little doubt, however, that for the time being she was very much in earnest. It is not likely that she would have stipulated for towns of security, if she had not had in contemplation an open breach with the King of Spain. Nor can it be supposed that she would have chosen such a man as Walsingham to go on a fool's errand.

Walsingham and Cobham were dispatched from court on the 15th of June. Before they left they paid a visit to Mendoza, the Spanish envoy in England. They assured him that they were going over in the cause of peace and they asked him for letters to Don John. Mendoza answered them 'with very sweet words', promised that they would be well received by Don John, and gave them the letters they asked for. But his private convictions were that they were going over to stir up trouble.¹ This conviction, by the way, was shared by the ambassador of Venice at Paris.²

In commenting on the mission in a letter to Philip II Mendoza wrote that Walsingham was really the soul of the embassy and that Cobham was sent only for the sake of appearances.³ It seems likely that this was to some extent the case. Walsingham was bound, by the very nature of his office, to be the more important of the two. Had he been sent alone, his pronounced

¹ Mendoza to Philip II, 13 June 1578, *Cal. Spanish*, 1568-79, 513.

² *Cal. Venetian*, 1558-80, 576.

³ Mendoza to Philip II, cited n. 1 above.

bias in favour of the rebels would have given to the embassy a complexion too obviously anti-Spanish for the pacific purposes for which, at least ostensibly, it was sent. Cobham's presence contributed a conservative and in some measure a pro-Spanish element. He was regarded by many in England and abroad as being Catholic in his sympathies. On that account he had been thrown into the Tower at one time for suspected complicity in the Ridolfi Plot. He was not by any means a nonentity. At the time he was Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, one of the most responsible positions in England, and he was a man of considerable diplomatic experience.¹ But for all that he was not the man that Walsingham was, and throughout the course of the negotiations it will become evident that his position on the embassy was, if not for mere appearances, at any rate of distinctly secondary importance.

Although the two envoys had left court by the 15th of June, it was almost a week later before they got out of England. This, as Walsingham explained in a letter to Davison, was because of the extensive preparations which they had to make before leaving. They were going over in state, with more than 180 persons in their following, and it was no small problem, even with the resources of the kingdom at their command, to convoy such a party.²

The very pomp and ceremony with which they went, involving as it did large expenditures, is another argument to prove the importance which the Queen attached to their going.

They finally took ship at Dover on the 20th of June in the evening and on the next day they arrived at Dunkirk.³

A week later, travelling overland, they reached Antwerp. The Netherlanders had been led to expect everything from their coming, and accordingly they received a very cordial reception. To this, Pruneaux, one of Alençon's agents in the Low Countries, bears eloquent testimony, which is not untinged with jealousy. 'The English ambassadors', he wrote to his master, 'were met upon their landing and have been very honourably conducted to

¹ Cf. Cobham's Life in *Dict. of National Biography*, art. Henry Brooke.

² Cobham and Walsingham to Davison, 17 June 1578, Lettenhove, x. 524.

³ News from the Low Countries, s. d., *ibid.* 542.

Antwerp where the Count Egmont and the Prince de Chimay with many others escorted them. Such honours have not been accorded to your servants. It is true that they are accompanied by more than sixty English gentlemen. They spend a lot of money and give fine presents.'¹

As soon as the ambassadors landed they sent out parties of gentlemen, some along the French frontiers, some into the heart of the country, and others along the coast,² to investigate the condition of the country, to see how well the towns were fortified, how the inhabitants stood with respect to Don John, to the Estates, and to the French, and how they were affected in religion.³ These gentlemen made their reports early in July, and although they discovered different sentiments in different places, on the whole they bore testimony to the fact that the towns through which they passed were well defended, sound in religion, and friendly to the cause of the rebels.⁴

It was not long after their arrival at Antwerp that Walsingham and Cobham opened negotiations with the Estates. For this purpose the Estates seem to have appointed a committee of their number with the Prince of Orange as head to deal with them. Before this committee, the ambassadors, in accordance with their instructions, presented certain questions for consideration. In the first place, they inquired how the Estates were disposed towards peace, and how they thought peace might be secured. In the second place, they asked, if war was inevitable, what means the Estates had to carry on such a war effectively. In the third place, they protested against the manner in which the Estates were conducting negotiations with the Duke of Alençon. Around these three points the discussion which followed turned. Upon the first point Orange, speaking for the Committee, said that the Estates, although they saw small hope of peace, were willing to treat with Don John and promised very shortly to submit their terms. On the second he said that he believed the Estates would be able to raise enough money for all their needs. But, he went on to say, that for their present necessities, they

¹ Pruneaux to Alençon, 5 July 1578, Muller and Diegerick, i. 316.

² Cobham to Burghley, 5 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 567.

³ The letter of instructions given to these gentlemen, dated 23 June 1578, is printed in Lettenhove, x. 536.

⁴ These reports are printed in Lettenhove, x. 549 ff.

hoped that the Queen of England would be willing to advance them a loan. Walsingham inquired what security they had to offer. They promised to give their bonds. Walsingham retorted that since they had offered to give Alençon certain towns for his security, Elizabeth could hardly content herself with 'ink and parchment'. Orange asked him what towns he would have. Walsingham did not wish to commit himself on this point. He said he had no commission to demand any, but that he would transmit any offers which the Estates had to make to the Queen.

Finally, the question of Alençon came up. The ambassadors pointed out the dangers which were likely to follow if Alençon were admitted into the country without any moderation of his forces. They said that the Queen was angry with the Estates for having proceeded so far with him without her knowledge. Nevertheless, they added, she was not unwilling that they should seek aid from the Duke so long as they made sure his purposes were merely to help them and not to 'impatronize' himself in their land. To this Orange answered by apologizing for their hasty course in the negotiations. He said that their fears lest Alençon should join forces with the enemy or should lay strong hands on the frontier provinces had induced them to begin negotiations with him, but that they had no intention of coming to terms with him until they had ascertained what help they might look for elsewhere, and at all events that they did not mean to sign any treaty with him to the disadvantage of the Queen of England.¹

This preliminary conference, although in no wise conclusive, indicates clearly enough the state in which matters stood. The Estates were, it appears, willing to treat with Don John if he would meet their terms. They thought their resources sufficient to carry on the war further, but they were plainly in need of money for their present necessities, and were anxious to borrow from Elizabeth. It was clear that they had been more or less forced into negotiations with Alençon. It was almost equally clear that their further dealings with him, as Orange intimated, would depend largely upon how much the Queen was willing to do for them.

¹ Report of the conference of which three copies exist, one in the Record Office, and two in the British Museum, printed in Lettenhove, x. 558, 2 July 1578; cf. also Japikse, ii. 103 ff.

The chances of negotiating a successful peace depended obviously upon the terms to which the Estates were willing to agree. It was some six days later before the ambassadors received a definite answer upon this point. It came on the 8th of July. The Estates said that they were willing to treat for peace on condition—first, that Don John and his soldiers left the country and delivered up to the Estates General all the towns and fortresses which they held; second, that the Archduke Matthias should be recognized as their governor; third, that the question of religion should be referred to the Estates General. They touched upon other points also, but these were the main ones.¹

These terms were obviously prohibitory and Walsingham and his colleague did their best to procure some mitigation of them, but to no effect.² In consequence neither of them had any hope of peace. On the 14th of July Walsingham wrote to Leicester, 'Your Lordship, by the enclosed copy of the States' answer, may perceive how little hope there is to procure a peace between Don John and them, being as they are determined not to enter into any treaty until he be retired with his forces and such holds delivered up into their hands as he presently possesseth—a condition so hard and dishonourable as he can in no case accept. On the other side, if it be true as is advertised (notwithstanding the French King's brother's preparations), he is resolutely bent to continue the wars, being encouraged thereto by the King of Spain, his brother, with promise of a continual support of money to be delivered monthly unto him. Both parties being thus resolutely bent to abide and endure the event of wars, I leave to your Lordship to judge what hope there is to do good between them.'³ In fact, both Walsingham and Cobham thought that there was very little use of their making any further efforts in the direction of peace, and so they wrote to Elizabeth asking her to recall them.⁴

They thought war was inevitable, but they were nevertheless of the opinion that the Estates were well prepared to support the

¹ Response of the States General, &c., 8 July 1578, Cotton MSS., Galba C vi, pt. ii. f. 71.

² Cobham to Burghley, 12 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 583.

³ Walsingham to Leicester, 14 July 1578, *ibid.* 588.

⁴ Walsingham and Cobham to Wilson, 13 July 1578, *ibid.* 583.

conflict.¹ 'This may be generally and truly vouched,' they wrote to Elizabeth on the 6th of July, 'that all things stand here in so reasonable terms that, according to man's discourse, and appearance of all probable conjectures, the success cannot be but good if some few difficulties might be well accommodated which render the Prince and States somewhat perplexed, which few difficulties are these; the cause of religion, the matter of Monsieur, and lack of money to serve present necessities.' The matter of religion, they thought, might easily be settled by leaving the whole question in abeyance for a time. The other two matters were more difficult of solution.²

The ambassadors were puzzled to know what to make of Alençon's doings. They had been ordered to confer with his commissioners, but they had no opportunity of doing so. On the 1st of July, Dammartin, one of the Duke's agents, came to them, and told them that his deputies would be in Antwerp to treat with them shortly, but two weeks passed by and no Frenchman put in his appearance.³ 'Monsieur d'Anjou's doings', Walsingham wrote to Leicester, 'carry here a very strange course; first, in that he offereth support to them that ask it not; secondarily, in that he disavoweth his ministers' doings; lastly, in that his ministers who should have conferred with us above ten days past, do not repair unto us, but feed us on with delays.'⁴

The ambassadors still harboured the suspicion that Alençon was acting treacherously, and that he was all the while in secret agreement with Don John.⁵ In this they were wrong. They were not certain what the attitude of the States towards the Duke was. They were probably right in saying that the deputies were just as much at sea in the matter as they were themselves. Walsingham was of opinion that the Prince was jealous of the power of France and was not disposed to deal with Alençon any further than necessity compelled him.⁶

¹ Walsingham wrote to Leicester on the 14th July (cited p. 387, n. 3): 'The more I consider of the state of this country the harder I find it for the King of Spain ever to recover the full possession thereof, unless God should take away the Prince, whose advice they cannot well spare, though their towns by the new fortifications be made impregnable.'

² Cobham and Walsingham to Elizabeth, 6 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 569.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Walsingham to Leicester, 14 July 1578, cited p. 387, n. 3.

⁵ Cf. n. 2 above.

⁶ Walsingham to Leicester, 6 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 575.

But of one thing both Walsingham and his colleague and Orange and the Estates were certain—that Alençon was a force to be reckoned with. For months he had been pressing the Estates to come to terms with him, and for months they had been able to hold him off. But now he was just about taking matters into his own hands. In spite of his brother, the King, he was rapidly amassing an army on the frontiers. He was moreover bringing pressure upon the Estates General by dealing separately with the provinces of Hainault and Artois who were not indisposed to negotiate with him.¹ It became obvious that very soon the Low Countries must declare themselves one way or another.²

The only way to keep Alençon out, as Walsingham and Cobham looked at it, was for the Queen to send the Estates assistance at once.

It will be remembered that Elizabeth had already lent the Estates £40,000 in order to enlist for them the services of John Casimir. She had also paid them £5,000 directly at the Marquis of Havrech's earnest request when he had been in England. She had, moreover, promised to stand their bondsman to the extent of £100,000 besides. But her bonds had not as yet been delivered to them.³ The Estates had succeeded in borrowing some £28,750 on the mere promise of them, and had tried to borrow more, but the money-lenders grew cautious and refused to lend any more until they had their security. They pressed the Estates for the Queen's bonds, and the Estates pressed the ambassadors. They in turn pressed the Queen.

'It may please you therefore,' they wrote to Wilson on the 14th of July, 'upon consideration of the weightiness of these causes, to move her Majesty for the speedy dispatch of the said bonds, and seeing their extremity is so great that thereupon dependeth presently the loss of all the province [of Hainault] to the French, and of other pieces of the country consequently by like default of necessary provision to furnish their necessity, to resolve with herself what she is pleased to do for their succour and relief that way. For in the mean season we must declare you a truth, we hear very evil of these delays that are used. They

¹ Cf. Instructions of Rochepot, Alençon's agent, 28 Mar. 1578, Muller and Diegerick, i. 121.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 14 July 1578, cited p. 387, n. 3.

³ Cobham and Walsingham to Wilson, 14 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 587.

call upon us incessantly for a resolution, declaring unto us that though the relief may seem great to her Majesty, wherewith she has been pleased to help them, yet in truth it has come to them in such sort that the benefit and fruit of it hath been half lost, to the great hazard of the country and foregoing of many advantages which might well have been taken ; and the further that these delays grow in length, the more their peril and danger increaseth and is now almost at a period remediless. And therefore they most humbly and instantly beseech her Majesty to determine one way or other with them. If she please to relieve them they hope to keep out the French, if she forsake them they must of necessity receive them.' ¹

This, in fact, was the predicament as Walsingham saw it. If the Queen wanted to keep the French out, or even temper their influence, she must help the Estates herself without delay.

On this subject Walsingham had some private conference with the Prince of Orange. He told Orange he thought Elizabeth would come to their assistance if she could be assured of a town or two in security. Orange showed himself agreeable to the suggestion. Nothing was done in the matter officially, but Walsingham wrote home to Leicester that he thought the Queen might have Sluys in pawn if she wanted it.²

These conferences between the English secretary and the Prince are interesting, not so much for what they accomplished, which was little, as because they brought two great champions of Protestantism together. At first Walsingham seems to have been disappointed by the reception which he received at Orange's hands. 'I have had no private conference with the Prince since my arrival,' he wrote to Leicester on the 6th of July, 'neither do I find him to deal so kindly towards me as I looked for.'³ But before very long Walsingham began to feel differently. On the 14th of July he wrote again to Leicester: 'The Prince's strangeness grew only for that we came over with so slender matter, in a time so fit to deal roundly, whereat all the world doth wonder. He is loth to open his intentions to those of whose assistance he is doubtful ; which carrieth good sense withal. I am thoroughly persuaded that he is no otherwise inclined to run the course of the French, than as extreme necessity shall lead him. The more

¹ Cobham and Walsingham to Wilson, 14 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 587.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 14 July 1578, cited p. 387, n. 3.

³ Same to same, 6 July 1578, cited p. 388, n. 6.

I deal with him, the more sufficient I find him.' ¹ As time went on Walsingham's admiration and respect for Orange increased, so that towards the end of his mission they were working together towards a common end in perfect harmony.

Meanwhile the work of the ambassadors had for the time being come to a standstill. They had made proposals of peace to the Estates and in return they had got an answer which practically precluded the possibility of peace. They had, according to the Queen's commands, sought to get in touch with Alençon, and he had shown very little desire to co-operate with them to this end. There was nothing more that they could do but await the Queen's further commands.

While they were waiting they paid a visit to the Estates' army, which was in camp some twelve miles out of Antwerp. They found there some ten thousand foot soldiers and eight thousand horsemen, and they were very well pleased with the aspect of them. 'I think', Walsingham wrote, 'there was not seen the like numbers so well appointed for horse and armour these many years. . . . If God, who is the disposer of victory, withdraw not courage from them, there is great hope of their good success.' ²

Meanwhile news reached the ambassadors that Alençon had crossed the borders and had entered Mons with a few horsemen—a fact very well calculated to aggravate a situation already acute.³ A day or so later, on the 15th of July, Mondoucet, an envoy of the Duke, came to Antwerp. On the same day he held conference with the ambassadors. Walsingham and Cobham took occasion to complain of the long time that they had had to await his coming. Mondoucet excused his master on the ground that he had been waiting for the consent of the Estates before undertaking to treat with them. The ambassadors then protested against the Duke's entry into Mons. Mondoucet replied that Alençon meant to justify his action to the Queen by special

¹ Same to same, 14 July 1578, cited p. 387, n. 3. It must have been at this time that Walsingham discussed with Orange the advisability of conceding some measure of toleration to the Roman Catholics in England. Orange argued in favour of it, Walsingham against it. Nothing further is known of this discussion. Walsingham merely made a chance allusion to it in a conference with Dutch envoys in England ten years later. Cf. Motley, *History of the United Netherlands* (ed. 1871), ii. 439-40.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 18 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 596.

³ Cobham and Walsingham to Wilson, 14 July 1578, *ibid.* 586.

envoy. Thereupon Walsingham said that if Alençon intended to impatronize himself in the country, Elizabeth would use all the forces she could command to prevent him. He said he thought that if the Duke's intentions were really honourable and directed towards the welfare of the Low Countries he ought to seek peace before beginning war. Mondoucet protested that his master meant to live up to the letter of his obligations. He said, however, that he did not believe the Estates would consent to hear of peace. Walsingham hastened to assure him to the contrary, and that was as far as the conference got. Mondoucet shortly afterwards took his leave, promising that he would report all that had been said to his master and that the ambassadors should receive their answer in a few days.¹

Very little had been accomplished and the ambassadors were considerably perplexed by the whole affair. They went and asked Orange's opinion of it, and Orange told them that he was no less amazed than they themselves. He thought the Duke might do great good or great harm. He was sure, however, that the best way to countercheck his dangerous ambitions was 'by drawing into the association one greater than himself', to wit, the Queen of England. In a word, Orange laid before them the old alternative. Either the Queen must help them or must be content to let them make the best terms they could with the French.²

And this was the fact which both Walsingham and Cobham continued to impress upon the mind of the Queen and of her Privy Council in England. But their words did not find a welcome with Elizabeth. 'We had rather here be lookers-on every way than doers any way,' Wilson wrote to Cobham on the 12th of July, 'and therefore God grant a peace might be had, which is chiefly desired here and most agreeable to our natures at this time.' He wrote further that Spinola and Palavicino and others who had lent money to the Estates on the Queen's credit were pressing her Majesty in person for their security and that she showed herself little disposed to give it.³

About a week later the Lords of the Privy Council in a letter to the ambassadors explained the Queen's attitude in this regard

¹ Walsingham to Wilson, 18 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 600.

² Ibid.

³ Wilson to Cobham, 12 July 1578, *ibid.* 581.

more at length. She was not inclined, they said, to lend the Estates more, nor to allow them to raise money on her bonds until she knew what assurances besides ink and parchment they were willing to give her for its repayment. The Lords of the Council suggested that Walsingham propose 'as of himself' to the Estates that they offer the towns of Flushing and Sluys or one of them in gage. They further charged Walsingham in the Queen's name to remind the Estates of their promise to repay the £45,000 which the Queen had lent them out of the first money they raised upon her bonds.¹

Leicester wrote at the same time that he had tried his best to get the Queen to send her bonds, but had only received hard words in reply.² Burghley wrote in a similar vein.³ To add to this grievance Walsingham learned from Sir Christopher Hatton that the Queen was very much displeased with the way he had conducted himself. She said he should have pressed the Estates for a repayment of the money she had lent them, and that he should have done more than he did to effect a peace by persuading the Estates to mitigate their 'imperious' demands.⁴

The ambassadors were in despair. They had been sent to prevent the French from gaining control in the Low Countries. They saw Alençon pressing forward day by day. They knew that the only way for Elizabeth to check him was by coming promptly to the assistance of the Estates. And yet when they ventured to point out to the Queen this way of safety and to urge it upon her they got rebuked for their pains.

Certainly Walsingham laboured with a heavy heart.

'It is an intolerable grief to me', he wrote to Hatton, 'to receive so hard measure at her Majesty's hands, as if I were some notorious offender. Surely sir, it standeth not with her Majesty's safety to deal so unkindly with those that serve her faithfully. There is a difference between serving with a cheerful and languishing mind. If there had lacked in us either care, faithfulness, or diligence, then were we worthy of blame. . . . When our doings shall come to examination, I hope the greatest fault we may be charged withal is that we have had more regard to her

¹ Lords of Privy Council to Cobham and Walsingham, 18 July 1578, *ibid.* 591.

² Leicester to Walsingham, 20 July 1578, *ibid.* 613.

³ Burghley to Cobham, 18 July 1578, *ibid.* 594.

⁴ Edmund Tremayne to Walsingham, 20 July 1578, *ibid.* 616.

Majesty's honour and safety than to her treasure, wherein we have dealt no worse with her than with ourselves, having for her services' sake engaged ourselves £5,000 thick ; which doing of ours, being offensively taken, doth make the burden the heavier.' ¹

To Thomas Randolph, his second cousin by marriage and his old friend, Walsingham wrote in a vein of satirical humour. 'It is given out both there and here that we shall be hanged at our return so ill have we behaved ourselves here. The worst is, I hope, we shall enjoy our ordinary trial, my Lord to be tried by his peers, and myself by a jury of Middlesex.' ²

Nevertheless, in spite of this discouragement, Walsingham and Cobham according to their lights continued to do what they could for 'her Majesty's safety and honour'. They sought to check the appeals of the Estates for money by suggesting that towns be offered in security, but since they had no commission to make any definite demand they could accomplish little this way. Walsingham, as Elizabeth had directed, reminded the Estates of their promise to repay her the money she had lent them, and they told him that they had been forced to borrow at 25 per cent. interest, and that they needed every cent they had for present necessities.³ And, in fact, the financial situation in the Low Countries was so acute that the ambassadors saw that it was worse than useless to make such demands. They were so sure of this and so afraid of evil consequences to follow if something were not done immediately, that they even went so far as to lend the Estates £5,000, which they borrowed on their own private bonds, hoping that the Queen in good time would appreciate the wisdom of their course and reimburse them.⁴

This was a rash thing perhaps to do. They had good reason to repent of it afterwards. Nevertheless, those £5,000 bear eloquent testimony to the strength of their convictions.

On the 18th of July the Queen, seeing apparently that nothing more was to be hoped for from the ambassadors' further stay in

¹ Walsingham to Hatton, 29 July 1578, Hatton's Letterbook, B.M. Additional MS. 15891, f. 43 b, printed in Sir H. Nicolas's *Life of Hatton*, p. 75.

² Walsingham to Randolph, 29 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 665.

³ Cobham and Walsingham to Council, 24 July 1578, *ibid.* 635.

⁴ A copy of Cobham's and Walsingham's bond for this sum is in the R. O., printed in Lettenhove, x. 605.

the Low Countries, ordered them to return home.¹ They were nevertheless given some discretion in the matter. If they had entered negotiations with Alençon or saw any other good reason for remaining longer, they were to stay. The ambassadors thought it better to stay a little while longer, in the first place, because they wanted to watch over the dealings of Alençon and the Estates; in the second place, because they considered it unwise to leave without satisfying the Estates one way or the other as to how Elizabeth meant to deal with them. They still cherished the hope that she could be brought to send them aid.²

On the 25th of July they dispatched Somers to Alençon to complain that he had sent no accredited agent to deal with them as he had promised he would do. Somers was further charged to recommend to the Duke that he make some effort to arrange peace between Don John and the Estates before he appealed to arms.³

Somers saw Alençon at Mons on the 27th of July and delivered his message. The Duke apologized for not having sent deputies to the ambassadors sooner. He said that he had been waiting until he could induce the Estates to resume negotiations with him. Now that he had accomplished this he would send his deputies to speak with the ambassadors. He apologized also for having entered Mons in such a hasty fashion. It had seemed to him that the situation there had admitted of no delay. As to treating with Don John, he said that he had not done so, because he feared the Estates might suspect him of double-dealing. Finally, he protested on his honour that he had no thought of overstepping his engagements nor of impatronizing himself in the Netherlands.⁴

Somers had not yet returned to Antwerp when Walsingham received secret orders from the Queen to go and visit the Duke of Alençon privately, hold personal conference with him, and see if he could not find out 'the very secret of his mind and disposition in these affairs'.⁵ Walsingham prepared to go, but he evidently

¹ Lords of Council to Ambassadors, 18 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 591.

² Ambassadors to Lords of Council, 24 July 1578, *ibid.* 635.

³ Cf. Somers's instructions, 25 July 1578, *ibid.* 640.

⁴ Somers to Ambassadors, 27 July 1578, *ibid.* 647.

⁵ Wilson to Walsingham, 21 July 1578, *ibid.* 622. It was rumoured that

believed that he was bound on a fool's errand. 'By her Majesty's order,' he wrote to Burghley on the 29th of July, 'I am commanded to repair to Mons to Monsieur, where I shall receive some flourishes of great goodwill borne to her Majesty, to make her Majesty the less to suspect his intentions for these countries.'¹

But Walsingham did not go at once. At the end of July the Commissioners whom Alençon had appointed to negotiate with the Estates General arrived in Antwerp, and Walsingham thought it better to wait at Antwerp for a time and see what they were about. 'Touching my repair to Alençon,' he wrote to the Queen, 'for that I understand that he had sent Bussy d'Amboise and the rest of his commissioners who are now arrived in this town, I thought good to stay until such time as I might learn from them what the said Duke's intention might be touching these countries and in what sort they proceeded here with the States.'²

Judging from the state of affairs in the Low Countries Walsingham seems to have acted wisely in this matter, but things were going on in England of which he knew little that made Elizabeth take a somewhat different view of the situation. It will be remembered that, just before Cobham and Walsingham had departed for the Netherlands, there had been some talk both in England and in France about a revival of the marriage project between Elizabeth and the Duke of Alençon. Very likely this was proposed in the first place by an envoy whom the Duke sent over to England in March 1578. Sir Edward Stafford, when he went to France in May to remonstrate against Alençon's projected expedition into the Low Countries, seems to have suggested it as a convenient way out of many difficulties. Apparently the Duke was willing. Catherine de Médicis received the suggestion with pleasure. It is difficult to say how far the matter had got by the time Walsingham and Cobham left

Alençon was planning to marry the daughter of William of Orange. Walsingham was directed to look into this also.

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 29 July 1578, S. P. Holland and Flanders, Eliz., vii, f. 87.

² Walsingham to Elizabeth, 31 July 1578, Cotton MSS., Galba C vi, pt. ii, f. 218 b. This is a draft of the missing original. It is undated, but its contents fix its date at the end of July; cf. also Japikse, ii. 67.

England, but it is pretty clear that in consequence of it Elizabeth was inclined to regard the adventure of the Duke in the Low Countries with a more friendly eye. She seems to have imagined that if she could attach him to her interests by encouraging him to sue for her hand, she could turn his adventure to her advantage.

Of course there was some danger that the Duke was playing a similar game and that he was making a pretence of suing for her hand in order to prevent her from interfering with his project. This was probably the case. Elizabeth was not without suspicion that it might be so, even though she was purblind by an exaggerated belief in her personal charms. At any rate she thought the game was worth playing. An element of love-making in diplomacy was always very much to her fancy.

And so when Alençon sent de Vray, another envoy, over to England with warm protestations of his affections and of his entire submission to the Queen's will, Elizabeth received him kindly, gave him a gold chain worth £50, and told him that if his master intended to help the Netherlanders to take their liberty 'by force of arms against the Spanish tyranny without any mind to usurp upon them under colour to do them good, she would not only well like of such dealing, but would gladly join with him.'¹

After this the marriage matter remained in abeyance for a time, but the Queen was plainly allured by the idea. It was on that account probably that she dealt in such an uncertain fashion with Walsingham and Cobham. They kept urging her to thwart the Duke by going to the assistance of the Estates with men and money. She was inclined to trust to Alençon's protestations of affection, and to believe that he was, as he said, entirely at her devotion. If that were the case she did not wish to oppose his schemes. Why should she spend her good money if she had him to fight her battles? But she was not quite sure. That was the reason why she got angry with her ambassadors, and why she wanted Walsingham to go to Mons and look into the Duke's inmost heart.

It was probably to reassure her that Alençon, who was playing his game with some astuteness, sent another embassy to her late

¹ Wilson to Walsingham, 18 June 1578, Lettenhove, x. 525.

in July. This embassy was made up of the *Sieur de Bacqueville* and the *Sieur de Quissy*. They landed in England on the 26th of July and on the 3rd of August they had audience. They told the Queen that she might dispose of their master at her pleasure. His person and his fortune in the Low Countries were at her command. They spoke of marriage and suggested that if the Queen would permit Alençon would come over to England and press his suit in person. They hinted that he had really gone to the Low Countries in order to be nearer to her. They protested that if she was displeased with his conduct there she had only to tell him so, and he would withdraw himself. These honeyed words did not deceive Elizabeth's councillors. Perhaps the Queen herself was not altogether credulous, but her woman's vanity was flattered. She determined to put the matter to the test.¹

Accordingly she wrote to Walsingham on the 8th of August ordering him to proceed without delay to Alençon and find out exactly what his intentions were, and whether he meant to proceed according to her wishes as he said he did. She further charged Walsingham to find out from the Estates whether they actually needed the Duke's services or not. If they said they did not, Walsingham was to urge the Duke to withdraw, as Bacqueville had said he would do at her command.²

Burghley tried his best to dissuade the Queen from sending this letter. He told her that it was unreasonable to expect the Duke to give up all his plans and leave the Low Countries at her mere request. Leicester and Wilson were no less urgent with her.³ But it was of no use. The letter was signed and dispatched.

The next day, however, the Queen had a change of heart. Francis Knollys wrote to Walsingham that he thought it was because of the news she had received of the gallant showing which a troop of English volunteers had made in the skirmish between the forces of the Estates and of Don John at Rymenam.⁴ Burghley and Wilson attributed it to her fear that the French

¹ Cf. on this the letters of Elizabeth, Wilson, Sussex, Burghley, and Leicester to Walsingham, 1-8 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 678, 696, 698, 701, 702.

² Elizabeth to Walsingham, 8 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 698.

³ Burghley to Walsingham, 8 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 701.

⁴ Knollys to Walsingham, 10 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 712.

would become masters of the country.¹ Probably the news which Walsingham sent her of negotiations already begun between the Estates and the deputies of Alençon had alarmed her. At all events she dispatched a second letter to the ambassadors couched in very different phrases from the one she had written the day before. She said that she was very much afraid that Alençon would make himself lord of the Low Countries or, failing that, would go over to the Spaniard. Either of these contingencies she considered very dangerous for England. Accordingly she directed them to see if they could not check his inordinate ambition, by making to the Estates underhand offers of help from England. She did not, however, wish this suggestion to appear to proceed from herself. She thought if it did the Estates might believe she was afraid of Alençon and might take advantage of the situation to make exorbitant demands. She rather wished the ambassadors as of their own accord to suggest that she might be willing to lend them more money and to send over some thousand or twelve hundred men in order to prevent the Duke from making himself sovereign in their lands. If the Estates showed themselves agreeable to the suggestion, the ambassadors were to request that negotiations with the Duke be stayed until they could communicate with her. 'If indeed', Elizabeth concluded, 'we shall perceive it shall be needful to divert the perils of Monsieur, and that otherwise he cannot be refrained or tempered, we cannot fail but yield to aid them with men or money, or rather with men to make all things sure, and we doubt not but to cause a power of ten or twelve hundred men to be made ready and transported within time convenient to serve the purpose.'²

Elizabeth, it appeared, had at last come over to Walsingham's way of thinking. He had told her again and again that the only way to restrain the French was by sending speedy assistance from England. Now apparently she had made up her mind to follow that course. But Burghley was not so sure that she would persist in her new resolution. 'It is at this present determined here,' he wrote to Walsingham, 'that if, upon your answer,

¹ Burghley to the Ambassadors, 9 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 710; cf. also Wilson to Walsingham, same date, *ibid.*

² Elizabeth to the Ambassadors, 9 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 708.

necessity shall induce her Majesty to send forces, my Lord of Leicester will come over without delay and the army shall follow. Nevertheless, though this be for the present earnestly meant, I can assure nothing but this only, that I am here uncertain of much.' ¹ Secretary Wilson, though more optimistic in his tone, was plainly not so sure either. ²

As it happened, it did not make a great deal of difference whether the Queen was in earnest or not. A month earlier her valiant decision might have stood her in very good stead. As it was, it came too late to be of any use. Before her letter reached the hands of Walsingham and his colleague the treaty between Alençon and the Estates had been signed. But this is to anticipate matters. Before the treaty was concluded, the Queen's ambassadors did their best to prevent it.

On the 19th of July the Estates had signified to Alençon their willingness to enter into a treaty with him. Nine days afterwards his commissioners had arrived in Antwerp with full powers to conclude an agreement. On the 4th of August the negotiations had reached such a point that the Estates had submitted to the Duke's commissioners a statement of the terms upon which they were prepared to treat. ³ The important provisions in this statement were that Alençon should furnish them with 16,000 foot and 2,000 horse at his own expense for three months, and afterwards with 3,000 foot and 500 horse to the end of the wars ; that he should not meddle with their government nor deal with the provinces separately ; that he should act in close friendship with the Queen of England and their other allies. In return for these concessions they agreed to name him publicly the defender of their liberty and to prefer him before all others in case they decided to choose a new sovereign, to give three towns in security for their good faith, to concede to his absolute dominion all conquests which he made beyond the Meuse, and finally to assist him in all his private wars except in wars against their allies or in those waged on account of religion. ⁴

This offer was submitted by the Estates to the English ambassadors for their approval. Walsingham and Cobham

¹ Burghley to the Ambassadors, 9 Aug. 1578, cited p. 399, n. 1.

² Wilson to Walsingham, 9 Aug. 1578, cited p. 399, n. 1.

³ Namèche, vi, p. 377.

⁴ Muller and Diegerick, i. 379.

objected to the terms upon three points. They protested first against the article which provided for the elevation of Alençon to the sovereignty of the Low Countries in case a new sovereign were chosen there; second, against the delivery to the Duke of towns of security; third, against the concession to him in absolute dominion of all his conquests beyond the Meuse. The rest of the provisions, they said, they would have to refer to the Queen.¹

Of course what Walsingham and Cobham were trying to do was to delay the conclusion of the negotiations as long as possible. But the Estates, when they received the ambassadors' answer, would not hear of a delay. They said they should like very much to have the advice of the Queen, but that necessity constrained them to close with Monsieur at once, in order to prevent him from going over to the camp of the enemy.²

To this the ambassadors, still seeking to gain time, answered that the Queen would think it very strange if they made so important a treaty without consulting her. They accordingly requested that the Estates should wait eight or ten days in order that her opinion might be obtained.³

This the Estates were not at all willing to concede. Nevertheless, the ambassadors were of the opinion that the final decision would probably be deferred for that long at least. 'For though', they wrote to the Council on the 8th of August, 'their last proposition, delivered to us in writing, seemed to import a resolute determination out of hand, yet they have sent their said instructions to several provinces for their good liking and consent which will not be returned these eight or ten days.' They accordingly pressed the Queen to instruct them without delay as to what course they should pursue.⁴

Meanwhile, Walsingham thought he had better take advantage of the temporary lull in the proceedings to hasten to Mons and confer with Alençon as the Queen had commanded him. Just when he went is uncertain, but it was probably on the 8th or 9th of August. He pretty certainly left Mons again on the 11th and probably was back in Antwerp on the 12th or 13th of the

¹ Note of the English Ambassadors, 4 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 689.

² Declaration of the Estates General, 5 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 693.

³ Memoir of the English Ambassadors, 6 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 695; cf. Japikse, ii. 105.

⁴ Ambassadors to the Privy Council, 8 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 704.

month.¹ There is no precise record of what passed between him and Alençon at the conferences they had together, but it seems likely that Walsingham made very much the same speeches to the Duke as he had formerly made to his deputies. At least this much is certain, that Alençon took advantage of the Secretary's visit to send a letter to Elizabeth, protesting his affection for her and his desire to please her in all things, and begging her to further him in his designs.²

Very little else came of the visit. Possibly, as Walsingham had feared, it worked some harm to the Queen's cause by removing him from Antwerp just at the time when the negotiations in progress between the commissioners of the Duke and of the Estates made his presence there particularly desirable.

Walsingham reported the result of his conference with Alençon through the lips of Somers. That is the reason why we know so little about it. He wrote almost nothing on the subject. In a private letter to Leicester, however, written on the 18th of August, he made some interesting comments upon the marriage negotiations in general which show clearly how he regarded them. Leicester had written him on the 1st of August informing him that Elizabeth was somewhat set upon reviving the old marriage negotiations and advising him in consequence to be careful of what he said.³ Walsingham wrote :

'How much I think myself bound unto your Lordship for your friendly advice given me, touching the governing of myself in Monsieur's cause, I had rather declare with a thankful requital than with the use of many superfluous words. Hard it is to discover the bottom of that matter for that affections are inward things and can hardly be deciphered until they grow to effects. To think that Monsieur could not be content to marry with our mistress were a vain opinion, being as she is the best marriage in

¹ The dates of this visit can be fixed approximately by Walsingham's correspondence. He departed from Antwerp on the 8th of August and Alençon gave him a letter to Elizabeth which is dated the 11th of August and which shows that the conference between them had already taken place.

² Alençon to Elizabeth, 11 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 713.

³ 'My only wish and advice to you', Leicester had written, 'is that you observe all offices that way in not only seeking the very bottom of his [Alençon's] intention, but to make all your reasons plain to her Majesty whether it be with it or against it, and that nothing proceed from you there to him that he may take discouragement at your hands nor yet to himself, to show without plain cause that you mistrust his affection or mislike the match.' Ibid. 678.

her parish ; but to say that he does hope after it, considering his former trial in the attempt thereof, is very doubtful. To use the same as a means to render her Majesty more inclinable to allow of his proceedings here, standeth with good policy. The gentleman I find very wise, well spoken, and not so deformed as he was. The great troubles he hath passed (which is the best whetstone) hath greatly sharpened his wit and increased his judgement. If it were not for the expectation of the crown of France that is to light upon him, which difficulty above all others I do weigh, knowing what it is to live under a viceroy, the match were not to be disliked, seeing the necessity her Majesty and the realm hath of the same.' ¹

Walsingham, it appears from this, was not altogether averse to the idea of marriage, but he pretty plainly saw that Alençon was using his courtship to further his ends in the Low Countries.

While he had been holding vain conferences with the Duke, the treaty commissioners had been making great progress in Antwerp. Walsingham, in fact, got back from Mons just about in time to hear that the treaty had been signed. He had been deceived in believing that it would take eight or ten days at least to bring the matter to a conclusion. The Estates had taken advantage of his absence to push the matter through. Walsingham had feared such an event. It was for that reason that he had put off leaving Antwerp as long as he had.²

The peace as signed between the Estates and Alençon was practically identical with the terms which the Estates had proposed on the 4th of August. Alençon was to furnish them with 10,000 foot and 2,000 horse at his own expense for three months, and after that with 3,000 foot and 500 horse until the end of the war ; he was not to meddle in the government of the Low Countries ; he was not to treat with the provinces individually ; nor to make war on their allies. In return he was to be named *Défenseur de la Liberté Belgique contre la tyrannie Espagnole*, he was to be preferred before all other candidates if

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 18 Aug. 1578, Cotton MSS., Galba C vi, pt. ii, f. 94 (Lettenhove, x. 743). Lettenhove makes a mistake in assigning Sussex as the recipient of this letter. In the original it is endorsed to Leicester, and from its contents it is clearly an answer to Leicester's letter of the 8th. (Cf. preceding note.)

² Instructions to John Somers about the 15th August 1578, Lettenhove, x. 720. This document is not dated, but it plainly belongs about the middle of August, shortly after the treaty was signed.

the Estates decided to change their sovereign, he was to be given three towns along the frontier for security, and permission to keep all the lands he conquered beyond the Meuse, and he was to be assisted in all other wars in which he should engage except in wars of religion.

An important clause was added at the end giving the Estates until the end of the month to come to terms with Don John.¹

These terms were obviously very much in favour of the Estates General. They conceded to the Duke very little more than an empty title, an uncertain promise and three unimportant towns. In return they gained 12,000 reinforcements. Alençon was not admitted to any participation in the direction of their policy, he was simply accepted as their ally, as their Défenseur with the privilege of carving out for himself from the King of Spain's dominions a principality beyond their borders.

The Estates, in apologizing to the English ambassadors for coming to terms with Alençon so hastily, said that they had thought it the best way to force Don John to make peace. They said, moreover, that they feared, if they did not restrain Alençon by treaty, that he would carry further his secret dealings already begun with Hainault and Artois and would wrest them away from the other provinces. The ambassadors, although very much provoked that the Estates had acted so hastily, were inclined to believe that they had done wisely in signing the treaty. If the Queen could have been induced to send aid in time, they thought it might very well have been avoided, but under the circumstances they considered it better for the Estates to join the Duke to their cause in such a fashion than to force him into the enemy's camp by rejecting his offers.²

The treaty had been concluded on the 13th of August. About the same time the ambassadors received Elizabeth's letter of the 9th, directing them to make offers of men and money to the Estates in order to check their negotiations with the Duke. It is easy to imagine Walsingham's feelings when he read that letter. It embodied the very policy which he had all along urged Elizabeth to pursue. And now, when it was too late, she had come round to his point of view.

¹ An abstract of this treaty is printed in *Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, 163.

² Instructions for John Somers, 15 Aug. 1578, cited p. 403, n. 2.

And yet perhaps it was not yet too late. The treaty did not come into effect until the end of the month. The ambassadors still had some eighteen days of grace and they cherished a faint hope that in the meantime Don John might be brought to terms, or else that the Queen might be induced to send the Estates effective assistance.¹ To these two tasks accordingly the ambassadors addressed themselves; first, to winning for the Estates the assistance of the Queen; second, to arranging a peace with Don John.

In pursuance of the first of these, they went to the Prince of Orange to find out what measure of assistance the Estates expected from England. They did not find the Prince in quite so conciliatory a mood as he had been before. The treaty with Alençon had placed him in a more independent position. He told the ambassadors that he thought if the Queen would lend £25,000 at once, and would furnish them with 5,000 troops at her own expense during the time of the wars, she might check the Duke's ambition. As security for the troops he said the Estates would place Dunkirk and Nieuwpoort in her hands. But he did not think they would consent to deliver over so important a place as Sluys. Indeed he confessed that they were somewhat chary about giving towns at all, fearing that if Elizabeth should die her realm would pass to a sovereign who was hostile to them.²

These were large demands, but Walsingham and Cobham both strongly urged the Queen to accept them, 'considering how much it importeth her Majesty in honour and safety, as well to have them kept from the French as from being tyrannized by the Spaniards'.³ They did not advise her to accept Dunkirk and Nieuwpoort in security, for these towns were so badly fortified that it would cost her more than they were worth to defend them,⁴ but they thought she might very well accept the bonds of the Estates instead.

While they awaited the Queen's answers to these proposals, they turned their attention to their second task of inducing Don John to come to terms with the Estates.

To this end they had been working ever since their arrival in

¹ Cobham to Burghley, 16 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 728.

² The Ambassadors to Elizabeth, 16 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 724.

³ Same to Council, 17 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 733.

⁴ Instructions to John Somers, 15 Aug. 1578, cited p. 403, n. 2.

the Low Countries. They had suggested peace to the Estates in the very beginning, and the Estates had answered that they were perfectly willing to come to terms with Don John, but they had made such exorbitant demands that both Walsingham and his colleague had thought it futile to press the matter any further. They did not, however, altogether give up hope.

In this matter they found a useful ally in the imperial ambassador, the Count of Swartzenberg, who had likewise been instructed by his master to do what he could for the cause of peace, and to a lesser extent in Bellièvre, who had been sent by the King of France to see if he could not recall Alençon from his purposes. In the interests of peace Swartzenberg had gone to Don John on the 31st of July.¹ Before he left, Walsingham and Cobham held long conference with him, in which they impressed upon him the Queen's desire for peace, and laid before him at some length the reasons which they thought ought to persuade Don John to come to terms.² They also sent along with him a letter to Don John in which they assured him that they had come to the Low Countries principally in order to effect a peace, and offered, if he thought it would do any good, to come and confer with him in person.³

To this letter Don John returned a very courteous answer. He said that he was grateful to the Queen for her kindly efforts in the cause of peace. For himself, he wished nothing better. He could not promise that much good would come of their visiting him. He thought perhaps they would employ themselves more profitably in persuading the Estates to be more reasonable in their demands. But he could assure them that if they did come they would be very cordially welcome.⁴

The friendly tone of this letter led Walsingham and his colleague to believe that the cause of peace was not altogether desperate. They were still more encouraged by the report which Swartzenberg made of his negotiations with Don John.⁵ 'What success the peace will take,' Walsingham wrote to his

¹ Davison to Burghley, 31 July 1578, Lettenhove, x. 673.

² Conference of Cobham and Walsingham with the Imperial Ambassador, 28 July 1578, *ibid.* 654.

³ Cobham and Walsingham to Don John, 31 July 1578, *ibid.* 670.

⁴ Don John to the Ambassadors, 6 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 693.

⁵ Cobham to Sussex, 16 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 727.

friend, Sir Thomas Heneage, 'now that it is committed to the Emperor's hands, time only is to teach us. For my own part I am not altogether out of hope but that it may take good effect, the Emperor being afraid that the French are like to become possessed of these countries, as also the King himself, who is chiefly interested in the matter, is altogether weary of wars, being not in that state for treasure to maintain the same as by some is conceived that take pleasure to set out his greatness.' ¹

The Estates were no less hopeful. It was probably on that account that they had postponed coming to a final agreement with Alençon until the end of August. They accordingly appointed commissioners to enter into negotiations with Don John.² They drew up once more a statement of their demands,³ and they requested the English ambassadors to use their personal efforts to persuade Don John to make peace.⁴ The terms upon which the Estates offered this time to treat were almost the same as those which they had submitted to Walsingham and his colleague at first. Don John was to leave the country with all his forces; Matthias was to be retained as governor, and all he had done in the past was to be ratified by the King; the religious difficulties were to be referred for settlement to the Estates General. They did, however, mitigate their terms in one respect. They insisted that Don John should surrender all the places which he held on their side of the Meuse, but they promised to restore these places to him again before the end of the month of August.⁵

In accordance with the request of the Estates, and encouraged by Don John's friendly letter, the English ambassadors determined to repair to him, and to see what they could accomplish in the way of peace. On the 16th of August they wrote to Don John announcing their intention and asking for a safe conduct.⁶ Don John replied on the 19th of August that he would be very glad to see them. He directed them to proceed to Louvain where he had provided for their reception.⁷

¹ S. P. Holland and Flanders, ix. 30.

² An abstract of their commission, dated 6 August, is given in Lettenhove, x. 694.

³ Dated 14th of August, *ibid.* 716.

⁴ Cobham to Sussex, cited p. 406, n. 5.

⁵ For these two sets of demands cf. Lettenhove, x. 576, 716.

⁶ The Ambassadors to Don John, *ibid.* 723.

⁷ Don John to the Ambassadors, 19 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 745.

When they received his reply they were already on the road. They had left Antwerp on the 18th of August. They heard from him at Malines on the 20th. There they had some conference with the envoys of the Estates.¹ On the 21st of August they left Malines and proceeded to Louvain in accordance with Don John's instructions. From Louvain they went on farther to the town of Jodoigne, which they found very much infested by the plague, and thence on the 25th of August to the village of Perwez. The next day, being Sunday, they were conducted by two of Don John's gentlemen to have audience with him. They found him surrounded by soldiers, seated under an oak tree in the midst of a great plain, and there he listened to what they had to say.²

There is something distinctly medieval about the scene. It carries the mind back to the pictures which Joinville drew of St. Louis, seated in the open air, judging his people. Medieval as it was, it was an appropriate setting for the gallant young man in the foreground. For Don John himself was a medieval figure, the last, if you please, of the knight-errants. It was perhaps for that very reason that he never got on well with the shopkeeping Netherlanders. He belonged in another setting, charging with lance in rest against the Moors in Spain, or fighting under the banner of the Cross on the deck of his flagship at Lepanto. He understood chivalry better than diplomacy. Possibly it was a touch of the romantic in him which led him to receive the English ambassadors at the place and in the manner which he did.

And over against him stood Francis Walsingham, his very antipode—a quiet, keen-eyed man who belonged to the new order of things, a lawyer, a diplomatist, a master of craft, a heretic, and the servant of a heretic, an enemy to all those ideas which Don John held sacred and a friend to all those which he despised. It was as if the old and the new, the past and the future, met and talked together on that summer day.

It speaks well for Don John that he received Walsingham as he did, for men had whispered evil things of the English secretary into his ears. A short while before he had captured an

¹ Ambassadors to the Council, 20 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 746.

² Same to same, 27 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 758.

Englishman who had confessed under torture that he had been employed by Walsingham to murder him.¹ And yet Don John received Walsingham with stately courtesy and completely won his admiration. 'Surely,' he wrote to Burghley afterwards, 'I never saw a gentleman for personage, speech, wit, and entertainment comparable unto him. If pride do not overthrow him, he is like to prove a great personage. Most villainous and hard reports have been given out unto him against me, as well by our rebels and fugitives here as by letters out of England. Notwithstanding I found his entertainment very good outwardly.'²

Having been presented to Don John, the English ambassadors fell at once to business. They spoke first of Elizabeth's various efforts to restore peace and of the envoys she had sent both to Spain and to the Low Countries with that end in view. They complained of the little account which King Philip had made of her endeavours. Then they expressed her fears lest the French would turn the disordered state of the country to their own advantage, and slip in and lay hands on the Netherlands while Philip and his subjects were quarrelling. It was on that account, they said, that she had given the rebels what small assistance she had. They protested that their mistress had no idea of impatronizing herself in the Low Countries nor of disputing the rights of the King of Spain there. She merely wished to keep out the French,

¹ This Englishman was none other than Egremont Radcliffe, the half-brother of the Earl of Sussex. He was subsequently executed. Shortly before his appearance in the Low Countries in 1578 he had been released from the Tower of London where he had long been imprisoned for complicity in the Rising of the North. There can be little doubt that he charged Walsingham with having instigated him to attempt the murder of Don John (*Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, nos. 473, 510, 519, 538). Walsingham repudiated the charge with vehemence when he heard about it the following January (*ibid.* 510). Some doubt is cast upon his entire innocence from a letter which Thomas Harrison wrote to the Earl of Essex, 15 Feb. 1598/9, to the effect that he had been employed by Walsingham in many matters of service in Don John's camp where, if he had not cunningly escaped, he would have died with Egremont Radcliffe, from whom he was to receive notice for Walsingham (*Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ix. 86). Very likely this Thomas Harrison was the same one who confessed at another time that, as Walsingham's secretary, he had forged Elizabeth's signature to Mary Stuart's death warrant and had assisted Thomas Philippes in forging all the letters which implicated Mary in the Babington conspiracy (*Cal. Scottish*, 1586-8, p. 530). Who this fellow Harrison was does not appear. He was certainly not what he claimed to be. The only certain fact about him is that most of what he said about Walsingham was a preposterous lie. His evidence on this point of the conspiracy against Don John is, in itself, absolutely worthless.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 28 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 766.

and yet for all her efforts it seemed as though the French might get in after all. The treaty made between the Duke of Alençon and the Estates promised no less. It appeared that the only way to prevent it was for Don John to make peace. And so the Queen, their mistress, earnestly besought him to come to terms.¹

Don John listened until they had finished, and Walsingham, observing him closely, could see honour and necessity fighting for the mastery in him.² He answered briefly. No one, he said, wished for peace more than he, no one realized better than he that every blow struck in this contest was a blow struck at a Spanish subject, and every drop of blood spilled on either side was a drop of Spanish blood. But his own honour and the honour of his King and of his God were at stake. He would sacrifice them all if he yielded to such terms as the Estates proposed. He swore he would not yield to them—no, not if he were a prisoner at Brussels. His cause was just. God would yet give him the victory.

The ambassadors answered that they knew the terms were hard, but they insisted that the need was very pressing. They acknowledged that peace on such a basis might seem to touch Don John's honour, but they contended that it was more honourable for him to save the Low Countries by peace than to lose them by war. They bade him recall the example of his father, Charles V, who for all his devotion and courage and magnanimity had found it expedient to yield to peace when war meant destruction.

But Don John was not to be persuaded even by the example of his illustrious father. He would not be induced to yield to the terms proposed, 'seeming to be more resolute to run any fortune and to hazard the loss of the Low Countries rather than yield to the same'. Whereupon the ambassadors, knowing his distress and how greatly he feared the advent of the French, in order to put his resolution to the test, made as though they utterly despaired of peace and asked for a safe conduct back to Brussels. This move, as they expected, led Don John to unbend a little. He did not wish to break off the negotiations without some further effort for peace. He accordingly made some difficulty

¹ Ambassadors to the Council, 27 Aug. 1578, cited p. 408, n. 2.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 28 Aug. 1578, cited p. 409, n. 2.

about giving them a passport. They took this for an encouraging sign and thought it wise to remain in the neighbourhood a while longer and await developments. They accordingly returned to Louvain.¹

It appears that Walsingham took advantage of his visit to Don John to have some talk apart with de Gastel, who had some time before been in England, and to lay before him some strong arguments in favour of peace. De Gastel in turn laid them before Don John and perhaps some good was wrought that way.²

As soon as the English ambassadors returned to Louvain they conferred with Swartzenberg, the Imperial ambassador, who was there, and he agreed, in order to arouse Don John to prompt action, to write that he found the English ambassadors altogether desperate of peace and minded to depart at once.³

Perhaps it was this letter, perhaps the representations of de Gastel—most likely both—that induced Don John to send his deputy the next day to Louvain, who brought better promise of peace and desired the English ambassadors to delay their departure for a time. This step made Walsingham and his colleague hopeful that peace might be accomplished, and they very willingly consented to remain.⁴

And so they did, not without some danger to themselves, for the plague was very bad in Louvain. The French agent, Bellièvre, had lost two of his gentlemen in consequence of it, one of Lord Cobham's train was taken sick, and, as Walsingham remarked, he had no privilege in this matter above the rest.⁵ Nevertheless they stayed. Meanwhile Don John delayed his final answer, although the last of August was near at hand, the day on which the treaty between the Estates and Alençon was to come into effect. It was not until the 31st of August at 8 o'clock in the morning that the Spanish deputies brought Don John's answer, and then it proved to be unsatisfactory. The deputies of the Estates were minded to leave Louvain forthwith, but Walsingham and Cobham persuaded them to remain another day in hope of

¹ Ambassadors to the Council, 27 Aug. 1578, cited p. 408, n. 2.

² Cf. de Gastel to Walsingham, 24 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 754; also Walsingham's reply, 26 Aug., *ibid.* 757.

³ Ambassadors to the Council, cited p. 408, n. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Walsingham to Wilson, 2 Sept. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 791.

a more favourable reply.¹ Finally, on the 1st of September Don John announced that his master the King of Spain had decided to refer the whole question of peace to the arbitration of the Emperor.² And so the peace negotiations were to be drawn out to greater length. But the object for which Walsingham and Cobham had primarily interested themselves in peace, namely to keep out Alençon, was lost. On the 28th day of August³ he was formally proclaimed Defender of the Belgic liberties, and on the 1st of September the treaty between him and the Estates came into effect.

Walsingham wrote to Leicester that he was greatly amazed that Don John had not come to terms. He had expected that his lack of money and supplies and the plague which infested his camp would have forced him to it. He said he thought that Don John's personal ambitions drove him to prefer a doubtful war before peace. War made him a great Prince and gave him an army of 20,000 men to serve any ambitious purpose which he might cherish. Peace would deprive him of all this strength and leave him 'without a foot of ground to repair unto'.⁴ Perhaps Walsingham was in part right, for Don John was a soldier by trade and his ambitions were boundless. But even had he been the most pacific of men, he was well aware that his master would never consent to a peace which opened a door to religious liberty. The refusal of peace did not come ultimately from Don John. It came ultimately from Philip II of Spain.

Walsingham and his colleague had reckoned on two possible ways of circumventing the ambition of the French in the Low Countries. They had reckoned first on the possibility of bringing Don John to terms before the date set for the publication of the treaty between Alençon and the Estates. They had also reckoned on the possibility of gaining such help for the Estates out of England that they would be independent of the French. With this in view they had consulted with the Prince of Orange as to

¹ Ambassadors to the Council, 3 Sept. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 791.

² Same to same, 9 Sept. 1578, *ibid.* 810.

³ Davison to Burghley, 1 Sept. 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, 211.

⁴ Walsingham to Leicester, 2 Sept. 1578, S. P. Eliz., Holland, ix, 3 u. (Lettenhove, x. 787, wrongly ascribed it to Walsingham and Cobham. The copy of this letter in the Record Office is obviously from a page of Walsingham's letter-book.)

what assistance the Estates would demand, and Orange had asked for an immediate loan of £25,000 and for 5,000 soldiers. These demands the ambassadors had communicated to Elizabeth on the 16th of August. They had hoped that the Queen would send a favourable answer before the last day of the month. They had written to all the principal councillors showing excellent reasons why she should do so. But August 31 came and went and found them still waiting for their answer. It was now no longer a question as to whether the treaty between the Estates and Alençon would become an accomplished fact, it was a question as to whether the Estates for lack of money would not be compelled to throw themselves still more entirely into the arms of France.

The ambassadors had no sooner got back from their conference with Don John than the Marquis of Havrech came to them from the Estates demanding to know what the Queen was going to do for them. He said that unless they had help from her quickly they would be compelled to seek aid elsewhere. The ambassadors sought to pacify him, declaring that the Queen's messenger had been delayed by contrary winds and that doubtless when he came he would bring news to their satisfaction.¹ But they pretended to a confidence which they did not feel.

'Sorry I am', Walsingham wrote to Leicester, 'that the peace cannot take place, doubting, by the delay of the dispatch of Mr. Somers, that her Majesty hath no disposition to embrace this cause as in reason and policy she ought to do. Truly, my Lord, we are greatly grieved with the Marquis' speeches . . . in laying before us the harm growing unto them by not execution of her Majesty's promise, having nothing in substance to reply for defence thereof. We see plainly that if Mr. Somers be not returned with good answer, that they are fully resolved to have no further dealings with us, so that we, leaving them unsatisfied, shall return home the most discontented ministers that ever were employed in foreign services, not in respect of our own credits (which were not greatly to be weighed if it were not for the place we hold) but in respect of the mischief that is likely to ensue, both presently to her Majesty and to her successors, by the alienation of these country peoples' hearts from her. But seeing it seemeth to be a thing decreed by Him that governeth all things, we are to digest the same with patience and pray unto

¹ The Ambassadors to the Council, 3 Sept. 1578, cited p. 412, n. 1.

Him, who is hope against hope, to give another issue of success of these causes than in reason or policy is to be looked for.' ¹

It was with such feelings as these that Walsingham awaited Elizabeth's answer, and when it came a few days later it fully justified his expectations. The Queen began by censuring the ambassadors for their course of procedure. She complained that they had not been diligent enough in preventing an accord between the Estates and Alençon, nor in furthering a peace between the rebels and Don John. For her own part, she said, she had no intention whatever of sending over the 5,000 troops at her own expense, which Orange had asked for, nor for that matter, of advancing the Estates £25,000 more of her good money. She did, however, make some slight concession to their necessities.

It will be remembered that early in the year she had promised the Estates that she would be security for any money which they borrowed to the extent of £100,000. She had further lent them £40,000 to enlist the services of Duke Casimir and £5,000 in cash at the earnest entreaties of the Marquis of Havrech. They were to repay this £45,000 out of the first money they raised upon her security. But the Queen had delayed to send her bonds for the £100,000. In expectation of them the Estates had negotiated a loan of some £28,000 from two Genoese bankers, Battista Spinola and Horatio Palavicino. Spinola and Palavicino had already paid the Estates some £17,000 of this sum. Having paid so much they became anxious for their security and refused to pay more until they had received the Queen's bond.

Now Elizabeth said that this £17,000 which the Estates had raised was rightfully hers in part payment of the £45,000 they owed her. She agreed, however, to let this pass, and further to deliver to the bankers her bond for the whole £28,000, provided that the Estates in turn would give security to her for its repayment. She wanted, however, good security. Ink and parchment would not do. She must have plate and jewels.²

This, then, was the Queen's answer to the pressing demands of the Estates. She would not send troops, she would not send

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 2 Sept. 1578, cited p. 412, n. 4.

² Elizabeth to the Ambassadors, 29 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 767.

money, she would not even send the bonds for £100,000 which she had promised. She would 'in respect of their great necessities' lend them her bond for £28,000, provided they handed over to her plate and jewels of equal value as collateral.

Considering the strained relations which existed already between the Estates and the Queen, such a proposal must have seemed to Walsingham monstrous. The explanation of it was forthcoming in a letter from Leicester. Bacqueville was still in England pressing Elizabeth to consider favourably Alençon's offer of marriage, and protesting to her again and again that the young Duke meant to be guided in all things by her direction. These reiterated protestations had their effect on the Queen. Leicester wrote: 'Through the earnest semblance of Monsieur's whole direction under her Majesty's favour, and none otherwise, she is better persuaded of her ability to direct all these causes without such charge as we lay down for her, and so resteth in assured hope that Monsieur will do nothing without her liking there, though she assure him of no further hope of his suit here than she hath done before.'¹

Walsingham had suspected for some time that the marriage question lay at the root of all the difficulties, so he was not greatly surprised at what Leicester wrote. For his own part he did not think the Queen was seriously inclined to marry. He remembered her former courtship. In a letter to Leicester on the 28th of August, after some words of praise about Don John, he wrote: 'If Monsieur were furnished with like good parts, I suppose verily it would prove a match, and yet would I be loth to lay any great wager on the matter. Though I perceive that Venus beareth greatest sway in your climate, yet I fear that Saturn approaching, being a winter planet, will put Venus out of countenance. In the meantime the treaty of this matter doth not a little advantage Monsieur's proceedings in this country.'² Indeed Walsingham was inclined to believe that the marriage project was being pushed forward in England by those of the Council who were opposed to an aggressive policy in the Low Countries in general and to Leicester and himself in particular. 'I am right sorry to see', he wrote to Leicester again, 'the

¹ Leicester to Walsingham, 29 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 772.

² Walsingham to Leicester, 28 Aug. 1578, *ibid.* 764.

indirect dealings at home in causes that so much touch her Majesty in safety. I hope God will one day reveal these treacherous dealings, that the authors thereof may receive their due hire. In the meantime it behoveth us to have an eye into their doings; especially seeing, besides the public, they do seek some advantage against your Lordship and me. I hope, when they have done their worst, our doings will abide the sunshine, and the forces of their malice light upon their own heads.' ¹

Such was Walsingham's opinions of the motives which led the Queen to act as she did. What he thought of her answer to the request of the Estates for aid he expressed in a letter of the 9th of September to Burghley.

'As your Lordship writeth,' Walsingham observed, 'he had need to be furnished with patience that shall deal in such sour service as we are employed in, being almost ashamed to show our faces abroad, having entertained them here with hope of the continuance of her Majesty's favour, and now, in the end, when they stood in greatest need of her assistance, to be as it were quite abandoned. Besides the alienation of this country people's hearts from her Majesty, which cannot but be perilous both unto herself and her realm, it will render her Highness hateful to the world, many hard speeches being given out against her, which as we hear with grief so cannot your Lordship but also read with grief, if we should set down the same, and therefore I forbear to make mention thereof. To have all the world your enemies at once, it is greatly doubted you will return Monsieur's ministers unsatisfied, which, if it so come to pass, then do I not know any Prince whose friendship you may assure yourself of. The King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé are to learn by your dealings with the Prince and States here, what they are to look for in the time of their necessity. And, as for Duke Casimir, he doth curse the time that ever he departed out of his country, seeing her Majesty dealeth so coldly in these causes, especially finding her now grown hateful to this people and he himself, for her sake, the less esteemed. How unpleasant it is to be employed in so unfortunate a service I leave to your Lordship's good judgement.' ²

¹ Walsingham to Leicester, 28 Aug. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 764. It is difficult to say to whom Walsingham referred in this letter. Suspicion must fall on Sussex, who was a confessed rival of Leicester's and strongly in favour of the marriage, and perhaps to some extent on Burghley.

² Walsingham to Burghley, 9 Sept. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 814. The following letter, indicated as being from Walsingham to Burghley in the *Cal. Foreign*, was probably to Leicester. It is undated in the Record Office copy, but was probably dispatched 9 September 1578. It contains such an

Walsingham had some reason to feel aggrieved at the Queen's answer on his own private account, for she had made no show of

excellent statement of Walsingham's general position at this time as to be worth quoting in full :

' Your letter by Mr. Somers I have received, and do find to my great grief the answer brought by him, such as I looked for, having by experience seen that your long consultations do most commonly end with the worst resolution. By whose advice her Majesty is directed to deal so hardly with those of this country, depending as they do chiefly upon her favour in their extreme necessity, where a little treasure may do more good than millions at another time, I know not ; but sure I am that the alienation of these peoples' hearts from her, which I see apparently already come to pass, will breed so great peril to her Highness self and so great mischief to the whole realm in time to come, as she will curse them that were authors of the advice, when she shall perceive that they had more regard to some particular profit (for that either by corruption it cometh to pass or that they are weary of her government), than to her Highness safety as in true course of duty they are bound. For he that looketh substantially into her Majesty's present state, weighing as well things at home as abroad, shall see by this resolution so dangerous a storm drawing on as is likely utterly to blemish the blessedness of her Majesty's former course of government.

' And first to look into things abroad, it is over apparent how Spain and France (who are her nearest neighbours) are affected towards her ; and if any think they may work her Majesty's surety by procuring a reconciliation between her Highness and them, as I know some have been carried away with such conceits, they will be found to be authors of very dangerous and unsound counsel, building surety upon a reconciled enemy, especially some of them being so carried away with desire of revenge as they spared not their own blood in the nearest degree. The Prince and States here, who were altogether at her Majesty's devotion, seeing themselves abandoned in their necessity, cannot but withdraw their former goodwill and affection and of assured friends grow most dangerous enemies, and therefore I will take upon me hereafter to give no further assurance of the Prince's friendship. And as for the King of Navarre and Prince of Condé they are to learn by the usage of those of the Low Countries what they have to look for at her Majesty's hands. How Duke Casimir doth greatly repent his repair into these countries, seeing her Majesty taketh that course that she doth, I suppose will appear by his own letters unto her Highness. To conclude, Scotland which is the postern gate, to see the mischief and malice as is borne and bended against us, I see (though the matter may be patched up for a time) disposed to take another course for their safety and not to depend upon those whom they think do make little account of them, having dismissed their late ambassadors with so evil satisfaction, as I perceive by a letter received from Alexander H. they were, who for the common cause doth greatly lament it. And to heap up the mischief in full measure, I fear Duke d'Alençon's ministers will be returned with evil satisfaction.

' Now for the discontent at home, if her Majesty could truly look into it, and see the misliking that reigneth generally in all states, though men make outwardly a fair show, it would then appear unto her that the approach of some dangerous alteration is at hand, which I do the rather fear, for that your Lordship with the rest of her Majesty's Council with whom her Highness has conferred touching these country causes, have most faithfully and substantially delivered your minds in that behalf, as Mr. Somers informeth me, who was present at the debate of the matter. And therefore, seeing good counsel cannot take effect, it is an argument that the mischiefs likely to light in that

securing the £5,000 which he and Cobham had allowed the Estates to borrow on their own private bonds. It therefore looked as though, in addition to his other burdens, he would have to bear one of debt. It is no wonder that he wrote to Wilson, 'I would for mine own part that when her Majesty appointed me first to the service, I had been confined to two years' imprisonment.'¹

The ambassadors sent Elizabeth's answers to the Estates, and not long afterwards the Marquis of Havrech came to speak with them about it. He said that the Queen had broken her promise, that it had been kinder had she told them in the first place that she did not mean to help them, so they could have sought aid elsewhere. He declared that the world would judge her harshly for it, and that the Netherlanders would turn their hearts from her. A hundred thousand crowns, he said, would have benefited them more now than ten million later. But, he concluded, seeing they could not depend upon England, it would behove them to turn elsewhere for aid before it was too late.

The next day the Prince of Orange and the Count of Bossu, General of the Estates' army, came likewise to visit the ambassadors. They showed in what direful straits their army stood for want of pay and besought Walsingham and his colleague to lend them at least a hundred thousand guilders for their present necessities. But the ambassadors could do nothing. They said that they had no authority for making such a loan. They could only hope for better news from home.²

'We do what we may', Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 'to remove the discontentment and for the stay of this people from running a desperate course, by putting them in comfort that

realm, is fatal and cannot be avoided. The only remedy left unto us is prayer, where consultation will take no place.

'According to your Lordship's advice I have set down such reasons as moved us to allow or at least not to mislike of the numbers of the French forces agreed on in the accord between them and the States. If it would please her Majesty to hear before she condemn, her displeasure would be avoided and her ministers serve with more courage and contentment. But I fear this mislike growth by practice of some to do (*sic*) not rest the best affected towards me, whereof I have received very hard measure since my repair hither. I am enjoined by my wife to yield your Lordship my humble thanks for your comfortable letter sent unto her, which among other benefits I have received at your Lordship's hands, I do not esteem the least. And so desiring your Lordship to accept in good part these scribbled lines, I most humbly take my leave.' S. P. Holland and Flanders, ix, f. 3 k.

¹ Walsingham to Wilson, 9 Sept. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 816.

² Ambassadors to Elizabeth, 9 Sept. 1578, *ibid.* 806.

when her Majesty shall be by us truly informed at our return of the state of their affairs, then will she take some such resolution as shall be to their contentment. But, when they ask us what assurance they may have thereof, to induce them to rely thereupon, seeing how former resolutions here have taken no better effect, we know not what to answer, and yet are we not silent, though our answers do neither satisfy them nor ourselves.' ¹

The ambassadors presented these facts to the Queen. They did not urge her to send money. They had already made themselves unpopular by doing so in the past. They let the facts speak for themselves.

But Elizabeth, allured still by the specious promises of Bacqueville, sent them cold comfort. She said she was tired of being browbeaten for money. If the Estates continued to persecute her with their exorbitant demands, she would withdraw her aid altogether.² In her letter to the ambassadors of the 15th of September she quite ignored the question and bade them turn their attention to the question of peace by co-operating with the Emperor in the efforts he was making in that behalf. She instructed them to see if they could not induce both of the contending parties to diminish their forces, and if they could not arrange some kind of an interim agreement upon the knotty point of religion.³

To this task, and to the other task of getting from the Estates security in plate and jewels for the bonds which Spinola and Palavicino were demanding of the Queen, the ambassadors now addressed themselves.

The publication of the so-called religious peace by the Estates General a short while before saved them from the necessity of dealing for an Interim.⁴ Upon the question of diminishing the numbers of the army they found the Estates obdurate. The chances of peace, they said, were too uncertain for them to give up the advantage which their larger army gave them over Don John. Besides, they thought that their very strength would the sooner induce Don John to meet their terms.⁵

¹ Walsingham to Burghley, 9 Sept. 1578, *ibid.* 815.

² Elizabeth to Ambassadors, 8 Sept. 1578, *ibid.* 798.

³ *Ibid.* 822.

⁴ Davison to Walsingham, 25 Sept. 1578, *ibid.* 845.

⁵ Ambassadors to Elizabeth, 26 Sept. 1578, *ibid.* 848.

In their other task of getting the Estates to give substantial collateral for the Queen's bonds the ambassadors were more successful. The Estates agreed to place in her hands sufficient jewellery and plate to cover the value of the bonds.¹ Their offer was later accepted by the Queen.²

But this was after Walsingham and Cobham had returned home. Their futile attempts to induce the Estates to consent to a diminution of their forces was practically the last thing which the ambassadors did in the Netherlands. Burghley had written to Walsingham on the 8th of September, and had instructed him to hold himself in readiness to visit Alençon in case the Duke should send for him.³ But Walsingham received a letter from Bacqueville on the 25th of September which relieved him of this unpleasant prospect.⁴

On the 15th of September the Queen had written to the ambassadors informing them that they might come home if they found they could do no more good in the Netherlands. Accordingly, as soon as Walsingham had received his communication from Bacqueville, the ambassadors turned their faces homeward. They left Antwerp on the 27th of September,⁵ and were probably at Dunkirk by the last of the month. But they were delayed in crossing the Channel and did not present themselves at the English court, then at Richmond, until the 7th of October.⁶

They made their report the next day, but owing to the Queen's illness it was almost a week later before she was able to consider the affairs of the Low Countries.

Walsingham had promised the Estates that he would use every persuasion in his power to induce the Queen to come to their assistance, and to all appearance he did, but he could not persuade her to do any more than accept the Estates' offers of plate and jewels as collateral for her bonds of £28,000, and this indeed may be accounted the total result of his mission.

He and Cobham had been sent to make peace between Don

¹ Ambassadors to Council, 24 Sept. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 840.

² Wilson to Davison, 16 Oct. 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, 306.

³ Lettenhove, x. 799.

⁴ Bacqueville to Walsingham, 23 Sept. 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, 266.

⁵ Ambassadors to Wilson, 26 Sept. 1578, Lettenhove, x. 850.

⁶ Walsingham to Davison, 11 Oct. 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1578-9, 299.

John and the Estates, to counteract the influence of the French, and to promise the Estates that the Queen would help them. They had accomplished none of these things. Don John and the Estates were still at war ; the French Duke of Alençon had been proclaimed the Defender of the Belgic Liberties and was leading a large army into the Low Countries ; and as for the Queen's aid it had shrunk in dimensions to such an extent that the Netherlands had almost ceased to make account of it.

The total effect of Walsingham and Cobham's visit to the Low Countries had been rather disastrous than otherwise to the interests of England there. The Estates, by reason of the Queen's promises, by reason of the rank of the envoys and of the pomp and ceremony in which they came, had been led to expect great things of them. They got little or nothing, and with their disappointment came a revulsion of feeling against England which might have worked great harm had Alençon been an abler man than he was.

Walsingham and Cobham are in no sense to be blamed for the ill success which attended their efforts. They failed in a part of their mission because they attempted to accomplish the impossible—that is to say, to patch up a peace between the Estates and Spain. In the other part they failed because the Queen would not support them in the work she had sent them out to do. It is pretty certain that the Estates General did not want to receive the Duke of Alençon. They delayed negotiations with him as long as possible and they offered him terms which they frankly did not believe he would accept. Had the Queen come to their assistance in time with men and money, it seems highly probable that Alençon would never have gained the foothold that he did. At least such was the opinion of Walsingham. But Elizabeth, when she had her opportunity, threw it away. Perhaps she thought a policy of active intervention in the Low Countries too expensive and too dangerous, perhaps she was beguiled into believing that she could direct Alençon at her will, and so save expense and obviate the danger of war with Spain. Perhaps she realized what was without doubt true, that Alençon's expedition into the Low Countries was not likely to be nearly so dangerous to her as her councillors made it out to be. It is hard to say. Very often what appeared to be feminine caprice in the Virgin

Queen proved in the end to be very subtle policy. But this much is certain, that her change of viewpoint on the Alençon matter effectually prevented Walsingham and his colleague from keeping Alençon out of the Netherlands or from limiting his influence there, things which they had by the express terms of their instructions been sent out to do.

It was the Queen's fault that they failed. Perhaps it was well for England that they did fail. But it was hard for them.

Walsingham himself got very little for all his labour except hard words and large debts. He was disappointed and discouraged. 'God send me well to return,' he had remarked, 'and I will hereafter take my leave of foreign services . . . seeing men are so ready to pick quarrels and to deprave both careful, painful, and good meaning.'¹ But he reckoned without his host. Elizabeth was not deceived by his apparent failure. For all her hard words, she knew her man, and she had much work for him still to do before he could 'take his leave of foreign services'.

¹ Walsingham to Sir Thomas Heneage, 2 Sept. 1578, S. P. Holland and Flanders, ix. 30.

APPENDIX

A Treatise of the Office of a Councillor and Principall Secretarie to her Ma[jes]tie ;¹

Divided into 3 parts,

Whereof the first treateth of the diversitie of Councells in England, their Jurisdictions and Authorities,

The second, of thinges fitt to be provided by a Secretarie for his better service both for forraine and domestick Affaires ;

The 3rd, of matters ordinarilie fallinge into consultac[i]on, and of the manner of givinge counsell and advise to a Prince or in the assemblie of Councillors, and of the settinge downe of dispatches incident and appertaininge to the office of a Secretarie.

Essay : X

Woe unto them that decree wicked decrees and wright greivous thinges.

Instructions for a Principall Secretarie, observed by R. B. for S[i]r Edward Wotton : A[nn]o Do[mi]ni, 1592.

Imprimis, my meaninge is not to speake anie thinge of such qualities as are fitt to be in one that should be a Prince's Secretarie or Councillor. That argument hath been handled by others,

¹ This treatise is preserved among the Yelverton MSS. (vol. clxii, ff. 1 ff.) now in the possession of Lady Calthorpe at 38 Grosvenor Square, London. It is written in a clerkly hand of the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century. It was evidently composed in 1592 for the benefit of Sir Edward Wotton who expected at that time to be appointed Principal Secretary. As a matter of fact he was not appointed then, nor three years later when the matter was broached again (cf. life of Wotton in *D. N. B.*). The author is indicated to have been R. B., without much doubt Robert Beale, to whom most of the Yelverton MSS. at one time belonged. Beale was Walsingham's brother-in-law and secretary as well as clerk of the Privy Council. He was employed on several diplomatic missions and more than once took Walsingham's place as Principal Secretary when he was away from England. Beale was, besides, a stout champion of the Puritans and a distinguished civil lawyer. He was unusually well qualified to write of the office of Principal Secretary and his observations are particularly interesting in this connexion because his knowledge of the office was gained during Walsingham's incumbency and undoubtedly reflected the situation as it existed in his term of service.

In the printing of this manuscript, the spelling of the original has been reproduced, contracted forms being resolved in square brackets. The punctuation has been modernized.

and whom her Ma[jes]tie shall call to that place my simple Judgment must thinke sufficientlie qualified. Wherefore mine intenc[i]on shalbe only to note such thinges as belong unto the practise of the place of a Secretarie, w[hi]ch consisteth partlie in dealinge w[i]th her Ma[jes]tie and p[ar]tlie w[i]th the rest of her highnes most honorable privie Councell.

Touching matters to be handled before the Councell, to avoide the number and trouble of manie unnecessarie suites, it were convenient to have at the first entrance the Order renewed and observed w[hi]ch hath bin many times made by the LLs. of the Councell: for them to attende unto matters of Estate eyther at home or abroade; to referre private suites to the Masters of the requestes or other Ordinarie Courts of Justice. And for this purpose you shall doe well to acquaint yourselfe w[i]th the Jurisdicc[i]ons of the perticular Courtes of this Realme, whereof Mr. Lambert and Mr. Crompton have of late made speciall Treaties. And yet, wher ther is great cause, I would not have her Ma[jes]ties councill wholie abridged of that Prerogative, for in times past they did deale in such causes, as appeareth by the first book or Register of the Court of Requests and many other Presidents of great moment.

Of such things as the Secretarie is to proffer to the Councell, let him first have in a sev[e]rall paper a memoriall or Dockett of those w[hi]ch he mindeth to propounde and have dispatched at everie sittinge. He is to proffer the publicke before the private and discerne of thinges w[hi]ch require speedie answer before such as may tarrie longer leasure. Especially let not such Messengers longe staye w[hi]ch come either from beyonde the seas or other partes and must have allowances for their journeyes and attendances.

When the Councell meeteth, have a care that the time be not spent in matters of small moment, but to dispatch such thinges as shalbe propounded unto them, for you shall finde that they will not meete so often as you would desire, sometimes for sickness and sometimes for other employments.

Deferre and prolonge not Suters or anie busines you have in hande, for otherwise more will come upon you than you shalbe able to dispatch, for as Seneca sayde of the affaires of Princes

*Nunquam placidam sceptrâ quietem,
Certumque sui tenere diem;
Alia ex alijs cura fatigat
Vexatque animos nova tempestas*

and for this purpose you shall do well to have a memoriall in wrightinge of things to be done, least your memorie deceive you.

Favour not secrett or Cabinet Councells w[hi]ch doe but cause

iealousie and envie. Some will protect them by the example of Henry the 7th, who was indeede a politicke Prince, but they doe not well either conceive or reporte the matter, for, cominge from a Civill warre, he was forced to have the Noblemen reside in their Countries to see good orders kept in the Execuc[i]on of Justice; besides he was not destitute of a Councell of B[isho]ps and Nobles who both attended him and made dispatches, as appeares first by ye first booke of the Court of Requests; 2ly, the disinheritinge of his mother-in-law by a great Councell. It is true this hath been observed in other States upon extraordinarie occasions, as duringe the controve[r]sies betweene the houses of France and Burgundie, so upon the voyage of Charles the 8 into Naples and the opposic[i]on of the house of Arragon, so that of Charles the 5 and Frances the first. Seeinge now in our State there is no competic[i]on, as the cases differ, so the reasons varie.

When ther shalbe anie unpleasant matter to be imparted to her Ma[jes]tie from the Councell or other matters to be done of great importance, let not the burden be layed on you alone but let the rest ioyned w[i]th you. Excuse yourselfe by your yeares and for lack of experience; doe not ov[e]rthrowe yourselfe for anie of their pleasures or other respect as M. Davison did, for if anie thinge be misliked, it wilbe saied That it was the Secretarie's doinge, that they signed for companie, that the l[ett]re was brought to them, &c. And manie times l[ett]res are gotten in Chambers by Councillor's Clercks goinge from one to another w[hi]ch often are called in question, wherof no Recorde is kept in the Councell booke. And therefore it were good to renewe the order kept in K. Edward's time, the next daye after their L[ord]s had signed ye l[ett]res, to sett their handes to the entries of the booke.

It hath bine the manner that the Secretarie should abbreviate on the backside of the l[ett]res, or otherwise in a bie paper, the substantiall and most materiall pointes w[hi]ch are to be propounded and answered, lest the rest of the L[ord]s will not have them all redd, or shall not have leisure, and let him in a bie paper make a note breiflie of their resoluc[i]ons to everie point, com[m]andinge the Clerckes of the Councell to approach and give good eare for his better direcc[i]on to frame their L[ord]ship[s]' l[ett]re or answer.

Afterwardes, upon sight of the l[ett]res sent and the notes thus taken of their L[ord]ship[s]' resoluc[i]on, the Clerck of the Councell may drawe a l[ett]re or Minute (if it be a great cause), written w[i]th large lines, to be perused by the Secretarie and likewise com[m]unicated to the L. Thr[esour]er before it be preferred to the other L[ord]s to be signed.

The Secretarie must have a care that the Clercks of the Councell keepe a perfect booke of the L[ord]s' sittinges, of the place, daye and number and likewise of their l[ett]res signed; and when everie mounth is ended, let the Clercke attendinge make up in order the bundell for the mounth and keepe a speciall note in a paper booke of everie l[ett]re or other specialtie in the saide bundell in forme of a Calender, so as by the said Callender he may know in what month and bundell to finde that w[hi]ch shalbe asked for, w[i]th a blancke on the other side of the saide booke to note to whom anie of the sayde l[ett]res may be delivered, if anie send for them.

Let the Clerkes of the Councell likewise keepe a speciall booke of all the bonds taken by monthes and dayes in forme of a Callender, leavinge one side of the paper booke blancke to note by what order and what daye the same bonde was discharged.

Let also the sayd Clercks, besides the great booke, keepe a little note of such as may be com[m]itted from the Councell, and if the Secretarie com[m]itt anie of himselfe, let his man keepe a note of them and will him to putt him in remembrance of them, that they lie not to longe to their utter undoinge, and so manie times the punishm[en]t hath beene greater than the offence, besides many times the time is forgotten and passeth away w[hi]ch the Law hath appointed for their inditements and trialls, and so the offence is not punished as it should be; and sometimes her Ma[jes]tie is put to greater charges than needeth for findinge of them in prison. It hath beene heretofore an use that against great festivall dayes and her Ma[jes]tie's remove in sum[m]er time from London, the keepers of the prisons should be com[m]anded by the L[ord]s of the Councell to bringe in a Catalogue of their prisoners and by whom they weare com[m]itted, to be considered of by the L[ord]s as they sholde see cause.

Take heede to whom you give anie warrant for the apprehenc[i]on of any man or serching of houses, they may abuse you and use it for other purposes, as was seene in the Starr-Chamber in the case of Dr. Gollock and his companions and, unless there be great cause or you be so speciallie com[m]anded by her Ma[jes]tie, take heede of anie l[ett]res that may staye or hinder ther ordinarie course of Justice betwene partie and partie or be against the Lawe and libertie of the Lande, wherto the Prince is sworn; and it is the inheritance both of the Prince and subiect.

When anie businesses cometh into the Secretarie's handes, he shall doe well for the ease of himselfe to distribute the same and to use the helpe of such her Ma[jes]tie's servants as serve underneath him, as the Clercks of the Councell, ye Clercks of the

Signett, the Secretarie of the Latin and of the French tonge, and of his own servants.

Albeit the Secretaries of the Latin and French tonge can sufficientlie discharge their duties, yet, for that the matters whereof they shall wright anie l[ett]res as also her Ma[jes]tie's meaninge and humor shalbe better knowne unto you then them, you shall doe well to consider first of the Minutes of the l[ett]res, the (*sic*) by no scholasticall, ambiguous or generall phrase anie advantage may be taken, as D[uke] Casimir did at his beinge here and hath besides often happened.

If there be any occasion of Treaties, obligac[i]ons or Contracts w[i]th Forraine Princes or Estates in Latin, besides former presidents and your owne lerninge, you shall doe well to use the helpe of the D[octo]rs of the Civill Lawe and some discrete and well experimented Notaries, w[h]ich weare more used in former times then of late yeares. Remember the sayinge of the L[ord] Hastings, L[ord] Chamberlaine to K[ing] Edw[ard] 4th, in Com[m]lines;—That the Englishmen have been more overtaken by the French in their Treaties then in their warrs. And surelie, in whomsoever the fault was, the last Contract with the United Provinces was penned to the great disadvantage of her Ma[jes]tie and the fault coulde never since be amended.

Burthen not yourselve w[i]th to many Clercks or servants as S[i]r Fra[ncis] Walsingham did. Lett your secrett services be knowne to a fewe, the Lord Thr[esaur]er Burghley, being Secretarie, had not above two or three. Some you may traine up for the first in wrightinge out and compilinge such bookes as are necessarie for your service, whom uppon preferment of your other servantes, and after some time of prooffe, you may call neerer unto you as they shall deserve and you shall see cause.

You must have a care that they w[h]ich be about you be no adv[er]tisers of anie matters but wher and when and to whom you shall appoint.

Be not to credulous lest you be deceived; heare all reportes but trust not all; weigh them w[i]th time and deliberac[i]on and be not to liberall of trifles; observe them that deale on both handes least you be deceived; follow the advice of the Poet

*Qui cavet ne decipiatur vix cavet cum etiam cavet:
Etiam cum cavisse ratus est, saepe is cautor captus est.*

Other matters wherew[i]th a Secretarie is to deale in may be distinguished into publicke services, eyther appertaininge to the Realme or else w[i]th other Forraine states.

Imprimis, let him keepe a iournall in forme of a Callender by day, Month and yeare of the time of the receipts of his l[ett]res and likewise of his dispatches by Post or otherwise.

If anie of the Postes be slack or doe not their duties w[i]th such dilligence as they ought to doe, w[hi]ch will appeare by the endersments of the paquetts, the Secretarie must see the fault forthw[it]h redressed, least afterwarde, when perhaps the service shall require more speede, it be hindred by beainge w[i]th their negligence. And for the better direc[i]on of this service, a Secretarie is to have a speciall care to such orders as have bene heretofore made about these causes and to see them executed w[i]th all severitie.

The Secretarie shall do well to appoint the Clercks of the Councell to keepe perticular bookes of the messages w[hi]ch they shall sende away from the Councell and to sign no messinger's bill unles the partie bringe backe a certificate from him to whom the l[ett]res weare sent. And the Secretarie's Clerck is to keepe the like booke for such messages as he shall dispatch of himselfe and have a care that he be not abused by counterfaitinge of handes and the Q[ueen] surcharged as heretofore she hath bine.

A Secretarie must have a speciall Cabinet, whereof he is himselfe to keepe the Keye, for his signetts, Ciphers and secrett Intelligences, distinguishing the boxes or tills rather by letters than by the names of the Countryes or places, keepinge that only unto himselfe, for the names may inflame a desire to come by such things.

A Secretarie is to have everie yeare from the Clercke of the Crowne a coppie of the bookes of the Justices of peace, of all the Com[m]ic[i]ons that shalbe from time to time for restraint of Graine and other services, of all Judges and principall Gentlemen able for service, either Civill or Martiall.

I could wish that the Secretarie should make himself acquainted w[i]th some honest Gentlemen in all the shires, Citties and principall Townes and the affecc[i]on of the Gent[ry]. But let him take heede that he be not to light of credit, least they abuse him and serve their private turnes.

It is convenient for a Secretarie to seeke to understande the State of the whole Realme, to have S[i]r Thomas Smithe's booke, althoughe ther be many defects, w[hi]ch by progresse of time and experience he shalbe able to spie and amende ;

Then to have a booke or notice of all the Noblemen, their Pedegrees and Alliances amonge themselves and w[i]th other Gentlemen.

A Secretarie must likewise have the booke of Ortelius'[s] Mapps, a booke of the Mappes of England, w[i]th a particular note of the divisions of the shires into Hundreds, Lathes, Wappen taes (*sic*), and what Noblemen, Gent[lemen] and others be residing in every one of them ; what Citties, Burrows, Markett Townes, Villages ; and also a good descripc[i]on of the Realm

of Irelande, a note of the Noblemen and surnames English or Irish of their Septs, Enraghes, (*sic*) Galloglasses, Kerns and followers, and if anie other plotts or mapps come to his handes, let them be kept safelie.

It is requisite that a Secretarie should have digested into X or XII severall bookes thes matters followinge :—

1. Imprimis, of matters concerninge Religion, of Recusants in every shire, of their bondes, placinges, children, &c. ; of the examinac[i]ons of Priests and Traitors, to conferr them together, w[hi]ch cannot be when some parcells are in one man's handes and some in another ; and surelie it were not amisse that some discreet person were appointed for that purpose, thinges would be better remembered and sooner dispatched ;

2ly, The Com[m]ission and Instrucc[i]ons for the Principalitie and Marches of Wales ;

3ly, The Com[m]ission and Instrucc[i]ons of her Ma[jes]tie's Councel in the North, the Com[m]ic[i]on of the L[ord] Lieutenant, the Com[m]ic[i]ons of the wardens over against Scotlande, the establishm[en]t of Barwicke, a role of the officers and bandes, the Lawes of the Marches ;

4ly, A note of the fortes alonge the Sea Coastes of this Realme, who be their Captaines, how they be furnished, when, and how they be repaired, by notes out of the Office of the Ordinance, &c. ;

5ly, A note of the Office of the Ordinance and armorie, powder and munic[i]on w[i]thin the Realme and in what places ;

6ly, A booke of the names of her Ma[jes]tie's shippes, of their reparac[i]on and furnitures and of the Marriners and Souldiers that are requisite ;

7ly, A booke of the rates of victualls to serve either by sea or lande ;

8ly, A Collec[i]on of the late Musters in everie sheire for some few yeares, what able men, what furniture and what kinde of armor, what numbers have beene of late yeares taken out of them for anie service abroade, so as they be not overburthened ;

9ly, A booke of the priviledges of Gernesey and Jersye, of the auncient customes of Normandie and of the sayd Isles, of the orders of the L[or]ds of the Councell uppon their appeales, of the provic[i]ons and munic[i]on in the saide Isles ;

10ly, Of the affaires of the Realme of Irelande and the ordinarie com[m]ic[i]on and Instrucc[i]ons of the L[ord] Deputies and Presidents, the speciall l[ett]res to be kept that are sent thither.

A Secretarie should not be unacquainted w[i]th the Estate of such English corporac[i]ons and companies as trade into the partes of beyonde the Seas, as the Marchant Adventurers, the

Marchants tradinge the Easte Countryes, those of Spaine, Muscovia and such like.

Likewise he should not be unacquainted w[i]th the number of the strangers, Denizens and others both in London and in other places of this Realme. And surelie, for want of Consulls and governors to each Nation as in times past, their is growne a great ignorance and confuc[i]on in the Trade by one couleringe another, pluralitie of Trades and by other abuses, w[hi]ch are to be redressed even for her Ma[jes]tie's proffitt and the good Estate and quietnes of the Realme.

A Secretarie should not be unacquainted w[i]th the matters of her Ma[jes]tie's Minte, of the Standarde, allayes and remedies of her coyne, and likewise of other coyne abroad, and of matters of exchange ;

Likewise w[i]th her Ma[jes]tie's revenewes, Lands, Customes, Profittes by wardes and such like ; w[i]th the expenses, fees, annuities, penc[i]ons and other charges, both ordinarie and exterordinarie, that her Highnes is at.

I could also wish that the Secretarie provide for himselfe a good extract of the late bookes of the Subsidies and of the Loanes or Privie Seales ; a collecc[i]on of the subsedyes, benevolences, releifes and other contribuc[i]ons graunted by the subiects since the Conquest ; likewise a coppie of the bookes of the Undersheriffs and Coroners in everie Sheire ; by w[hi]ch meanes he shall know the names of the Gent[ry] as also of the wealthier sort of yeomen in the whole Lande.

Many times ther wilbe consultac[i]on for househould matters, wherfore it is fitt that a Secretarie should have some knowledge of the orders of the K[ing's] houshold, of the rate of the provic[i]ons, of the late composic[i]ons w[i]th every Sheire, to the intent he may not be ignorant but able to saye somewhat as a Councillor ought to doe.

Finallie, it is very requisite that a Secretarye should be so sufficientlie instructed in the points of Christian Religion w[hi]ch the Church of Englande professeth as to be able to maintaine the same and answer all Traitors and other adversaries that he shall have to deale w[i]th. I could also wish that he should not be ignorant of all other Contraversies about rites and Ceremonies and what hath beene done concerninge them, that he may not be carryed away w[i]th the partiall reportes of such as only seeke the maintenance of themselves and care not what untrue reportes they give out to incense her Ma[jes]tie against true and loyall subiects who are not hearde as they are. And wheras the Eccl[es]iasticall Courtes doe by law and Custome holde pleas of very many thinges w[hi]ch doe touche both the bodies and goodes of the subiects, it is a strange thinge that their Judges

only take the oathe of Supremacie and no oath to deale uprightlie in Justice and accordinge to the Lawes of the Lande, as was used in the time of K[ing] Hen[ry] 8. And such an oath hath bine alwayes exacted and ought to be in places of judgment. But seeinge the Eccl[es]iasticall Lawe is not yet reformed as it ought to be accordinge to sundrie acts of Parliament, they doe what they list in admittinge unlearned and dishonest ministers, in suppressing of good preachers, in toleratinge, under colour of Justice, Pluralities and Nonresidencies, in Simoniacall choppings and changings of livinges and other enormities and abuses, as it is no wonder to see the Apostasye of this Realme to Poperye and Atheisme by their defaults, unles some speedie remedye be taken w[hi]ch, by former examples in the times of K[ing] Joas and Josias and the longe experience of this time, cannot be hoped for that it will ever proceede from the Clergye.

Albeit all thes thinges cannot be had at once, by reason of late yeares that thinges have bine made more private then weare fitt for her Ma[jes]tie's service and no meanes used of instruct[i]on and bringinge up of others in Knowledge to be able to serve her Ma[jes]tie, yet those remembrances may serve as Notes and heades wherto a Secretarie may referre such thinges as he may gett and be acquainted w[i]th in the time of his service. And although there be no present use, yet he shall doe well to inquire and looke after such thinges, to cause some of his Clercks to wright them out and, for avoidinge of confuc[i]on, to digest them into such heades to serve his turne wher ther shalbe neede.

In the Colleecc[i]on of thinges I would wish a distince[i]on used betweene that w[hi]ch is publicke and that w[hi]ch is private,—that is, a separac[i]on betweene those thinges w[hi]ch are her Ma[jes]tie's Recordes and appertaines unto her and those w[hi]ch a Secretarie getteth by his private industrie and charge. Heretofore there was a chamber in Westm[inster] where such thinges, towards the latter end of K[ing] Hen[ry] 8, were kept and were not in the Secretarie's private Custodie; but since, that order hath beene neglected and those thinges w[hi]ch weare publicke have bine culled out and gathered into private bookes, wherby no meanes are left to see what was donne before or to give anie light of service to yonge beginners, w[hi]ch is not well; and therefore I would wish a Secretarie kept such thinges aparte in a chest or place and n[o]t to confound them w[i]th his owne. And the want of so doinge was the cause that upon the death of Mr. Secretarie Walsingham all his papers and bookes both publicke and private weare seized on and carried away, perhaps by those who would be loath to be used so themselves.

But to returne to the practice of the office of a Secretarie ; whensoever anie Privie Seale shall passe for anie of the above-named services, let especiall note be kept thereof in a booke under their severall titles, that you may be able to give a true informac[i]on of the same and require an account if ther be cause. It may be that, many times before the Privie Seale and warrants be obtained, ther shalbe necessarie use of the monie for w[hi]ch your l[ett]re or bonde may be directed. Beware how you take such a charge uppon you and remember the Warrant be gotten in due time. I have hearde it crediblie reported that the olde Thr[easur]er, the Marquiss of Winchester, did so often-times direct his warrants to the Tellers of the Exchequer and afterwarde did forgett to sollicite the Warrants as he should have done, and so by age and for wante of memorye did forgette ther perticular imploiments and was cast in arrerages unto the Q[ueen], and I knowe th[at] S[i]r Fra[ncis] Walsingham was ov[er]taken in this sorte. The L. Thr[easur]er Burghlye is more circumspect, not to paye anie thinge before the Warrant doth come, and you shall doe well to followe him in this point.

Touching forraine services, I would wish that you did, as soon as you can, informe yourselfe of such thinges as have passed betweene this Realme and other States, at the least for the space of one year before, to the intent you may ioine your service w[i]th that w[hi]ch went before.

It is a Secretarie's dutie before hande to consider of the Estate of the Realme and all ye rest of the Princes' Estates w[i]th whom ther have bine and are anie doinges, and what daungers may happen and how they may be remedied. Securitie hath bine alwaies the bane of all Kingdomes and Estates ; and it hath bine in the end seene that, when Councells are daylie taken and varied accordinge to the uncertaintie of affaires, eyther at home or abroad, uppon suddaine events, the wisest men have bine often overtaken and put to harde shifts and have not knowne what Councell to give or take. As Dion well noteth of Pompey, who was both wise and valiant, thought that w[i]th the tramplinge of his foote to have made all Italye tremble ; whence Thucidides sayeth that *Timor memoriam excutit ; propter repentina et longe praeter opinionem accidentia capiuntur consilia plerumq[ue] nociva*.

Wherefore, if occasion serve, no opportunitie is to be omitted to compounde all discontents w[i]th neighbors abroad, so as the same may be with the honnor of God and benefitt of the Realme, and to procure as much friendshipp as may be ; lest, by sufferinge thinges to runne on careleslie at randome, our ennemies prevent us of the meanes and they cannot be recovered

when we would wish it. The sinnes of the people of this Lande are generallie such and so little teachinge and reformat[i]on of them, that if Job, beinge an upright man, fearinge God, escuing evill, did everie day by prayer and sacrifice seeke to make an attonement for the sinnes w[hi]ch his children might have com[m]itted and even then had no quietness or rest, but feared that w[hi]ch afterwarde came uppon him, suerlie we ought to be afraide that that come not upon us w[hi]ch our sinnes have most manifestlie deserved, and seeke to prepare ourselves for all events, that we be not dismayed at any thinge that may happen.

For the knowledge of thinge (*sic*) heretofore passed betweene this Realme and other forraine Estates, besides that understandinge w[hi]ch he may obtaine by dilligent readinge and observac[i]on of the histories of all Countryes, he is to provide for himselfe a booke of such Treatyes as have, at the least for the space of one hundred yeares, beene betweene this Realme and other Princes and States abroad.

As for the Low Countryes, the Treaties of the entercourse, the Colloquie of Bruges, the contracts w[i]th the Estates Generall and all such as doe depende upon them. The Treaties w[i]th Spayne and Portugall are to be had and likewise a collec[i]on of the unkindnesses offered by the K[ing] and how his pretences both for ye Low Countryes and Indyces may be answered, that when ther shalbe anie Treatie or other occasion, you be not to seeke.

For France, lett him gather all the Treaties before the last King's death and likewise such thinges as have passed w[i]th the K[ing] that now is for assistances and lones of monies.

In Italey, since the suppress[i]on of the Pope, ther have bine little dealinges, notw[i]thstandinge the practises w[i]th the Pope. Intelligences from these partes are not to be neglected. The great D[uke] of Tuscanye hathe caused our Nation to be well used at Ligorno and, albeit he be allyed w[i]th the D[uke] of Lorraine, yet he is esteemed to be no great freind to the greatnes of the Spaniarde, and if his frindshippe weare entertained it would serve to good purpose, for he hath a greate partie in Rome amongst the Cardinalls. The Signorie of Venice hath, before the time of Q[ueen] Mary, had their Ambassadors resident heere; since, by reason of Religion and for other causes, they have omitted the continuance therof. They maligne the English traffique w[i]th[in] the Straights and if occasion served would do anie thinge w[i]th Spayne to cutt it off, fearinge lest the English Trade by Muscovia into Persia would abbridge anie parte of their com[m]oditie, by their tradinge to Alexandria and Aleppo. They have delt w[i]th the K[ing] of Polonia to hinder

our Merchants from repairinge thither. In such cases therefore, *cum Cretensibus Cretisandum est*, to gett as much good as may be by them and from them w[i]thout impietie and dishonestie.

In Germanye, the Secretarie of the Latin tonge can I thinke informe you what l[ett]res have beane sent to the Emperour, the Princes and Estates of Germanie. And forasmuch as the matters of the Hanse Townes is one daye likelie to come in question, a Secretarie shall doe well to informe himselfe before hande of that w[hi]ch may be saide on both sides.

Heertofore many Treatie (*sic*) have bine w[i]th Denmarke and some dealinge for the takinge awaye of the new imposic[i]ons uppon the English subiects in the time of his warre w[i]th Sweden, passinge the Sounde, and likewise for the Trade into Muscovia ; of thes a Secretarie ought not to be ignorant.

The like may be sayd of former dealinges w[i]th the Princes of Italye, w[i]th the Kinges of Polonia, Sweden, the Muscovite, the Turke, the K[ing] of Barbarye and all others w[i]th whom this state hath had anie doinges.

Our neighbours of Scotlande are not to be forgotten : what Treatyes have passed heretofore betweene both the Realmes and for thes latter yeares, what benefitts her Ma[jes]tie hath bestowed uppon the K[ing] since his cradle. And for the matters of the late Scottish Q[ueen] (w[hi]ch may perhaps be one daye called in question) a Secretarie for the honnor of the Q[ueen] and the Realme is by all the meanes he can to informe himselfe of all her actions, concerninge the murther of her husbände, her flight into Englande and likewise her practises against her Ma[jes]tie, especiallie that w[i]th Babington, and the cause of her iust and necessarie execuc[i]on, w[i]thout w[hi]ch neither her Ma[jes]tie's person nor Estate could be upholden and perserved. A Secretarye is also to understande the affecc[i]ons and partialities betweene the Nobilitie of Scotlande, to keepe some intelligence w[i]th the Ministers and, by shewinge some Justice and favour to such Merchants as may have complainctes heere, to procure that they may make good reporte of the freindshippe of Englande amonge the Burrowes of that Realme, w[hi]ch for the most parte are well affected in matters of Religion and the best part of the strength of that Realme. As the keepinge of him bare and the maintenance of a facc[i]on of his owne subiects against him, behaving of himself well, is not to be liked, so it is not convenient to leave him alone to be practised by others. And therefore, accordinge to the councell given to K[ing] Hen[ry] 8 for K[ing] James the 5 of Scotlande, his Grandfather, it were requisite to have continuallie w[i]th him

some Gent[leman] that might followe him in all his exercises and pastimes, that might doe her Ma[jes]tie good service and hinder the designes of others.

In the setting downe of the notes touchinge forraine Estates I have been more particular, for that I would wish you to followe another course w[i]th them than hath beene of manie yeares heretofore used. Some have despised it eyther of ignorance or for some other frowarde conceite. The government of Children and Civill dissenc[i]ons abroad have served our turnes better than perhapps they will doe hereafter. I have not a little wondred to see soe manie great actions overpassed wherin her Ma[jes]tie was notablie interressed and yet had no person to deale for her; as when the last French K[ing] was chosen K[ing] of Polonia. If his brother had remained in France and he there from whence all the provic[i]ons of the Navie comes, and both had ioyned against us, what should we have done. And yet to prevent it her highnes had noe bodie for her, when all the pettie Princes in Italye and Germanie had both then and afterwarde. What Prince is more interressed in the affaires of the Low-Countryes then her Ma[jes]tie is, yet none was imployed eyther in the meetinge at Collen or in the agreement w[i]th the Malecontents. Thes things impare her Ma[jes]tie's credit, make her to be left to her selfe and cause that shee is not dueliie informed how things passe, nor hath anye of her subiects so acquainted w[i]th forraine affaires as is fitt for her Ma[jes]tie's service. The inconvenience will more appeare hereafter than it doth at this present.

But to return to my former purpose for the informac[i]on of a Secretarie.

If, when you shalbe Secretarie, you shalbe putt to answer anie Ambassador, sent before your com[m]inge to the place, see his former Instrucc[i]ons and Com[m]ission, that either he may not swarve from it or else to procure him some farther warrant by her highnes owne l[ett]re if cause shall so require.

If you be to make anie new Instrucc[i]ons for Ambassadors, consider of the former presidents and well weighe what her Ma[jes]tie's meaninge is and what is the best waye to attaine therunto, how the State wherto he is directed is divided or affected in warr or otherwise. And heerin perhapps your Italian *Relationi* may stande you in some steede for the knowledge of forraine Estates.

If the charge of forraine Espialls and Intelligences be com[m]itted unto you, I will show you my opinion. Mr. Secretarie Walsinghame, w[i]th her Ma[jes]tie's allowance and his owne

purse, entertained in above fortie severall places. In the time of the Ambassages of Mr. La Mott and Mr. Mauvesier he had some of his Secretaries that bewrayed the secretts both of the French and Scottish dealinges. In Scotlande he was well beloved of many of the Nobilitie, Ministers and others, whom he releived when they weare banished into England; w[i]th moneye he corrupted Preists, Jesuits and Traitors to bewraye the practises against this Realme. But, seeinge how much his liberalitie was misliked, I doe not thinke that you can followe the like example.

Out of Italye you may be adv[e]rtised by such as com[m]onlie everie weeke wright the Occurrents from Venice, and heerin you may use the helpe of some Italian or Marchant that tradeth into those partes. And if ther be anie English Gent[leman] that travelleth into those partes, you may require him to advertise you of what he shall heare and he will take it as a great favour at your handes.

In Germanye you shall doe well to acquainte yourselve w[i]th some discreete person of the Companie of the Merchant-Adventurers and those w[hi]ch trade into those partes, to advertise you from time to time what they may understande at Staden or Elbinge and you may give them some convenient allowance to sett others on worke about those matters. You shall doe well also to require the Clercks or Secretaries of the saide Companies and others, that if they shall by any l[ett]res or reporte of Marriners or Travellers understande anie thinge, to informe you therof as soone as they can. I thincke also that you may easilie gett acquaintance w[i]th some in Augusta and Franckford and likewise in the Courtes of the Emp[eror], the Paltsgrave, Landsgrave and other Princes, that may from time to time informe you of such matters as they shall understande.

In France there is not that neede as was heretofore, consideringe the good amitie that is betweene her Ma[jes]tie and the French K[ing]. And yet for Brittanie, the Governors of Gernesey and Jersey may be admonished to procure intelligences of the ennemies doings and to adv[er]tise you therof. In former times some correspondence hath beene kept w[i]th the Governor of Callais w[hi]ch may serve for good purpose, and it were convenient to have some advertise from thence, Deipe and Rouen.

In the United Provinces the Councillor for her Ma[jes]tie w[i]th the States may enforme you both of their actions and of such other Intelligences as they shall have out of other places, acquaintinge himselfe with that person to whom they shall

committ that charge, w[hi]ch com[m]onlie is one of the Councell of Estate.

To understande how thinges passe under the government of the Kinges side, you may use the helpe of some honest Marchants, seeinge the Postes are suffered to come weeklie from Antwerpe. But this must you keepe to yourselfe for feare of daunger to the partie and besides you must see what others will doe for money.

In Spayne I knowe not anie other course that can be holden but by money. Scottishmen are suffered to trade thither and if anie such assured person may be founde they may be used. A Frenchman had great allowance to reside uppon the borders but I thinke deserved not his entertainment.

But take heede they deale not double w[i]th you and abuse you w[i]th toyes and matters of their owne invenc[i]on. And for dealinge w[i]th such as the Lawes of the Realme esteemeth Traitors, together w[i]th all others that shall deale w[i]th them, beware by the example of olde S[i>r Thomas Wiatt in the time of K[ing] Hen[ry] 8 and lately of S[i>r John Perrot, and see first you have a good warrant to deale in such causes as Montague and Chomley had, savinge themselves by especiall pardons and by their advice ov[er]throwinge the whole Nobilitie and Councell.

And forasmuch as you may be called in question for such Privie Seales as you may have received for such services w[i]thout imprest or accounte, as happened after the death of S[i>r Fra[n]cis Walsingham, you shall doe well to keepe unto yourselfe a speciall note what sum[m]es you have delivered out and how the same Privie Seales have bine employed and may be answered and discharged if cause require.

Thinges to be done w[i]th her Ma[jes]tie.

Have in a little paper a note of such thinges as you are to propounde to her Ma[jes]tie and divide it into the titles of publicke and private sutes as the L[ord] Thre[asur]er and Mr. Secretarye were wonte to doe. Justinian sayd: *Omniu[m] reru[m] habere memoria[m] divinitatis potiusquam humanitatis est.* And it may be otherwise that manie times one matter will make you forgett another if you have not such a remembrance.

Learne before your accesse her Ma[jes]tie's disposic[i]on by some in the Privie Chamber w[i]th whom you must keepe credit, for that will stande you in much steede, and yet yeilde not too much to their importunitie for sutes, for so you may be blamed, nev[er]theless pleasure them when convenientlie you may.

Shew yourselfe willinge to pleasure anie of her Ma[jes]tie's kin, for although perhapps nothinge be obtained, yet it wilbe well taken, as though you did it in respect they appertaine unto her.

Doe not burthen your selfe w[i]th many suites but referre them unto others of the Chamber or househould under whom they serve; so shall you content the parties, deferre honnor unto others who would be iealous of your sole credit and keepe yourselfe to doe good to men of speciall honestie and desert.

When her highnes is angrie or not well disposed trouble her not w[i]th anie matter w[hi]ch you desire to have done unles extreame necessitie urge it.

When her highnes signeth, it shalbe good to entertaine her w[i]th some relac[i]on or speech whereat shee may take some pleasure.

To bills for Landes and Leases ther must be first gotten the handes of the L[ord] Thr[easur]er and Chancellor of the Exchequier and of her Ma[jes]tie's Attornie and Solicitor Generall;

To pardons, the handes of the Justices of the Assises before whom the partie hath been convicted. And if the pardon contains anie restituc[i]on of Landes or goods it is requisite that her Ma[jes]tie's lerned Councell and the officers of the Exchequier should be first acquainted therw[i]th. And take heede least in the draught of the pardon, under the colour to pardon one offence, you be not abused w[i]th a generall clause of *Necnon omnes alias murdras* (sic) *et felonias*, reaching to thinges not spoken or thought of, as some have beene heretofore.

In com[m]on thinges the hande of the Clerckes of the Signet may suffice. For Benefices the hand of some B[isho]p must be gotten.

Let the Clerckes of the Signet keepe speciall notes in their bookes what bills be procured to be signed by yourselfe, what by the Masters of the Requests or anie others, lest the same happen to be called in question. And likewise let them keepe notes of such bills as passe by im[m]ediate Warrant; the accompt wilbe the better kept of the fees appertaininge to your office in the Hanipier.

When anie Privie Seale shalbe directed to the Secretarye w[i]thout imprest or accompt, for anie rewarde to anie other whose name her Ma[jes]tie would not have knowne, let him keepe a speciall booke to himselfe how and to whom the same was imployed, least ther be an accompt afterwarde demanded as was after the death of Mr. Secretarye Walsingham.

If you be com[m]anded to wright anie matter of importance, doe what you can to procure that the same may be done by a speciall l[ett]re from her Ma[jes]tie herselfe, or if that may not

be, sett it downe in wrightinge. Make as though you doubted whether you had conceived her highnes' minde or not and reade it before her and alter it as she will have it. Keepe that Minute and a note of the daye, least afterwarde you be charged w[i]th it, as was the case of Mr. Davison and S[i]r Edw[ard] Wotton in Scotlande.

If it shalbe needfull to publish anie proclamac[i]ons, consider well of the matter and looke unto former presidents, and therfore it shalbe needfull for you to have the booke of proclamac[i]ons printed in the time of K[ing] Edw[ard] 6 and all the rest as many as you can gett, dividinge them accordinge to their matters into severall bundells, to avoyde confuc[i]on and longe search. If the matter be accordinge to Law then urge it, and for this purpose you shall doe well to have alwaies at hande the abridgements of Rastall and Poulten. If it be of anie matter of Law that is not contained in the saide bookes, then let the draught be made by the Q[uee]ne's learned Councell and perused by the Judges and so passe accordingle. As new evils require new remedies, so if no provic[i]on hath bine heretofore made that may be enforced by Lawe, then her Ma[jes]tie by her prerogative may take order in mannie thinges by proclamac[i]on. And herein it is good to see what hath bine done in like cases in other Countries. And to this purpose the bookes of the Edicts and ordinances in France and of the Pragmaticaes in Spayne may stande you in some steade. But be circumspect in applyinge of those presidents to this Estate to avoide an opinion of beinge new fangled and a bringer in of new Customes. Shew the necessitie and cause and likewise the com[m]on benefitt, that it may not be thought to tende to anie private respects, and let the threateninge of the penalties be such as may not seeme strange or excessive, against the Lawe and libertie of the Lande.

Be not dismayed w[i]th the controlements and amendments of such thinges w[hi]ch you shall have done, for you shall have to doe with a Princesse of great wisdome, learninge and experience. It is reported of K[ing] Hen[ry] 8 that when S[i]r William Peter, at the first time that he was Secretarie, seemed to be dismaied for that the K[ing] crossed and blotted out manye thinges in a wrightinge w[hi]ch he had made, the K[ing] willed him not to take it in evill parte, for it is I, sayd he, that made both Crumwell, Wriothesslie and Pagett good Secretaries and so must I doe to thee. The Princes themselves knowe best their owne meaninge and ther must be time and experience to acquainte them w[i]th their humours before a man can doe anie acceptable service.

Use no peremptorie contestac[i]ons or replies but deliver your opinion simple and the com[m]odities and inconveniencies that are like to ensue on both sides. Give no occasion that either her Ma[jes]tie or anie other doe thinke that you doe it as though you esteemed your owne witt better than theirs, but onlie of conscience and dutie, so as if thinges fall out otherwise, her highnes may see your single and upright dealinge and that shee may conceive that you are not carryed, sometimes one waye and sometimes another, to serve private turnes, as perhapps she may be persuaded others have done.

It is written of Xerxes, when he called all his captaines and officers, intendinge to make warres uppon Greece, he used thes speeches: *Ne viderer meo tantum consilio hoc aggressus convocavi vos, ceterum mementote mihi parendum magis, quam persuadendu[m] est.* Princes finde such flatterers and Councillors as Cambises and Rhehoboam did to followe their humours, yea manie times will urge their Councillors, as it is reported K[ing] Hen[ry] 8 was wont to do to S[i>r] Edw[ard] Montague, the Chiefe Justice and others. But consider you your dutie and if you cannot doe as much good as you woulde, yet decline *a malo*. Remember there is a higher Lord that will exact an account and is able to laye a more greivous punishment of soule and bodie than anie Prince can doe.

If, not followinge your advice and Councill, thinges shal not falle out well as you advised, insult not, magnifyinge your owne opinion and condemninge hers, but w[i]th patience and meekness helpe to remedie that w[hi]ch may be amisse. Afterwardes, when the like occasion may fall out, you may use it as a persuasion, but yet humble and dutifullie. Remember what

Arrian sayeth in the life of Alexander: *Illud Lib. 7^o. satis scio nullum unquam antiquorum Regum in tantam post peccatum poenitentiam venisse ut illud vellet agnoscere. Pleriq[ue] quamvis se deliquisse sciunt, id tamen tanquam jure factum existimantur, &c.,* and therefore you must be contented and have patience.

So likewise towards your fellowe Councillors behave yourselve as Maecenas counselled Augustus, *quorum consilium sequendum existimabis eos collauda et honora nam illorum inventis gratiam tibi paries: quorum vero rejeceris ne[m]quaquam eos aut ignominia afficies aut culpabis, &c.*

Be not therfore violent to have all faults reformed at once, for as an Emp[eror] sayde: *Multa simul Pluto corrigi non possunt.* And such was the answer that Antonius Pius the Emp[eror] made (as Capitolinus wrighteth) to his Councillors

that solicited him to such a suddaine and hastie reformat[i]on. Accordinge to the necessities of time, place and parsons seeke to doe good as much as you may, not exceedinge the boundes of your callinge and dutie. In the time of K[ing] Edw[ard] 6 it was an unseasonable advice given to the Duke of Som[er]sett to graunt forth Com[m]ic[i]ons for Inclosures. His adversaries used this as an occasion both to raise popular insurrecc[i]ons and to overthrowe his credit and authoritie.

Take heede you doe not addict yourselve to anie facc[i]on that you may finde amonge the Councillors. You shall finde they will only use you for their owne turnes and that done sett little by you afterwarde. Manie times also men have bine in danger w[i]thout due desert and undone by suspic[i]on of such men and matters. And the jealousie of Princes is such that they cannot abide anie Councillor should depend on anie other than themselves, neither is it convenient. Seeke therefore by all the meanes you can to deserve well of them all and suffer yourselve to be rather carried w[i]th the matter than w[i]th the man, as shalbe most meetest for the service of God and her Ma[jes]tie.

If ther arise anie partialities and facc[i]ons, doe you endeavour rather to compounde than to increase them or to have them continued to the hurte of the State, for by such meanes neither good came to anie Prince or sounde advice in counsell given wher they weare maintained,—so Proverbs: 26: 2. Remember touchinge Englande the wise and politique discourse of Philip de Comines how Q[ueen] Margaret, wife to K[ing] Hen[ry] 6, by maintenance of such debate betweene the D[uke] of Somersett and the E[arl] of Warwicke, ov[er]threwe her husbände, her sonne, her selfe and almost the whole Realme. Although, God be thanked, ther be no such stronge parties now, yet consideringe our ennemies, w[hi]ch attende anie occasions, it is better they weare suppressed than continued.

Beare reproofes, false reportes and such like crosses, if they be private and touch you not deeplie, w[i]th silence or a modest answer. But if it be in companie or touch your Allegiance, honor or honestie, mine advise is that you answer more roundlie, least your silence cause standers by to thinke ill of you and to retaine it in memorie and theruppon to worke your farther indignacc[i]on and discreditt. The not bearinge of it may perhapps cause that the like iniurie shall not be offered unto you againe, or at the least other men, who commonlie take such wordes for truth, will suppose them rather to proceede of choller than anie just cause; otherwise the olde sayinge is true: *Veterem iniuriam tolerando, novam provocamus*. But, *ne quid nimis*.

Beware that before God and the whole world you can give a

good account of your counsellis and actions to be voide of impietie, covetousnes, envye, maliciousnes, iniustice and fraude.

Remember the sayinge of Plato: ' whilst a man's bodie is in good health, we like well of those that seeke to satisfie our appetites and so indeede minister occasions of sicknes. And when the sicknes com[m]eth we attribute the whole cause, not to them who weare in fault, but to the Phisic[i]an who doth not cure us as we would : ' *sic in republica, quando erumpit morbus presentes criminamus consultores atq[ue] iniuria afficimus; priores illos, qui causam morbi dederunt laudibus efferimus.* But Isocrates sayd: *Æquum non est ut calamitatu[m] culpas in eos casus transferamus qui postremo acciderunt, sed delicti accusari debent, qui insecuti infortunij materiam dederunt;* nevertheless the world most com[m]onlie iudgeth otherwise.

Wherefore you must be circumspect and praye to God, from whom everie good gift proceedeth, to direct you by his holy Spiritt. Doe nothinge against his worde, w[hi]ch ought to be your lanterne, way and direcc[i]on. First, breiflie examine all your Counsellis and actions accordinge to the rule of the tenne com[m]andements, doinge nothinge that is prohibited in anie of them, for (as the Apostle sayeth), *non est faciendum malum ut eveniat bonu[m].* And the Prophet cryeth out Esai. 10 & 25. a woe unto them that take counsell w[i]thout him and wright greivous thinges, who shall not escape in the daye of the visitac[i]on of the Lorde.

Greive not your owne conscience and keepe yourselfe as neere as you may to the maintenance of the Lawes and liberties of the Lande. Decline from evill and doe good. Beware of to much worldlie policie and humaine witt. Be not selfe conceited and thinke not as they doe of whom the Poet speaketh: *Qui faciunt intelligendo et nihil intelligunt.* So shall the Lord prosper you against all such as either by open malice or secrette practises shall seeke your overthrowe.

Be dilligent: Remember the sayinge of Salust: *Non votis aut supplicationibus muliebribus auxilia divina parantur; vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo, &c., ubi enim secordiae et at[que] ignaviae tradideris, nequaquam Deum implores: iratus et infestus est.*

Be not one in speach and another in action, as Bion chargeth Seneca, *quod in plerisq[ue] contra facere visus esset, quam philosopharetur.*

Be cleane handed, and although it weare a harde matter to abridge one that shall occupie that place of all takinge of that w[hi]ch wilbe offered, yet it is utterlie to be avoided in matters w[hi]ch concerne either the honor of God or Justice. The Lord

will blesse you otherwise sufficientlie and your Ennemies shall have lesse occasion to seeke your discreditt and overthrow, who most com[m]onlie, in the supplantac[i]on of men, looke rather to some parte of the spoile or praie than eyther to iust matter or the service of God, Prince or Countrie.

By the readinge of histories you may observe the examples of times past, judging of their successe. Agrippa, a great Councillor to Augustus the Emp[eror], was by Dion Lib. 47. accounted happie that he coulde so use his

Master's favour *ut neq[ue] ei unquam molestus esset, neq[ue] invidiae alioru[m] obnoxius: Augusto imperium stabilivit, et populu[m] beneficijs ita deuinxit ut omniu[m] maxime popularis judicaretur.*

Thus have I passed over these thinges wherof I thought it necessarie to informe you, beinge readie to pleasure you in what else I may.

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